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MILITARY STRATEGY — Third Edition

by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy

A Translation, Analysis, and Commentary

*and
A Comparison with Previous Editions*

By: Harriet Fast Scott

Prepared for.

Office, Chief of Research and Development
United States Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Under direction of:

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13. ABSTRACT

This analysis of the third edition of Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy compares it to the first, published in 1962, and the second, published in 1963. Mrs. Scott compares the changes through the editions and comments on change significance and what may be the more striking significance of the continuity in many major areas of consideration.

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FOREWORD

ATAC
This analysis of the third edition of Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy compares it to the first, published in 1962, and the second, 1963.
The editor
~~Harriet East~~ Scott compares the changes through the editions and comments on change significance and what may be the more striking significance of the continuity in many major areas of consideration. An understanding of the Soviet strategy, as represented by Sokolovskiy's book would seem essential to enable a strategic planner to properly assess the strategic requirements of the United States.

Military Strategy. Edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy
Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1968. 464 pages. The Officer's Library
series. 30,000 copies printed. Price: 2 rubles.

The third edition of this work was prepared by the following collective
of authors: (see footnote)

Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy (director); Colonel V. K.
Denisenko; General Lieutenant I. G. Zav'yalov; General Major V. V. Kolehisky;
Colonel V. V. Larionov, Candidate of Military Sciences, Senior Scientific
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I. V. Parot'kin; General Major A. A. Prokhorov; Colonel A. M. Shimansky,
Candidate of Military Sciences, Senior Scientific Worker; General Major M. I.
Cherednichenko, Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent; Colonel A. I. Shchegolev.

This work was prepared for the press by Colonel V. V. Larionov.

In the third edition, materials contributed by Doctor of Military
Sciences, Professor General Colonel A. I. Gastilovich; Colonel A. S. Popov;
and Colonel K. I. Sal'nikov, which were published in the 1st and 2nd editions,
have been used.

Note:

Colonel A. I. Belayev, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, General
Colonel A. I. Gastilovich (took part in preparing the seventh chapter),
Colonel A. S. Popov, Colonel K. I. Sal'nikov were listed as authors of
the first and second editions.

Advisors were: General Lieutenant P. Ya. Mordvintsev, General Lieutenant
S. P. Platonov, General Major A. N. Strogly, and General Major N. P. Sygichko.

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The editor wishes to acknowledge the great assistance given by Dr. Victor A. Fediay in accomplishing the translation of the new portions of the third edition of *Military Strategy*.

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Over a time span of six years -- from the pre-Cuban Missile Confrontation period to the preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia -- the three editions of *Military Strategy* present perhaps the most descriptive work available to Western students on Soviet military philosophy and the reactions of Soviet doctrine and strategy to changing technology and world events. As an example of the impact of changes in military weapons systems, this 1968 edition contains a paragraph not found in the earlier editions:

*"Possibilities of averting a surprise attack are constantly growing. Present means of reconnaissance, detection and surveillance can opportunely disclose a significant portion of the measures of direct preparation of a nuclear attack by the enemy and in the very first minutes locate the mass launch of missiles and the take-off of aircraft belonging to the aggressor and, at the right time, warn the political leadership of the country about the impending danger. Thus, possibilities exist not to allow a surprise attack by an aggressor; to deliver nuclear strikes on him at the right time."*¹

The "Frunze Prize" is awarded each year in the Soviet Union for the best writing on a military subject. In 1969, five books were nominated for this coveted prize, one of which was the third, 1968 edition of Marshal Sokolovskiy's famed *Military Strategy*. This nomination indicated official approval for the views presented.

The first edition of *Military Strategy* appeared in Soviet bookstores in the summer of 1962, two or three months before the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet perceptions of war and peace at that time, which resulted in the first nuclear confrontation, can be recognized more fully when analyzed in light of this book. However, few if any United States policy-makers had read this work at the time the Confrontation took place.

A second edition of *Military Strategy* went to press in the Soviet Military Publishing House--Voenizdat-- in August, 1963, shortly after the signing of the nuclear test-ban treaty. This book did not differ in substance from the first edition.

The third edition of *Military Strategy* was published in the spring of 1968, at a time when the Soviets were rapidly reaching strategic nuclear parity with the United States. The "relationship of forces" which Lenin emphasized so strongly in all his writings was shifting toward the side of the Soviet Union. The Soviet drive for strategic nuclear superiority which was first outlined in the initial, 1962 edition of *Military Strategy*, was further explained in the third edition.

1. Chapter VI, p. 22.

The translation of *Military Strategy* which follows makes it possible for the reader to readily identify various changes of emphasis which occurred in Soviet strategic thinking between 1962 and 1968. Double lines in the margin indicate those portions which were added in the second, 1963 edition, while triple lines indicate material new in the third, 1968 edition. In addition, those significant segments dropped from the first two editions are marked as [Editor's Notes] and placed in the appendix. Thus, the reader has, in effect, all three editions of *Military Strategy*.

Much is written and published in the United States about the Soviet Union, as seen through the eyes of United States and other Western authors. Many try to project into the Soviet structure the identical situation that exists in the United States. Some try to show a split between the Soviet 'hawks' and the 'doves,' or between the Soviet military and the Communist Party. So little is available in the United States concerning Soviet doctrine and strategy that it is understandable why United States policy-makers are surprised again and again by Soviet moves such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia or the building of quantities of missiles such as the SS-9.

Although there are many changes in this 1968 edition of *Military Strategy*, the similarities to earlier editions may be more striking to many readers than the differences. Essentially, Soviet strategy and doctrine are the same in 1968 as they were in 1962. This is despite the fact that when the first edition appeared, Khrushchev was firmly in control, the open polemics from the Soviet side against the Communist Chinese had not yet begun and the Cuban Missile Confrontation was still in the future. In 1963, at the time of the second edition, Khrushchev still retained his leadership. This third edition, in 1968, appears after almost three and one-half years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, on the eve of the Czechoslovakian invasion.

The deletion of words, sentences or entire pages from the earlier editions are in some cases as interesting as the additions. The changes in this book -- both the additions and the deletions -- reflect the dynamics of events over the period from 1962 to 1968. In response to shifting Soviet foreign policy lines, the third edition refers to France in a relatively favorable manner. However, West Germany remains, in Soviet eyes, the villain of Europe. Some emphasis is given to the nuclear submarine, a weapon system the Soviet's may not have possessed at the time of the first two editions. These changes denote Soviet perceptions of the different international power situation as well as advances in technology.

The vital statistics on the three editions of *Military Strategy* are revealing. The first edition was typeset on March 3rd, 1962, printed on April 24th and appeared in bookstores about July or August. The length of the book was 460 pages. 20,000 copies were published at a cost of 1 ruble 60 kopeks.

The second edition was typeset April 16, 1963, printed August 8th, 1963 and appeared on sale about December. 40,000 copies were printed, the length was 504 pages and the cost was 1 ruble, 70 kopeks each.

The statistics on the third edition show interesting comparisons. It was typeset 23 November, 1966, but not printed until November 30, 1967. This delay in printing was noted in three other books of the 'Officer's Library' series to which *Military Strategy* belongs. They, too, were not approved until late November, 1967, apparently due to the heavy demands for printing books connected with the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union which took place in early November, 1967. *Military Strategy* appeared in Soviet bookstores in late March, 1968. 30,000 copies were printed. The book was 464 pages long and cost 2 rubles.

Soviet military writings, with the possible exception of the 1962 translation of *Military Strategy*, are generally unknown to Western readers. Because of unfamiliarity with the general Soviet military area, the reader may wonder about the nature of Soviet military writings, the authority and status of the authors, and the various military establishments involved. Accordingly, a brief overview of contemporary Soviet military thought, their strategy establishment and the nature of their military writings since 1962, are presented in the introduction to the actual translation.

The Background to Contemporary Soviet Military Thought

"War is a continuation of politics by other means." When reading this phrase in Clausewitz' *On War*, Lenin wrote in the margin, "...that is, by violent means." Soviet military writers today, when quoting this dictum from Clausewitz, always insert the Lenin modification. Soviet Colonel Grudin, Professor and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, goes on to state: "This formula is accurate and scientific in the highest degree. It was and remains the stable definition of the essence of war."¹

This helps to explain the Soviet concept of military doctrine, which is defined as "the system of scientifically based views accepted by the government on the nature of modern war and the use in it of the Armed Forces, and also the demands for the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for war which flow from these views."² Doctrine is formulated "by the political and military leadership of the state" and has two sides, "the socio-political and the military-technical."³ Of the two, the socio-political is considered the more important and always takes first place.

It is important that Soviet military doctrine not be confused with military science. This latter subject examines all military affairs, past, present, and future, and from this 'works out the most current methods of waging

1. Grudin, Col. A.I., Professor, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, "On the Question of the Essence of War," *Red Star*, 12 July 1966.

2. *Dictionary of Basic Military Terms*, (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965) p. 41.

3. Zavyalov, I.G., General Lieut., "On Soviet Military Doctrine," *Red Star*, 30-31 March 1967.

war."¹ Doctrine, which looks only to the future, is formed "with the help of military science and is based on its conclusions."² Whereas doctrine "is a single system of views and directions free from private views and evaluations,...in military science various and even contradictory points of view do have a place, with various presentations and hypotheses."³ Military art is a component part of military science and is divided into three parts: strategy, operational art, and tactics.

References to doctrine, strategy, military science and military art are found throughout Soviet military writings. The defense-intellectuals of the Soviet Union, while consisting of military officers on active duty, operate under the control and guidance of the Communist Party. Military doctrine stems from Party decisions, and military strategy must be in accordance with approved doctrine. These terms have definite meanings and cannot be used interchangeably.

Sokolovsky's first edition of *Military Strategy* was noted in Soviet reviews as being the first work of its kind in over thirty-five years. The last such writing had been A. Svechin's *Strategy*, published in 1926. The period between these two publications coincides with the time that Stalin assumed complete power in the Soviet Union, to his public denunciation by Khrushchev before the XXII Party Congress in 1961. Strategy had been under the personal purview of Stalin.

Despite this, military strategy remained of considerable interest to the leaders of the Soviet Armed Forces. In particular, the military academies were concerned over the lack of discussion. A. Svechin, the author of *Strategy*, was on the faculty of the Academy of the General Staff which was founded in 1936. Like the majority of Soviet senior officers, he was to die in Stalin's purges. A military strategy course was started at the Frunze Military Academy in 1935, but was quietly dropped in less than a year, due to vague objections from "on high."

In 1947, while Stalin still was in power, a basic research center was formed for studying questions such as military economics, the organization of the armed forces, strategy, operational art and combined arms battle. This was a post-war development, at a time when Stalin had a massive nuclear program underway as well as modernization of certain weapons systems, particularly fighter aircraft. The research center was in the Military History Department of the General Staff, headed by General Major N.A. Talenskiy.

1. Sushko, N.Ya., General Major, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences and Kondratkov, T.R., Lt. Colonel, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, (editors), *Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practical*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966) p. 91.

2. Ibid., p. 91.

3. Ibid., p. 95.

After the death of Stalin in 1953, the Military History Department of the General Staff was drastically curtailed. Military history facilities at the General Staff Academy, the Frunze Military Academy and at other institutions were reduced. The era of Stalin appeared to be over, but there was nothing left to take its place. The military leadership was too uncertain of itself to provide guidance. General Major Talenskiy, formerly one of the leading Soviet military theoreticians, left the Military History Department the following year. Later he became associated with the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, where he actively participated in Pugwash conferences. For a brief period, Soviet military thought was in limbo.¹

The XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 at which Khrushchev made his "secret" speech denouncing the cult of personality, was a major turning point in the development of Soviet military thought. Military history facilities at the military academies were reorganized. Within restricted circles discussions took place on various aspects of military art, science, doctrine and strategy. In the same circles, classified writings were published. These were associated with the hydrogen bomb, which the Soviets had exploded in 1953 and the ballistic missile which they successfully tested in some quantity during the 1955-1957 period. Analysis was made of the possible use of nuclear weapons, since maneuvers taking into account their use had been conducted as early as 1954. A few memoirs of military leaders also appeared.

In Soviet terminology, "a revolution in military affairs" was taking place. The essence of the revolution was the introduction of the nuclear rocket weapon into all five services, (one of them, the Strategic Rocket Troops, was created in 1959) and the resultant internal reorganization necessary for its use. All past Soviet military theory had to be reconsidered in light of this revolution in military affairs.

The Soviet military theorists also restudied the role of economics, as well as the moral-psychological and socio-political factors in warfare. Military science, in working on the problem placed before it by the Communist Party and the Soviet government on "protecting the vital interests of the country," "revealed the nature of a future world war." With this theoretical base developed, military doctrine was formulated, which soon was followed by a new concept of military strategy.

At the XXII Party Congress in 1961, Khrushchev publicly broke the hold that Stalin's ghost had still maintained on the open publication of military writings. Books and articles, which previously had been classified, since they differed from the Stalinist concepts, could now be placed in bookstores. The first edition of *Military Strategy* appeared in the following year.

1. Pavlenko, N., General Major, *Military History Journal*, #5, 1966. p. 10ff.

The Soviet Strategy Establishment

The most influential group today associated with Soviet military strategy is the Military Science Administration of the General Staff. From this group a wide network reaches out into various areas of the Soviet Armed Forces, guiding military science through a variety of means. These include maintaining close contacts with the staffs and faculties of military academies and institutes, and holding conferences on various aspects of military theory.

The "professor-teachers" of the Academy of the General Staff appear to have a responsibility for the development of military theoretical studies. The faculties of other Soviet academies, such as the Frunze Academy and the Lenin Military-Political Academy, also participate. These academies maintain close cooperation with other institutions such as the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (under the Central Committee of the Communist Party), the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences and the Military History Institute of the Ministry of Defense.

Since 1966, "Frunze Prizes" have been awarded annually to the best writings of "excellent military theory or military history work." On the 1966 list were General Major A.N. Strogii, General Major A.A. Prokhorov, Colonel V.K. Denisenko and Colonel V.V. Larionov - all four associated with *Military Strategy*. These annual awards of the Frunze Prize serve as a useful gauge in assessing the significance of Soviet military publications.

Military Strategy, Tactics, and 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR were nominated for the Frunze Prize in 1969. But, for the first time, no announcement of winners or awards was made that year. The omission became even more curious when *50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR* won the Frunze Prize for 1970. One can only speculate that *Military Strategy* may have won the prize for 1969 and the Ministry of Defense did not want to publicize it, for some reason or other.

Soviet defense-intellectuals, who vary in rank from major to marshal, generally are associated with one of the academies or with the General Staff. Many hold graduate degrees, usually that of "Candidate," a degree somewhat more advanced than the Master's degree in the United States. A few possess Doctors' degrees, which are not awarded until the Candidate has proven himself an authority in his specialty, and defended a pertinent thesis.

In this latter category are Chief Marshal of the Armored Troops P.A. Rotmistrov, Professor, and Doctor of Military Sciences; General Major E.A. Boltin, Doctor of Historical Sciences; and Colonel A.I. Grudinin, Professor, and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences.

The importance of the degree can be observed by studying the contributors to significant Soviet military books. For example, *Tactics*, published in 1966 as one of the "Officer's Library" series, was reviewed in *Red Star* as the most significant work of its kind since 1941. All of its authors were "Candidates of Military Sciences," who also were on the faculty of the Frunze Military Academy. Another significant book was *Methodological Problems*

of *Military Theory and Practice*, written by members of the faculty of the Lenin Military-Political Academy. All of its contributors had advanced degrees, two being Doctors of Philosophical Sciences, and the remaining thirteen being Candidates of Philosophical Sciences. The first edition was published in 1966 and the second in 1969. *V.I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces* (1967) which won the Frunze Prize in 1968, was also a work by the learned men at the Lenin Military-Political Academy.

The Academy of the General Staff has made major contributions to the development of Soviet military thought through the influence of its professors. All three editions of *Military Strategy* single out General Colonel A.I. Gastilovich, Professor, and Doctor of Military Sciences, who, until his retirement, was the Deputy Commandant of the Academy. He is specifically associated with the seventh chapter, "How to Prepare a Country to Repel Aggression." His close relationship to General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev, dating from World War II days, will be discussed in the notes to that chapter.

In the postwar years outstanding military leaders have headed the General Staff Academy, such as Marshal M.V. Zakharov, later Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense. Zakharov not only was the Commandant in 1945-1949 but he also was reassigned as Commandant in 1963, after being replaced as First Deputy Minister of Defense. He was then returned to his former position in the Ministry of Defense when the incumbent, Marshal S.S. Biryuzov, was killed in an accident.

The contributors to *Military Strategy* obviously fit into the Soviet strategy establishment. The fourteen names associated with this book are an interesting group to study. With the exception of one person, the contributors have been the same for all editions. It is little wonder that Soviet military writings have continuity.

The editor of all three editions was the late V.D. Sokolovskiy who at the time of his death was a Marshal of the Soviet Union, a Hero of the Soviet Union and one of the thirty-five military figures who served on the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He took part in the Potsdam Conference, also in the Moscow and London Conferences and has headed talks in Geneva. In 1966, he accompanied Premier Kosygin to Tashkent for the settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan. In February, 1968, he headed a delegation to Paris. On May 10, 1968, twenty-three years and one day after the end of the war with Germany, Sokolovskiy died and his prestige at that time was reflected in the wide coverage given to his death in the Soviet press.

Born in 1897, Sokolovskiy planned for an academic life and entered a teachers' school in 1914. He joined the Red Army in 1918 and became a regimental commander by the end of the Civil War. During the thirties he managed to escape Stalin's purges, which eliminated over three-fourths of the Soviet generals. He ended World War II as Zhukov's deputy in Berlin, and was the Soviet Supreme Commander when the Berlin Blockade was started in April, 1948. From 1952-1959 he held the post of Chief of the General Staff and

First Deputy Minister of Defense, (the latter from 1949). In late 1959, he suffered a heart attack and moved into a less active assignment as a general inspector of the Ministry of Defense. In this capacity he became internationally known as a Soviet spokesman and theoretician.

One of the contributors, General Major Cherednichenko, is well known for his association with Sokolovskiy, with whom he coauthored a number of significant articles. He is a Candidate of Military Sciences and an Associate Professor at the General Staff Academy. On Sokolovskiy's 70th birthday, Cherednichenko, writing in the *Military History Journal*, eulogized Sokolovskiy as being the key figure in the revolution in military affairs.

*"The appearance of the nuclear rocket weapon brought about the rearming and reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces. This in turn required the reexamination of many positions of military doctrine. At the same time questions of strengthening the combat cooperation with the armies of socialist countries were resolved. Such was the fundamental content of the work of the General Staff and its Chief -- Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovskiy."*¹

General Lieutenant I.G. Zavyalov also has been one of the authors of all three editions of *Military Strategy*. In 1965, *Red Star* published a series of his articles entitled "Speed, Time and Space." In March, 1967, at a time when this 1968 edition of *Military Strategy* was at the publishers, *Red Star* carried his two-part article, "On Soviet Military Doctrine."

Marshal Sokolovskiy and his group represent not only the view of the Ministry of Defense, but also that of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. *Military Strategy*, re-issued as a book of the "Officer's Library" series, does not have an exact counterpart in the United States. It reflects the official military view of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the USSR.

These defense-intellectuals of the Soviet Union all are in uniform. They occupy a favored place in the military structure and their writings are directed by the political-military leadership. What have they produced?

Soviet Military Writings Since 1962

The significance of the first edition of *Military Strategy* was noted in the Soviet press as well as by many observers in the West. There were a number of reasons for it being the first work of its kind published in the Soviet Union since Svechin's *Strategy* in 1926. During the long regime of Stalin, there was little intellectual substance permitted in Soviet military writings. After his death, military theoreticians cautiously began to publish works concerning the changes in warfare brought about by the nuclear weapon. Official encouragement was given to the discussion and a number

1. Cherednichenko, M.I., *Military History Journal*, July 1967, p. 50.

of writings are reported to have appeared in the classified journal, *Military Thought*.

After Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech at the XXII Party Congress in 1961, the Soviet defense-intellectuals were given the task of transforming the thinking of the Soviet military forces from World War II concepts to nuclear warfare. *Military Strategy* opened the floodgates. The late Marshal Malinovskiy, former Minister of Defense, directed:

"Military newspapers and magazines, and Voenizdat, our military publishing house, can and must do a great deal for the thorough explanation of the nature of the revolution in military affairs and the resulting demands produced in the training and education of personnel of different branches and services of the Armed Forces..."

"The task of propagandizing the progressive views and conclusions of Soviet military doctrine is highly important because some units of military personnel still live with old, outmoded notions about the nature of modern warfare." 1

The requirement was given to the Soviet military press in 1963. A *History of Military Art* by Chief Marshal Rotmistrov appeared that same year, a book which in the main was concerned with past wars. In early 1964, *Soviet Military Science* was published. This book stressed the doctrine of strategic nuclear rocket strikes, of surprise and of the importance of the beginning period of the war. It was a logical continuation of the first two editions of *Military Strategy*. However, before it was fully studied and analyzed in the United States, Khrushchev was ousted, and *Soviet Military Science* was erroneously considered as being out-dated. Some foreign analysts, suspecting that Khrushchev had been the architect of Soviet nuclear philosophy, anticipated a major shift in Soviet military strategy and doctrine after a new Soviet regime was installed.

One of the first indications of the military policies of the new Brezhnev-Kosygin period was contained in the *Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs*. This book actually was typeset while Khrushchev was in power. Within one week of his ouster, it was sent to the printers with all references to Khrushchev deleted. This collection of articles, originally published either in *Red Star*, the Ministry of Defense's daily newspaper, or *Communist of the Armed Forces*, (the official fortnightly magazine of the Main Political Administration), appeared in 1965. The military philosophy represented in this book was the same as that given in *Soviet Military Science*, which had been published the year before.

1. Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Ya. Malinovskiy, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Task of the Military Press," *Communist of the Armed Forces*, November 1963, #21, p.9. This same article also is contained in *Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs*, (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965), pp. 3-7. For an English translation, see: Kintner, W.R. and Scott, H.F., *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs*, (Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), pp. 17-21.

This same view was echoed in Soviet military journals and newspapers. General Major Bochkarev published "On the Character and Types of Wars in the Modern Era" in June, 1965. "On the Nature of World Nuclear Rocket War," by Lt. Colonel Ribkin, also appeared in the *Communist of the Armed Forces* later in the year. Professor General Colonel Lomov published an article in the same journal entitled "The Influence of Soviet Military Doctrine on the Development of Military Art" in November, 1965. There was no divergence in basic doctrine and strategy found in these articles from that which had appeared in books and articles published during Khrushchev's time.

In 1965 the Soviet press announced a series of books which would be published as the "Officer's Library" and listed seventeen titles. By 1968 the last of the series had been published. All are identically bound with "Officer's Library" in gold letters on the cover.

The wide readership expected for these books is indicated by the number of copies published. The "tirazh" for this 1968 edition of *Military Strategy* is 30,000. *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army*, another book in the series, ran 50,000 copies. The books listed in this library provide an excellent insight into the organization, strategy, doctrine and personnel policies of the Soviet Armed Forces. One of the purposes of the series is the "self-education" of the Soviet officer.

Each of the publications - even the excellent *Dictionary of Basic Military Terms* - stresses the Soviet doctrinal and strategic concepts of war in the nuclear age. *Tactics*, reviewed in the Soviet press as the first work of its kind since 1941, examines "the basic questions of the tactics of combined arms battle in nuclear rocket war." *Military Psychology*, published in 1968 as part of the "Officer's Library" series, lists as its purpose "the preparation of the soldier for nuclear rocket war." 2

Soviet books published outside of the "Officer's Library" series contain the same nuclear emphasis on strategy and doctrine. Volume VI of the *History of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945*, completed in 1965, devotes the last section to nuclear doctrine and strategy. *The Program of the CPSU and the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland*, available in 1965, follows the same theme. *Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice*, 1966 and the revised edition, 1969 was edited by General Major Sushko. This same General Sushko also edited the 1965 and 1968 editions of *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army*. *V.I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces*, first published in 1967, was again published in 1969 in a second edition. One of the latest books is *Army of the Soviets*, written by S.S. Lototskiy and published by the Political Literature Publishers. Lototskiy and his group just happen to be

1. General Major V.G. Reznichenko, Candidate of Military Sciences, (editor) *Tactics*, (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1966), p. 2.

2. Colonel M.I. Dyachenko, Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, (editor), *Military Psychology*, (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967), p.3.

General Lieutenant Lototskiy, Head of the Department of the History of Wars and Military Art at the Frunze Military Academy, and ten of the department associate professors. All of them have advanced degrees in either military or historical sciences.

The composing editor of *Military Strategy*, Colonel V.V. Larionov, wrote an article in the Institute of the USA's new journal *USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology*, in the March 1970 issue. This recently formed institute is headed by Georgi Arbatov. It appears Colonel Larionov, a long-time worker in the Military Science Administration of the General Staff, has retired and is continuing his research of the United States in the Academy of Sciences' Institute of the USA. General Colonel N.A. Lomov has written an article in the April issue of the same magazine and appears to be a consultant of the Institute. Lomov has for years written on military doctrine and taught that same subject for many years at the Academy of the General Staff.

This movement of military defense-intellectuals to 'civilian' research institutes of the Academy of Science was urged by Sokolovskiy himself several years ago. Sokolovskiy was writing of RAND and the Hudson Institute in the United States and of the British Institute for Strategic Studies. RAND was called "an original factory of military thought."¹ The Soviets consider military strategy as a social science and there is some evidence that the 1967 decrees upgrading the emphasis on the social sciences has caused the Soviet Union to develop some RANDs of their own in the Academy of Sciences, in particular.

The Development of Soviet Military Thought

Soviet strategic thinking and military developments appear to proceed along certain planned lines. A new *History of Military Art*, published in 1966 and written jointly by the staffs of the Lenin Military-Political Academy and the Frunze Military Academy, declares:

"Three stages can be distinguished in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces and military art after World War II: the first encompasses the eight postwar years, 1945 - 1953; the second, the end of 1953-1959; and the third stage which began in 1960."

General Major Cherednichenko, writing in the June, 1970, issue of the *Military History Journal*, in an article entitled "On the Details of the Development of Military Art in the Postwar Period," uses the same periodicity. He further describes the first period as "pre-nuclear" and the second period, beginning in 1954, as "nuclear". He then subdivides the latter into two parts, from 1954 to 1959 and from 1960. The first stage of the nuclear period concerned the gradual introduction of the nuclear weapon into the services, and their accumulation, which caused changes in strategy,

1. Sokolovskiy, V.D. and Cherednichenko, M.I., *Communist of the Armed Forces*, #7 April 1966, p. 59.

operational art and tactics. After listing the many instances of what the Soviets consider as United States "aggressiveness", Cherednichenko remarks:

"The Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to these facts. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR at its IV session in 1960 adopted important resolutions on the further strengthening of the defense capability of the country. These questions were given serious attention at the XXII Congress CPSU."

Cherednichenko gives interesting details of the development of military art during this whole period. He ends with this conclusion:

*"In conclusion it must be stressed that the development of military art in the postwar era has taken place at ever increasing tempos, and that our military art at the end of the period under review arrived at the most advanced position in the world. This fact must be noted that serious changes in military art have taken place with definite periodicity, at an average of each 6 to 8 years. At the base of these lay the substitution of the basic types of weapons with more powerful weapons."*¹

The official doctrinal guidelines, stated in 1963 and before, were as follows:

*"The Party reached the conclusion that the Armed Forces and the country, as a whole, must prepare for a war in which nuclear weapons will be widely used; which will represent a decisive, classic collision of two opposed world social systems; and which will be distinguished by unprecedented violence, dynamic force and high maneuverability of combat operations."*²

The above was written when Khrushchev was in power. Four years later in 1967, a new regime had been installed but the guidelines remained the same:

*"Now all military organizations and methods of waging war are under the determining influence of the nuclear rocket weapon. By possessing colossal destruction and strike possibilities, it produced a fundamental revolution in military affairs and demanded absolutely new methods of fighting actions."*³

1. Cherednichenko, M.I. General Major, Candidate of Military Sciences, *Military History Journal*, #6, June, 1970, p. 19.

2. Sbytov N.A. General Lieutenant, Candidate of Military Sciences, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Its Meaning," *Red Star*, Feb. 15, 1963.

3. Zavyalov, I.G., General Lieutenant, op. cit.

An even more authoritative article, written by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, the Minister of Defense, which presented the latest documentation of Soviet military doctrine. He wrote:

"In contemporary circumstances, the most important principles of combat, operational and political training of Armed Forces' personnel have been predetermined by the positions of Soviet military doctrine, according to which a new world war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, will be a decisive clash of two social systems in which the coalition of socialist countries, united by common political and military goals, will oppose the aggressive imperialist bloc. The main and decisive means of conducting battle will be the nuclear rocket weapon. In it, 'classical' kinds of weapons will find application. In certain circumstances, the possibility is admitted of conducting combat actions by units and subunits with conventional weapons."

"We have given much attention to the judicious combination of the nuclear rocket weapon with 'classical' armaments. From strategic nuclear rockets to the latest firing means of motorized infantry --this is the range of our weaponry. Personnel of the army and navy learn to wage combat operations both in conditions of the use and without the use of the nuclear weapon. It is important to decide all study tasks so that the soldier will be always ready to successfully operate in the battlefield in circumstances that take shape in different ways."

This same idea appeared both in *Kommunist*, the theoretical journal of the Central Committee CPSU, and *Communist of the Armed Forces* in articles by Marshal Grechko.

Soviet theoreticians carefully point out, however, that "military doctrine is not dogma, is not an unchangeable, eternal category."² Soviet writers are careful to caveat each position. "Our doctrine views nuclear war as *skorotechnaya* -- short and swift-moving. At the same time it recognizes definite circumstances by which war might take on a protracted character."³ Or again: "While giving special significance to the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for world war which the monopolistic circles are preparing, our military doctrine takes into account the possibility of the unleashing of local, limited wars also by the imperialist aggressors."⁴ Essentially, Soviet military doctrine is concerned with world nuclear rocket war, but each discussion recognizes the possibility of a different category of war.

1. Grechko, A.A., Marshal of the Soviet Union, *Communist of the Armed Forces*, #7, April, 1970, p. 21. See also: *Kommunist*, February 1970.

2. Sushko, N. Ya., General Major, op. cit., p. 85.

3. Ibid., p. 86.

4. Ibid. p. 87.

Military Strategy: Points of Revision¹

The ouster of Khrushchev in October, 1964, the meeting of the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1966, the events in Vietnam, the six-day war in the Middle East and advances in weapons systems -- any of these events could have been sufficient to have warranted an updating of *Military Strategy*. The Soviet editors themselves note in their foreword: "Strategy...cannot remain indifferent to various political and technological-economic shifts calling for more finite definition of established strategic concepts."

The editors also call attention to the changes and additions that have been introduced in this edition of *Military Strategy*. As itemized in the foreword, they are:

"a. A number of positions of the book have been supplementarily improved in light of the decisions of the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"b. A few more precise definitions of a factual nature, mainly concerning the second chapter.

"c. The social and political essence of world nuclear war and questions of the categories of war in the modern era are revealed a bit more broadly.

"d. The basic ideas of the revolution in military affairs and its reflection in strategy are indicated.

"e. Necessary, more precise definitions in questions of the leadership of the Armed Forces have been introduced."

The first reason for the new edition has considerable significance. The first edition of *Military Strategy* had appeared in 1962, within one year of the meeting of the XXII Party Congress in 1961. The timing of its

1. For those who have read the first edition of *Military Strategy* in one of the English translations, rereading the sections which have remained unchanged since 1962 may prove a surprise. This is because, first of all, the Soviets have published several explanatory dictionaries since that date which have more precisely defined some of their terms. Among these have been: *The Dictionary of Basic Military Terms*, (Moscow; Voenizdat, 1965) and *The Explanatory Dictionary of Military Terms* (Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1966) and *The English-Russian Missile and Space Dictionary* and the *English-Russian Military Dictionary* (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1966 and 1968.) These have permitted a clearer meaning than was possible in the earlier translation. Also, in the years that have passed since the first edition, many obscure references have become quite clear with the passage of time.

appearance can be compared with the third edition, which actually was typeset in 1966, shortly after the meeting of the XXIII Party Congress. The decisions approved in the meeting of the Party Congress were given in official reports and discussed in a number of articles by military theorists.

The fact that the 1968 edition of *Military Strategy* was put into draft form shortly after the XXIII Party Congress is indicative of the political military relationship in the Soviet Union. Military strategy is subordinate to military doctrine, and both reflect the military aspirations of the Communist Party.

The second reason, "concerning the second chapter," may be the portion most interesting to the United States' reader. This entire chapter is devoted to apparent Soviet perceptions of the Armed Forces of the United States and of the Western European NATO nations. Also, this single chapter contains the greatest number of changes between the 1968 edition and the two earlier editions. Of particular interest is the discussion concerning the participation of the United States in limited wars.

The third stated change, in which "the social and political essence of world nuclear war and questions of the categories of wars of the modern era are revealed a bit more broadly," is a subject of great interest to the political and military leadership of the United States. Since 1962 there has been considerable discussion among the Western defense intellectuals about the strategy of "flexible response" and of Herman Kahn's theory of "escalation." Also, there have been theoretical discussions about whether "controlled" nuclear war could take place without developing into all-out war. At the other end of the spectrum is the type of war that the United States has fought in Southeast Asia. Most of the discussions on this subject are given in Chapter II, and treated as being theories developed in the United States.

"The revolution in military affairs" is referred to in the fourth change listed by the editors. Dozens of articles and a number of books published in the Soviet Union since 1962 have described the revolution in military affairs in detail.¹ The official Soviet *Explanatory Dictionary of Military Terms* defines this revolution as follows:

*"The whole sum of fundamental, qualitative changes in the means of armed conflict, of methods of combat actions, in the organization of troops, their training and education, which has come into being in the last fifteen years in the more developed countries relative to science and industry and which is primarily connected with the creation of the nuclear rocket weapon."*²

1. See, for example, Kintner, W.R. and Scott, H.F., op. cit.

2. *Explanatory Dictionary of Military Terms*, op. cit., p. 393

The fifth change is "the question of the leadership of the Armed Forces." The treatment given this subject is indirect and only occasionally is obvious to the reader. In one example, the text in the first and second editions had read as follows:

"... raising the morale even to the highest level does not guarantee victory, but merely provides better prospects for it. These prospects still must be converted into reality; this is the problem of military strategy."

In the third edition, this last sentence is changed as follows:

"These prospects still must be converted into reality; this is the problem of the military and political leadership during a war."
(underlining added)

In addition to this background information, each of the chapters that follows in the actual translation of *Military Strategy* will be preceded by further introductory notes. These will be in the same 'modern type' as this introduction, in order that they not be confused with the actual Soviet text. It is hoped that this will provide some clarification and assistance to the reader exposed to Soviet military writings for the first time.

Readers of *Military Strategy* should recognize from the outset that Soviet military theoreticians think in patterns which differ from those to which the non-communist world is accustomed. As the Soviet editors indicate, their work proceeds "from a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the essence, causes and conditions of the origin of war in the modern era." They write "from the point of view of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic."

The military-political strategy of the Soviet Union affects every facet of American life. Yet, somehow, this strategy seems little understood in the United States. It has been said that "the cardinal sin in military leadership is to fail to recognize the nature of your probable opponent." Although the vast majority of Americans hope for lasting peace with the Soviet Union, the fact remains, as testified again and again in *Military Strategy*, that the Soviet military writers regard the United States as the leader of the "imperialist bloc" preparing for war against their country.

We must understand the ideological aspects of Soviet military thought, and its conditioning through the dialectic of Marxism-Leninism. We also must understand their military strategy and doctrine, which has been presented so well by the late Marshal Sokolovskiy and his associates. Through these insights we can better appreciate the development of their weapon systems and concepts of deployment. Unless we gain this understanding, it is highly improbable that we can successfully negotiate any agreement with the Soviets towards meaningful arms reduction or arms control.

EDITOR'S NOTE ON THE FOREWORD AND INTRODUCTION

The 1968 edition contains a completely new foreword. Also included, for reasons not clear, is the "Foreword to the Second Edition." It is not customary practice in the Soviet Union to include the foreword to a previous edition in a new edition. In the case of *Military Strategy*, the foreword to the third edition is rather bland and straightforward. It gives the reasons for the new edition (already noted), and advises that the book is to be included in the "Officer's Library" series where "it must serve as a self-instruction textbook for a broad group of Soviet officers."

The foreword to the second edition, on the other hand, is reminiscent of Khrushchev banging his shoe on the rostrum of the UN. It also gives a background that is most interesting, stating that the first edition was subjected to much discussion, both in the press, at the General Staff Academy and at military science societies of the Main Staff of the Ground Troops and elsewhere.

The inclusion of the foreword to the second edition reminds that "the book *Military Strategy* created a great deal of interest in readers at home and abroad. It was translated and published in a number of socialist and capitalist countries."

With pride the editors in the second edition call attention to "the repercussions which the book caused in the press of a number of capitalist countries." The late Marshal Malinovski, former Soviet Defense Minister, is quoted: "The best method of defense is to warn the enemy of our strength and readiness to smash him at his very first attempt to commit an act of aggression.... This is why we do not hide our points of view on the nature of future war and the means of conducting it, but present them in this book, *Military Strategy*."

Perhaps to the disappointment of the Soviet leadership, the second edition of *Military Strategy* was not translated and published in the United States. In fact, none of the many books on military subjects published by the Soviets since 1962 are available in English in the United States.

The introduction to the third edition contains only two sentences that are new and neither are particularly significant. More interesting are the paragraphs omitted from the previous editions.

The reader of the 1968 edition, for example, is not told that *Military Strategy* was the first book of its kind in the Soviet Union since the publication of *Strategy*, by A. Svechin, in 1926. This was one of the several items dropped from the previous introduction. Also, the editors did not include the statement that: "Many basic positions of Soviet military strategy, especially those stated during the postwar period, have been influenced strongly by the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin," and that Stalin "intentionally distorted the concepts of a whole series of questions of military strategy."

||| FOREWORD TO THE THIRD EDITION |||

Four years have elapsed since the second edition of Military Strategy appeared in print.

In the interim, the world has seen a number of international events, new successes have been achieved in the national economy and political development of our country and in other countries of the socialist community, new milestones have been recorded in the development of the world's scientific and technical progress.

Over the course of these years, the aggressive trend in the policy of world imperialism has been intensified, a trend very clearly expressed in the foreign policy course of the USA.

In 1964, American imperialism overtly intervened in South Vietnam. Simultaneously, armed provocations by the USA did not cease in other regions of Asia, and Africa, and in Latin America, while nuclear claims and militarization on the part of West Germany have been intensified.

During the same period, the USSR demonstrated its steadfast desire for peace and the prevention of a thermonuclear world war as well as a firm resolution to foil aggressors' schemes; toward that end, it raised, in every possible way, the combat readiness of its Armed Forces and their technical equipment. The Soviet Union announced its resolute support of the Vietnamese people, fighting for their freedom and independence, and is rendering them all-round assistance.

In 1965, the successful fulfillment of the Seven-year plan contributed to the consolidation of our country's defense power, and the combat readiness of our Armed Forces.

In March, 1966, the XXIII Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union convened; it laid down a new Five-year development program for Soviet society in its advance toward communism. The Congress debated development problems in industry, agriculture and transport, and in raising consumer-goods production efficiency; it condemned subjectivism and voluntarism in the management of the national economy.

The decisions of the Congress and the heroic effort of the Soviet people in fulfilling the new Five-year plan will contribute to a further consolidation of this country's economic power and its defensive potential.

During these years, our country's scientific-technical progress has been marked by new successes in the production of high-strength materials, in the automation of production processes and control of them, in outer-space research, and in a number of other spheres of science and technology.

Strategy, being closely related to the international and domestic conditions of the country, mindful of the achievements in scientific-technological progress and achievements in the development of combat means and military equipment, cannot remain indifferent to various political and technologi-

cal-economic shifts calling for more finite definition of established strategic concepts.

The authors also took cognizance of the fact that this book would be included in the "Officer's Library" Series, and that it must serve as a self-instruction textbook for a broad group of Soviet officers.

Many congratulatory responses, recommendations, and criticisms were addressed to the authors' collective by individual readers, authors, and creative organizations in our own and in socialist countries abroad. All [such material] was carefully studied and considered during the preparation of the third edition of this book.

As a result, in the new edition, when compared with the preceding edition, the following changes and additions have been introduced.

(1) A number of theses of the book have been expanded in the light of the decisions rendered at the XXIII Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union.

(2) More specific definition of a factual nature has been introduced, mainly with regard to Chapter 2.

(3) Somewhat more light has been shed upon the social and political essence of a nuclear world war and on the question of categories of war, in the modern age.

(4) The fundamental facets of the revolution in military affairs and its reflection in strategy are shown.

(5) Necessary corrections in the question of leadership of the Armed Forces have been introduced.

When compared with the Second edition, the authors have made abridgements in the interests of compactness of material and the exclusion of a few repetitions.

The authors' collective expresses their sincere gratitude to all those readers and organizations who took an active part in reviewing the second edition of this book; the authors will gratefully accept all suggestions which may arise from the reading of this edition.

FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION

After publication of the first edition of Military Strategy, the collective of authors received many comments and suggestions, a significant part of which were considered in the preparation of this edition. The book Military Strategy created a great deal of interest in readers at home and abroad. It was translated and published in a number of socialist and capitalist countries.

The authors are not inclined to consider all of this as evidence of their personal merit, but as the result of the natural interest of readers in the questions of military strategy in general.

The repercussion which the book caused in the press of a number of capitalist countries is also fully explainable. The politicians and military ideologists of imperialism did not find to their liking the unmasking of their criminal plans for preparing a new world war or the fact that the book exposes the aggressive nature of the military strategy of contemporary imperialist governments. Moreover, they would have liked to see the Soviet Union and other socialist countries defenseless in the face of danger of attack so that it would have been possible to conduct their aggressive policies and to dictate their will on other countries and peoples with impunity. But with respect to the peoples of the socialist countries, such policies are not suitable. The socialist countries have no intention of attacking anyone; however, they also give no illusion to the enemy of their unpreparedness to repulse such attacks.

As the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky writes, "... We are not adherents of the well-known military aphorism: attack is the best form of defense. On principle, this does not suit the socialist states, which are peace-loving by their very nature. We propose another: the best method of defense is to warn the enemy of our strength and readiness to smash him at his very first attempt to commit an act of aggression." 1

This is why we do not hide our points of view on the nature of future war and the means of conducting it, but present them in this book, Military Strategy.

Set forth here, moreover, are the material, moral, and political possibilities for checking aggression -- and the means to repel it -- right up to the complete smashing of the forces which encroach upon the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and on the labor of the peoples of the brotherly socialist countries. Naturally, all this caused hostile comments and slanderous attacks by several Western press reviewers. And this should have been expected.

In the Soviet Union, the book was subjected to discussion in a number of newspapers and periodicals and at readers' conferences. It was discussed in the General Staff Academy, the military science societies of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces, the Central Club of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze, and a number of other institutions. Many critical comments

were expressed to the authors of the book and they were given much useful advice. The collective of authors greatly appreciates this advice and expresses its gratitude to all persons who took part in the criticism and discussion of the book.

At the same time, for a number of reasons, the authors could not accept all of the reviewers' suggestions without exception.

In particular, the collective of authors was reproached because the definition of military strategy given in the book contradicts its objective character as a science. Indicating the objectivity of laws which operate in the sphere of armed conflict, some opponents consider as irregular the statement that military strategy represents a system of scientific knowledge concerning the conduct of armed conflict in the name of definite class interests.

Of course, there can be no agreeing with this, because military strategy, based on the objective laws of economic development, as well as on the development of military equipment and the means of combat, investigates the ways and means of armed conflict in the interest of state policy, which is formulated by the ruling class in a given country. The undeniable dependence of strategy on policy signifies the party spirit of that science. To refrain from the definition given in this book would mean to slip back on the objectivist position of evaluating the role and missions of military strategy.

The authors did not find it possible to agree with the recommendation of some reviewers to exclude from the scope of military strategy the investigation of the problems of directing the preparation of the country for war. Such a recommendation was motivated by the idea that military strategy apparently should concern itself only with investigating the problems of leadership of the armed forces and that the military preparation of the country is, they say, a political matter.

Can one thus mechanically divide these two interdependent facets of a single leadership process? For it is known that the defensive capability of a country finds its expression first of all in the combat readiness of the armed forces, which represent the most important element of the military might of the country.

Consequently, the investigation of the problems of leadership in the preparation of the country to repel aggression, as well as the problems of the leadership of the Armed Forces, should also enter into the mission of Soviet military strategy.

Nor can there be any agreement with the recommendation to exclude from this work the principles of operational art and tactics, since the presence of these principles supposedly broadens the framework of the book to the entire limits of military art.

Actually, the authors touch upon these aspects of military theory to some degree in the work to illustrate the close interdependence and inter-relationship of all component parts of military art. This is necessary

because military strategy is the leading branch of military art. Operational art and tactics develop on the basis of the goals and content of strategy. The elucidation of operational and tactical problems just to prove this principle, in the opinion of the authors, not only is not superfluous, but also is necessary.

The authors

Footnote

1. Р. Я. Малиновский. Бдительно стоять на страже мира, Москва, Воениздат, 1962, стр. 25.

INTRODUCTION

In the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the basic directions have been determined of the struggle to build a communist society in the USSR.

In presenting to the Soviet people the majestic tasks of economic, political, and cultural development, the Communist Party announced as the main aim of its foreign policy the securing of peaceful conditions for the building of communism in the USSR and the development of a world socialist system. The guiding principle of foreign policy of the Party and the Soviet government is the struggle for peaceful coexistence of countries with different social structures; for general and complete disarmament, for banning the nuclear weapon, a struggle to exclude world war from the life of society.

All this has found new confirmation in the work of the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party and its decisions. In line with this, the CPSU proceeds from the premise that forces have formed and are growing in the world which are capable of preserving and strengthening peace. Confirmation of this is the fact that the ideas and policies of peaceful coexistence are shared by a larger number of people and that it wins newer and newer victories with each day.

The conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underseas which meets the vital interest of all peoples, represented a great, practical success in the solution of international problems in the spirit of the principles of this policy.

Valuing highly the effect of this agreement on reducing international tension, the sense of reality, at the same time, cannot be lost. It should be considered that the cessation of nuclear testing, while opening favorable prospects for the quest for further steps in the name of peace, at the same time does not signify disarmament, cannot halt the process of accumulating a reserve of nuclear weapons, and does not eliminate the danger of unleashing a thermonuclear war by the imperialists.

Therefore, in the struggle to prevent such a war, the Soviet Union cannot rely on the "good will" of imperialists, but relies, first of all, on the might of the socialist camp and on the continually growing preponderance of the forces of peace over the forces of reaction and war. Having outstripped capitalism in a number of the most important branches of sciences and technology, socialism placed in the hands of the peace-loving peoples the mighty material means for checking any imperialist aggression

The success of the world socialist system, which is becoming the decisive factor in the development of human society, the bankruptcy of the colonial system, the unsolvable contradictions of the capitalist

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camp, and the desire of the peoples of the world for peace, clearly show the legality of the historically unavoidable downfall of the obsolete world system of imperialism. This strongly motivates the imperialists, primarily those of the USA, to forestall the imminent destruction of their own dying system and, by means of war, to change the development of world events so unfavorable to them. It is for this reason that modern imperialism threatens the peace and security of nations.

Imperialist countries openly proclaim their mad plans to liquidate the Soviet Union and other socialist countries through a new world war. To do this, as before, they engage in a frenzied armaments race, allocate additional funds to military budgets, and undertake practical steps to prepare for an attack against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community.

Taking this into account, and in order to secure the safety of the USSR, our Party is taking all steps to strengthen the defensive powers of our Motherland and to increase the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Program of the CPSU states: "The internal conditions of the Soviet Union do not require the existence of an army. However, as long as there remains a military threat from the imperialist camp, and a complete and general disarmament has not been achieved, the CPSU deems it necessary to maintain the defensive power of the Soviet state and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces at a level which would guarantee the total destruction of any enemy who would dare to infringe upon the Soviet nation."

In the light of these requirements, the profound study of the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and armies and the mastery of all areas of military knowledge on the part of the Soviet military leadership acquires great significance. One of the real problems of theoretical military preparation of military cadres is, at the present time, a study of the theory of military strategy as a leading branch of military art. [Editor's note # 1]

The appearance in the armaments of modern armies of weapons of mass destruction and especially with development and perfection of the nuclear rocket weapon requires a thorough review of many positions of military strategy. However, this natural phenomenon, caused by the development of arms, is much easier to master by comparing it with past strategic concepts and by studying the development and the theory of military strategy. For a wide Soviet readership and for military theoretical preparation of young officers this work, presenting the general concepts of military strategy, clarifying the nature and conduct of modern warfare, the preparation of the country and the armed forces for war, and the direction of the development of armed forces, may be a useful book and guide.

These considerations have guided the authors of the present work.

This book consists of eight chapters in which we examine, in order, the rise of the concept of military strategy, its position vis-a-vis politics, economics, and moral and political factors, and of what is the nature and content of the military strategy of modern imperialist countries directed toward the preparation of World War III. We give a short description of the development and present state of Soviet military strategy. We show the basis of military strategy of the leading capitalist countries of the world, arising from the present state of the means of armed conflict, military-political and economic conditions; we also show the views of bourgeois military theoreticians regarding the nature and conduct of modern warfare. We deal with the development of armed forces, with preparation for war, with organs and methods of strategic leadership of military forces and also show the part played by the services of the armed forces and service arms in modern warfare.

This book is intended for a wide circle of readers.

EDITOR'S NOTE ON CHAPTER I

This chapter, "General Concepts: General Information Regarding Military Strategy," may be surprising to some scholars who have attempted to analyze Soviet policies over the past several years. It is almost identical to the two earlier editions.

Before giving detailed attention to the chapter, as well as to the revisions contained throughout the book, an understanding of the exact meaning of "military strategy" may help put the entire translation into more meaningful context. According to Soviet theoreticians:

"MILITARY STRATEGY is the higher area of military art which represents a system of scientific knowledge of the laws of war as an armed conflict in the interests of definite classes. On the basis of the studying of the postures of military doctrine, the experiences of past wars, military and political conditions, the economic and moral possibilities of the country, new means of battle, and the views of the probable enemy, military strategy investigates the conditions and nature of a future war, works out methods of its preparation and conduct, the bases of the strategic use of the services of the armed forces and also the bases of the material and technical maintenance of the leadership of war and the armed forces.

"MILITARY STRATEGY in the conditions of modern war is becoming the strategy of deep nuclear rocket strikes in combination with the actions of all the services of the armed forces with the task of the simultaneous defeat and destruction of the economic potential and the armed forces of the enemy throughout the whole depth of his territory for the achievement of the goals of war in a short period of time.

"MILITARY STRATEGY, which occupies a subordinate position in respect to military doctrine, works out and investigates the concrete questions concerning the character of a future war, the preparation of the country for war, the organization of the armed forces and the methods of waging war.

"MILITARY STRATEGY is in close correlation with operational art and tactics - in relation to which it is leading, since it determines the general goal of actions, forces, means and methods of solving problems. The mutual conditionality of all component parts of the theory of military art and the leading position of military strategy is explained by the fact that in war each separate success is subordinate to a common goal. Soviet military strategy is guided by the advanced scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism which allows the knowing and the correct use of objective laws which determine victory. Military strategy in imperialist countries is directed at preserving and consolidating the obsolescent capitalist system and at a struggle with the advanced and progressive system of human society - the socialist."

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With this definition in mind, a glance at the table of contents of the book, *Military Strategy*, shows that each of its eight chapters examines one facet of the overall definition. The chapters are:

- 1) General Concepts
- 2) The Military Strategy of Imperialist Countries
- 3) The Development of Soviet Military Strategy (1917-1945)
- 4) The Nature of Modern War
- 5) Problems of the Organization of the Armed Forces
- 6) Methods of Conducting Warfare
- 7) Preparing a Country for the Repulsion of Aggression
- 8) Leadership of the Armed Forces

* * *

The "general concepts" of military strategy, as given in this chapter, remain largely unchanged from the earlier two editions. "The laws of strategy are objective and apply impartially to both hostile sides." An important element "is the question concerning the nature of a future war." Major attention still must be given "to the scientific basis of planning," which considers political factors, scientific and technical accomplishments and the "preparation of the territory of a theater of military operations."

As already noted, in defining military strategy, the authors state that:

"Military strategy under conditions of modern warfare becomes the strategy of deep nuclear rocket strikes in conjunction with the operations of all services of the armed forces in order to effect a simultaneous defeat and destruction of the economic potential and armed forces throughout the enemy territory, thus accomplishing the war aims within a short time period."

The 1968 edition adds the following:

"Quite naturally, the question here is strategy of nuclear rocket war and this definition does not reflect the nature and the laws of war without the use of the nuclear weapon."

This is of particular interest to military theorists in the United States. In chapter two, the authors discuss United States military concepts, such as "Flexible response" and "escalation." Also discussed, as foreign concepts, are various types of limited wars. Soviet military writings on their own doctrine and strategy deal largely with nuclear war. There is, however, always the caveat that they must be prepared to fight "with or without the use of the nuclear weapon."

It is probable that this first chapter is in consideration part the work of General Lieutenant I. G. Zavyalov, listed as one of the fourteen contributors. In March, 1967, after this 1968 edition of *Military Strategy* already was at the printers, *Red Star* carried General Zavyalov's article, "On Soviet Military Doctrine." The article was of particular interest in

that reference was made indirectly to antiballistic missile defense. The General noted that "we recognize not passive but active defense, built on a new technical basis brought about by the appearance of modern means of waging war - defense directed primarily against the means of nuclear attack of the enemy."

Another probable contributor to this same chapter is Colonel V. V. Larionov. The discussion of "strategic maneuver," by simply retargeting nuclear strikes, is very similar to Colonel Larionov's article, "New Means of Fighting and Strategy," which appeared in *Red Star* in April, 1964. In the third issue of the new Soviet journal, *USA ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY*, published by Arbatov's Institute of the USA, Colonel Larionov published an article, "The Strategic Debates," Colonel Larionov appears to be part of the Institute specializing in study of the United States. His past associations with military doctrine and *Military Strategy* should make him a valuable contributor in his new position.

CHAPTER I

GENERAL CONCEPTS

GENERAL INFORMATION REGARDING MILITARY STRATEGY

The rise of the Concept of Military Strategy. The modern concept of military strategy as a science did not arise all at once. As we know, the formation of any system of concepts is preceded by a process of accumulation of information; V. I. Lenin pointed out that man goes from experiment to theory.

Military experience of many years, which also served as man's source of knowledge of the phenomena of war, was the prime mover in the development of military strategy.

When society was divided into classes and professional armies appeared, war became the constant companion of the development of antagonistic society. Often the head of the state was also the military leader. His military expeditions, victories, and defeats were at first simply recorded by chroniclers. As military experience accumulated and factors of military history could be compared, people began to arrive at a conclusion concerning the recurrence of certain phenomena of war; they began to generalize and to formulate certain principles and rules. However, initially these generalizations did not take any definite form or system. Despite the fact that the generals of classical antiquity such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar, as well as others, entertained definite concepts of the art of conducting war, these concepts never went beyond private generalizations and conclusions.

The first attempts to systematize the accumulated military experience took place in the First through Fourth Centuries, A.D.

In ancient Rome and Greece at approximately the same time there appeared the first military works touching upon the questions of strategy. [The word "strategy" comes from the Greek "στρατηγία"-"general" or "leader of troops."] Among them should be noted the "Instructions to Generals" of Onisander and "Brief Exposition of the Principles of Military Affairs" of Vegetius. Even though these treatises dealt mainly with the training of troops and with tactical art and skill, a certain place in them is devoted to the art of conducting war as a whole.

The Middle Ages, until the 16th Century, contributed little to the formulation and development of military strategy as a science. F. Engels characterized this as the "barren period."

In the beginning of the 16th Century, the Italian Machiavelli made a serious attempt to put forth the factors pertaining to the conduct of war. Based on generalizations of the experience of generals of classical

antiquity, he wrote his "Dell' arte della guerra" ("On the Art of War"). In this treatise, in the form of a dialogue, he gave recommendations about the organization and the principles of forming a national militia army to replace the mercenaries, about the role and the principles of the formation of cavalry and artillery, as well as some general requirements for generals for whom the author felt it indispensable to be familiar with geography, the theater of operations, and military art.

However, in bourgeois military history the birth of scientific knowledge of war is usually attributed to the middle of the 18th Century, when the Englishman Henry Lloyd, serving in Russia, in his introduction to the history of the Seven Years' War systematized and put forth a number of general theoretical concepts and principles of military strategy. From this time on, in military literature strategy is increasingly frequently described as a system of knowledge including the most general concepts of war and becomes identical with military science.

In this manner, similar to philosophy, which at first included the totality of man's knowledge of nature and society, military strategy in its initial development occupied in the area of military knowledge the position of the science of sciences, and until nearly the end of the 19th Century is defined as the "synthesis and integration of the entire military field, its generalization and philosophy" [1].

By this time, in other social sciences the process of differentiation of knowledge was already in full swing. This lag was fully justified for bourgeois military science, which considers any military theories only as a product of the creativity of individual geniuses.

The appearance of new methodology in the study of the phenomena of war is connected with the birth of the Marxist dialectic method which opened new vistas for the determination of laws governing the changes in the nature of war and methods of its conduct.

The founders of this scientific method, K. Marx and F. Engels, showed that the development of industry, the construction of railroads, the appearance of new types of weapons and equipment determine the changes in the organization of armies, the development and perfection of theoretical military concepts, and, consequently, the necessity for a more concrete study of the problems of war.

Contrary to the concepts of the bourgeois military school, life itself soon showed that all the problems of preparation and conduct of armed conflict cannot be placed within the framework of strategy alone; already by the middle of the 19th Century independent sciences began to be formed in the realm of military knowledge. As a result of this process, strategy at first evolved from an all-encompassing military science into tactics, artillery, and fortifications. Subsequently, the expansion of the scope of war made necessary the development of military geography as an independent branch of military science. Still later evolved military administration, and, by the beginning of our century, the theory of

operational art, which, incidentally, has found clear expression only in Soviet military science.

Thus, the limits of research and the series of problems constituting the study of the theory of military strategy, were gradually formed and the concept of military strategy as a science was born.

The formulation of military strategy as a system of knowledge was the direct result of generalization of the experience of leadership of the armed forces in the course of preparation and conduct of wars on a strategic scale. However, military strategy is not only the result of generalized experience but also includes theoretical predictions of possible conditions, of methods of conducting armed conflict and the leadership of war in the future. Therefore, the theory of strategy is today inseparable from practice.

On the basis of the experience of practical leadership of the armed forces, changes in the realm of military equipment and means of conflict, and also data of training and maneuvers of troops, the theory of military strategy is constantly enriched and developed. The daily practice of strategy serves for it as a criterion of the correctness of newly advanced concepts and determines the way of its development.

In this manner the unity and interrelation of theory and practice in the realm of strategy have decisive importance in the dialectic process of their mutual enrichment and development.

This unity is most clearly expressed in wartime when the theory of preparation and conduct of military operations on the strategic scale becomes fused with the practice of the strategic leadership of war.

The Role of Strategy in Military Science. The complexity and diversity of the phenomena of armed conflicts studied by military science require exact scientific classification of military disciplines, i. e., the relative position of each of them in the over-all system of military knowledge.

The modern classification of military knowledge is based on the classification of each branch: first, according to the scope of military operations, and second, according to the service of the armed forces.

Hence, in the classification of military science the determining discipline is the theory of military art whose subject is the nature and methods of military operations of various scopes, both in the aggregate and as applied to each separate service of the armed forces, and each branch of service in particular.

The theory of Soviet military art as applied to military operations of various scales is divided into strategy, operational art, and tactics.

Bourgeois military art is divided into two basic parts: strategy and tactics. Along with this, bourgeois military literature uses the term "grand strategy." In the British Field Service Regulations, "grand strategy" is defined as "the art of most efficient application of the entire powers of the state."

Strategy occupies the leading place in military art.

The theory of strategy deals with the use of all military forces and means of a country in war. This means that one of the problems of military strategy is the development of general foundations for the utilization of various services of the armed services and the coordination of their efforts aimed at the achievement of a common military and political objective. At the same time, the theory of strategic utilization of each of the services of the armed forces, resting on a common basis of a unified strategy, works out concrete forms and methods of application.

Strategy is closely connected with operational art and tactics. As compared to them, military strategy leads, since it determines the general aim of the operations, the forces, and the ways and means for solving the problems at hand. The mutual dependence of all component parts of the theory of military art and the leading position of strategy are explained by the fact that in war each individual success is subordinate to the overall aim. It is for this reason that the tactical principles must correspond to the aims of operational art, which in turn are determined by strategy as a whole.

Modern strategy cannot develop without taking into account economical, political, and scientific and technical factors. Its prognoses must be based on modern accomplishments in mathematics, physics, chemistry, cybernetics, and other sciences, without which the problems of preparation and utilization of armed forces in war cannot be solved. Therefore, military strategy is closely connected with other social and natural sciences.

The need for a close connection between strategy and other sciences is also determined by the fact that some technical sciences which are more closely related than others to the sphere of military production receive general and sometimes even concrete tactical and technical assignments from strategy, for construction of new types of weapons and other forms of military equipment.

The Content of Military Strategy. The content of strategy is not constant. Its nature changes depending on the definition of the subject of strategy which has built up at a given time, the problems put to military strategy by the state policy, and possibilities of the material and moral type, i. e., the forces and means placed at the disposal of strategy.

In accordance with the political aims of war, one of the problems of military strategy becomes the study of the laws of armed conflict

derived from theoretical analysis of military experience on the strategic scale taking into account the state of military affairs. One of the main problems of strategy is the study of the conditions and of the nature of future war and development of methods and forms of its conduct. Hence, strategy must determine the composition of the forces and the means necessary to accomplish the aims placed before it, and consequently the general direction of the development of the armed forces and their preparation for war. Another problem of strategy is the development of material and technical bases for armed conflict and the leadership of armed forces. All these problems must be examined by strategy in conjunction with a detailed study of the attitudes and potential of the probable opponent; the opponent's strategic views are also included in the study of strategy.

From the above considerations the scope of the theory of military strategy includes:

- the laws governing armed conflict which are inherent in strategy;
 - the conditions and nature of a future war;
 - the theoretical foundation of preparation of the country and of the armed forces and the principles of military planning;
 - the services of the armed services and the basis of their strategic utilization;
 - || - the fundamentals of civil defense; ||
 - the methods of conducting armed conflict;
 - the basis of the material and technical support for armed conflict;
 - the bases of leadership of military forces and of the war in general;
- and
- the strategic attitudes of the probable opponents.

In order to give a more complete exposition of the content of military strategy we should at least briefly illuminate the problems comprising each of the enumerated subdivisions.

Military strategy cannot claim the status of a science if it is not indeed based on the knowledge of the historical development of the laws of war as an armed conflict.

The fact that the development of the ways and means of armed conflict is subject to definite laws was proven as early as 1851 by F. Engels, who wrote [2]:

"A prerequisite of the Napoleonic method of war was increased productive capacity; this will also be the prerequisite of each new improvement in the conduct of warfare."

The laws of strategy are objective and apply impartially to both hostile sides.

This can be confirmed by the strategic principles formulated in his time by V. I. Lenin. His general principle, stating that war is a universal test of the material and spiritual resources of each nation, that wars are won by those who have greater resources, the greater source

of forces and support among the masses, and that in each war, victory in the final count is stipulated by the spiritual state of those masses who shed their blood on the field of battle, applies in the same measure to either of the belligerents.

The knowledge of the general laws of armed conflict makes it possible for the military leader to foresee the nature of military events in a future war and to use these laws successfully in conducting the war, rationally directing the efforts of the armed forces. This is the subjective aspect of the use of objective laws.

In this manner the elucidation and study of the laws of armed conflict have great practical value for military leadership in the preparation and conduct of military operations on the strategic scale.

The next important element in the content of military strategy is the question concerning the nature of a future war. Here, strategy examines the conditions and factors which at the given historical moment determine the nature of future war, the distribution of military and political forces, the quality and quantity of the war materiel, the military and economic potential, the probable composition and potential of opposing coalitions and their geographical distribution.

In studying the nature of the war proper, strategy devotes attention to the basic means of its conduct, the duration, the intensity, and the geographical scope.

|||In accordance|||with the nature of future war, military strategy examines the|||questions|||of preparation of the armed forces for war, where the main attention is given to the scientific basis of planning, taking into account political requirements, economic potential, and scientific and technical accomplishments; the organization of strategic intelligence; the composition of the armed forces required to solve strategic problems; the composition and method of preparation of strategic reserves; the accumulation of materiel reserves, and the preparation of the territory as a theater of military operations.

In examining the services of the armed forces, in regard to their structure and application, military strategy studies the factors which determine the structure and interrelation of the services of the armed forces, the requirements put to them in connection with the changing political and strategic aims of war as well as changing conditions, the tasks and problems of the services of the armed forces in a future war, the principles and perspectives of their future development.

An important part in the content of military strategy is played by the study of the methods of conducting war. In studying these problems the theory of strategy develops general concepts concerning these methods and their dependence on the factors which most strongly influence their change and development.

The main attention of military strategy is directed to studying the conditions under which a future war may arise, a detailed study of the peculiarities of the strategic deployment of the armed forces, the methods of delivering the first strike and conducting the first operations, as well as the method of strategic utilization of the different services of the armed forces.

The principles of determining the general volume of the materiel requirements for war as a whole, and in dependence on the forms of strategic operation, are studied on the basis of the material and technical supply of the armed conflict. Attention is given to the organization of the strategic rear area including questions of the location of rear-area of the armed forces and the bases for the planning and adoption of concrete measures for the materiel and technical support for an armed conflict.

In examining the bases of leadership of the armed forces, military strategy touches first upon the leadership of the war on the whole; it determines the possible organs of strategic leadership, their organizational structure and function, and the principles and methods employed by each individual country and military coalition for the control of the armed forces.

In examining the strategic views of the probable enemy, military strategy turns its attention to what sort of military and political aims he might pursue in future war and what his economic, military, and moral potentials are for this. In addition, strategy studies the view of the enemy on the character and methods of conducting a war, the build-up of armed forces, and the preparation of the economy, population, and the territory for war.

Such is the content of the problems examined in the theory of military strategy. The concrete study of each question assures the necessary depth of perception and makes it possible for the study of strategy to develop scientifically based recommendations for the leadership of the armed forces in preparing for war and during its waging.

The practical part of military strategy includes the activity of the higher military and political leadership, the supreme military command, and the higher headquarters, concerned with preparation of the country for war, and with the organization and realization of the strategic operations of the armed forces during the entire war, as well as at various stages and theaters of military operation. Starting with the theoretical data of military strategy and based on the actual conditions of the strategic situation, these organs undertake a series of measures aimed at the preparation for and successful conduct of armed conflict. These measures include:

- || - the development of a strategic concept || and practical realization of plans dealing with the preparation of the country for war,
- practical guidance of the preparation of the armed services for war,
- the leadership of the armed forces during the war.

To sum up, the following definition of military strategy can be given.

Military strategy is a system of scientific knowledge dealing with the laws of war as an armed conflict in the name of definite class interests. Strategy,-- on the basis of military experience, military and political conditions, economic and moral potential of the country, new means of combat, and the views and potential of the probable enemy, -- studies the conditions and the nature of future war, the methods for its preparation and conduct, the services of the armed forces and the foundations for their strategic utilization, as well as foundations for the material and technical support and leadership of the war and the armed forces.

At the same time, this is the area of the practical activity of the higher military and political leadership, of the supreme command, and of the higher headquarters, that pertains to the art of preparing a country and the armed forces for war and conducting the war.

The Content and Nature of Military Strategy Under Conditions of Modern Nuclear Rocket Warfare. As is known, the development of technical means of armed conflict has considerable influence on the nature of war and military strategy.

The appearance of the nuclear rocket weapon radically changed previous concepts of the nature of war. Modern nuclear rocket war in its destructive and death-dealing potential cannot be compared with previous wars. Mass application of nuclear rocket weapons makes it possible within a very short time to force a country from the war, or a number of countries, even those with relatively large territories, well-developed economies, and populations on the order of tens of millions.

There is an immeasurable increase in the spatial scope of modern war. The almost unlimited range of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons gives modern war such an infinite scope that the boundaries between the front lines and the rear areas are erased, eliminating the previous concept of the theater of military operation.

Military strategy under conditions of modern war becomes the strategy of deep nuclear rocket strikes in conjunction with the operations of all services of the armed forces in order to effect a simultaneous defeat and destruction of the economic potential and armed forces throughout the enemy territory, thus accomplishing the war aims within a short time period.

||| Quite naturally, the question here is of the strategy of nuclear rocket war and this definition does not reflect the nature and the laws of war without the use of the nuclear weapon. |||

In the light of this definition a whole series of previous principles, norms, and rules, which had been considered definitive for military strategy as late as World Wars I and II, are now radically revised or

lose their significance altogether.

The ancient and extant principle of concentrating the forces and means in the decisive direction requires a radically new approach. In all previous wars the concentration of decisive efforts in the main direction was accomplished by increased concentration of men and equipment on a relatively limited sector of the ground front; today this can be achieved, obviously, by massed strikes of the nuclear rocket weapon.

Concentration of troops at the areas of breakthrough and the formation in these relatively narrow front sectors of high troop densities, as employed as recently as World War II, now are fraught with grave consequences. Moreover, there is no longer a need for it, since continuous fronts have become a thing of the past, and the concept of penetration has lost its significance. The greatest importance is now acquired not by the direction of the main strike but by the areas of maximum effort, since nuclear strikes can be simultaneously delivered in many directions throughout the entire enemy territory, and also by the exact calculation of the forces and means on the objectives of the strikes, the sequence, and the time of the strikes against them.

Under conditions of nuclear rocket war, the strategic principle of the economy of forces appears in a new light. It is apparent that when the very outcome of the war depends largely on the number and the effectiveness of the application of effort at the very beginning of the war, it is hardly reasonable to count on using the potential capabilities of a country and to reserve a large part of the forces for conducting military operations during later periods of the war. An overwhelming majority of military theoreticians in the highly developed countries of the world are coming to such a conclusion.

In the military strategy of previous wars a large role was always attached to the principle of partial victory. It was considered an irrefutable fact that a general victory in war consisted of a number of local successes on various fronts and in various spheres of military operations. Modern strategic means of armed conflicts which are located in direct subordination to the high commands, and which make it possible to achieve decisive results in gaining victory in war often without utilizing the forces and means of the tactical and operational element, speak in favor of the position that now partial success can be dependent on success of a general strategic nature.

Thus, strategy, which in the past was nourished by the achievements of tactics and operational art, now is given the possibility to attain, by its own independent means, the war aims regardless of the outcome of battles and operations in the various areas of armed conflict. Consequently, over-all victory in war is no longer the culmination, nor the sum of partial successes, but the result of a one-time application of the entire might of a state accumulated before the war.

The changes which are introduced into strategy by the appearance

of new means of armed conflict touch not only upon the principles and rules of military strategy, but also upon the basic strategic categories.

Thus, the concept of a theater of military operations has changed completely. In the classic definition, a theater of military operations was a territory or aquatory in which direct military operations took place. The boundaries of such a theater were determined primarily by the aims of the armed conflict in the given theater and by the range of the weapons, which until World War II rarely penetrated beyond the operational rear areas. Thus, the strategic rear area and the entire territory of the belligerent country beyond these boundaries were not part of the theater of the military operations.

The development of long-range bomber aviation and the appearance of nuclear weapons especially that of ICBM's have significantly changed the concept of a theater of military operations.

The modern concept of a theater of military operations may include the entire territory of a belligerent or coalition, whole continents, large bodies of water, and extensive regions of the atmosphere, including space. On this basis, the traditional theaters of military operations can be grouped together: western, near eastern, far eastern, etc. Thus, the zone of military operations is no longer limited to the firing range of weapons, since the latter is almost unlimited. This zone can be determined, depending on the boundaries of the continent or body of water as well as on the location of strategic targets subject to attack.

Strategic offense and strategic defense as forms of strategic operations under conditions of nuclear rocket war have lost their previous significance. They played a major part when the resolution of the main aims and problems of war was accomplished by ground troops with the cooperation of aviation (in coastal areas, with that of the navy), and the main basis of waging war was ground-front operation. Under conditions of nuclear rocket war, the resolution of the main aims and problems of war will be accomplished by strategic rocket troops, by delivery of massed nuclear rocket strikes. Ground troops with the aid of aviation will perform important strategic functions in a modern war: by rapid offensive movements they will completely annihilate the remaining enemy formations, occupy enemy territory, and prevent the enemy from invading one's own territory. The strategic operations of other services of the armed forces will consist of the following: the national PVO troops will protect the country and groupings of the armed forces from the nuclear strikes of the enemy; the navy will perform military operations in naval theaters aimed at the destruction of enemy naval formations, the disruption of enemy naval communications, and defense of one's own communications as well as the coastal areas from strikes from the sea.

The strategic offense and strategic defense as forms of strategic operations can retain their significance in the event war is waged by conventional means in certain types of local wars, the probability of which cannot be excluded in contemporary conditions.

Nuclear rocket weapons have introduced substantial changes in the concept of strategic deployment.

The concept, existing up to World War II, of strategic deployment of armed forces as a complex of successive planned carrying out of measures designed to cover, mobilize, concentrate, and deploy the armed forces in the theater of military operations, executed in a time of threat or at the start of the war, has obviously become obsolete.

Today most of these measures can be accomplished beforehand, so that they need only be completed in a time of threat.

Thus, the new concept of strategic deployment is a process of creation of strategic formations of armed forces prior to the outbreak of war, according to a war plan and to the conditions of its unleashing. An important part in this process is played by increased military preparedness of the armed forces.

Perfection of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons to their target, their great range, and the ability to be retargeted in a short period of time from one target to another, change the previous concept of strategic maneuver. This was previously defined as the creation of the most favorable formations of forces and materiel in a theater of military operations or a strategic direction; today the essence of a strategic maneuver, obviously, consists in the creation of favorable conditions by the shift and concentration of nuclear strikes for the resolution of the main problems and aims of war, as well as for the achievement of strategic results by all services of the armed forces.

The realization of strategic maneuver in the past war was accomplished by moving large commands and formations by rail and motor transport from one front or theater of military operations to another. The high vulnerability of communications and the lack of time necessary for such regrouping make these maneuvers difficult to accomplish and in a number of instances inexpedient.

Consequently, strategic maneuvers under conditions of nuclear rocket war can be defined as the shift of effort from one strategic direction or objective to another, mainly by fire and maneuver with nuclear weapons. Maneuver in the old sense may find application primarily within theaters of military operation by the ground, aviation, and naval forces.

The above basic principles and categories of military strategy confirm the rationality of those radical changes which have been introduced into strategy by the appearance of new means of armed conflict.

These are the general principles of military strategy touching upon the definition of concepts and the position of strategy in military science, its content, and those changes produced by the appearance of nuclear rocket weapons.

Strategy and Politics

The Dependence of Military Strategy on Politics. In determining the essence of war, Marxism-Leninism uses as its point of departure the position that war is not an aim in itself, but only a tool of politics.

In his remarks on Clausewitz' book, On War, V. I. Lenin stresses [3] that "politics is the reason, and war is only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently, it remains only to subordinate the military point of view to the political."

The acceptance of war as a tool of politics also determines the interrelation of military strategy and politics, which is based on the principle of the full dependence of the former on the latter.

These scientific Marxist concepts are and were opposed by the representatives of the bourgeois metaphysical approach to war, who deny the class nature of war. They are inclined to see the causes of war in the "psychological makeup" of man, in the overpopulation of the earth (Malthusians and neo-Malthusians), and in racist geopolitics

Such theories always played into the hands of extreme militarists, who deny the dependence of military strategy on politics. This idea was defended, in its time, by the German military writer Friedrich von Bernhardi who asserted for example that politics "must adapt its demands to military exigencies and contingencies" [4]. The German military ideologists of World War I, von Schlieffen and von Ludendorff, trying to justify their militaristic aspirations, and contended that politics, having accomplished its business by starting the war, could retire at the beginning of hostilities to the position of a passive observer.

The views of the bourgeois military theoreticians of the past find adherents even among military ideologists of present-day imperialism.

Thus, the English military theoretician Kingston-McCloughry writes [5] with regard to the Clausewitz formula:

"Take his famous statement that 'war is the continuation of politics by other means' (violent means) and examine it in the light of modern conditions. In the event of nuclear war nothing would be further from the truth than this statement. Such a war, in the event of its unleashing, would mean the end of all politics and complete mutual annihilation."

He finds an echo in pursuing the military political field of West Germany's Rendulitsch, a former Hitlerite general, who in the article "Armament Changes Politics" declares that: "...atomic weapons have introduced radical changes into the form of war and its relation to politics... Atomic war has lost its meaning as a tool of politics."

It is quite evident that such views are a consequence of a metaphysical and unscientific approach to such a social phenomenon as war, and

are a result of idealization of the new weapons. It is well known that the essence of war as a continuation of politics does not change with changing technology and armament. Conclusions to the contrary were resorted to by the military ideologists of imperialism in order to justify their preparation for a new war and to subordinate the development of economics, science, and technology to the service of military organization. In their opinion it is not the civil, but rather the military organization which, hand in hand with science, has taken the leadership into their own hands.

At the same time, regardless of such declarations of individual authors, bourgeois military science recognizes the dependence of war and military strategy on politics. True, bourgeois politics in this case is represented as the expression of the interests of society as a whole, which in reality is not the case. Thus, the class essence is removed from politics and it assumes the form of a national, primarily foreign, policy. However, in a society composed of antagonistic classes, such a policy cannot be pursued, since as V. I. Lenin pointed out, politics outside the classes and politics independent of classes does not exist.

The dependence of military strategy on politics finds the most varied expressions. The influence of politics affects the determination of general and particular strategic aims, and the general character of state strategy, and on the selection of forms and methods of conducting war.

V. I. Lenin declared that the nature of the political aim has a decisive influence on the conduct of war. Indeed, the political aim determines the just or unjust nature of war, and this influences strategy in a radical manner, since in one case the strategy is supported by a wholehearted endorsement of the war aims by the population, and in the other case these aims cannot be shared by the people, and this changes the relationship of the people toward war, right up to revolutionary withdrawal from it.

Depending on the extent of contradictions between the states or coalitions of states, the political aims of a war vary in their decisiveness. The most decisive political and, consequently, strategic aims are pursued in civil or revolutionary class wars. The wars between states with different social systems, the highest form of class struggle, are particularly decisive. In wars between states with the same social system, when there are no class antagonisms between the opponents, the political and strategic aims, as the experience of imperialist wars shows, are usually limited. In the course of such wars, long before economic and military exhaustion of the belligerent states, compromises of various types are possible. A strategy of this nature is characteristic for wars in which both sides pursue predatory aims.

The subordination of military strategy to state policy determines not only the nature of strategic aims, but also the general nature of strategy.

For instance, the policy of capitalism as an outmoded structure consists of the desire to stave off its inevitable downfall and to prevent the natural development of the world on the road to socialism.

Being by nature adventuristic and reactionary, the policy of the imperialist countries gives birth to military strategy founded on adventuristic calculations. Such a nature of strategy causes an underestimation of the laws of armed conflict, of the constantly operating factors, and of the role played by the popular masses, and aims to use the combination of political and strategic factors for the purpose of treacherous attacks in violation of international treaties and agreements.

The general nature of military strategy is strongly influenced by the prevailing or general line of state policy. The existence of this idea makes military strategy firm and consistent. For instance, the general line of the policy of the CPSU, whose essence was so graphically expressed in the Program of the party, is the building of communist society. On the road to the achievement of this aim, our country must survive various battles, some of them, as shown by historical experience, with drawn sword. Soviet military strategy directed by such a clear and noble idea acquires the necessary direction and consistency.

We can cite another example in which politics is unable to provide strategy with a leading idea, or when the idea is reactionary in its essence.

This applies to the policy of Czarist Russia which in the first half of the Nineteenth Century was guided by the reactionary idea of a struggle with a bourgeois revolution. Hoping to preserve the outmoded feudal-serf system, Russia appeared as the gendarme of Europe. The doom of the backward social structure of Russia affected not only her politics and ideology but also her military strategy.

The nature of military strategy is often influenced by such factors as the general historically accumulated national and political traditions of a country. For instance, Britain in its foreign policy always adhered to a clearly pronounced policy of watchful waiting, over-cautiousness, having someone else do their dirty work for them. This influenced the nature of their military strategy, which avoided decisive engagements, refused to take even reasonable risks, and always looked for devious, indirect roads for the achievement of victory. Apparently, in connection with this, the concept of "the strategy of indirect action" has wide circulation in England. This, of course, does not indicate that the ruling circles of England did not, and do not, pursue an aggressive policy directed at unleashing war.

However, the influence of politics on military strategy is not limited to the determination of the general nature of strategy alone. The solution of many concrete problems of strategy depends directly on state policy. One such problem is the question of the methods of conducting war.

The methods of waging each actual war, as is well known, are deter-

mined by the stage of development of production, the properties of weapons, of combat equipment, and of the composition and nature of the armed forces. Therefore in its policy a state must always take into account the fact that the methods employed in the conduct of war must correspond to the military and economic potential of the state, to the level of technical equipment of the armed forces, and to the nature of war. For instance, under modern conditions, if a state does not have nuclear weapons at its disposal, then whatever the method of conduct of war advanced by state policy, it could hardly succeed in achieving victory over an opponent possessing such weapons.

However, in spite of this, the influence of politics on the selection of methods of conducting war at times becomes quite evident.

F. Engels states that the victorious proletariat will create new methods of conducting war, stressing that the revolutionary change in social structure presupposes creation of new, more progressive methods of conducting warfare. "The actual liberation of the proletariat, the complete elimination of all class distinctions, and the total socialization of all means of production..." [6] are, in his words, the prerequisites of new methods of conducting war.

The influence of politics on the methods of conducting war is manifested in various ways.

The passive and defensive strategy of the Anglo-French Command during the period of the "phony war" in the West (1939-1940), when it acted in accord with the will of imperialist politics to encourage Hitler's aggression against the USSR and the change of the incipient war into an anti-Soviet war, is well known to all.

A substantial influence on the methods of conducting war of the Anglo-American troops during World War II was exerted by certain circles in the USA and Britain which strove to achieve an economic and military exhaustion of the USSR and of Germany; this gave rise to the Anglo-American strategy of deploying their troops along secondary fronts and protracted military action.

The military strategy of capitalist countries, guided by this policy, in 1942 and 1943 refused to deliver a main blow in France, which would have led to the quick defeat of Germany.

In striving to maintain the domination of imperialism in Central and Southeast Europe, the British political leadership by all possible means delayed the landing of the Allied forces and the opening of the second front in France, insisting on a landing in the Balkans.

The modern doctrines of "flexible response;" "limited wars," the theory of "escalation of war," etc., which are advanced in such profusion by bourgeois military scientists also reflect imperialist policy. This is a further proof of the dependence of the methods of conducting war on politics.

Politics Creates Favorable Conditions for Military Strategy. State policy in its activity usually not only presents strategic aims, but also strives to bring about conditions favorable to the realization of these aims. Having in its hands all the control and the means, politics can mobilize to the maximum extent the human and material resources to safeguard the operations of the armed forces. Politics considers the requirements and reasons of strategy, as well as the potentialities of the state, seeking to make the aims commensurate with the forces and means available.

For the successful accomplishment of the assigned aims, the military forces are forced to create favorable conditions with respect to diplomacy, economics, and moral and political factors. The state prepares for war in all these realms.

The preparation of foreign policy for war includes such measures as the signing of treaties, the formation of coalitions, the safeguards of the neutrality of neighboring countries, and others. A vast range of activity for diplomacy is opened here, which, in striving for a strengthening of the international position of its country, constantly takes into account its security in conjunction with the requirements of military strategy.

In making one alliance or another, bourgeois diplomacy, as a rule, is guided primarily by the principle of cash and profit. In selecting allies it usually takes into account their forces, their incentive for war, and their geographic location, which is particularly important for military strategy.

The history of bourgeois diplomacy shows that since the main aim of coalitions of capitalist countries is the strengthening of one alliance and the weakening of another, these coalitions, allegedly formed for mutual defense in the event of war, in reality always led to war.

"Peaceful coalitions," wrote Lenin having in mind imperialist alliances, "prepare wars and in turn are products of wars, one causing the other..." [7].

It is for this reason that the Soviet Union, true to its peace-loving policy, decisively rejects the formation of military coalitions. It is only the creation of aggressive military blocs by imperialist countries, spearheaded against the socialist countries, that forced the Soviet Union to unite with socialist countries in a military alliance strengthened by the obligations of the Warsaw Defense Pact of 1955.

It is important for military strategy to assure neutrality of a number of countries or of individual countries; this task is also assigned to diplomacy.

For instance, the Prussian diplomacy prior to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 secured the neutrality of Russia, which permitted Prussia, first, to avoid battle on two fronts, and, second, to commit to battle the majority of its forces, leaving only one division in the rear areas of its army.

It is well known that in World War II Soviet diplomacy spent considerable effort to assure the neutrality of Japan; this, to a certain extent, made it possible for the Soviet Supreme High Command to transfer a part of the forces from the Far East and to concentrate them on the Soviet-German front.

The above examples show that the creation of favorable conditions on the foreign-policy front plays an extremely important part in military strategy.

Politics prepares war and creates, for the benefit of strategy, favorable conditions in the economic and ideological respects; this is examined in detail in the following sections of this chapter.

The Features of the Interrelations Between Politics and Strategy in Time of War. The features of the interrelations between politics and strategy in time of war arise from the fact that in a war period the center of gravity of the political struggle is transferred from nonmilitary to military form. Politics, it is said, "exchanges the pen for the sword," and new relations and laws become operative.

"...Once the military movements on land and on sea have been started, they are no longer subject to the desires and plans of diplomacy, but rather to their own laws, which cannot be violated without endangering the entire expedition" [8].

Pointing out the certain independence enjoyed by strategy, F. Engels did not intend to stress its independence from politics. He only warned that if policy violates or ignores the laws of military strategy, this can lead to the defeat of the army and to the destruction of the state. During a war, strategic concepts often have a reverse effect on policy. Cases even arise when the military factor acquires decisive significance. V. I. Lenin pointed out during the Civil War in the USSR that the outcome of the revolution depended entirely on "who won" the Civil War.

Therefore, in time of war, politics must often conform its actions with this fact: to what degree do these actions favor the achievement of strategic results, which in the final analysis lead to the accomplishment of political aims in war. Of course the diplomatic and economic struggle does not stop in wartime, but these forms of political struggle are entirely dependent on the decisive form, that of armed conflict and at times are also waged by its means.

For example, diplomacy, directing all its efforts to facilitate accomplishment of strategic aims, may enter into an alliance with a country which heretofore had been in the enemy camp. This is undoubtedly an important factor for military strategy, facilitating the tasks it must accomplish. Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, Soviet diplomacy, having concluded agreements with Bulgaria and Rumania, put the fascist German army in a very difficult position on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. But, in order to assure the success of this diplomatic step, first of all

the efforts of the Red Army were necessary in delivering a crippling blow to the German fascist [Editor's note #1] armies, placing them on the brink of a military catastrophe. Thus, only as a result of the mutual efforts of Soviet strategy and diplomacy were such successes achieved. This is a striking example of complete coordination of action between diplomacy and strategy, unified by a single aim.

In time of war, the economic struggle also becomes dependent on military strategy; which in a number of cases is conducted by military means for which strategy even carries out special strategic operations.

If we turn to the lesson of the Great Patriotic War we can see that shortly before the capitulation of fascist Germany its economic condition was still fully capable of supporting successful military operations. This is evidenced by the production index of the main armaments of Germany in January, 1945, i. e., three months before surrender. Despite the fact that on the whole it had a tendency to drop, still, as compared with the production index in January, 1942, (taken arbitrarily as 100) the production index of 1945 was quite high.

Table 1
German Armament Production--1942-1945

	January 1942	January 1945
All types of weapons [28]	100	210
Airplanes	100	210
Ammunition	100	200
Tanks	100	approx. 600
Artillery and small arms	100	300
Warships	100	150
Gunpowder and other explosives	100	160

As these data show [9], the economic capabilities of Hitler's Germany three months before surrender were higher than the index for that phase of the war when the German fascist armies were successful. However, the destruction of Hitler's armed forces by the Red Army and insufficient manpower reserves led fascist Germany to catastrophe.

Thus, it was not so much the economic struggle and economic exhaustion that were the causes for the defeat of Hitler's Germany, but rather the armed conflict and the defeat of its armed forces.

"The heroic Soviet Army not only accelerated the 'economic exhaustion' of Hitler's Germany but was the cause and the main force which exploded the economic foundation of the enemy" [10].

Under conditions of modern war, when mass application of nuclear rocket weapons can lead to destruction and annihilation of important industrial objectives, economic regions, and to the undermining of the economy of the opposing country or coalition, an entirely different picture emerges.

The country which finds itself in a catastrophic situation as the result of mass nuclear rocket strikes may be forced to surrender even before its armed forces have suffered any decisive defeat. But we must remember that such results can be accomplished only by means of violence, by means of armed conflict.

Politics, from an evaluation of military and political factors, selects the most propitious moment to start a war, taking into account all the strategic considerations. How important is the proper selection for the beginning of war can be judged from the fact that in those cases when it was well selected strategy usually achieved greater military results, while politics reaped the greatest advantages from it.

Thus, in 1866, the Prussian chancellor Bismarck started the war with Austria at a time when Austria, not having as yet recovered from the unsuccessful Italian campaign of 1859, was conducting a reform of its entire military system. As a consequence of the Hungarian desire for separation, the Austrian internal position was also rather unstable. Prussia at this time had a well organized army and a strong ally in Italy. All these circumstances enabled her to achieve victory almost entirely because of the fortunate timing of the moment.

Another example, from the history of the Russo-Turkish war, also proved the important part played by politics in the timing of the outbreak of hostilities and for the creation of favorable conditions for military strategy from the very beginning of the war.

By the middle of the 19th Century, in the countries of the Balkan peninsula subjugated by Turkey, a movement of national liberation arose, which found support in Russia among the Slavophiles and on the part of the Czarist government which was pursuing its capitalists' interests in the Balkans. The repressions of the Turkish government against the local population added fuel to the fire of this movement. A war was brewing between Russia and Turkey. Britain assumed the part of mediator, all the time pursuing its own selfish aims, in the fear that a Turkish defeat would lead to the capture of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by Russia. Allegedly supporting Russia, Britain at the same time encouraged an uncooperative attitude on the part of Turkey. Russian diplomacy was unable to resolve the Balkan contradictions under these circumstances, and on November 1, 1876, Russia declared a partial mobilization.

If this had been followed immediately by the beginning of military operations, then this would have been at a time which was most unsuitable for Turkey and Britain: The former was tied down in a war with Serbia and Montenegro and urgently needed a reform of its army; the latter, because of its military weakness, was unable to dictate any terms to Russia. Turkey also had to prolong the conflict until the beginning of the winter storms in the Black Sea which would hinder the operation of the Russian Navy.

Under these conditions Turkey and Britain resorted to diplomatic

procrastination. When on April 12, 1877, Russia was nevertheless forced to declare war on Turkey, the favorable moment had been lost; Britain had gathered its strength and Turkey, having concluded a peace treaty with Serbia, had put through a reform of its army.

Thus, as a consequence of the poor political timing for the outbreak of war, effective use of strategy was prevented, and politics was unable to reap all the gains of military successes since, in the ensuing peace treaty, despite the fact that Russia had been victorious, she was not able to achieve her political aims as formulated in the beginning of the war. Strategy was also hindered by the limitations stated in the treaty. Instead of attempting to achieve a complete destruction of the Turkish army and the occupation of Constantinople, which was completely within its capabilities, the Russian Army was limited to just the liberation of Bulgaria, at that time part of the Turkish Empire.

An example from the recent past can be given. The timing of the attack by Hitler's Germany in 1941, extremely unfavorable for our country, to a certain degree was conducive to the initial success of the fascist German troops. Our army, which was not fully mobilized, was in the process of reorganization and rearmament.

All these examples point up the close connection between strategy and politics at the beginning of war.

The role and influence of politics on military strategy at the end of a war, is exceptionally great since the situation in which a country finds itself at the final stage of the war has a great effect on its postwar international position.

The Features of the Interrelation of Politics and Strategy in Coalitions. In a coalitional war the interrelation of politics and strategy has its own peculiarities. To achieve victory the states allied in a coalition must perforce have a coordinated strategy. However, such strategy can arise only from politics strengthened by a unity of purpose on the part of the coalition members, which is very difficult to achieve in coalitions of predatory imperialist countries. Moreover, it must be taken into account that the strategy of each individual country is determined by its economic potential, its geographic situation, national character and traditions, etc. Consequently, in each country strategy has its strikingly expressed national traits. At the same time allied strategy cannot be a mechanical combination of the strategic views of the various countries.

Because of these conditions, the development of a unified plan of strategic conduct of capitalist countries in a coalitional war can be achieved only at the expense of compromises, mutual concessions, or dictation on the part of the stronger countries. It is by "diktat" on the part of the USA that the unified strategy of a modern imperialist coalition is developed, which is designed first and foremost to achieve the military and political aims of the USA. It is evident that the irreconcilable

contradictions inherent in a capitalist society make it impossible to achieve complete unity of strategy in imperialist blocs and coalitions. Experience indicates that with respect to the development of a unified allied strategy each country tries to get as much from the coalition as possible and to contribute fewer efforts than the other countries. V. I. Lenin remarked that in capitalist coalitions "...there are two tendencies, one, which makes the coalition of all imperialists inevitable, and the other, which makes for opposition among the imperialists; two tendencies, neither of which has any firm basis" [11].

These words are confirmed by the acute contradictions existing within the modern aggressive military blocs of imperialist countries.

Centrifugal forces, overpowering this product of the policy of anti-communism, are placing before its fathers a mass of problems of a political, economic and military order.

Some time ago most bitter debate was produced in the NATO council by the discussion of the strategic plan for the "defense of the West." The French and the West German military leaders insisted upon the idea of "continental strategy" and demanded that the United States participate in the "defense" of the European continent. "The peripheral strategy" propounded by the military leaders of Britain and the USA did not provide for the "defense" of Europe by the noncontinental countries and propounded a defensive belt on the periphery of the European continent: on the islands of the Atlantic Ocean, on the Mediterranean, and on the North Sea. Even though it would seem that the proponents of the "continental strategy" had won, subsequent events show that the agreement reached in 1955 was ephemeral. In the course of the regular session of the NATO council in 1959, the basic disagreements of the allies reappeared with new strength. The USA refused to finance, to the extent previously accepted, the armament of the West European armies and demanded increased contribution to armaments from the allies, which the allies rejected.

The political and military command of NATO constantly strives to somehow smooth out the contradictions within that aggressive bloc, to work more or less unified strategic concepts, and to obtain agreement on fundamental trends in the construction of national armed forces.

This is understandable, since it is inconceivable that such a bellicose coalition as NATO could be built on a regional basis. However, up to now, the persistent endeavors to obtain complete agreement on the bloc's military policy, not to mention strategy, did not lead to comforting results. This can be explained by the fact that NATO is a union of imperialist plundering states, each of which strives to derive as much gain and advantages as possible from its membership in the union, placing on others the burden of expenses and the more dangerous obligations. With reference to this, naturally, it must not be forgotten that the entry of the imperialist states into this war bloc was conditioned, above all, by their class solidarity and enmity toward countries in the socialist camp.

The insurmountable nature of contradictions within the military bloc of the imperialist states stems from the law of their uneven development, discovered by V. I. Lenin, and confirmed with each passing year. All new shifts which take place in the western alliances change to some degree the distribution of forces. The hopes of the ruling circles of Great Britain to continue to play the part of major partner of the USA are more and more subject to doubt. Now West Germany is competing economically and militarily against Great Britain. Though France left the military organization of the union altogether, she did remain, it is true, in NATO, when considered as a political organization.

An ever growing struggle is being continuously waged between the United States and their western European allies for spheres of influence in the various areas of the world, for a predominant role in one or another field of armaments, and for the leading role in determining military policy and strategy.

All these examples confirm that British Field Marshal Montgomery was correct in declaring that instead of "a sea of unity" the West has "approximately thirty political puddles."

This was also noted by the message of the late President Kennedy: "Our alliances in Europe have not materialized and are in a state of disorder. The unity of NATO is weakened by economic rivalry and partly undermined by national interests" [12].

In a coalition of socialist countries, the achievement of an agreed military strategy is determined by the unity of political aims, which unites all the countries into a union of equal partners. In V. I. Lenin's words, "We...shall unite and merge the nation not with the power of money, nor with a big stick or force, but by voluntary agreement, and the solidarity of the workers against the exploiters" [13].

The lack of contradictions between the politics and strategy in the socialist coalition assures a harmonious combination of mutual international traits and national characteristics of military strategy of the different countries. The unity of problems of defense of the socialist camp from an attack by imperialist aggressors is based not only on the combat cooperation of the armies of the socialist countries, but also on the unity of strategic concepts.

The defensive military Warsaw Pact signed by the socialist countries unites the participants with the single aim of defending the accomplishments of socialism in these countries from the aggression of imperialists. Its freedom-loving aims assure tremendous advantages to this coalition in the case of war, since the time-vested principles of Marxism-Leninism, the principles of proletarian internationalism, are the foundations of the relations between the countries of the world socialist system and of all communist and workers' parties.

Strategy and Economics

The Role of the Economic Factor in War. Every war is a product of social and economic relations. F. Engels in his proof of the mutual dependence of war as a form of force and the material basis of this force-- weapons and troops-- stated that war is not the simple act of volition: " ..the victory of force is based on the production of weapons, and the production of weapons in turn, is based on productivity in general, and consequently on 'economic strength,' on the 'situation of the economy' and on material means at the disposal of that force" [14].

Economic conditions determine not only war in general, but also "the combat methods of the army," i. e., those forms and methods by which war is conducted, in other words, strategy.

Initially this dependence was not very noticeable. In the slave-owning and feudal societies, and in the initial development of capitalism, the influence of economics on war and strategy was not very strikingly expressed in the time of the "small scale" wars, countries could go to war even while the state of their economy was poor. This is evident by many examples from military history. Before the first bourgeois French Revolution, the Bourbon dynasty brought France to the limit of economic exhaustion, so that Napoleon was forced to undertake his initial campaigns with a literally empty treasury. However, in spite of a twenty-year period of continuous war, the Napoleonic empire in 1811 had a two-hundred-million franc surplus. Another example is pre-revolutionary Russia which, in spite of the backward economy and complete dependence on foreign capital, was militarily a rather strong nation due to the vast human resources.

This was true until the beginning of capitalism which gave impetus to the development of trade, industry, and means of communication. This provides the basis for wars of increased scope and, consequently, increased material requirements. This law was more and more clearly confirmed with each new war and World War I showed a sharp increase in the cost of material expenditures, as compared to preceding wars. For example, the cost of one year of those wars, which were conducted by Russia in the 19th and 20th Centuries, increased progressively from war to war. In millions of rubles (gold) it was as follows:

The patriotic war of 1812	80
Crimean War (1853-1856)	190
Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878)	450
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)	1,420
World War I (1914-1917)	12,000

In wars of the era of monopolistic capitalism, the percent of expenditures for military technology as compared to the total costs of war increases regularly. For example, in the Russo-Turkish war, this percentage for Russia was 25, whereas in World War I it increased to 60.

World War II shows an even larger increase in the role of equipment.

While in 1914, an average of one-third of one horsepower per soldier was estimated, in World War II this amounted to 20 horsepower. Undoubtedly, in modern war these indexes will be much higher.

The increasing material requirements for waging war naturally lead to a requirement for greater productive strength of industry of the belligerent countries. The table shows the increase in the growth of yearly production of the basic weapons and military equipment among the main participants of World Wars I and II.

Table 2
Average Annual Production in the Main Belligerent Countries

	World War I	World War II (1941-1944)
Airplanes	up to 45,000	130,000
Tanks	9,000*	over 91,000
Artillery pieces and mortars	37,000	up to 510,000
Machine Guns	over 250,000	over 1,660,000

* Produced in the countries of the Triple Entente by the end of the war.

This indicates that the growth of production and the development of productive forces naturally lead to an increasing role of the economic factor in war.

The Nature of the Interrelation of Strategy and Economics. The interrelation of strategy and economics is characterized by the fact that the developments and the changes in strategic concepts depend completely on economic conditions and the level of productive forces achieved at a given time.

A characteristic feature of these interrelations is also the fact that although economic development is subject to its own laws, the direction of this development is chosen from strategic considerations, and in time of war is almost completely determined by military requirements. The interdependence of strategy and economics is not direct, but rather through the organs of governmental administration.

Let us examine in order how these traits and peculiarities are manifested in the various aspects of the interrelation of strategy and economics.

The entire history of the development of the theory of strategy is a striking proof of the dominating influence of economics on the nature of military strategic concepts. Regardless of the era, whose features these concepts always bear, and regardless of the national affiliation of the strategy, one general regularity formulated by F. Engels exists: "Armaments, composition, organization, tactics, and strategy primarily depend on the level of development of industry and means of communication achieved at a given moment" [15].

This dependence is manifested as a result of evolutionary development

and gradual change of industrial methods, as well as because of radical revolutionary changes. Strategy is influenced by the change in the social-economic structure as a whole, as well as by individual discoveries and inventions in the technical field. For instance, the invention of gunpowder and of firearms led to the creation of the scattered formation on the battlefield. Rifle artillery pieces led to deep formations in the combat order and the ability to hit the enemy deep behind the front lines. The invention of radio and the creation of the first radiotelegraph companies, providing communication at distances of 80 kilometers or more, made radio communication at times into a means of strategic leadership. The appearance of aviation marked the birth of the strategic theory of air superiority and changed previous concepts of ground operations. The nuclear weapon marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of strategy, based on entirely new principles.

It should be noted that changes in the concepts of military strategic views are influenced not only by discoveries and inventions in some narrow field, but also by the general level of technical progress, encompassing all the leading branches of the economy. For instance, the gradual increase in the tonnage of ocean-going vessels increased the possibilities of transportation and concentration of troops by sea. This in turn made the navy a means of strategic concentration and deployment. Or another example. The perfection of metallurgical processes led to higher-quality steel, which made it possible to construct and build rapid-firing artillery pieces and machine guns. The introduction of these weapons into the army influenced not only the methods of solution and tactical and operational problems, but the methods of warfare as a whole. Radical changes in military strategic concepts were made by the mass introduction of automobiles and tanks into armies which caused the elaboration of maneuverable methods on conducting war.

Strategy was influenced immensely by the rapid construction of railroads which accelerated and increased the volume of transport, making possible rapid troop concentration. Further extension of the railroad system, the perfection of railroad equipment, the increased load capacity of moving stock, and the increased passability of the track made it possible to amass, within a short time, large troop concentrations in theaters of military operations, and expanded the possibilities of strategic maneuver.

All this to a great extent had an influence on the changes of strategic concepts. The density and shape of railroad networks began to influence the formulation of strategic war plans as well as individual operations, since they determined the timetable of mobilization and deployment of armed forces. For instance, Germany and Austria, which have a highly developed network of railroads and railroad lines running parallel to the eastern border, before World War I planned to complete their strategic deployment according to the following timetable: Germany, thirteen days after the proclamation of mobilization, and Austria, sixteen days. At the same time Czarist Russia, due to the absence of a well-developed railroad network or a system of railroads running parallel to the western border, could complete its deployment only after twenty-four days according to the

calculations of the Russian general staff.

This is the general picture of the first feature of the interrelation of military strategy and economics.

In spite of the fact that economy develops on the basis of its own specific laws, its development has certain peculiarities which arise from its responsibilities toward strategy.

The economy of a country cannot develop without taking into account the strategic considerations and interests of the most efficient use of the country's resources for defense. It is for this reason that the requirements of military strategy are taken into account in the formulation of economic development plans. In addition to this, a country must be able to change its economy to a war footing at a moment's notice in the event of war. For this purpose the economic structure of a country usually is adaptable to some degree to make the switch of the economy to a war footing easier.

The most careful strategic considerations are taken into account by the organs of the economic leadership in formulating plans for the geographic distribution of industry, regions of agricultural production, and the building of means of communication.

In speaking of the relationship between military strategy and economics, we cannot neglect the responsibilities of military strategy toward the economy. Military strategy in presenting definite demands to the economy must outline very clearly the entire course of economic mobilization of the national economy, the actual possibilities, and the conditions of deployment of military industries, as well as the difficulties which may arise.

Strategy must supply to the economy accurate data on the requirements of at least the first year of war, as well as the rates of consumption, losses, and replacement of material and technical means. It must develop and realize measures aimed at the protection of its economic units, as well as take measures to affect the economy of the enemy by means of armed conflict.

In order to execute military attacks against the economy of the enemy according to strategic plans, frequently special operations are executed to capture and destroy strategically important regions or raw material sources. In this sense we can refer to Hitler's operation "Blue Fox," whose main purpose was the capture of the nickel deposits of the Kola Peninsula.

Each state usually reorganizes its economy on a military footing in the event of war. Depending on the economic structure of the society, the economic reorganization in different countries can take different courses. However, as shown by military experience, it must include the following measures:

- a) the mobilization of industry, agriculture, transportation and communications;
- b) the development of the construction of new military industrial centers and the evacuation of regions threatened by military action;
- c) the construction of a highway system;
- d) the organization and redistribution of manpower, and the training and re-training of industrial manpower;
- e) the mobilization of all food resources of the country and the introduction of a strict food rationing;
- f) the conduct of financial operations of the country, the issuing of bond certificates, the levying of additional taxes, and internal loans;
- g) the rearrangement and redistribution of foreign trade; and
- h) the reorganization of economic control.

With the outbreak of military hostilities the influence of strategic plans on economic development grows considerably. At the same time strategy develops its plan always on the basis of material and technical possibilities. Historical military experience shows that the beginning of many large-scale military operations had to be timed to the appearance of new military equipment at the front. This is especially clearly characterized by the counter-attack of the Soviet troops during the period of the battle of Stalingrad, 1942-1943.

The material safeguards often influence also the most long-range plans of strategic leadership. For example, the Russian high command in 1915 was forced to stop the successfully developing offensive in the Carpathians and withdraw its troops because of a lack of ammunition.

We must delve briefly into the forms of the interrelations of strategy and economy. As previously pointed out, this interrelationship is most often manifested not in direct relations, but rather through the organs of state administration. This is understandable, since military leadership cannot issue orders directly to the various trusts, combines or factories; this would produce anarchy in industry. Therefore, even the capitalist state strives to achieve some agreement and coordination of action between its strategy and economy through the organs of state administration, even though it is not always successful. The centralization of economic administration in time of war makes it possible for military leadership to deal with only one responsible agency or organ, which takes into account military and economic interests.

The organization and functions of state organs dealing with the fulfillment of strategic requirements and providing the necessities of the armed forces have different structures in different countries. However, in design, the organs have a common denominator. They usually perform the

following functions: take into account the possible economic resources of the country and probable requirements of war; develop plans for the economic preparations of the country and the supply of the armed forces with all the necessities in the event of war; tie in the current economic measures with the requirements of military strategy; eliminate discrepancies in the economy, should these arise; prepare and execute the mobilization of industry, transportation and communications; distribute materiel between the front and the rear areas.

Strategy and Economy in Socialist and in Capitalist Countries. The social and economic conditions exert a substantial influence on the interrelation of strategy and economy. This becomes particularly evident in the imperialist era. In 1905, in the article "The Fall of Port Arthur," V. I. Lenin states: "The connection between the military organization of the country and its entire economic and cultural structure has never been as close as it is today" [16].

In the socialist state the relation between strategy and economy in many respects is determined by the socialized ownership of the means of production, by the planned basis in the development of the national economy and the leadership of the Communist party.

Public ownership of the means of production excludes all unhealthy competition in the economy and permits all efforts to be concentrated on the achievement of the general aims of the state.

The absence of private ownership of the means of production enables Soviet military strategy to be based exclusively on the scientific analysis of the nature of modern war in its determination of the specific weight and the directions of development of one or another service of the armed forces, without considering the interests of large monopolies, as is done in capitalist countries.

Planned economy furthers the economic organization of society and makes it possible to utilize all the productive resources of the country more rapidly and efficiently, so that the strategy of a socialist state in its plans can always find support in the known possibilities and clearly defined perspectives of economic development.

The unified leadership of the Communist party assures agreement of the aims and actions of strategy and economy.

The decisive advantage of the Soviet socialist state over the bourgeois states is the fact that the socialist structure assures a more perfect economic organization of society; this is of decisive significance for the defensive power of a state. Better economic organization made it possible for the Soviet government during the Civil War, under conditions of total destruction of the economy, to utilize effectively those meager material resources at the disposal of the young Soviet republic and to organize successfully the defense of the country. The leadership of the Communist party in the defense of the country and the strong organization

of the nation made it possible even in those days to realize Lenin's slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory!"

The strong economic organization of the Soviet society played an even more important part during the Great Patriotic War. The reorganization of industry according to a war program was accomplished in the Soviet Union twice as fast as in the capitalist countries of the anti-Hitler coalition; the rate of growth of military industry exceeded by many times those previously known for socialist economy. Thus, by December of 1942, the production of airplanes in the USSR, in comparison with December, 1941, increased by a factor of 3.3; that of tanks by a factor of 2. These high rates of production, combined with effective organization of labor and industry, made it possible for the Soviet economy to produce yearly more airplanes, tanks, artillery pieces and mortars, in spite of the fact that the enemy produced more steel, cast iron, coal, and other materials.

During the four years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union produced an annual average of 11.3 million tons of steel, 7.8 million tons of cast iron, and 113.7 million tons of coal, while Germany together with its satellites produced 33.4 million tons of steel, 24.5 million tons of cast iron, and 537.7 million tons of coal. At the same time the Soviet Union produced an annual average of 27,000 airplanes and 23,774 tanks and self-propelled guns, while Germany produced 19,720 airplanes and 12,400 tanks and self-propelled guns.

One of the principles of socialist economy is the agreement between the interests of development of national economy and the goal of satisfying the requirement of the growing needs of the population and the problems of strengthening of the defense of the country.

M. V. Frunze, in 1924, in the article "The Front and the Rear in Future War" described this principle: "In every new undertaking -- economic, cultural, etc. -- one must always ask the question: How will the results of this undertaking jibe with the defense of the country? Is there any chance of securing definite military aims without detriment to peaceful requirements?" [17].

The principle of combining the interests of development of the national economy and the reinforcement of the defensive strength makes it possible to strive simultaneously for: decreasing the distance between industry and the sources of raw materials and between industry and consumers; the economic development of the backward regions of the country; a planned territorial distribution of the labor force among the economic regions in accordance with the plan of complex development of economy within each economic region; the convenience of strategic deployment; the material and technical support of the armed forces and their constant high combat preparedness.

These are, in brief, the features of the interrelation of strategy and economy in a socialist state.

The situation is quite different in a capitalist state where the economic development is to a great extent subject to the unbridled forces of competition. Private ownership of the means of production gives rise to a bitter fight for profits which has a serious effect on military production, and consequently on the development of different services of the armed forces and on the development of strategic concepts and theories. Private capitalist interests often retard the development of those branches of military industry whose production is of little profit, even though it is indispensable from the military point of view. The attempts of a bourgeois government to assume a coordinating role are not always successful, since the statesmen try to favor the monopolies, i. e., the arms manufacturers, whose interests they represent before the government. To prove this, it is sufficient to consider the new American administration. The present Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, is the President of the Rockefeller Foundation; the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, is a former president of the Ford Motor Company and a director of the Scott Paper Company; the Postmaster General, Edward Day, is a former vice-president of the Prudential Life Insurance Company; and the Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon, is one of the heads of the Dillon, Reed and Company.

To satisfy business interests in a bourgeois government, even strategic plans are built on economic advantages. War experience shows that private capitalist interests often guide military actions. Thus, during World War II the American companies, General Motors and Ford, closely connected with the automobile and tank companies of Germany, succeeded in pushing through their demands that the plants of the latter companies not be subjected to bombing by the American Air Force.

For profit's sake the capitalists are ready to justify and support any military doctrine. The Rockefellers netted \$450,000,000 profit during World War I. As a result of World War II, the capital of the Rockefellers increased to \$2,127,000,000. The profits race does not even stop capitalist monopolies from betraying the national interests. It is known that more than sixty American companies located on German soil during the war produced arms for Hitler's armies, which were then used against the Allied armies. The American firm General Motors, through the German Opel Company, produced one-half of all the automobiles manufactured in Germany during the war for use of the German army. During World War II, the Rockefellers gave to the German I. G. Farbenindustrie patents for the preparation of synthetic rubber, indispensable to Hitler's armies, and withheld these patents from American industrialists.

One cannot completely deny the influence of bourgeois governmental organs on the interrelation of strategy and economics in capitalist countries. For example, in the countries of the fascist totalitarian regime, as shown by experience, the state played a strongly regulating part. This was especially evident during the war.

However, one should not forget that the influence of a bourgeois state on the economy in the interests of strategy can often assume the ugliest forms. Thus, in the past war the governments of Germany and Britain

through their legislatures achieved a concentration of industry, forcibly liquidating small and medium-sized businesses. A German government decree forbade development of any industry with a capital less than 500,000 marks. In Britain by the middle of 1943, allegedly because of shortage of labor, equipment, and raw materials, 3200 small companies were forcibly closed; that is, one-third of those in existence at the beginning of the war.

In the final analysis, these measures produced some benefits with regard to effective industrial organization and increased the military production of necessary items. But again, this was done to favor the large monopolists, who in their competition with the smaller firms were aided by the government. The only course open to bourgeois government in the coordination of strategy and economy is to take into account the peculiarities of development of the capitalist economy, and to use this as a basis for the development of their strategic plans.

The governments of imperialist countries can do nothing to bring about a more rational geographic distribution of the economy. It is not by chance that in capitalist countries almost the entire economy is concentrated in large administrative and industrial centers and nothing is done for the undeveloped regions. For example, in the USA the northeastern industrial region comprising 30.9 percent of the territory of the USA contains 80 percent of the production of ferrous metals and two-thirds of the production of electrical energy.

In Britain, 55 percent of petroleum products, 63 percent of the steel and cast iron, and over 60 percent of all military equipment is produced in 15 large industrial regions. In West Germany, the Ruhr Valley alone accounts for the production of 90 percent of coal and 85 percent of the production of steel, chemicals, and military equipment.

Thus, in spite of the fact that the capitalist economy as a whole is aimed at a preparation for war, bourgeois military strategy cannot be based on economic planning and often lacks a clear perspective of economic development, since everything is basically subject to the unbridled forces of competitive struggle.

Strategy and the Moral-Political Factor

The Role of the Moral Factor in War. Marxism-Leninism defines the moral factor as one of the decisive elements of any war, since victory, in the last analysis, depends on "...the morale of the masses who shed their blood on the battlefield" [18].

This acquires special significance in conditions of nuclear rocket war, in the fire of which not only the political and moral foundations of the state as a whole, but also the moral steadfastness of each soldier, his ideological convictions, and his psychological traits are subjected to a cruel test.

Examining these traits, not from the point of view of abstract

morals, but understanding them as the result of the influence of the sum total of ideological and political stimuli on armed forces personnel, the possibility of a profound moral shock, which a person may experience after the first destructive and devastating nuclear strikes, should not be ignored.

It goes without saying that high morale of troops engaged directly in military operations is inconceivable without a high political morale of the entire nation. This becomes especially evident today, when the sphere of armed conflict encompasses vast masses of the population of the belligerent countries, when the borderline between the front and the rear is erased.

Modern war is waged by mass armies, and their morale is an outgrowth of the attitude of the entire nation, that is, of the ideas which emanate from the rear areas. Any military strategy which does not take into account this most important factor and which is based only on the superiority of material means runs the risk of losing a lot. In time of war, as pointed out by F. Engels, the moral factor is immediately transformed into material strength.

The moral state of soldiers and the social-political aspect of the army were considered by F. Engels to be the most important factors affecting military strategy. He stressed that the victories of the French Revolution were substantially aided by the fact that the ranks of the revolutionary army were composed of people liberated from feudal oppression, which was not the case with the enemies of France, who maintained discipline only by means of a big stick. Engels also points out that a member of the socialist society will always fight with inspiration, fortitude, and courage; in the face of these, the mechanical training of the bourgeois armies is of no avail.

In discussing the reasons for our victories in the Civil War, Lenin wrote: "...our proletariat, weak in numbers, worn out by misfortune and privation, was victorious because of its strong moral force" [19].

To evaluate correctly the role of the moral factor in war it is necessary to start with an objective analysis of military history and of the conditions and nature of modern war. Military strategy is weakened as much by underestimating as by giving this factor a dominating role in war. It is necessary to keep in mind that in various periods and by different military leaders the role of the moral factor in war was evaluated differently.

The significance of the moral factor in war has been known to generals for a long time. Napoleon said that victory in battle depends 75 percent on moral elements and only 25 percent on other conditions.

Modern bourgeois military theoreticians in writings are inclined at times to overestimate the significance of these elements in war. For example, British Field Marshal Montgomery in one of his speeches said: "I consider morale the greatest and the only factor in war. Without high morale no success can be achieved, no matter how good the strategic and

tactical plans, and all the rest" [20].

Many examples can be given indicating recognition by bourgeois ideologists of the important role of the moral factor in war. However, it is necessary to recognize what is meant by the moral factor and what elements in the opinion of the imperialist military ideologists take part in the formulation of moral forces.

The bourgeois concepts of the moral force of the army are usually reduced to a collection of subjective psychological and biological qualities of soldiers and officers. Therefore the basis for the moral potential is taken not from social and economical conditions and class interests, but rather from the biological, racial, and psychological peculiarities of man, which are a result of the national customs and habits.

British Field Marshal Slim in the article "What is Morale?" gives the following definition: "Morale is the intangible spirit of men and women. Like bravery, morale is a state of mind, a mixture of feeling and reason" [21].

In line with this, bourgeois military ideologists consider that the sources of morale are not conditions of the material life of society and the social structure, but rather the national peculiarities of the psychology of the people. Certain bourgeois theoreticians insist that the source of morale is the striving of man for self-preservation, the herd instinct, racial solidarity, etc.

It is quite evident that the national characteristics play an important part in the creation of the morale of an army, just as do individual characteristics of each man (heroism, self-sacrifice, initiative, and spirit). However, this is not the main source of the moral potential. History shows that not only strong patriotism and the readiness of a people for self-sacrifice, but all material, political and spiritual forces of a people, taken as a whole, determine the course and the outcome of war. Lenin stressed that the moral factor has an economic basis: "They refer constantly to the heroic patriotism and the marvelous military spirit of the French in 1792-1793, but they forget the material and historical-economic conditions which alone made these words possible" [22].

The social and state structure is the most important source of the morale of an army. The social and state structure of a belligerent country plays a decisive part not only in the creation of the moral forces of a nation and army but also in maintaining these at the necessary level in time of war.

What is the moral-political factor?

The moral-political factor, in its military significance, is the totality of moral factors expressing the ability of the people and of the armed forces to withstand all the trials of war, even those requiring the maximum exertion of physical and spiritual strength. At the same time,

it is the ability of the government [Editor's Note #2] to maintain a constant high morale of the army and the people.

In the creation of the moral-political factor a decisive part is played by politics, which provides the necessary ideological and economic conditions. However, raising the morale even to the highest level does not guarantee victory, but merely provides better prospects for it. These prospects still must be converted into reality; this is the problem of the military and political leadership during a war. [Editor's Note #3]

The Interrelation and Interdependence of Strategy and the Moral-Political Factor. From the point of view of strategy, the assurance of success of military operations requires not only a high moral-political level of the entire nation but particularly a combat morale of the troops engaged directly in combat. High combat morale of the armed forces makes victory possible with equal, and sometimes even with smaller forces than the enemy has, as shown by many examples from military history.

Thus, the interrelation between strategy and the moral-political factor in war is most often manifested as a mutual dependence of strategic successes and the morale of the troops, as one of the elements of the moral-political factor.

All this testifies to the fact that in the working-out of strategic plans, consideration of the moral and political state of the people and, consequently, of the moral and combat qualities of the troops becomes an extremely necessary condition for their reality.

The moral-political factor influences not only the nature of the strategic concepts, but also the methods for their realization. Strategic leadership cannot but consider the moral and political state of the entire population of the country and of the armed forces, when selecting one or another method of strategic action.

The most important sources of high morale of the armed forces are the social and political homogeneity of the rear areas and the unity of spirit of all the levels of the population. It is not by accident that the most stable morale belongs to that army whose rear areas are marked by class unity. However, it should be noted that in individual cases high moral stability can be achieved in an army even in the absence of such unity. This is the situation when the rear areas of the belligerent country are held together by a feeling of national unity, and when the class contradictions become less pronounced, for a certain time, than the ideas of national independence and sovereignty.

In other cases, a short-lived relatively high stability of the troops, in the absence of a class unity of the people, may result from false but purposeful propaganda. It is impossible to underestimate the ability of the ideological apparatus of an imperialist country to make fools of its people, to intoxicate them with the drug of nationalistic ideas, and to work them up psychologically in order to achieve its selfish imperialist

aims. It is well known how shamelessly Hitler's propaganda played on the national and racist feelings of the German people during World War II.

However, experience indicates that such a boost to morale is not long-lived. The nationalistic fervor of the German people, who were intoxicated by their first military successes in the West, disappeared as soon as Fascist Germany came face-to-face with defeat on the Eastern front.

Here the interrelation and interdependence of strategy and the moral-political factor were manifested with great strength. As seen from this example, military successes or defeats decisively affect the morale of the army and the people.

The victories of the Red Army at Moscow and Stalingrad are also indicative. They serve to raise the morale not only of the Soviet people, but of the peoples of all the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. In spite of all the efforts of the bourgeois falsifiers of the history of World War II to minimize the psychological significance of these victories, they will remain the most prominent victories with regard to their military and moral significance throughout World War II.

Even the German military historian K. Tippelskirch refuted the statement of Anglo-American historians who ascribed first-place significance to the events in Africa during World War II:

"In spite of the fact that, within the framework of the war as a whole, the North African events received greater attention than the Battle of Stalingrad, the Stalingrad catastrophe shook the German army and German people far more, because it hit closer to home. Something had occurred there, something inconceivable, that had not been seen since 1806: the annihilation of an army surrounded by the enemy" [23].

Thus, military successes have a substantial influence on the morale of the people and the army; morale, in turn, determines the nature of strategic plans in general, and of individual operations in particular.

The moral factor has an important place in strategic planning. Thus, if the policy on the whole corresponds to the interest of the popular masses, then the strategic plans reflecting the policy will find the support of the people and the army. Otherwise, they are built on sand. For example, the leaders of the countries of the Triple Entente initially thought it possible to defeat the young Soviet republic with twenty or thirty thousand well-armed troops. However, the high morale of the young Red Army, as well as the popular resistance within the Entente countries showed the complete failure of these plans.

Because the Red Army during the Civil War showed an exceptionally high revolutionary fortitude and enjoyed the moral support of the majority of the population, the interventionists, [Editor's Note #4] ||even having superiority in military equipment, ||| could not accomplish their rapacious aims.

The dependence of strategic plans on the morale of the army is manifested also in the fact that these plans must often be coordinated with the current attitudes of the troops. History shows us many examples where low morale of the troops forced strategic leadership to renounce planned offensives.

To properly estimate the combat potential of an army, it is necessary to have a clear conception of its morale, that is, as Engels stressed, one must know what can and what cannot be demanded from the army without risking its demoralization. Strategic plans must take into account not only the prewar morale of the army, but also the morale as war began, since the morale of the army changes substantially with the onset of war. This occurs because war makes the contradictions much more acute, especially those of rear areas where there are class distinctions.

In capitalist countries, as Lenin pointed out, in time of war the contradictions between the government and the people, the people and the army, and the army and the government becomes more acute. In a socialist country, on the other hand, the government, the people, and the army, in the fire of war reach even greater unity, which gives rise to new moral-political qualities of the entire society. Past military experience shows that the harder the trials of a country, the more boldly are manifested the opposing tendencies. It is for this reason that modern bourgeois military theoreticians, fearing a disruption of the equilibrium between the social strata of their country (which, even in peacetime, is achieved with great difficulty, and only in very few capitalist countries, at that), strive for methods of warfare and strategic concepts which would guarantee the quickest conclusion of war, and preclude popular objections to war. In fitting their military strategy to limited moral resources, bourgeois military theoreticians advance various theories such as those of "limited war" and "small professional armies." The political scheme of these theories is to convince the public that the war will require few sacrifices and will be limited as to scope, methods, and aims, so that it can be won by a small professional army without involving the entire nation.

In addition to this, certain capitalist military strategists are not loath to advocate a "blitzkrieg." The reasons advanced for this are that in a short war the moral-political advantages of the socialist camp will lack the time to manifest themselves with the same force as in a protracted war.

The military strategists of imperialism are interested not only in the moral-political preparation of their people and army for war. An important part in the strategic plans of imperialism is given to the ideological work among the troops and the population of the opponent, to the so-called "psychological warfare." This method of warfare, together with the actions of the ground forces, the air force, and the navy, is considered to be an independent type of operation. The theory of "psychological warfare" often degenerates into the principle of delivering a "demoralizing blow" which, according to bourgeois military theoreticians, should lead to final victory within a short time.

The concept of the "demoralizing blow" was hatched by Hitler, who from the experience of the fascist German operations in the West tried to induce panic in the rear areas of the Red Army. However, by the admission of the Germans themselves, that which was easily accomplished in France and Belgium proved to be impossible on the Soviet-German front.

This indicates that the concept of a "demoralizing blow" and an expectation of good results from "psychological warfare" can yield positive results only in single combat with a morally unstable enemy.

Strategy and Military Doctrine

Military doctrine is the expression of the accepted views of a state regarding the problems of political evaluation of future war, the state attitude toward war, a determination of the nature of future war, preparation of the country for war in the economic and moral sense, and regarding the problems of organization and preparation of the armed forces, as well as of the methods of waging war. Consequently, by military doctrine one should understand the system of officially approved, ||scientifically based|| views on the basic fundamental problems of war.

Military doctrine depends directly on the social structure, the state problems with regard to domestic and foreign policy, and the economic, political and cultural state of the country. Military doctrine exploits the conclusions of various sciences. The doctrine rests upon the conclusions of military science particularly as regards determining the nature of a future war and the methods for conducting it, and for determining the structure and preparation of the armed forces.

Military doctrine is formed on the basis of the entire vital activity of the country and is the result of an extremely complex and prolonged historical process of the origin and development of state ideas in the field of defense. The basic principles of doctrine are determined by the political leadership of the state. Therefore, military doctrine is state doctrine. There can be no single military doctrine for all states, since military doctrine is determined by the general political guideline of the social class ruling each state and by the economic and moral resources at its disposal. In addition, doctrine depends on the concrete conditions in which the state finds itself.

Speaking of Soviet military doctrine, it must be said that its political aspect was formulated by V. I. Lenin. The Leninist theses on the attitude of our state toward war, the nature of our military tasks, and the political aims of war are still valid today. They were further developed in the decisions of the Congresses of the Communist party.

The particular feature in the development of the military doctrines of the imperialist states is that their drafting takes place not only, and not so much within, the national frameworks of individual states as much as mainly within the framework of aggressive blocs. Kingston-McCloughry in the book Global Strategy writes: "The existence of NATO and SEATO, despite

their deficiencies, means that since the time that world war became a characteristic feature of history we are the first to have or may have at our disposal a ready military machine of allies, capable of developing the necessary strategy" [24].

Despite the fact that antagonism exists between imperialist countries and that these blocs are torn by internal contradictions, the imperialist military theorists are trying to develop an over-all, if one can say, "common" military doctrine. Attempts to develop a "common" military doctrine for aggressive blocs are directed to the creation of coordinated points of view on the structure of the armed forces and the conduct of war. In the opinion of the same Kingston-McCloughry, such a doctrine represents the "result of a compromise combination of individual elements of national strategy of the allies... The unity of interests and aims, without doubt, should comprise the basis of allied strategy... The first prerequisite for the solution of the great number of problems is the display of a certain flexibility of thought in political and military leaders as well as a spirit of mutual adaptability... Therefore, in the formulation of an allied strategy, many national interests must be abandoned" [25].

Consequently, the first prerequisite for the development of a "common" doctrine for the capitalist countries is the rejection by the countries -- participants in aggressive blocs -- of their national interests in favor of the imperialists of the USA.

The development of the armed forces of the countries participating in a bloc is determined not so much by their national, economic, and geographic position as by the striving of the ruling circles of the USA to hold their allies in complete political and economic dependence.

Of late, some countries as, for example, [Editor's Note #5] West Germany, have been striving to develop their armed forces independently; however, their practically complete dependence on the United States in the field of armaments, especially in nuclear rocket weapons, forces the governments of these countries to follow the USA in questions of the structure of the armed forces.

The content and nature of military doctrine is influenced to a certain extent by the geographical location of a country and the national characteristics of its population.

The influence of the geography of a country cannot be examined without taking into consideration other factors of economic and political nature, as well as the position of the neighboring states and the interrelations with them.

The influence of national characteristics of the people on the formation of military doctrine in a capitalist society at the present time loses its former significance. In its struggle to suppress the democratic forces of a country and to strengthen its position, the bourgeoisie of one country will come to terms with the bourgeoisie of another, stronger capitalist

country, often to the detriment of its own national interests of the people.

Military strategy occupies a subordinate position with regard to military doctrine. Military doctrine determines over-all policy in principle, while military strategy, starting from this over-all policy develops and investigates concrete problems touching upon the nature of future war, the preparation of a country for war, the organization of the armed forces, and the methods of warfare.

The Class Essence of Bourgeois Military Strategy

In speaking of the class essence of bourgeois military strategy, one cannot ignore the problem of the nature of the foreign and domestic policy of imperialist countries, since the class interests of imperialism find their expression in them and they also determine the content of military strategy and its essence.

At the present stage, the supremacy of monopolies and, in particular, the monopolies of the United States of America provide the economic and ideological foundation of imperialism. It sets the tone and in many respects determines the foreign policy of all imperialist countries.

American imperialism strives for world domination, as evidenced by the pronouncement of ex-President Eisenhower: "...the vital interests of America are connected with the entire world, encompassing both hemispheres and all the continents," and the United States feels it must "assume an important role in world affairs, a role of energetic leadership" [26].

In its desire to mask the predatory, aggressive nature of the foreign functions of the present American government, the ruling circles of the United States resort to lies, declaring that they extend economic aid to underdeveloped countries and mutual assistance to their partners in various blocs and alliances in defense against "Communist aggression." Former President Kennedy, in his speech in Vienna in June, 1961, hypocritically asserted that economic assistance to underdeveloped countries is a "historic opportunity for the United States to aid these countries in building the respective societies," and that for this reason we "can train and equip their troops." In the same speech, Kennedy stated that "the U. S. even now supports many countries from the north of Europe to the Middle East to Saigon." In essence, this speech again confirmed that the United States aims at world domination and proved that the economic relations of American imperialism with other countries have a sharply pronounced military and political taint.

The policy of the United States, Britain [Editor's Note #6] and West Germany reflects the desire of reactionary militarist circles to impose their will upon other countries by means of economic and political pressure, of threats and provocation.

This policy has been called a policy "from the position of strength." It gives expression to the desire of the most aggressive circles of modern

imperialism for world domination, the suppression of labor, democratic and national-liberation movements and for the preparation of military ventures against the socialist camp, and, first of all, against the USSR.

It is not by accident that the American military and political literature devotes special attention to the cult of force as the most important means for the realization of its foreign policy.

In numerous military and political publications which have appeared in the USA in recent years, the principle of force is regarded as the only possible principle of United States relations with other governments. Thus, the American military theoretician G. F. Elliot insists that "the only realistic American policy is to maintain its strength at an incomparable level" and that foreign policy must be based on an "actively aggressive principle" [27]. Another author, N. J. Spykman, in his book American Strategy in World Politics attempts to prove that international problems can be solved only by means of force and that only force can serve to accomplish the aims of foreign policy. "In international society," he writes, "all forms of coercion are permissible including destructive war." Spykman calls upon the government to "impose its will upon those who have no strength, and force concessions from those with little strength" [28].

The main component of the policy "from the position of strength" is international provocation, espionage and sabotage, the disruption of international economic and cultural ties, and artificial straining of international relations.

According to official pronouncements of political leaders of the USA, the policy from "a position of strength" is a policy of pressure, a policy of dictation, supported by the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. Nuclear weapons are its basic factor and fulcrum.

Among western statesmen there is a widespread opinion that this policy makes a new war impossible since it will assure "a balance of power" in the world.

Appearing in Chicago, former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles outlined two directions of American foreign policy: that of military blocs and that of an armaments race.

The armaments race in the USA has already assumed gigantic proportions. An increasing large part of the national income is expended for the maintenance of huge armies and for the armaments race.

The military and strategic forms of enacting the foreign policy of modern imperialist countries are manifested in the capture of bases, the occupation of foreign territories, and the knocking together of aggressive military blocs and groups.

In pursuing its aggressive aims and fulfilling the requirements of military strategy, the government of the United States of America has

created large military bases on the territories of countries thousands of kilometers away from the borders of the USA -- bases for military operations against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

American military bases are springboards for aggressive war against the countries of the socialist camp, and at the same time create conditions for interference in the internal affairs of the countries in which they are located. The USA, in locating its military units on the territory of its allies and equipping them with atomic weapons, pursues aims of provocation and attempts to divert from itself the retaliatory blow in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp.

The ideologists of American imperialism do not hide the true purpose of these bases. For example, Kieffer writes: "Tomorrow's battlefield will be the whole world. Today's problem is to secure the maximum number of points of strategic importance in the world and to train our troops to hold these positions" [29].

A more complete characteristic of the aims in forming these bases is given by Hanson Baldwin, military reviewer of the American magazine Saturday Evening Post. He writes that the military bases of the USA "serve many purposes. They are important as a springboard for an attack against the central areas of Russia... At the same time, the economic necessity which forces us to look beyond our borders is conceivably even more serious than the military necessity. We must have access to raw materials in other countries of the world and we must be able to export a part of our production surplus" [30].

In practice, the creation of numerous military bases on foreign soil becomes, in fact, an occupation of these countries. Thus, for example, in accordance with the American-Greek agreement concerning military bases, "the government of the United States can bring in, quarter, and maintain American personnel in Greece. American armed forces and their equipment can be brought into Greece, taken out at will, and moved freely within the country; moreover they will have free access to the air space over Greece and its territorial waters" [31].

New military blocs and alliances are being formed in preparation for a new world war.

Participation of small countries in military and political blocs and alliances often leads to direct occupation of these countries.

In following the aggressive policy on their countries, bourgeois military theoreticians formulate the military strategy of capitalist countries, which directs the genius of man against man himself, turning scientific discoveries into terrible weapons for waging destructive war. Thus, scientific discoveries dealing with the fission of the atom were immediately utilized by the military strategy of the USA to make atomic bombs.

To serve the militaristic desires of the American imperialists, inhuman theories of reactionary scientists, which differ but little from Hitler's mad dreams, were conceived in the USA. Thus, the Dean of the University of Tampa, Doctor Nance, declared: "I believe that we must engage in thorough preparation based on the law of the jungle. Everyone must learn the art of killing. I do not believe that war should be restricted to armies, navies, and air forces, or that there should be any limitation with regard to method or weapons of destruction. I would approve of bacteriological warfare, the use of poison gas, atomic and hydrogen bombs and ICBM's. I would not ask mercy for hospitals, churches, schools, or any other population groups..." [32].

Reactionary theories find practical application in the military strategy and in the foreign policy of the USA. The operations of the colossal apparatus of the White House, the Pentagon, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and all the practical activity of the U.S. government are directed toward the realization of these theories.

Reactionary scientists in various disciplines, sociologists, economists, and military theoreticians, in reflecting the desire of imperialists for world domination, develop various theories and doctrines of military strategy. Like flashes in a kaleidoscope, we see in the pages of the bourgeois press: "brinkmanship," "the strategy of deterrence," "the doctrine of containment," "doctrine of liberation," and finally, in recent years, there has appeared a special interest in the problem of so-called limited wars, and the theory of "escalation of war."

The emergence of the theory of limited war was not accidental. With the colossal success of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp in economics, science, technology, and culture before them, the imperialists have become convinced not only of the impossibility of crushing the socialist system but also of the inevitable catastrophic consequences for capitalism in the event of a new world war. However, political aims under conditions of capitalist society cannot conceivably be achieved without war; military theoreticians of imperialism scurry around in search of such methods of solution of military and political problems, which, on the one hand, would avoid the destruction of the capitalist system and, on the other hand, lead to the attainment of expansionist aims. Limited war, in the opinion of American military theoreticians, corresponds best to these aims. In advocating the theory of limited war, American strategists strive to secure the safety of the USA from retaliatory nuclear strikes, to suppress movements of national liberation, to preserve the colonial system, and to create additional stimuli for the economy in order to extract maximum profits.

Moreover, the imperialist military theoreticians consider that the theory of limited local wars allows convincing the American people and the people of the allied countries that war would not be "so terrible" even if nuclear weapons were to be used, that war could apparently be "softened," "normalized."

In the opinion of American military theoreticians, the value of the

doctrine of wars with limited aims consists of the fact that they apparently exclude the use of strategic nuclear weapons and, at the same time, fully preserve the possibility to implement aggression plans in Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The imperialist plans also give special importance to limited wars as a pretext for unleashing wars against the countries of the socialist camp.

Bourgeois strategy is reactionary in its social-political aims, since it serves the interests of imperialist aggressors, conducting wars which are unjust and predatory, aiming to seize foreign territories, to suppress movements of national liberation, and to subjugate peoples of other countries.

Bourgeois military strategy is reactionary, not only in its political essence, but in its ideological, theoretical, and philosophical foundations, since it interprets a social phenomenon such as war on the basis of anti-scientific bourgeois sociology, and on the basis of ideological and metaphysical philosophy.

The military strategy of imperialist governments is directed toward the preservation and strengthening of the outmoded capitalist system, at the preservation of the rotten system of colonialism, and at the struggle of the most advanced and progressive system of human society -- the socialist system.

The Class Essence of Soviet Military Strategy

The peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, constantly pursued by the Soviet government in international relations, is determined by the nature of the social system which has triumphed in the USSR and by the action of the basic economic law of socialism, whose essential characteristics and requirements are the assurance of the maximum fulfillment of the constantly growing material and cultural requirements of society as a whole by means of the constant growth and perfection of the socialist economy. The basic economic law of socialism is the objective law of development of the socialist society; it functions as the fundamental principle, which in the final analysis determines the essence of the foreign policy of a socialist state.

The decisive role of economics with regard to politics consists in the very fact that social ideas and theories have their roots in the material life of society, and that they must be sought in economics, since new political ideas and institutions arise from the existing problems of development of the material life of society.

V. I. Lenin adapted the Marxist theory of foreign policy to the new historical conditions. Leninism, starting with the objective economic laws of development of human society long before the victory of the proletariat in Russia, provided a thorough foundation for the peaceful foreign policy of the future proletariat state. Its point of departure was the new social

structure as well as the new objective laws which arose from the victory of the socialist revolution.

The Communist party of the Soviet Union is the great directing and guiding force of the Soviet state. It is guided by Marxist-Leninist theory, by the knowledge of objective economic laws, and can scientifically solve the most important tasks of building communism. In the field of domestic policy the Party considers one of its most important problems to be the constant effort to completely satisfy the constantly growing needs of the Soviet people, while in the field of foreign policy the Communist party and Soviet government consistently follow a course of preservation and consolidation of peace between nations and of development of cooperation and trade with all countries, observing the principle of maintenance of mutual interests and equal rights. In all the years of its existence, the Soviet Union has never conducted one war with aggressive aims.

In the congresses of the Communist party and in the decisions of its plenums and conferences, it is constantly stressed that the basis of the foreign policy of the Communist party and the Soviet government is the struggle to eliminate war from the life of society and to preserve world peace. The entire practical activity of the Soviet government in the international arena stems from these decisions.

To the Communist party and the Soviet government and to all the Soviet people, the cause of the strengthening of peace and the safeguarding of the security of nations is not a question of tactics and diplomatic maneuvers. It is the general guideline of Soviet foreign policy, which has been consistently expressed by the Soviet state for the many years of its existence.

The efforts of the Soviet government in this direction are bearing fruit. The nations of the world believe more and more in the possible liberation of mankind from world war. The elimination of world wars from the life of society is a real problem. All the necessary objective conditions for it have become ripe. Karl Marx wrote: "...humanity is never faced with problems which cannot be solved, since on close examination it always appears that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist, or at least are in the process of being formed" [33]. The real possibilities for the solution of this problem consist in the fulfillment of the economic plans of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, thus securing and increasing their defensive potential.

Despite the growth of its military might the Soviet Union is increasing its struggle for the cessation of the armaments race, for the prohibition of atomic weapons and testing, for complete and general disarmament, for the liquidation of foreign military bases and the removal of troops from foreign territories, and for the elimination of world war from the life of society.

The new scientific discoveries and engineering achievements of the

socialist society are used to strengthen peace and security.

The mastery of nuclear energy and the creation of ballistic rockets under the Soviet regime are used for the benefit of mankind and for the conquest of nature. The first atomic power stations and the first atomic ice breaker were designed and built in the Soviet Union; we launched the first artificial earth satellite, the first interplanetary stations, and the first man into space.

It is quite evident that the Soviet Union has left the United States far behind in the mastery of space. However, this advantage is used by the Soviet Union in peaceful and scientific ways for the benefit of all mankind.

The Soviet Union has had intercontinental rockets since 1956. It is difficult to overestimate the strategic importance of these rockets. They can reach any point on the globe carrying atomic or thermonuclear warheads of essentially unlimited destructive power. However, the Soviet government did not utilize this advantage to solve any problems of foreign policy. On the contrary, the Soviet government insists upon outlawing war, emphasizing the utter folly of solving international disputes by means of war under modern conditions. Peaceful coexistence or catastrophic war -- this is the only choice offered by history.

The high and noble aims of the Soviet government and its Armed Forces determine the nature and essence of Soviet military strategy. Soviet military strategy serves the interests of the most advanced and progressive socialist system; its efforts are directed toward the solution of problems of increasing the defensive potential of the Soviet government and toward the organization of its armed forces for successful repulsion of aggression. This is the class essence of Soviet military strategy.

Soviet military strategy is guided by progressive, rational, and completely scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, by the philosophy of dialectic and historical materialism, which makes possible scientific investigation and appropriate utilization of the objective laws determining victory in modern war.

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EDITOR'S NOTE ON CHAPTER II

The major changes in the third edition of *Military Strategy* are found in this second chapter. These changes are significant and have many implications. At the same time they should be interpreted with caution.

Military theoreticians in the USSR stress the requirement for all officers to have a thorough understanding of their probable opponents. One of the seventeen books of the "Officer's Library" series is *The Organization and Armaments of the Armies and Navies of Capitalist States*. In Soviet military bookstores, books and pamphlets can be purchased for a few kopeks discussing in detail the military equipments and forces of the United States, West Germany, or Great Britain.

Soviet perceptions of the military forces, strategy and doctrine of the Armed Forces of non-communist nations reflect, to some extent, their own concepts. This chapter, of course, may not give their true perceptions, but could be indicative of their views of the intentions of the political-military leadership of the West. Since most readers are familiar with United States military forces, individual judgments can be made as to the accuracy and the objectivity of the Soviet views.

The editors of *Military Strategy* probably have used this chapter for many purposes. The obvious reason is for the education of the Soviet officer. The section on preparation of new wars by the capitalist nations may be intended to make the Soviet officer more conscious of his responsibilities. Also, the authors may discuss military concepts which, for reasons of policy, cannot be acknowledged as being considered for adoption by their own forces, but which can be attributed to foreign nations.

Also, the Soviet political-military leadership may want their officers to become familiar with principles and concepts of non-nuclear warfare. Soviet military writings on doctrine and strategy discuss essentially nuclear concepts. Even a book such as *Tactics*, the eighth book to be published in the "Officer's Library" series, and which was reviewed as the first writing of its kind since 1941, still discusses only "the basic question of combined arms battle in nuclear rocket war." A discussion of non-nuclear war, except in the context of "wars of national liberation" apparently is not permitted - except when attributed to foreign sources.

Finally, there may be a dialogue of some sort between defense-intellectuals of the Soviet Union and the non-communist world. Conceivably, this chapter could have as a purpose that of modifying strategic thinking in the United States. Assumptions of a dialogue should be carefully made and firm conclusions are most difficult to reach.

The changed treatment the Soviet editors have given to the possible military use of space between this edition and the two previous editions is most interesting. The earlier editions had considered the military use of space in Chapter VI, entitled "Methods of Conducting Warfare," in a section on "Problems of using space for military purposes." Although all

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of the examples given were from United States sources, the editors did acknowledge that "Soviet military strategy takes into account the need for studying questions on the use of outer space and aerospace vehicles to strengthen the defense of the socialist countries."

In this 1968 edition of *Military Strategy*, all discussions of space programs are placed in Chapter II, "Military Strategy of Imperialist States and Their Preparations of New Wars." The space discussion concludes with the statement: "The facts stated are evidence that the American imperialists have taken the path of direct use of space to realize their aggressive intentions."

Later, in Chapter VI, the Soviet editors are very careful to give an impression of Soviet supremacy in space. Here the following addition is found:

"...it must be assumed that in the near future radical corrections will be able to be introduced into this system as a result of the incorporation of various cosmic means. All of this in turn conditions the nature of a future war, the methods of waging it, and the principles of organization of the armed forces."

This could be interpreted that the Soviets are taking a very active interest in the military use of space, while practicing traditional Russian secrecy. In another publication, Soviet military spokesmen have noted that "the creation of a weapon that is new in principle and secretly nurtured in scientific research bureaus and constructors' collectives can in a short time sharply change the relationship of forces. The surprise appearance of one or another type of weapon is advancing as an essential factor, especially in contemporary circumstances."

In the discussion of nuclear war, the Soviet reader may be confused by the Soviet interpretation of the views of the United States political-military leadership. The editors at one place attempt to show that the United States is seriously considering a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. In another paragraph, the Soviet authors conclude with an acknowledgment that the leaders in the United States recognize that "an all-out nuclear rocket war, no matter how it is unleashed, will be destructive for both sides." Then, "as an alternative to general nuclear war, the imperialist aggressors have promoted the concept of limited wars." In the Soviet view limited war is a type of armed conflict "...which on the one hand the USA participates in directly or indirectly (usually through their allies) and on the other, the USSR. The characteristic feature of such a war is that during its course, the strategic bombing of objectives on the territories of the USA and the USSR is supposedly not resorted to."

¹ Lt. Colonel V. M. Bondarenko, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, "Military-Technical Superiority: The Most Important Factor in the Reliable Defense of the Country", *Communist of the Armed Forces*, September, 1966, p. 10.

And further, as a United States definition:

"Limited warfare includes all types of wars using both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, as well as local wars."

The Soviets, professing to give United States views, further emphasize that a limited war is characterized by "deliberate mutual restraint", but it also is impossible "to determine accurately that limit at which a further relaxation of escalations restrictions will lead from a limited war into an all-out nuclear war." Essentially, however, it is "the essence of the pre-determined restraints on the belligerents which result in the war acquiring a limited character."

The use of nuclear weapons in a limited war always remains a primary danger. Soviet discussions of this problem are fairly realistically approached in this chapter. They acknowledge that very little actually is known about the effects of such weapons, especially their political, military and psychological consequences.

If a nuclear weapon is introduced into a limited war, what are the conditions which make it tactical or strategic? Can this be determined from its power alone, and how is this power measured? There also is the problem of determining "what means of delivery for tactical nuclear weapons can be used in limited war, and can these means be used when located outside the zone of the limited war?"

With what might be considered as an attempt at a dialogue, the Soviet editors assert that the Pentagon officials, as well as Western military theoreticians, understand the problem of limiting a "limited war," especially if "even tactical nuclear weapons are used." Henry Kissinger is quoted as an authority who believes "that limited war will automatically escalate into general war because the losing side will continually commit new resources in order to restore the situation."

After a continuation of this particular discussion, which supposedly is the American view, the Soviets conclude with the section thus:

"...in spite of all these theories and concepts, one can state with assurance that the strategy of limited warfare based on the use of only tactical nuclear weapons will involve the dangers analogous to those connected with the strategy of 'massive retaliation'."

It is also conceded that:

"A limited war is fraught with the tremendous danger of escalating into general war, especially if tactical nuclear weapons are used. This is also recognized by American theoreticians."

The Soviet editors note that the area for military maneuver in the NATO zone is very restricted, and because of this the forces might be required to use nuclear weapons from the very beginning of a conflict. Further it is considered that the NATO forces must be in constant readiness to conduct:

" - an all-out nuclear war, which from the very beginning will be conducted with massive and unlimited use of nuclear weapons...

" - an all-out nuclear war springing up as a result of the expansion of the scale of a conventional, limited armed conflict;

" - armed conflicts, during which only conventional means of destruction are used, or both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons are used."

The end result of the first two conditions postulated by the Soviets in NATO would be the same - an all-out nuclear exchange. The third suggests a "limited conflict," with or without the use of tactical nuclear weapons. However, according to Soviet theory, if nuclear powers are engaged in a limited war, the war must surely escalate to general nuclear war,

Under the heading, "Preparation of new wars by the imperialist states and basic trends in the development of the armed forces," the Soviet authors give their readers a summary of United States strategic goals and force posture. They assert that "the USA tries to have such a quantitative superiority over the USSR that, under any conditions including the most unfavorable, the USA would be in a position to deliver an effective blow with adequate force."

Facts and figures are given on the strategic offensive weapons system of the United States with relatively few polemics. The authors become less objective when they return to discuss the "military space program" of the United States. They claim that the United States is creating "space-supporting systems of satellites and systems for prohibiting the use of space by other countries..." The size of this space program is such that "the facts stated are evidence that the American imperialists have taken the path of direct use of space to realize their aggressive intentions."

Soviet discussions of United States "air defense and antimissile defense forces" presents, seemingly dispassionately, the view of the former Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, on defense limitations. The Soviets note the American premise that "with each additional increase in defensive forces, effectiveness of defense increases ever more slowly." They also note that "the American command has concluded that in the next decade the USA will actually be incapable of assuring complete defense of its territory whatever the forces available (offense and defense) for the conduct of a nuclear war."

The Soviets have added an interesting paragraph:

"The United States exerts great efforts in the creation of anti-missile and antispace defense. This is conditioned first of all by the fact that according to the views of the military-political leadership of the USA and a number of other countries of NATO, the side which

first creates an antimissile (antispace) defense, will have a most important strategic advantage which would allow the threatening of war or its unleashing without danger from the enemy's retaliatory strikes."

According to the Soviet perception of United States military posture, the United States military chiefs consider that success in "modern war is only possible through the coordinated efforts of all services of the armed forces, among which the most important role is played by the ground forces." The Soviets indicate the Americans believe these forces "are as indispensable to an all-out nuclear war as they are to a limited war..."

The Soviet editors discuss the role of "tactical aviation" in the capitalist countries and note that "in spite of the increased role and potential of nuclear weapons of the "surface-to-surface" class, tactical aviation is being further developed in most of the capitalist countries." Also noted is "the significance of tactical aviation in the conduct of limited wars is increasing."

The effect of "the revolution in military affairs upon the United States Armed Forces is also discussed. According to the Soviets, plans and programs must be formulated in the United States to satisfy military and political objectives in the light of the strategy of flexible response. This strategy requires constant combat readiness of the armed forces to conduct one or two local wars in various regions of the globe, with or without the use of nuclear weapons. Consequently, "the armed forces must be ready for all-out nuclear war."

The final summary of this chapter is most interesting. Nothing has been added, and it remains unchanged, in this respect, since 1962. The deletions from the previous editions make it significant. For example, in the next to the last paragraph there is a very curious omission from the earlier editions. The Soviet editors assert the standard phraseology about the preparation for war by the United States against the socialist camp. Previously, the last sentence in this paragraph had been as follows:

"They [the US] see the possibility of such an outcome of a war in a surprise attack and in the creation of strong and the most combat-ready armed forces which technically, especially with respect to space means, would be considerably superior to the armed forces of the enemy."

In 1968, the phrase, "especially with respect to space means" has been omitted.

This is an interesting chapter and at the same time probably easy to misinterpret. How much of it simply is to inform the Soviet officers of the Armed Forces of the so-called imperialist nations? How much is to conduct a dialogue with the West? Also, what might the Soviet editors expect the Chinese Communists to read into this chapter, as well as in the entire book?

The chapter ends with a change which might give some slight cause for optimism. Previously, the closing paragraph had contained the standard threat that "American aggressors" are being forced to reckon with "the might of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the persistent demands of the peoples of the world who protest against nuclear war and actively support proposals for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, for general and total disarmament, for achieving peace on earth."

The Soviets have dropped the meaningless phrase "for achieving peace on earth," and substituted the more realistic "for creating a sure system of international security." This suggests that Soviet leaders may be ready at last to come to some meaningful agreement which will prevent the catastrophe they have so accurately described. Words, however, must be backed up by action.

CHAPTER II

MILITARY STRATEGY OF IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES AND THEIR PREPARATION OF NEW WARS

THE CONTEMPORARY MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA AND NATO

The destruction of German fascism and Japanese militarism had an immense influence on the progressive development of the peoples of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America; it created favorable conditions for further strengthening and expansion of the influence of socialist forces. Socialism transcended the framework of one country and became a world-wide system encompassing more than one-third of the world's population.

Substantial changes also took place in the capitalist world as a result of World War II. Britain emerged from the war considerably weakened, having lost its previous might. France and other European countries, having endured German occupation for a long time, were almost totally devastated. The other capitalist countries who had participated in the war on the side of the anti-German coalition (with the exception of the USA and Canada) found themselves in bad economic straits.

The United States of America, having reaped ||unbelievable|| profits from the war, used the postwar situation to strengthen its economic, political, and military positions. The political aims of the American imperialists were and are to enslave economically and politically the European and other capitalist countries and, having turned them into obedient instruments, to unite them into various military and political blocs and groups aimed against the countries of the socialist camp. All this follows the main goal: the achievement of world domination. [Editor's Note # 1]

In the first postwar years the military and foreign policy of the ruling circles of the United States was expressed primarily in an attempt to surround the countries of the socialist camp by a system of inimical military and political groups and blocs of capitalist states and to unite them into a single anti-communist coalition. This policy was most clearly manifested in the organization of numerous military, air and naval bases around the countries of the socialist camp, in the ratification by the American Congress of the essentially expansionist "Truman Doctrine" and "Marshall Plan" which made it possible for the United States to establish control over the economy and the politics of European countries, and in the "Eisenhower Doctrine" aimed at the enslavement of the countries of the Near and Middle East.

Aggressive military blocs were formed with the direct and active participation of the United States: NATO in 1949 in Europe; SEATO in 1954 in Southeast Asia; and CENFO in 1955 in the Near and Middle East. In 1954, at the 14th session of the NATO Council in Paris, the United States succeeded in reaching military agreements favoring the rebirth of West German mili-

tarism and its conversion into a NATO striking force. In particular, this session examined and approved the decisions of the London and Paris conferences of the Western powers concerning the end of military occupation of West Germany, its remilitarization and inclusion in NATO. In addition to this, the Americans concluded a series of military and political agreements with vassal states -- Japan, South Korea, the Kuomintang clique and others. ||

|| Thus, soon after the conclusion of World War II, the U. S. formed aggressive military groups || against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp. As a result, the American imperialists obtained the right to use the territories of the signatory countries as military springboards. They also assumed control over almost the entire military and economic potential of these countries, including construction, preparation, and possible use of armed forces, making obedient puppets of their partners.

The formation of aggressive military and political blocs under the aegis of the United States leads to the loss of political sovereignty by the countries participating in these blocs as well as a significant loss in the national features of their foreign policy and strategy.

As opposed to the prewar years, when the strategies of the main capitalist countries had their own clearly expressed national features, the postwar period was characterized by a tendency toward a leveling of national military strategies and their unification into a single, global military strategy designed to implement U. S. foreign policy. || In working out a united strategy, || each country -- participating in one || aggressive || bloc or another -- introduces its own proposals, addenda or changes, stemming from its own national interests. This, of course, causes sharp conflicts among the different countries. However, in dealing with the political or ideological aspects of the struggle against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp, the imperialist circles, motivated by a hatred of the socialist countries, and by fear of the future, always find common ground for the acceptance of the coordinated decisions. This is evident, if only from the declaration of Stikker, former Secretary-General of NATO, to the effect that the only disagreements and contradictions in NATO are those of "tactical problems." As regards the struggle against the Soviet Union, "our alliance is firm" [1].

The end of World War II coincided with the appearance of atomic weapons, and thermonuclear weapons followed. This fact || greatly || facilitated the consolidation of imperialist forces, led by the United States, and exerted a significant influence on the formulation of a single imperialist military policy and of a strategy dictated by the American ruling circles. The initial postwar period was also characterized by an imperialist policy on the part of the United States "from a position of strength" toward the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The influence of this policy on strategy was reflected in official manuals, where military strategy is defined as "...the art and science of using the armed forces of a country to secure the aims of national policy by application of force or threats of force" [2]. [Editor's Note #2]

Until nearly the end of 1960, U.S. leaders adhered to the strategy of so-called "massive retaliation," resulting from a policy of "deterrence," and recognized only the possibility of waging a general nuclear war against the Soviet Union. The strategy of "massive retaliation," or as it was also called "massive retribution," was more clearly formulated by the government and the military command of the United States in 1953, with the beginning of the Eisenhower administration. Its official acceptance was announced on January 12, 1954, by then Secretary of State Dulles, who, appearing before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, declared: "The basic decision must be based primarily on our strong capability for delivery of an immediate retaliatory strike by such means and at such points as we may choose" [3].

The phrases "massive retaliation" and "massive retribution" served to mask the aggressive essence of American strategy. The imperialists of the United States, hiding behind similar phrases and terms, are in reality preparing for a surprise nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp. American political and military leaders have repeatedly stated this, directly or indirectly.

General Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in 1960 that in the opinion of the U.S. Air Force Command "in strategic air warfare a strong offense is the best defense" [4]. Taylor states further that: "If we take into account the possibility of an unsuccessful application of our forces (that is, of American forces -- Ed.),* the retaliatory actions of the opponent..." [5] (our emphasis -- Ed.).* This clearly shows who will attack first.

Former SAC Commander, General Power, in May, 1959, was even more frank: "We must never find ourselves in a position where we cannot begin a war ourselves...we must have the ability to deliver the first blow" [6].

The strategy of "massive retaliation, as is known, was based on the assumption that the United States then had, supposedly, an overwhelming superiority over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons and chiefly in strategic aviation. Therefore, the attainment of the outlined political and military aims of the United States could be assured from their point of view only by threatening to start a general nuclear war, assuming that the countries of the socialist camp would not dare to take this step because of their unfavorable position with respect to offensive nuclear forces.

In accordance with this strategy, the U.S. government put the main emphasis on the development of nuclear weapons of strategic and operational-tactical designation, de-emphasizing the conventional armed forces, especially the ground troops. [Editor's Note #3]

The strategy of "massive retaliation" was accepted not only by the United States, but also by the other NATO countries. In December, 1954, they first began to plan military operations using nuclear weapons, and later officially accepted the above strategy, according to which the armed forces of the North Atlantic aggressive bloc were to use nuclear weapons

* Translator's note: The editorial comment is that of the original Russian document.

in any case, regardless of whether or not the enemy would do so. It was assumed that NATO||| would not wage||| limited war against the Soviet Union in Europe. The possibility of limited (local) wars was examined only for the "less developed areas of the globe, beyond the confines of Europe" [7].

Thus, according to the designs of American aggressors and their NATO allies, the mere threat of the use of nuclear weapons was allegedly a sufficient factor of||| intimidation||| and their use in any conflict was presumed to nullify the offensive capability of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. However, these hopes were in vain.

As a result of the great successes of the USSR in the fields of||| nuclear weapons, ||| rocketry and the mastery of space, the strategy of "massive retaliation" failed. Completely unrealistic in its foundations, it was soon rejected by its very creators. As early as October 27, 1957, Dulles declared that the United States and its allies must take the necessary action in the event of the arising of local conflicts "without provoking a general nuclear war" [8].

Thus, during 1957-1960, the United States and other Western countries began a period of research for reasons and for failure of the strategy [Ed. N.#4] ||| of "massive strike" ||| and to search intensively for a new strategy which would correspond, from the point of view of the American aggressors, to the changing balance of power between the East and the West. This study was undertaken by various military and civilian agencies and organizations, and this problem is also dealt with by individual American and West European military leaders. [Editor's Note #5]

As a result, in the United States, Britain, and other countries, there appeared a large number of reports, books, and articles dealing with the problems of the foreign policy, war, and strategy.

In December of 1959, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published a special report "The Development of Military Technology and Its Effect on the Strategy and Foreign Policy of the United States" prepared by the Johns Hopkins Washington Center and serving as an official document of Congress. In addition, in the United States books appeared by R. Osgood, Limited War, B. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, General Maxwell Taylor, Unreliable Strategy, * Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, a group of authors**, A Forward Strategy for America, and in Britain the book of Air Marshal Kingston-McCloughry, Defense, Policy, and Strategy, and a number of others.

The authors of these books and reports are unanimous in their negative evaluation of the strategy of "massive retaliation" and in the proposed preparation for aggressive war against the countries of the socialist camp in the changing situation, as well as in plans for aggression in other regions of the world. Many of the above investigations were conducted by direction of governmental and military agencies of the United States, and therefore to a significant degree influenced the formulation of the official views of American ruling circles. [Editor's Note #6]

*Russian translation of The Uncertain Trumpet. Henceforth we will refer to this book by its original title.

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The main reason for the decline of the strategy of "massive retaliation" was the overestimation of the forces and possibilities of the United States and the obvious underestimation of the economic, technical, scientific, and military possibilities of the Soviet Union. As a result of the achievement of considerable superiority of the USSR over the USA in ICBM's, a real threat for American territory was created; therefore, the political and military leadership of the United States was faced with the need for re-evaluation of its strategic position and possibilities.

The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that "the ending of the American nuclear monopoly and the growth of the strategic possibilities of the Soviet Union increased the difficulties connected with the maintenance of the military position required for the attainment of the established American aims" [9]. This report gives a rather sober evaluation of the capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to territory and population, as well as loss of previous advantages of the United States in continental security and in size of industrial potential. The Committee stated that "the military position of the United States had deteriorated; the country, which previously enjoyed undeniable security, is now open and vulnerable to a direct and devastating attack" [10].

An even more depressing evaluation of the United States' position was given by H. Kissinger, who decisively rejects any illusions as to the invulnerability of the United States. [Editor's Note #7]

Characteristically, in his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, which appeared in the United States in 1957, Kissinger was still in favor of a strategy based on the threat of unlimited use of nuclear weapons, that is, the unleashing of a general nuclear war. However, the events of the last four years have forced him to arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions as to the necessity for choice, in his words, "between humiliation and general nuclear war."

The increased military strength of the Soviet Union and loss of [Ed. Note #8] superiority of the United States in strategic means of armed conflict had to be recognized by President Kennedy himself, who in November, 1961, declared in Seattle that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient [11].

Thus, under conditions which had taken shape when, || in the West's estimation, || there is a "balance" (in the sense of "parity") in strategic means of destruction and a superiority of the USSR in conventional armed forces, American strategists were forced to re-evaluate their previous position with regard to general war.

There has been created, as they say in the West, "a nuclear stalemate": on the one hand a tremendous increase in the number of nuclear rocket weapons and on the other, the incredible danger in their use. Under these conditions, according to the political and military evaluations of the USA and NATO, both sides had attained the position of so-called "mutual deterrence."

All this led to the conclusion that the strategy of "massive retaliation" proved to be inflexible and could no longer guarantee the achievement of the political aims of the American imperialists. While previously the United States could, with almost complete immunity, threaten the unrestrained use of nuclear weapons in any incident, even in local military conflicts which might possibly arise, the changed balance of power has made it dangerous to engage in "nuclear blackmail" and to risk the security of the country.

These circumstances had an especially strong effect on the European satellites of the USA. In particular, even by the end of 1959, it was noted directly in the decisions of the Western European alliance that the European countries can no longer rely exclusively on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, as was previously the case, since there are no grounds for assuming that the Americans will be automatically involved in war in the case of any military conflict springing up in Europe, not wishing to risk nuclear attacks from the Soviet Union. [Editor's Note #9]

From an evaluation of the new conditions, the political and military leadership of the United States began to recognize the strategy of so-called "flexible response" as the most acceptable and expedient one. This, in their opinion, makes it possible, if necessary, to conduct either a general nuclear war or a limited war with or without the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The strategy of "flexible response" was formulated by General Taylor in the above book The Uncertain Trumpet, where he discloses the nature and the mode of realization of this strategy: "The strategic doctrine which I would propose to replace massive retaliation is called the strategy of 'flexible response.' This name suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping with anything..." [12]. In other words, the strategy suggested by Taylor is, in his opinion, expedient in all contingencies and provides a way out of any situation.

The American journal Foreign Affairs of January, 1961, in the article "Security Will Not Wait," gives the following basic tenets of this strategy formulated by Taylor as well as the general military program of the United States government:

a) the formation of invulnerable strategic rocket forces, with the capability of delivering a paralyzing blow to the enemy "even following a surprise nuclear attack by the enemy;"

b) the formation of satisfactory and well-equipped mobile forces for limited wars, "that is, armed conflicts on a smaller scale than general nuclear war between two blocs of nuclear powers;"

c) formation of an effective system of military alliances;

d) assurance of the most favorable use of the resources allocated for carrying out the military program.

The new strategic concept of the USA was, in effect, already determined by the time the Kennedy administration came into power. [Ed. Note #10]

A number of official documents of the United States government, published in 1961, explained quite clearly the aspects of the new strategic concept and the military program of the United States.

The strategic concept, a message of the President of March 28, 1961, stressed, "must be at the same time flexible and decisive," and envisage the preparation for waging any type of war: world-wide or local, nuclear or conventional, large-scale or small-scale. This concept is based on the same idea of a "retaliatory strike," the only difference being that previously this term, regardless of the scale of the possible conflict, implied the threat of the unrestricted use of nuclear weapons, that is, general nuclear war, whereas now the "retaliatory strike" should correspond to the nature of the possible conflict.

In connection with this, it is noted that the United States must increase the capability of its armed forces to "respond quickly and effectively" to any action of the enemy. Under conditions of a world war, this means that the part of the armed forces "which survives the initial strike" must retain this capability. It is most important to guarantee the possibility of surviving the enemy's first attack and of delivering a retaliatory strike of destructive force, "which shall cause him unacceptably greater losses." In addition, it was stressed that the ability to force the enemy to refrain from attacking depends not only on the number of missiles and bombers, but on the degree of their preparedness, the ability to survive in case of attack, and the flexibility and reliability of their guidance for the achievement of strategic goals.

With regard to the conduct of limited wars, the message states that the United States and its allies must have the capability of conducting such wars with conventional weapons. However, if the troops with conventional weapons cannot fulfill the assigned tasks, nuclear weapons can be used. At the same time, the probability of a limited war escalating into a world war is not denied, but it is stressed that all measures must be taken to localize the conflict and to prevent a general nuclear war arising because of it. [Editor's Note #11]

Thus, the strategy of "massive retaliation," which existed for the USA and NATO until 1961, and provided only for the preparation and waging of a nuclear war against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp had outlived its time and has been replaced by the strategy of "flexible response" which provides for preparation and conduct against the socialist countries both of a general nuclear war and limited wars with or without the use of nuclear weapons. [Editor's Note #12]

It is characteristic that the strategy of "flexible response" which is suitable for general nuclear war is now being further developed. On June 16, 1962, the American Secretary of Defense, McNamara, defined the essence of the strategy of "counterforce" (or "exclusion of cities").

Fearing a retaliatory nuclear strike against military-economic and military-political centers of the United States, he announced: "The United States came to the conclusion that we should approach the basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war to a considerable extent just as we approached more conventional operations in the past. This means that the main military task in the event of nuclear war...should be the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, and not the civilian population."

The American military clique came to such a conclusion as a result of a lengthy study of how to conduct nuclear war as a whole. It was necessary to determine the destruction of which objectives could lead to the rapid defeat of the enemy.

Various points of view were expressed on this score. Some recommended concentrating the main efforts on inflicting strikes on the most important military objectives, in the first place, on the locations of strategic weapons; others recommended strikes against large populated places. In the opinion of the American military command, the solution of this problem was of basic significance.

The launching of nuclear strikes against enemy strategic weapons is a more difficult task in comparison with the launching of strikes against large cities. These difficulties are caused primarily by the fact that, first of all, there are significant numbers of such weapons and, secondly, by the fact that the majority of them, especially rocket weapons, in modern conditions are an absolute weapon, located in underground bases of low vulnerability, on submarines, etc. In this connection, there is a growing tendency toward the increase of their invulnerability.

The decision as to which objectives should be the ones against which nuclear strikes are launched -- against strategic weapons or cities -- depends to a considerable degree on the weapons system on hand and on its quantity. If the weapon is so inaccurate that it cannot be used to destroy small-dimension targets such as ballistic missile launching pads or airports, and there is not enough of them, it can only be used against large objectives, for example, cities.

According to press reports, over a number of years the American command conducted war games with the use of computer machines, during which computations were performed of the different variations for launching strikes with strategic weapons against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp. These calculations led the military leaders of the United States to come to the following conclusion: the launching of strikes against cities does not remove the threats of powerful retaliatory strikes by the enemy because in this case his strategic weapons remain practically untouched, and strikes against cities may lead to the destruction of a tremendous number of people and to the destruction, not only of the cities, but of the country as a whole. With the launching of strikes against enemy strategic weapons, its possibilities for destroying American cities and the population are reduced considerably.

On the basis of these very calculations, the command of the USA came to a final conclusion concerning the necessity to destroy the enemy's armed forces, first of all his strategic weapons, about which the Secretary of Defense spoke in his speech.

The American press notes that the strategy of "counterforce" has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House and interprets it as some kind of recommendation to the Soviet Union concerning "rules" for the conduct of nuclear war.

The political implication of this strategy is that by conducting a so-called "controlled" nuclear war, the destruction of the capitalist system can be prevented. However, the illusory nature of these hopes is too obvious. If nuclear war is unleashed by the militarists, then no strategy, however it may be called, will save imperialism from destruction.

As a matter of fact, how can everyone be "convinced" of the necessity to adhere to the "new rules" that nuclear strikes should be launched only against military objectives and not against cities, when the majority of such objectives are located in large or smaller cities and populated places? If these "rules" are followed then, as noted in the press, the United States and her European allies must carry out an extremely expensive shifting of all military objectives from the large cities. This task is considered as unrealistic; however, the press stresses that if the United States and her allies set about moving military objectives from the cities, the USSR will draw the conclusion that the United States is preparing for an attack [13].

Moreover, in the opinion of the American press, the strategy of "counterforce" assumes the necessity for construction of a wide network of shelters for the population, the role and significance of which are extremely problematical for a future war.

It is considered that the reality and the effectiveness of a strategy of counterforce depend on a number of factors, the primary of which are:

1. The presence of a sufficient number of reliable reconnaissance means.
2. The presence of a large number of rocket weapons of great accuracy and reliability and capable of operational use, since military objectives are considerably more numerous than cities.
3. The presence of a reliable system of guidance, warning (notification) and communications.
4. The careful planning of nuclear rocket strikes and of operations of the armed forces of the imperialist coalition as a whole, based on the wide use of computers.
5. Surprise.

The command of the United States intends to solve the reconnaissance problem primarily by launching a large number of special reconnaissance satellites. [Ed.N.#13] Thus, Kissinger, analyzing the dependence of "counterforce" strategy on the possibility of reconnaissance means, wrote in the periodical Foreign Affairs for June, 1962, "...that for the strategy of counterforce to remain successful to some degree, it is necessary to know the locations of the targets ahead of time. This is especially true with respect to rockets which cannot find objectives for a strike." [Ed.N.#14] In the future, he stresses, Soviet rockets will be more and more dispersed and well protected in special underground structures (shafts); a significant number of rockets will be mobile or be based at sea, which makes their discovery even more difficult.

With respect to rocket weapons, basic reliance is placed on second generation rockets, that is, on solid fuel rockets such as the intercontinental ballistic "Minuteman" missile and the intermediate range "Polaris" (or its prototypes). It is assumed that space weapons will occupy an important place in the future. [Editor's Note #15]

However, the requirements of a strategy of "counterforce" are not answered by atomic submarines armed with "Polaris" missiles. According to the conclusions of a number of American military specialists, the contemporary Polaris missile does not operate with sufficient accuracy for use in strikes against small military objectives. These specialists believe that the primary mission of the "Polaris" missile will be to inflict a crushing blow against cities, [Ed. Note #16] and industrial complexes. [Ed. Note #17]

Some military specialists of the United States consider that the difficulty of collecting intelligence information on military objectives and, first of all, on nuclear rocket weapons of the countries of the socialist camp and the continuously increasing amount of strategic weapons for conducting war which both sides have complicates to a significant degree the planning and organization of a rocket attack by the United States of America. All this, taken together, places great doubt on the effectiveness of a strategy of "counterforce" for, in their opinion, there can be no counting on the complete destruction of the enemy's strategic weapons, especially if the growing number of mobile launches of strategic rockets and nuclear rocket-carrying submarines in their inventory is taken into account.

It is considered that the uncertainty in the solution of this problem leads to a lowering of the political value of the "counterforce" strategy, possibly even more rapidly than the military value, because the representatives of the command of the armed forces will find it ever more difficult to convince political leaders of the absolute reliability of their calculations and plans which have been prepared on the basis of incomplete intelligence data of enemy objectives. [Editor's Note #18]

The strategy of "counterforce" primarily stems from the necessity for preventive war and the achievement of surprise. [Editor's Note #19 and 20]

It is believed that as a result of a forceful surprise attack, the enemy might be paralyzed in all respects, and that his fate would be decided

in the course of the very first days of the war.

An evaluation of the role played by the element of surprise in modern war was made by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which, rejecting all pretense of "peacefulness," appealed directly for carrying out a first surprise nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp. Its report states: "The advent of the nuclear rocket age led to a fantastic reduction in time necessary for the delivery of a nuclear warhead from one continent to another, and to a corresponding reduction in the time...to receive a warning of an attack. And with the fact that until the present time there was no defense against ICBM's in flight, this led to a strong temptation to deliver the blow first in a nuclear war" [14].

It is not accidental, therefore, that American theoreticians are carefully studying the pros and cons of preventive war and of first and pre-emptive strikes.

The theory of preventive war was first advanced by the most reactionary representatives of the U.S. political and military leadership at the end of the 1940's. [Editor's Note #21] However, subsequently [Editor's Note # 22] the propaganda for this theory abated somewhat. Under present-day conditions, the official agencies of the military leadership and the military scientists of the United States have again returned to the question of preventive war, considering it one of the possible and permissible alternatives. What is preventative war? B. Brodie, in his book Strategy in the Missile Age, gives the following definition: "I am using the term to describe a premeditated attack by one country against another, which is unprovoked in the sense that it does not wait upon a specific aggression or other overt action by the target state, and in which the chief and most immediate objective is the destruction of the latter's over-all military power and especially its strategic armed forces.* Naturally, success in such an action would enable the former power to wreak whatever further injury it desired or to exact almost any peace terms it wished" [15].

The case for preventive war, in Brodie's opinion, has rested primarily on two premises: first, that in a strategic aerospace war using nuclear weapons, the country that strikes first undoubtedly has crucial advantage, which with reasonably good planning will almost certainly be a decisive one; and second, that total war is inevitable.

"Without exaggeration, it can be said," states Brodie, "that our plan for strategic offensive, whatever it is, would have its best chances of being successful if we struck first, and that those chances would be brought to a very minimum if the enemy struck first. If we thought only about maximizing our chances of survival, the above circumstances might be considered reason enough for going ahead with preventive war" [16].

American theoreticians are frankly in favor of preventive war and surprise attack. [Editor's Note #23]

Public officials, even though they always speak of the "incompati-

*The phrase "strategic armed forces" is a Russian mistranslation of Brodie's phrase "strategic air power."

bility" of preventive war with the principles of American "democracy" and "morality," in effect fully share these views.

It follows that the threat of unleashing preventive war by American imperialists against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp is quite real. The slogan "...that which is inevitable had better come early rather than late, because it would be less devastating that way" [17], is fraught with many temptations, because the time for the beginning of a preventive war is selected by the aggressor to coincide with the most favorable time. [Editor's Note#24]

Certain American military ideologists, Kissinger, for example, replace the expression "preventive war" with the expression "surprise (first) strike." The distinction is purely formal, and pointless since the first strike can also herald the beginning of preventive war. No matter what this strike is called, its main aim is the maximum achievement of surprise.

They say that surprise can and must be achieved in striking a preventive blow. Such a blow, in the estimation of American military theoreticians, is allegedly defensive, since it is delivered to an enemy who is preparing for attack (either for the initiation of a preventive war or for the delivery of the first blow). It is considered to be the final and only means of avoiding catastrophe.

This is the evaluation of the surprise factor, which can be achieved by starting preventive war, by striking the first or pre-emptive blow. [Ed.N.#25]

Among other U.S. strategic concepts, the concepts of "guaranteed destruction" and "damage limiting" are of interest and were put forth by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, R. McNamara, in March, 1965, in his appearance before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives.

The essence of the concept of "guaranteed destruction" according to McNamara's statement, is that the USA must have the ability of destroying a potential enemy as a viable society even after the U.S. Armed Forces have been subjected to a well-planned and successful attack. In this concept, the forces for "guaranteed destruction" must include part of the intercontinental ballistic missiles, "Polaris"-type missiles launched from atomic submarines and a fixed part of the manned strategic bombers. It is believed that the primary, vitally important task of the strategic nuclear forces of the USA is their ability to assure the "guaranteed destruction" of the military potential of an enemy, including the destruction of one-fourth to one-third of the enemy's population and approximately two-thirds of his industrial power. Such damage, according to the plans of the Pentagon, is unacceptable to any industrialized country, and, consequently, will serve as an effective deterrent and vouchsafe the execution of an aggressive policy by the USA. According to the intentions of the military-political leadership of the USA, in the event a war breaks out and "guaranteed destruction" of a probable enemy becomes a reality, he will not be able to regain his status as a powerful state over the course of many years.

The concept of "damage limiting," according to McNamara, means the capacity of the U.S. to weaken the force of a blow by a probable enemy by using strategic offensive and defensive forces, as well as by taking measures to assure a certain degree of protection of the population from the consequences of the enemy's nuclear strikes.

According to the plans of the political and military leadership of the USA, "damage limiting" forces must include:

-- the remaining strategic offensive means (intercontinental ballistic missiles, "Polaris"-type missiles on atomic submarines, and strategic bombers), which must contribute to the "damage limiting" by crushing the enemy's nuclear means of attack at the launch sites and bases, if they can intercept them before they are launched against objectives in U.S. territory;

-- the defensive forces (surface-to-air missiles and interceptor airplanes, antimissile and air defense means, antisubmarine warfare forces) used to destroy enemy aircraft and rockets on their way to objectives as well as in regions where those objectives are located;

-- thoroughly-planned measures on a national scale for constructing shelters, assuring a reduction by about three times of the losses among the population from the consequences of the enemy's nuclear strikes.

Thus, the strategic concepts of "guaranteed destruction" and "damage limiting," considered together, suppose the delivery by the strategic strike forces of the U.S. and their allies of massive nuclear strikes on a whole complex of objectives that make up the military-economic potential of the enemy, and at the same time an active and passive defense of the U.S. so as to limit to a maximum degree the damage from a decisive retaliatory strike by the enemy. The realization of these strategic concepts, according to the military-political leadership of the USA, requires a balanced combination of strategic offensive forces, defensive forces, and means of passive defense. This fact is characteristically acknowledged in the West, that an all-out nuclear rocket war, no matter how it is unleashed, will be destructive for both sides. In this connection, the U. S. Secretary of Defense, McNamara, already stated in February, 1964, in the pages of a journal, Army Information Digest: "We could not again create, at whatever price, a situation in which strategic bombings would be a one-sided act. I believe that this factor should be considered one of the decisive factors when determining our policy."

As an alternative to general nuclear war, the imperialist aggressors have promoted the concept of limited war. [Editor's Note # 26]

Although the theory of a limited war became widespread soon after the end of World War II, the military strategy of the U. S. and NATO did not acknowledge the possibility of applying the concept of limited war to the zone of the North Atlantic bloc, inasmuch as in that zone, in their opinion, vitally important interests of the West and of the socialist bloc countries are encountered. According to the American General Taylor, a

limited war is an "armed conflict, in which the existence of the U.S. is not directly threatened." Consequently, under conditions when U.S. territory is no longer invulnerable, General Taylor and his successors are attempting, under conditions advantageous to them, to keep the war within a geographical framework which would not embrace the American continent and above all the U.S. In other words, such a war must be "limited" only with relation to the U.S.; for the other European countries of NATO, whose territories will be fully embraced by a "limited" war, it will be an unlimited "total" war with all the consequences. The concept of a limited war is an adventuristic calculation of the U.S. imperialist circles for conducting war on foreign territories; it is a concept for assuring the safety of the U.S. by excluding their territory from the possible zone of limited warfare; and finally, it is one of the methods of preparing an unlimited nuclear war against the Soviet Union and all the socialist countries.

A limited war, according to the U.S. and NATO command, occupies a middle (intermediate) position between the "cold" war and an all-out nuclear war. While "cold" war in the true sense of the word is neither war nor peace but is a continual struggle for the supremacy of power, which is conducted by political, psychological, and economic means, as well as with the aid of various military and paramilitary measures, [18] and an all-out nuclear war is an armed conflict in which the belligerents use to a maximum degree all the available forces and means; then limited war is characterized by premeditated restraint by both sides with respect to one or more factors characterizing war in general, for instance, the political aims, character, and size of the forces and means used, the size of areas for military operations, the number of participants in the war, etc. It is believed that the term "limited war" is inapplicable to naturally limited armed conflicts, in which one or both of the belligerents do not have the possibility of transforming the war into an all-out war. Limited war is not necessarily a small or short war, conducted for the attainment of political aims of small importance which involve insignificant forces and means.

According to the military leadership of the West, limited war is that type of armed conflict, in which on the one hand the USA participates, directly or indirectly (usually through their allies) and on the other hand, the USSR. The characteristic feature of such a war is that during its course the strategic bombing of objectives on the territories of the USA and the USSR is supposedly not resorted to.

Limited warfare includes all types of wars using both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, as well as local wars.

Thus, limited wars can be armed conflicts on a most varied scale without the use of nuclear weapons, however, with the threat of their use present; on the other hand, such wars could be conducted using only tactical nuclear weapons. "The scope, intensity, and duration of a limited war can vary greatly depending on the degree of limitation used by the belligerents" [19]. Although the characteristic feature of a limited war is considered to be deliberate mutual restraint on the part of the belligerents, it is nevertheless impossible (before or during such a war) to determine accurately

that limit at which a further relaxation of the restrictions will lead to the escalation of a limited war into an all-out nuclear war [20]. Most essential from the standpoint of determination of limited war is the fact that a limited war is any armed conflict, in which all available forces and means of the belligerents are not used.

It is considered that a limited war, to achieve the desired political and military aims, does not require a maximum military effort of the belligerents; to conduct such a war, the belligerents need only part of their human and material resources. In contrast to an all-out war, which usually ends with the unconditional surrender of one of the sides or from mutual exhaustion, a limited war usually is not developed to extreme limits and the participants come to an agreement before military operations exceed a definite limit.

The political and military leadership of the West believes that the most important prerequisite in conducting a limited war is the capability of the USA and NATO as a whole to conduct an all-out nuclear war, for, without this capability, it is impossible to terminate a limited war successfully and achieve desired political aims.

While supporting the concept of a limited war, Brodie nevertheless writes, "We shall consider all proposed limitations very critically and accept only those which suit us" [21]. U.S. and NATO officials are of the same opinion. This means that only that kind of limited war is acceptable to the West which is conducted according to the rules proposed and accepted by the West.

What then, according to the military theoreticians of the USA and NATO, is the essence of the deliberate restraints on the belligerents, which result in the war acquiring a limited character.

The U.S. Army field regulations indicate that since military strategy results from national strategy and is a composite part of it, military-strategic aims in a limited war must be subordinate to national aims, and military operations must be conducted within the restrictions established by national policy.

The American theoretician R. Osgood, in his book Limited War, indicates that "to limit war, means above all to limit its aims," since "the very fact that a war remains limited, in spite of the physical capacity of the belligerents to inflict much greater damage on the enemy, attests to the fact that neither side sets aims for itself that so threaten the status quo as to justify a significant broadening of the scale of military operations or risk the unleashing of an all-out war" [22].

When, however, the war's political aims are essentially not limited, the magnitude of violence and destruction is determined chiefly by the physical possibilities of the belligerents to deprive one another of the capability to continue the war. However, while expressing the aggressive intentions of American imperialism, Osgood at the same time indicates that in a

limited war the U.S. will not necessarily restrict its military aims to the definite limits and political conditions that existed before the war. An example of this might be the aggressive activities of the U.S. in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

It is believed that inasmuch as it is not possible more or less accurately to predetermine the possible causes and character of limited wars which will have to be waged by the USA and their allies in the aggressive blocs, the concrete aims of a limited war can be finally determined only at its beginning by taking into consideration the peculiarities of the situation under which the war broke out. However, according to the military theoreticians of the West, the general form of these aims must be predetermined on the basis of political goals established before the start of the war and which express definite interests of the Anglo-American coalition in the various areas of the world. Moreover, attention is being turned to the fact that the war can retain a limited character in the event that the essence of its most important political aims be made known to the enemy sufficiently in advance, so that the belligerents would conduct military operations in accordance with their limited political aims.

According to a majority of the foreign military theoreticians, the problem of restricting the means for conducting a war, when both the opposing coalitions have available tremendous reserves of nuclear weapons and means of delivering them on target, is directly dependent on its political aims. Therefore R. Osgood writes in his book, Limited War, "In weighing these two factors, the states must give the decisive role to political interests" and "know how to correctly evaluate what significance a potential enemy attaches to one goal or another, and what efforts he is ready to make in order to attain these aims, or for averting the threat of their attainment."

The problem of the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war is highly complex.

As is known, the military strategy of the USA and NATO foresees the conduct of limited wars with the use of the so-called tactical nuclear weapons. The necessity of employing tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war is based, first, on the fact that the preparation and conduct of limited wars using such weapons will be cheaper for the West; and, secondly, it will make it possible to compensate for the insufficiency of conventional armed forces in those numerous regions of the globe where limited warfare may arise; and thirdly, the resoluteness of the West to use nuclear weapons in a limited war will supposedly have a powerful moderating effect on an enemy and will force him to seek a compromise.

At the same time, as most military specialists of the West admit, the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war is possibly the most critical problem now confronting the military leadership of the USA and NATO. This is explained by the following circumstances.

First, many proceed from the assumption that very little is known about the effectiveness of this weapon on the battlefield, or the possible political, military and psychological consequences of its use. The role

and influence of this weapon on the situation as a whole is being based chiefly on assumptions.

Second, it is believed that it is extremely difficult to foresee how an enemy will react to the very fact of the use of a tactical nuclear weapon even on a limited scale. Various decisions by the opposing side are possible: declining a limited retaliatory strike, which will result in a loss of prestige and possibly capitulation; carrying out retaliatory strikes with nuclear weapons on the same or on a much greater scale; and, finally, the possibility of miscalculation is not excluded; the delivery of a powerful blow by strategic and operational-tactical means thus unleashing an all-out nuclear war and its consequences as a result.

Third, the difficulty of recognition by both belligerents of the classification of a nuclear weapon from its power as tactical or strategic.

Fourth, the difficult problem arises as to what means of delivery for tactical nuclear weapon can be used in a limited war, and can these means be used when located outside the zone of the limited war. Regarding the use in such a war of conventional forces and means, under certain circumstances, operations by the navy or the delivery of strikes by tactical aviation located outside the limits of the territory of a limited war are considered possible.

In addition, it is believed that the tactical nuclear weapon is not good for irregular military operations (suppression of revolts, struggle with guerrillas, etc.), as well as during intervention by the USA and its bloc partners in a war between noncommunist states.

Territorial limitations, as opposed to other types of limitations, are considered to be most effective from the point of view that it is easier to bring them into play when an armed conflict occurs and for the belligerents to observe and mutually control. Precise geographical limitations must be considered depending on the political and military intentions of the belligerents, the character and scale of the military operations, and the geographic, economic, and other characteristics of the region where the armed conflict occurs. Many in the West consider, for instance, that it is easier to localize a war on islands, peninsulas, and in underdeveloped economic regions than in highly developed continental regions, where there are no clear natural boundaries such as, for instance, in Europe.

At the same time, the fact is recognized that the presently existing military-political alliances of states to a large extent complicate the possibility of limiting an armed conflict to a certain territory inasmuch as all the alliance treaties indicate that an attack on one of the countries participating in the treaty will be considered by the other participants as an attack on the alliance as a whole.

In order to keep the war within a limited framework, it is considered necessary to restrict the delivery of strikes (also with nuclear weapons) to strictly defined military objectives (troops in the zone of military

operations, control points, air and naval bases, military depots, transport structures, junctions and lines of communication, etc), while not destroying strategic objectives and large populated points, even if they are in the geographic area of the limited war. However, even here, many complex and difficult to solve problems arise. The United States considers the basic problems to be the following:

-- the difficulty of differentiating (in theory and in practice) tactical and strategic objectives and the recognition of such differentiations (even if found) as legal by both of the belligerent sides;

-- the difficulty of destroying tactical objectives which are territorially related to strategic objectives, without destroying the latter and thus violating the accepted restrictions;

-- the ability of the belligerents to demonstrate a tolerant attitude toward accidental destruction of strategic objects.

By its character, a limited war contains two problems: on the one hand such a war must be conducted decisively and with the best methods using the necessary forces and means to achieve the set political and military goals; on the other hand, in a limited war, the armed forces must be used in such a way as to reduce the risk of a limited armed conflict escalating into general war to a minimum. The contradiction of this situation is clearly seen, if only because the need for success in a limited war is incompatible with the requirement for limiting the scale of combat operations, as regards territory, forces and means, the number of participants in the armed conflict, etc.

In the opinion of Pentagon officials and a number of Western military theoreticians, in the event a limited war breaks out, especially if even tactical nuclear weapons are used, danger of the emergence of a general nuclear war will appear. Thus, the well-known military theoretician Kissinger points out that "limited nuclear war will automatically escalate into a general war because the losing side will continually commit new resources in order to restore the situation" [23].

The American theoretician, B. Brodie, writes on this problem: "In the event of the use of any type of nuclear weapon, it will be probably much more difficult to preserve a limited character in the war, if only for the simple reason that it is much easier to draw a line between the use and nonuse of nuclear weapons, than between use above or below some arbitrarily established limit. The moral aspect of this problem stems from the impossibility of determining the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons" [24].

The most candid statement of opinion by the military-political leadership of the USA on this question was the statement of the former Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States, Gilpatric, who in one of his press conferences in June, 1961, announced: "...As for me, I never believed in a so-called limited nuclear war. I simply do not imagine how one can establish such limitations, once any sort of nuclear weapon is launched" [25].

Regarding the NATO zone, the command of that bloc, while working out the principles for conducting a limited war in the European theater of military operations, has put forth a concept of so-called gradual restraint or of a nuclear threshold whose application, in their opinion, must reduce the risk of a limited war growing into a general one. According to this concept, the armed forces of the bloc must first use only conventional means and attempt to solve problems within a limited armed conflict. However, if troops with the conventional armaments are unable to solve the set problems due to the numerical superiority of the enemy for instance, it is planned to use tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield so as to attain the desired military goals regardless. Finally, NATO armed forces must be prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons on a broader scale while at the same time taking precautions to keep the armed conflict within limits.

In spite of all these theories and concepts, one can state with assurance that the strategy of limited warfare based on the use of only tactical nuclear weapons, will involve the dangers analogous to those connected with the strategy of "massive retaliation."

Various limitations are mostly forced and conditional. A limited war is fraught with a tremendous danger of escalating into general war, especially if tactical nuclear weapons are used. This is also recognized by American theoreticians.

THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE MILITARY STRATEGIES OF THE MAIN WEST-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BELONGING TO NATO

The military strategy of the main imperialist countries, united in closed military-political groups, was formed under the influence of an essentially uniform aggressive policy of imperialist circles in those countries spearheaded against the socialist camp. Because of this, and also because of the dominant position of the United States in the military blocs, the strategies of the majority of countries which are members of the aggressive blocs have much in common. [Editor's Note #27]

The military strategy of each country is also characterized by its own specific peculiarities arising from the political, economic, geographical, national, directly military, and other conditions, of one country or another. [Ed.N.#28] In spite of the presence of interests in common with USA, the military strategy of the Western European countries in the postwar period developed and changed depending on the distribution of forces in the world arena, changes in the foreign policy of the ruling circles, economic resources, scientific-technical achievements, and other causes. It is characteristic that, beginning with the 1960's, the Western European countries tended toward a definite independence in solving political, and economic, as well as military problems. In recent years, they have been criticizing ever more sharply the basic concepts of the military strategies of the USA and NATO.

The military strategy of the Federal Republic of Germany is formed under the influence of the military strategy of the USA and NATO, taking into account the political and military position of West Germany. It is

a reflection of the revanchist policy of the West German imperialists, those maniacs of particular variety, who, in spite of the complete defeat in two world wars, continue pedantically, openly, and secretly, to plan, and methodically and persistently to create an extensive system of political, economic, military, and psychological measures in preparation for a new war.

The military-political leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany is attempting by all possible methods to make utmost use of the NATO bloc to accelerate a rebirth of their military-economic potential and the creation of a modern army whose power would exceed the armies of the other countries in Western Europe. It is precisely through the aggressive NATO bloc that the Federal Republic of Germany has taken, in a relatively short time, the most important measures of a political, economic and military power. It is not by accident that the former West German chancellor Erhard, when presenting the government's program in the autumn of 1965, stated that the NATO bloc, as before, is the basis of the military policy of West Germany, i. e., the type of organization through the use of which the Federal Republic of Germany can most effectively achieve the desired revanchist aims.

West Germany is exerting all her efforts to use the principle advanced by the military-political leadership of NATO for so-called integration by equipping the Bundeswehr with the most modern weapons and combat equipment, especially the nuclear rocket weapon, equipping the Federal Republic of Germany territory as a theater of military operations, creating West German military bases on the territory of other NATO countries, and also gradually increasing her influence on military construction in NATO and other countries. Right now, the Bundeswehr has the most powerful ground troops within NATO equipped with various operational-tactical nuclear rocket weapons, and large air and naval forces. West German territory is the most well-prepared NATO springboard with a far-flung network of air and rocket bases, pipelines, stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons, control points, communications, etc. West German military bases, training centers and stockpiles of various types are in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, England, Italy, and Greece. The Bundeswehr has penetrated into North Africa, the USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the Near and Middle East.

As a measure of growth of the Bundeswehr and the increase of the Federal Republic of Germany's contribution to NATO, West German military-political leadership is attempting to capture the key posts in the political and higher military organs, and also in the joint staff of the armed forces, so as to have a decisive influence on all the military planning and in implementing practical measures in NATO, transforming that bloc into an instrument of West German policy.

The building of a massive army on a modern military-technical base has led to the organization and expansion of Germany's own war production. Although in the beginning years, the development of the Bundeswehr occurred in an unfavorable political climate for the Federal Republic of Germany with insufficient technical and economic resources and basic military production supplies coming from abroad, especially from the U.S., presently,

the situation has radically changed. The Federal Republic of Germany has created her own military-industrial base, which makes it possible to develop the production of various types of arms and military equipment on a large scale and to satisfy the needs not only of the Bundeswehr but also the armed forces of other countries belonging to NATO.

The point of departure in the military strategy of West Germany is the recognition of the coalition character of a future war between the East and West. The former defense minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, von Hassel, wrote in regard to this in the American journal Foreign Affairs (January, 1965) that "for us (i.e., West Germany -- Ed.) there cannot be any question of conducting a war with our own forces and means."

The views of the military-political leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany as to the character of a future war are manifested first in her relation to the American strategy of "flexible response." Recognizing the basic positions of this strategy and its global character, the West German military command nevertheless believes that certain positions of this strategy as applied to Europe, and especially to the Federal Republic of Germany, must be changed. "The concept of 'flexible response' in Europe should not be interpreted -- either from a political or a military point of view -- in such a way that the so-called nuclear threshold might be raised to a significant limit without regard for political considerations," wrote von Hassel in the same journal, Foreign Affairs.

In his opinion, this means that the nuclear threshold must be very low as opposed to other regions of the world, i.e., nuclear weapons must be used at the very beginning of a conflict inasmuch as Western Europe, as part of the NATO zone, is only a strategic springboard with no depth, and thus not permit any loss of space or weakening of its military potential. The demands of West Germany for the use of nuclear weapons from the very beginning of a military operation have especially intensified since the French withdrawal from NATO and as a result of the significant decrease in the depth of the Central European theater of operations and the worsening of the strategic position of the main grouping of the armed forces of the bloc in West German territory.

In the opinion of the West German military-political leadership, the most important principle of strategy should be considered as flexibility both in the planning of a future war, in operations, and in the use of the available armed forces, taking into account the actual existing military-strategic situation. In this connection, it is believed that West Germany, together with her NATO allies, must be in constant readiness to conduct:

-- an all-out nuclear war, which from the very beginning will be conducted with massive and unlimited use of nuclear weapons against a whole complex of military power and military economic potential of the probable enemy;

-- an all-out nuclear war springing up as a result of the expansion of the scale of a conventional, limited armed conflict;

-- armed conflicts during which only conventional means of destruction are used, or both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons are used.

Taking into account that the territory of West Germany touches the frontiers of the countries of the socialist bloc, the Bonn military chiefs believe that the main ground operations will occur first on German territory. Therefore, on the initiative of the West German command, the so-called concept of "forward area," which presupposes the deployment in peacetime of the basic groupings of NATO troops directly on the frontiers of the countries of the socialist camp, was developed, approved by the NATO chiefs, and adopted on September 1, 1963.

In contrast to the views of the U.S. and NATO military command element which allow for the possibility of withdrawal from the frontier to the rear, with a loss of part of the territory in the event of an unsuccessful culmination of a border conflict, the leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany does not concede this but stresses the necessity of unrolling offensive operations by NATO front groupings from the very beginning of the war, and carrying ground combat operations into the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries. To implement the concept of "forward areas," the West German command has developed and is actually building near the eastern frontier of the Federal Republic of Germany a belt of nuclear land mines, while calculating on obtaining control over the use of these nuclear weapons. This belt must serve as a sort of nuclear barrier, with the support of which the NATO troops will be able to form the necessary groupings along decisive lines to conduct attacks, and in case of a failure, to go over to the defense directly along the frontiers.

The chiefs of the Bundeswehr believe that the character of modern means of armed conflict, the possibility of a sudden outbreak of war, and the decisive role of its initial operations require having even in peacetime the type of armed forces (regarding composition, equipment, and combat readiness), which could handle the problems of the first stage, and possibly of the whole beginning period of the war without significant reinforcement. It is believed that the period from "M" day (beginning of mobilization) to the beginning of the war will be extremely short. That is why "one should not expect that during the war it will be possible by mobilization to assemble a sufficient quantity of forces. Those forces which we shall assemble immediately after the beginning of the war will not have time to participate in its most decisive first phase...The times of classical mobilization are past," wrote the former commander of the joint NATO ground forces of the Central European theater of operations, the West German General Speidel, in the November issue (1964) of the NATO journal Review Militaire Generale.

In the opinion of the West German command, the principle of integration (unification) of the efforts of all the members of the North Atlantic bloc must be made the basis of the planning, preparation and conduct of the war and operations. "The basic practical advantage," wrote General Speidel, "resides in the uniformity of command of troops and their combat training, in the unity of the organization, armament, and supply, in unified principles in research work, in a common direction of the development of the NATO armed

forces and in a community of problems of 'psychological defense.'"

Proceeding from general and their own particular view on the probable character of a future war in Central Europe and methods of its conduct, the West German military-political chiefs are advancing a series of demands for the organization of the NATO armed forces. In particular, the following measures are believed necessary:

- to review the structure of the military leadership in NATO in order to intensify the influence of the Federal Republic of Germany in that bloc;

- to permit NATO commanders to decide for themselves when to use nuclear weapons independently from decision by political organs;

- to increase the combat personnel of the ground forces in the Central European theater of operations to 30 divisions, improve their combat capability now, in peacetime, and substantially improve the support of the troops by commensurate air forces;

- to improve the deployment of armies, by sending units directly to the eastern frontiers of the Federal Republic of Germany to those positions which they must occupy at the beginning of a war;

- to create the necessary reserves;

- to adopt uniform programs of military training, develop uniform lengths of service in the army for all NATO members;

- to introduce a single system of material-technical supply;

- to reduce the time period of mobilization;

- to introduce a unified chain-of-command in alerting the NATO command of all units and formations.

The cornerstone of the military policy of the Federal Republic of Germany remains its attempt to obtain access to nuclear weapons, or at least to have a decisive influence on the political control of their use and the development of operational plans for using nuclear rocket means.

The military strategy of Great Britain, like its military doctrine, has lost its former independence and is forced to gravitate towards the strategic concept of the USA and NATO. This situation has come about as a result of Great Britain's loss of her colonies, and, consequently, of military bases, the reduction of human and material resources, the weakening of the economic position of the country, which led to a decrease in her military potential with the constant increase of costs of the modern types of arms and combat equipment. A most important factor, having an influence on the military policy of Great Britain as a whole, is the disparity between her expanded military obligations in NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and to several

colonial countries on the one hand and rather limited economic resources of the country on the other. Such a situation has forced Great Britain either to withdraw as a second-class power, or to follow the military-political course of the USA, remaining their chief ally in the military blocs. This is the course that the political chiefs of Great Britain are following.

British strategy is based on the use of nuclear strike forces, as well as on small, regular, non-nuclear armed forces, which are scattered over various regions of the world: in Europe, the Near and Far East, Southeast Asia, and Africa.

Great Britain attaches great significance to national strategic nuclear forces, but does not intend to use them independently, only together with the strategic nuclear forces of the USA. Therefore, the bomber air command is completely integrated with the strategic command of the USA with relation to the assignment of targets, in the organization of communications, and material-technical supply.

While recognizing in principle the concept of limited war, the British military-political chiefs are incapable of creating and supporting, on an appropriate level, the armed forces needed for such a war. That is why she has repeatedly raised the question of reducing the number of her own forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, and also of the necessity of creating joint armed forces (with the participation of the USA, New Zealand, and Australia) in the British "zone of responsibility" -- east of Suez.

The most important principles of the military strategy of Great Britain are the mobility and flexibility of the armed forces, especially if their limited personnel and the scope of the British "zone of responsibility" are taken into account. To assure the mobility of the armed forces, the military chiefs are forced to support a strategic reserve at home, modern means of air and naval transport, and also to have an organized system of unified commands, located in overseas territories.

Thus, putting into practice the principles of modern strategy adopted by the British command will entail great difficulty.

Preparation for New Wars by Imperialist States

Status and Basic Trends in the Development of the Armed Forces

The chief measure of the coalition of imperialist states in the general system of preparation for war against the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist camp is the creation of powerful armed forces -- the basic instrument for realizing their aggressive policies.

The basis upon which the armed forces of the imperialist coalition is built is the strategy of "flexible response" and the so-called principle of "interdependence" in political, economic and military spheres advocated by the ruling circles of the USA as early as 1950, i.e., immediately following creation of the NATO bloc. The fundamental principles of the strategy of "flexible response," which, as is known, presupposes the creation

and training of armed forces capable of conducting both total nuclear war and limited wars, are considered by the countries of the American coalition when solving problems in developing armed forces, notwithstanding the fact that the political leadership of the NATO bloc has not as yet officially approved the strategy of "flexible response."

Regarding the principle of "interdependence," which in addition to NATO has subsequently been extended to the countries making up the CENTO and SEATO blocs, its basic purpose is to create within the framework of aggressive blocs of the American coalition "balanced" armed forces, to determine the responsibility and contribution of each country to the quantitative and qualitative development of such national troops, which are required by and correspond to the aggressive military and political plans of American imperialism. In this connection, the USA and in part England, who possess the greatest scientific-technical and military-economic potentialities, have taken upon themselves the task of creating the chief means for armed conflict, i.e., the strategic means of attack as well as the means for air defense and operational-tactical nuclear rocket weapons for all the services of the armed forces in the coalition. The remaining countries of NATO and of the other military blocs must, upon order and with the assistance of the USA, develop ground troops and air and naval forces for so-called tactical purposes. The principle of "interdependence" put forward by the USA is designed to assure the USA a dominant position in the military blocs created and to secure the use of the economic and military resources of the countries belonging to NATO, CENTO, and SEATO for realization of the aggressive policies of the USA ruling circles. However, such an interdependence, leading to the loss of national sovereignty, is rejected by some countries, notably France, which strive to have at their disposal modern means for armed combat, including strategic weapons; other countries, primarily West Germany, strive either to have such means or to participate actively in planning their use in a future war. The ultimate objective of these and other countries is to possess modern means for waging war, above all strategic means, so as to have a direct influence in the solution of political and military problems within the framework of the existing blocs. To satisfy to some extent the claims of their allies in NATO, the USA and England initially tried to create within that alliance multilateral (American variant) nuclear forces and then Atlantic (English variant) nuclear forces in NATO. However, sharp contradictions within the Atlantic bloc on a series of essential political, economic and military problems prevented solution of the problem of creating united nuclear forces, but so far this problem has not yet been removed from the agenda.[Editor's Note #29]

Since 1962, the buildup and preparation of the armed forces of NATO and of the other aggressive military blocs have been conducted in the interests of simultaneously waging total nuclear war and limited wars. In spite of the fact that the main efforts, as before, have been directed toward preparation for total nuclear war, much more attention has been paid in the last four to five years to the development of so-called conventional armed forces; this is evidenced by their quantitative growth and certain qualitative changes that have occurred in recent years or are projected for the near future. [Editor's Note #30]

The accelerated development of strategic offensive forces and means, which continue to form the basis of the military power of the American coalition as a whole, the tremendous efforts in the area of creating an air defense and antimissile defense, as well as the much greater attention paid to the strengthening and increasing of conventional armed forces have led, naturally, to a sharp increase in military spending in many capitalist countries and to a further arms race. Thus, from 1960 to 1966 the direct military spending of NATO countries increased from 61.2 billion to 74.2 billion dollars, i.e., by 16 percent. [Editor's Note #31]

As a result of measures introduced during the last four to five years, as well as in connection with the aggressive war of the USA and her allies in Southeast Asia and other regions of the globe, individual countries, especially the USA and West Germany, have increased the number and combat personnel of their armed forces, have increased the complement of military formations and units, and have reequipped them with improved weapons and military equipment. As a consequence, the general combat readiness of the land, air, and naval forces was increased, especially those assigned to NATO. [Editor's Note # 32]

At present, the countries of the imperialist coalition have at their disposal large armed forces numbering about 8.8 million men.

In addition, in each country are numerous formations of territorial and border troops, internal security troops, police and constabulary troops, numbering 1 million men, and also organized reserves totaling more than 1 million men.

In working out problems on the development of the armed forces, the military-political leadership of the USA and NATO holds to a so-called long-range strategy, which is based on an analysis of all factors (political, economic, scientific, technical, etc.) determining the development of the armed forces or having an influence on the solution of problems of military structure. Placing great emphasis on the time factor, the USA and NATO leadership proceeds from the fact that the basis of long-range strategy, calculated for the coming 5-10 years and aimed at securing the achievement of the political objectives of the USA and her bloc allies, must include the following basic principles:

1. Long-range strategy must provide for unified planning, the concentration of scientific-technical potentialities, financial and economic means, and also centralization of command of the military establishment. It was with these aims in mind that the USA, beginning with 1962, abandoned its previously held traditional principles of developing its armed forces according to the type of service, i.e., ground, air or naval forces. Judging by the statements of Pentagon officials, this is conditioned above all by the necessity for effective use of the military resources of the country, abolishing parallelism in the activity of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, most particularly when designing weapons systems, and also in centralizing and unifying operational planning, and the use of the services of the armed forces under the direction of unified commands and other

considerations of a strategic character.

In this connection, the organization of the armed forces is patterned after their specific mission. In this, the responsibility for recruiting and training personnel, as well as the provision of the services of the armed forces with combat equipment is done by the respective Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The responsibility for the operational planning and the employment of formations and units of different services trained and transferred to the operational command is delegated to the unified commands in the zones (European, Pacific, Atlantic Ocean, Alaska, Central and South America, and also air defense command in continental U.S. and the strike command) and special commands (Strategic Air Command, Naval Command Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean).

The development of the U.S. armed forces for specific missions is realized through the following structural components: [Editor's Note #33]

-- strategic attack forces composed of ICBM units, nuclear missile submarines (with "Polaris" missiles), heavy bombers, strategic reconnaissance and tanker aircraft;

-- strategic defense forces, including: air defense systems -- surface-to-air missiles, piloted interceptor aircraft, and also the warning and control systems connected with them; defense capability against ballistic missiles and antisubmarine forces; defense capability against attack from space -- interceptor rockets and systems of space identification and tracking;

-- general-purpose forces, including ground troops, tactical aviation, and naval forces (excluding nuclear missile submarines and antisubmarine forces);

-- forces and means for strategic transfer of troops including transport aviation of the transport aviation command and Air Force reserves, airborne transport aviation of the tactical command, and naval transport means, intended for the rapid transfer of units, arms and supplies from the USA to other regions of the globe;

-- armed forces reserves.

2. Long-range strategy, according to the military-political leadership of the USA, is, first of all, a strategy of supremacy in the area of weapons systems and equipment, which qualitatively and quantitatively must always be superior to the military power of a potential enemy. "If the rate of modernization of arms of one country is lower than that of another, the former, in the military sense, will be weaker than the latter. And on the other hand, the country that is able to modernize its means of waging war more rapidly and is able to outstrip its opponent in one or several cycles in the creation of basic armament systems, that country will win the arms race and will weaken the power of its opponent...The country lagging in such a decisive area of competition, may find itself in the position of

being 'unilaterally disarmed.'" [26.]

It is considered that the constant and ever accelerating technological progress is the main factor in the development of the means of armed conflict. Superiority in equipment can be maintained only under conditions where the accomplishment of many technical advances occurs, one after the other. Proceeding from this, the U.S. attempts to assure itself of a general technical superiority which would permit them to be far ahead of the probable enemy insofar as the creation of basic types of weapons and their firepower are concerned.

In this, the USA proceeds from the fact that weapons systems being created, with respect to their combat capabilities, must, first of all, constitute such a threat to the enemy that it would be difficult for him to counteract; and second, these systems must be capable of neutralizing (i.e., repel) any enemy threat. In this connection, the U.S. tries to have such a quantitative superiority over the USSR that, under any conditions including the most unfavorable, the USA would be in a position to deliver an effective blow with adequate force. With regard to this, it is considered that superiority of means for attack over the means for defense does not obviate the necessity of the latter. That is why the USA is attempting to create an effective means of antimissile and antispace defense, so as to reduce losses in men and materiel resulting from enemy nuclear strikes.

3. The economic field is considered by the USA military-political leadership as the most efficacious area for "long-range strategy," in which the following goal is pursued: to force their rival into a "constant struggle for leadership" on a global scale in order to weaken his military-economic potential by means of precisely calculated long-term pressure.

The American military-political leadership considers that the USA must do everything possible to slow down the economic development of its adversary. Following this goal, Pentagon specialists try to compile the greatest number of variations in the arms programs and in strategic conceptions.

Inasmuch as the cost of scientific research and development of weapons systems has turned out to be extremely high, the pooling of the efforts of the Western powers in this area was suggested. Along with this, it is considered extremely necessary to unify, within the framework of military blocs, most of the weapons systems and combat equipment so as to accelerate their development, lessen the cost of production, and simplify modernization, maintenance and supply. It is not difficult to understand that all these outwardly rational measures have as their ultimate goal the placing of the majority of the military-bloc countries in complete military-economic and, consequently, political dependence on the principal imperialist powers, above all the USA and West Germany. This is why the military-political leadership of the USA and West Germany so consistently strives to integrate all areas, especially the economic and military.

The status and the immediate future for the development of the armed forces in the imperialist coalition are characterized by the following basic

indices:

Strategic attack forces. [Ed.N.#34] The political and military leadership of the leading countries of the imperialist coalition considers strategic attack forces the chief means for waging general nuclear war. Therefore, basic efforts are concentrated on the still more complex development and perfection of strategic nuclear forces and weapons. Hence, particular attention is paid to designing and producing weapons systems of practically unlimited range, great accuracy, high viability, the capability to overcome the PVO and PRO (air and antimissile defenses) of the adversary, and high technical reliability and combat readiness.

The interrelation of components of the strategic attack forces is being changed by the military-political leadership of the USA on the basis of comprehensive study, evaluation and comparison of the effectiveness of individual systems of strategic weapons, especially for the future. Understanding of the word "effectiveness" involves the inclusion of the most important technical and combat characteristics of the weapons systems, which makes it relatively simple to subject them to comparative analysis. The basic characteristic of effectiveness in the USA is considered to be the combat reliability which U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara has determined to be the combination of combat readiness, technical reliability, viability, and the capability of successfully overcoming a PRO (antimissile defense) system.

The combat readiness of a weapons system is determined by its condition at the moment of commitment to combat and is expressed by a relationship between the quantity of means (missiles, planes) ready for launch according to plan, and the overall quantity of means available within a given system. The chief factor hampering an earlier attainment of high combat readiness in previous types of rockets was the time required for it to attain momentum and go over to the gyroscope system of missile guidance. The limited operational capability of the gyroscopes did not allow keeping them engaged during the entire time the missile was on combat alert. The use at present of gyroscopes on air suspension makes it possible to keep the missile on ready for an immediate launch over a period of many months.

Technical reliability, as one of the factors determining combat reliability, is the relationship of the quantity of means (missiles, planes) in good technical repair to the overall quantity of a given type.

The degree of viability is determined by the relationship of the quantity of means, which under combat conditions, according to computed data, can survive after a first strike by the enemy, to the overall quantity of a given type of means.

The possibility of overcoming the enemy's PVO and PRO is determined by the relationship of the quantity of means, which, according to computed data, can actually reach the targets and destroy them, to the overall quantity of means (missiles, planes) committed.

Such are the basic factors by which American military specialists determine the qualitative state of strategic means of attack, their combat capability, and combat readiness.

Strategic means of attack which, as is known, include ICBM's, nuclear rocket-carrying submarines, and heavy and medium bombers, are for the most part in the hands of the USA and, to a much lesser extent, England and France.

Only the USA possesses ICBM's.

The experimental-design work for creating rockets began in the USA as early as 1964. Convinced of their own technical superiority, for about ten years the Americans conducted that work relatively slowly, staking their hopes on strategic aviation and the winged rockets "Snark" and "Navaho."

Successes of the Soviet Union in rocket construction forced the USA in 1956 to accelerate design of the medium-range ballistic missiles "Thor" and "Jupiter." Simultaneously, the design and adoption of ICBM's "Atlas," "Titan" 1, and later "Minuteman" 1A and "Polaris" A1 as armaments were accelerated.

Taking into account the extremely insufficient technical reliability, low operational characteristics, vulnerability, and insufficient combat readiness of the missile systems, as well as a series of other significant defects of the so-called first-generation missiles, the American command came to the conclusion of the necessity:

- to increase the technical reliability of the missile system and thus reduce to a minimum the instances of combat alert breakdowns and the number of defects affecting the missiles while in flight;

- to increase the range of missiles in order to hit targets in any region of the Eurasian continent and increase the yield of their nuclear warheads;

- to decrease the vulnerability of the missile complexes by means of a wide dispersal of the locations of the launch pads in silos and improve their viability;

- to do away with systems of flight correction by radio and change over fully to improved autonomous inertial flight-control systems and thus increase the firing accuracy of the rockets and the operational reliability of the systems;

- to improve the combat readiness of the missile systems by using chiefly solid fuels in engines, making it possible to keep these missiles on alert a long time and decrease the time of the pre-launch preparation;

- to lengthen service life and increase the operational scope of all the missile's equipment (especially the gyroscope);

-- to provide missiles with a means of overcoming PRO and make it possible for ballistic missiles to maintain the role of an "absolute" weapon for many years.

As a result of the work carried out in the USA, the strategic missiles "Titan" 2, "Minuteman" 1B and "Minuteman" 2, "Polaris" A2 and "Polaris" A3 have been designed and adopted. The introduction of these missile systems led to the removal of the "Thor" (in 1963-1964), "Jupiter" (in 1964), "Atlas" and "Titan" 1 (in 1964-1965), and "Polaris" A1 (in 1966) from the armament system.

Adopted in 1963, the ICBM "Titan" 2 is the most powerful American missile, with a starting weight of about 150 tons, a warhead with a power of 10-18 megatons and a range of 23,000 km. In spite of the fact that the missile operates on liquid fuel, it can remain a long time on the launch pad completely fueled, which reduces the time of the pre-launch readying to 1-2 minutes. The launch pads for "Titan" 2 are of the silo type with autonomous underground control points, located at great distances from one another at three missile bases. On each base are two squadrons, with up to 9 launch pads each.

The ICBM "Minuteman" is the basic American missile, adopted at the end of 1962 (there are three versions: "Minuteman" 1A, "Minuteman" 1B, and "Minuteman" 2). The most modern is considered to be "Minuteman" 2, with an increased range of firing (11,000 km), a more powerful nuclear warhead (about 2 megatons), a more perfect PRO-jamming system and greater accuracy.

The USA military command believes that "Minuteman" 2 will form the basis of the strategic missile forces until 1970 and even later. The wide dispersion of "Minuteman" missiles in underground reinforced concrete silos, the duplication of the communication and control lines making it possible to launch missiles from underground as well as from air-control points, the use of retargeting equipment and many other improvements assure a high viability and effectiveness of strategic rockets in a nuclear war.

The "Polaris" ballistic missiles aboard nuclear submarines are second in significance as a component part of a strategic means of attack. These missiles are considered an extremely promising strategic weapons system because of their purported invulnerability to enemy missiles and shore-based antisubmarine defense, which results from the capability to launch missiles from a submerged position, from the autonomy of cruise, high mobility, and from the excellent camouflage of submarines.

The nuclear submarines of the U.S. Navy are armed with "Polaris" A2 and "Polaris" A3 missiles (16 combat-ready missiles on each submarine); the more perfect is considered to be "Polaris" A3, adopted in 1964, with a more powerful nuclear charge (1 megaton) and a greater range.

Altogether, by mid-1967, the American command planned to commission and have ready for combat 41 nuclear submarines with 656 "Polaris" missiles;

this was to include 13 submarines with 208 "Polaris" A2 missiles and 28 submarines with 448 "Polaris" A3 missiles.

It should be noted that although the "Polaris" A3 is more perfect than the "Polaris" A1 and "Polaris" A2, the American command does not consider them to have a future after 1970-75, mainly due to poor accuracy and low-yield nuclear charge. In this connection, the USA is at present working on the "Poseidon" missile (a "Polaris" B3 with a range of about 4600 km, a more powerful nuclear warhead, and increased launch weight), which is to replace the "Polaris" A2 and possibly "Polaris" A3.

The U.S. Navy command has decided to organize the rocket-carrying nuclear submarines into five squadrons of 7-9 submarines each. Three are to be kept in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, one in the Pacific and one at bases in the continental USA.

Simultaneously with the construction of nuclear rocket-carrying submarines, the U.S. Navy command is developing a system for base deployment, creating shore bases in various sea and ocean regions, and is accelerating the tempo in building special floating bases.

A characteristic of the nuclear rocket-carrying submarine base system is that it includes fixed naval bases on US territory and forward bases in other capitalist countries in Europe and Asia.

The fixed bases on the Atlantic coast in the U.S. are Charleston (South Carolina), New London (Connecticut) and Norfolk (Virginia), and in the Pacific basin are Pearl Harbor (Hawaii), Bremerton (Washington state) and San Diego (California).

In American military-strategic plans related to the organization of bases for nuclear rocket-carrying submarines, particular significance is given to forward base areas facing countries in the socialist camp. These areas must assure the maintenance of the nuclear submarines in a high state of combat readiness and, to a certain degree, divert the threat of a retaliatory nuclear strike from U.S. territory. The forward bases are Holy Loch (England), where the 14th and 18th Squadrons are located; and the Spanish base, Rota, supporting the combat activity of the 16th Squadron of nuclear rocket-carrying submarines in the Mediterranean basin along the southern and southwestern parts of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary.

Realizing that as a result of an enemy retaliatory strike, the fixed and forward bases would be destroyed, the American command is building floating bases for nuclear rocket-carrying submarines, one per squadron and one in reserve.

The accelerated creation of a nuclear missile fleet, and a base system for it, is evidence that the American imperialists are creating, around the USSR and other socialist countries, a network of mobile, strategic nuclear strike forces.

Strategic aviation. In spite of the intensified development of strategic rocket weapons, the command of the imperialist states continues to retain strategic aviation within the make-up of the strategic strike forces, and to improve it, planning to use it chiefly to deliver a subsequent attack, especially against hard and mobile missile sites and also against targets, which, in its opinion, there is no need to destroy in the first minutes of the war, for example, ammunition and fuel dumps, military-industrial targets, etc.

The strategic aviation of the USA includes heavy bombers, strategic reconnaissance planes, tanker aircraft, and subunits for supply and material-technical service. The principle grouping of the American strategic aviation is located in territorial USA.

Up to 50 percent of the combat-ready strategic bombers are constantly kept at the air bases on a 15-minute alert, for delivering strikes against targets predetermined for them and also ready for quick withdrawal in case of an enemy strike. At the same time, whenever necessary, there is round-the-clock air patrolling by heavy bombers, carrying nuclear bombs, along the northern coasts of Greenland, Canada, and Alaska, as well as above the Mediterranean Sea area. [Editor's Note 35]

In connection with the increase in the number of ICBM's and the introduction of nuclear rocket-carrying submarines, the quantity of strategic bombers in the U.S. Air Force in the last 5-6 years has been greatly reduced, chiefly because of the removal of the obsolete B-47 medium bombers from the armaments system. Within the next few years, the B-58 medium bombers and part of the B-52C and B-52F heavy bombers are also slated for removal from the armaments system.

By 1971, they plan to have about 450 strategic bombers, including 255 B-52G's and B-52H's with a flight range of up to 19,000 km having, besides a bomb load, two guided missiles of the "air-to-ground" class, "Hound Dog", and about 210 B-111 heavy bombers which are designed after the F-111 tactical fighter and which should go into service of the Strategic Air Command in 1968-71.

To counteract the enemy's air defense means, the bombers are provided with equipment for creating active and passive radio interference, as well as with "Quail" radio countermeasure missiles having a range of 320 km. Much attention is paid to inclusion of equipment on strategic bombers that would permit operation at low level thereby reducing losses from enemy antimissile defense means.

The American command attaches great significance to the development of strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which are variants of corresponding strategic bombers (RB-52 and RB-58) and the military transport aircraft (RC-130 and RC-135), are found alongside the specially built high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft U-2 and RB-57F. Also designed and, according to the American press, being commissioned for service in strategic reconnaissance aviation units is the

new supersonic aircraft SR-71. According to an announcement by the U.S. President, this aircraft, as well as the strategic reconnaissance aircraft RF-111, should become the basic aviation reconnaissance system of the Strategic Air Command.

Tanker aircraft assure an increase in the radius of operation of the combat aircraft. The basic tanker aircraft for the strategic bombers of the U.S. Air Force is the KC-135A (maximum reserve of fuel transferred in flight during refueling -- 43.5 t).

Thus, in the creation of strategic offensive forces, the main course followed was an accelerated development of "Minuteman" ICBM's and "Polaris" nuclear submarines. As regards strategic aviation, the number of heavy bombers in the next few years will remain approximately at the present level, although their role within the strategic strike forces will be gradually reduced.

England and France also have strategic nuclear offensive forces.

England, experiencing serious financial and economic difficulties, nevertheless tries, at least theoretically, to maintain independent nuclear forces in the makeup of the bomber aircraft command, so as to have the right to a decisive voice in the various organs of NATO. However, most of the political and military figures of the West, including Americans, consider that the British strategic nuclear forces are already obsolete and have lost their significance as an instrument of British foreign policy.

During the last four years, the number of aircraft in the British bomber aircraft command has decreased by about 30 percent. At the present time, it has about 80 medium bombers of the "Vulcan" and "Victor" type, armed with "Blue Steel" missiles having a nuclear warhead of megaton power, and a range of about 300 km. The British military-political leadership, judging by the Western press, does not intend to increase the number of strategic bombers in the coming years. On the contrary, their further reduction as compared with the existing level is possible.

England intends to realize a buildup in the strength of the strategic nuclear forces basically by construction and introducing by 1970 four nuclear submarines equipped with a total of 64 "Polaris" missiles which the USA will deliver to her. Thus, with some reduction in the makeup of the bomber aircraft command and with the fulfillment of the construction program for nuclear missile submarines, England, by 1970, can have 140-150 missiles and rocket-carrying aircraft of strategic designation.

Military Space Program. [Editor's Note #36] The imperialists plan to use the great achievements of modern science and technology in the mastery of space for their aggressive military purposes and, from year to year, allocate billions for the military mastery of space. From 1957 up to 1966, the US imperialists allocated about 40 billion dollars to the national space program. Other capitalist countries such as England,

France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Japan have begun work on their own national space programs, however, work in these countries has not yet reached the proportion of that in the USA due to the high cost of modern space devices and the inability of the economies of these countries to conduct large-scale space programs. To unite the efforts of a number of European capitalist countries regarding space mastery, two organizations have been created in Europe, for example: ELDO, the European organization for designing missile carriers, and ESRO, the European organization of space research; they are working on programs financed by the participating countries (England, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Belgium) on an equal basis. Japan is preparing to initiate space research under her own program. In addition, in many capitalist countries, work is being conducted on space research and mastery of space under joint bilateral agreements and programs with the USA.

The militarist circles of the USA are the principal aggressive force nurturing insidious plans for using space for military purposes and transforming space into a new theater of military operations; they consider space the most suitable for implementation of global military operations.

To support the national space research program and the military conquest of space, a Council on Aeronautics and Space Research, headed by the Vice-President, has been created under the President of the USA. The principle organizations responsible for the development of the military and scientific space programs are the U.S. Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). To avoid duplication in the area of long-term research and design of space apparatus, ships, and stations, and also of powerful missile carriers for putting useful payloads into orbit, the Department of Defense and NASA have created a special coordinating committee, headed by the director of NASA and by the director of the Administration of Scientific Research and Experimental Design Work of the Department of Defense. The principal organization in the Department of Defense responsible for designing and testing air and space weapons systems is the Weapons Systems Development Command (KRSV), within the U.S. Air Force. NASA and KRSV are the chief recipients of budget appropriations for space research and the mastery of space for military purposes. The number of personnel in these organizations increases annually. The problems of research and the military mastery of space are widely and quite openly discussed in the American press, where it is emphatically stressed that "space is the strategic theater of tomorrow."

At present in the USA, large-scale research on the mastery of space is being conducted according to NASA plans, and earth satellites and other space vehicles are launched allegedly for a scientific purpose. However, the American press does not hide the fact that due to the close coordination of efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense about 80 percent of all NASA work and projects are used for purely military purposes.

The military mastery of space in the USA is proceeding in three basic directions:

- toward creating space weapons systems that will assure high combat operations effectiveness for all services of the armed forces;
- toward creating space systems that will prohibit the other countries from probing and mastering space (means of anti-space defense);
- toward developing strategic offensive space systems to conduct armed conflict in space and to strike earth targets from space.

At the present time in the USA, there have been developed and continue to be developed, a series of space weapons supporting systems which are primarily designated for conducting strategic reconnaissance operations, securing communications and control for the benefit of all the services of the armed forces, and for securing navigation of military ships and planes.

With the aid of the reconnaissance satellites the coordinates of strategic objectives and targets are located and determined (military-industrial objectives, launch sites for intercontinental missiles, military bases, airports, radio and radar communication systems and detection systems and other objectives within the territory of socialist countries); precise geodetic maps of the earth's surface are compiled and tied to geodetic nets of strategic objectives and targets; weather reconnaissance for the air force and navy is carried out; also global photo reconnaissance from space. Each year, the Americans put 15-20 "Discoverer" type satellites and 8-10 "Samos" type satellites into orbit. Satellites have been designed and are being used to conduct radio and radar surveys from space, making it possible to determine the basic technical characteristics of radio electronic systems as well as their disposition, and methods and tactics of application.

To construct a global geodetic net and tie in the positions of intercontinental missiles and strategic targets, the Americans use the "Anna," "Starfish" and "Pageos" geodetic satellites, which are tracked by ground-based optical devices, and the "Secor" satellites, the measurements from which are conducted by ground-based radio range-finding equipment. The U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy, and also NASA, participate in this work.

Since 1964 the U.S. Navy has been equipped with a system of "Transit" radio-navigational satellites consisting of 4-5 operating satellites. The system is used for navigation of "Polaris" nuclear submarines and surface ships. The operation of "Transit" satellites is assured by an extensive network of ground tracking and control stations and by their on-board equipment.

For weather reconnaissance on a global scale, the USA has created a network of "Tiros" weather reconnaissance satellites equipped with TV

cameras allowing transmissions to the ground stations of pictures of cloud cover over the earth, over continents and oceans. These data, together with meteorological observations from terrestrial, marine, and aerial (aircraft) weather stations are used to accurately forecast the weather on a global scale in the interests of the armed forces and the country as a whole.

A network of military radio-communication satellites is in the process of construction. From 1960-1966, the USA conducted experimental and test work on designs for communications satellites both in the form of passive reflectors and active relays of electromagnetic radiation. During that period "Echo," "Courier," "Telestar," "Relay," "Syncom" and "Early Bird" type satellites were put into orbit (the last two types in synchronous orbits). With these satellites, numerous experimental radio-communications sequences were conducted in searching for ways to design the most reliable systems for military radio communications. The system of "Syncom" satellites is used by the U.S. Department of Defense to secure military radio communications with American troops in Southeast Asia. A decision has been made and construction started on creating a temporary military radio-communications system, consisting of 16-24 communications satellites placed in polar orbits at altitudes to 30,000 km, and launched by a "Titan" 3C military launch vehicle. The temporary military communications system will be used until 1970, when the Americans propose to replace it with a permanent system of military radio-communications satellites. The chief advantage of communications systems using satellites is their operational stability under conditions influenced by the effects of thermonuclear explosions in the ionosphere when other means of communication are incapable of guaranteeing the reliable transmission of information and the commands necessary for control.

For purposes of detecting nuclear weapons' tests in other countries, conducted on the earth's surface, in the atmosphere, and in space, the USA has created an experimental space system comprising the "Villa Hotel" satellite and a net of ground stations to receive reconnaissance information. The experimental system includes 6 "Villa Hotel" satellites located in orbits at a height of about 100,000 km and equipped with detectors of x-ray and neutron radiation resulting from nuclear explosions. Before 1970, they intend to build an operative system of 6-10 "Villa Hotel" satellites and a special network of ground stations to receive information.

In the USA, much attention has been paid to the "Midas" project, in progress since 1960, which envisages the creation of a space reconnaissance system for the detection of the launch of enemy ballistic missiles with the aid of on-board infrared equipment 25-30 minutes before the missile approaches the target. This is considered an extremely important factor in organizing antimissile and civil defense.

The creation of a space-reconnaissance system for ultralong-range detection based on infrared technology is considered by the Americans to be feasible by 1970.

Since 1965, a new tendency has appeared in the area of military supporting space systems: the construction of multipurpose satellites. This is caused by the great expenditure of means on rocket carriers, each of which puts 1-2 satellites into orbit. With the aid of multipurpose satellites it is proposed that the following problems will simultaneously be solved: reconnaissance of ground targets from space, detection of launches of ICBM's and ballistic missiles, launchings from submarines, detection of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and space, registering the detonation of nuclear ammunition in the target areas, and evaluation of the degree of destruction of objectives by nuclear weapons, weather reconnaissance, navigation of ships and aircraft, and also communication with remote regions of the globe. It is also considered possible that such satellites can be put into orbits up to altitudes of 1100 km and into synchronous orbits at about an altitude of 36,000 km. Americans estimate that they will have great strategic importance and, with a payload weighing about 1 ton, they can be placed in synchronous orbits by "Titan" 3C launch vehicles.

With regard to the fact that reconnaissance satellites moving along definite orbits are vulnerable and can be destroyed by antispace defense weapons, the creation is being planned of maneuverable, manned spaceships, with complex reconnaissance equipment on board. For reconnaissance of the most important regions, such a ship should be able to descend to an altitude of 130-160 kilometers and maneuver in space to avoid interception.

Antimissile and antispace defense satellites for intercepting ballistic missiles and prohibiting other countries' access to space were developed through the years in experimental-design stage in the "Bambi," "Sorti," and "Saint" projects. As a result of experimental work, the Americans came to the conclusion that these projects were unexceutable because of their complexity, high cost, and low effectiveness.

The Department of Defense decided to develop a piloted variant of the satellite interceptor for gaining practical experiences in rendezvous of satellites in orbit. For these purposes, it combined its efforts with NASA in working on the "Gemini" project with the purpose of extending these tests to project "MOL," which calls for the building of a military orbital laboratory. The "MOL" laboratory is being built to conduct experiments in using piloted space means to solve purely military problems in space.

The supporting space systems of satellites and systems for prohibiting the use of space by other countries is only part of the space program of the USA to master space for military purposes. Its main link is the creation of offensive space systems of strategic designation based on the use of aerospace aircraft, orbital rocket planes, or other types of space craft, carrying nuclear charges. For many years the American press has published information on the building of space manned and unmanned bombardment systems under projects "Dyna-Soar," "Boss," etc., whose basic purpose was the destruction of ground targets from space.

Several projects were continued to the experimental-design stage only to be temporarily discontinued as a consequence of a discrepancy in the technical possibilities set forth in tasking and the lack of powerful military launch vehicles. Nevertheless, with the development of powerful military launch vehicles, in particular the "Titan" 3 series with various modifications, the U.S. government has allocated 1.5 billion dollars for the military orbital laboratory "MOL" project. On this basis the possibilities of building military manned space weapons systems will be studied, the technical requirements for them worked out, and the on-board equipment for the military space systems also built. This does not at all mean that the USA has abandoned the idea of building a strategic offensive space system. The predictions of specialists and in particular those of Dornberger, who works in the USA, directly indicate that the trend in the USA is to "shift the center of gravity of all efforts for mastery of space to the solution of military problems." Dornberger, as early as 1961, proposed that hundreds of nuclear bombs should be placed in orbits passing over the USSR and other socialist countries with the rockets then available and keep those bombs in orbit and constantly ready to make nuclear strikes on objectives within the territory of these countries. It was noted that with the aid of such combat means "one can transfer the arena of combat operations from the earth to outer space" [27].

This trend is also confirmed by tasks which the U.S. Department of Defense is raising in the course of the development of the military orbital laboratory "MOL." On the basis of military orbital laboratories "MOL," it is considered possible to build military stations which can be used as command posts in space for conducting strategic reconnaissance using all types of reconnaissance equipment, to intercept satellites in orbit, and also for bombing from space.[28]

It is characteristic that in the USA program to master space for military purposes ever-greater significance is attached to the moon. Broad investigations are being conducted to determine the military potential of the moon, possibilities are being studied and some experiments are being conducted on using the moon to relay communications. The moon is being studied as a base for detecting strategic terrestrial targets and as a base on which to locate strategic means of attack from space. All sorts of projects are being proposed and studied for organizing research and military bases on the moon, bases for the location of strategic nuclear rockets to be used against targeted terrestrial objectives; the advantages and disadvantages of such bases are studied. Possibilities are also being studied of building manned circumlunar nuclear bombers with nuclear charges which can strike separate areas of the earth during a 24-hour period and return to their "lunar base." It is said that "in the course of the struggle for supremacy in space -- because of psychological and military considerations -- the possibility of landing people on the moon and ultimately establishing permanent base there will be important." [29] In this respect, in the statement of General Lemnitzer that the U.S. has already worked out basic concepts for using space for military purposes, with the role of the moon determined and the functions between the services of the armed forces distributed, deserves attention.

Many scientific-research and experimental-design organizations in the USA are, in fact, working on the problems of military use of the moon. However, the road for them is being paved by NASA, which has been developing the "Saturn-5-Apollo" systems since 1958 to realize a first stage (before 1970) for research flights to the moon, with a landing on its surface and a return to earth; but after 1970, these systems are to be used for extensive research and mastery of the moon in the national interests of the USA.

The U.S. Department of Defense has its own plans regarding the military use of the "Saturn-5-Apollo" systems and, in particular, the manned three-seater "Apollo" spaceship. The U.S. press publishes projects on the use of "Apollo" spaceships to conduct reconnaissance from space, and for inspection, interception, maintenance, and servicing of military space means in orbit. The "Apollo" craft is considered an element of military space stations. American specialists believe that the trail which NASA will blaze to the moon will make it easier for the U.S. Department of Defense to advance projects for its possible military conquest.

The facts stated are evidence that the American imperialists have taken the path of direct use of space for realizing their aggressive intentions.

Air Defense and Antimissile Defense Forces. [Editor's Note #37]

In working out plans for the development of air defense and antimissile defense forces, the U.S. and NATO commands proceed primarily from the fact that the strategic means of a probable enemy can inflict tremendous damage on the USA and her allies in military blocs. Therefore, even a "reliable" defense, against any given type of strategic means, has very limited value. This, according to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, McNamara, is the main reason why the USA, regardless of tremendous expenditures for the development of antiaircraft defenses up to this time does not have the effective forces and means capable of keeping the damage from an enemy's strike within tolerable limits. To solve this problem, it is considered imperative in conjunction with the building up of strategic offensive forces to develop balanced strategic defense means (antimissile, antiaircraft, and antisubmarine), as well as means of passive defense. This type of organization in the strategic defense forces, according to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, can to a certain degree assure a "deep defense," reducing the effectiveness of the enemy's strikes.

The American command, when working out programs for increasing the means for antiair, antimissile, antisubmarine, and passive defense, proceed on the premise that "with each new increase in defensive forces, the effectiveness of defense increases ever more slowly," and "this tendency toward diminishing returns from means expended places a practical limit to the sums spent for the solution of the defense problem." [30]

In evaluating the prospects for development of the Soviet Union's strategic means of attack, and their technical and economic possibilities in this sphere, the American command came to the conclusion that in the next decade the USA will actually be incapable of assuring complete de-

||| fense of its territory regardless of the forces they will have (offensive and defensive) for the conduct of a nuclear war. |||

The imperialist bloc has set up air defenses in three geographic regions: North America, Europe, and the Pacific area; in each of them, especially in the first two, these are unified systems.

The most highly developed unified system of air defense has been organized in North America; it encompasses the continental United States, Canada, Alaska, Greenland, and Iceland.

The North American air defense includes U.S. and Canadian air force and ground troops units equipped with fighter aircraft of air defense and guided surface-to-air missiles. In addition, units of Navy fighter aircraft and of the tactical air force located in the United States can be used for air defense purposes.

An integral part of air defense is the unified system of detection and guidance which includes a long-range detection network and a short-range detection and guidance network. The long-range detection network forms a line for detection of piloted means of air attack on the distant approaches to the continental United States from the west, the north, and the east.

This line of detection ("DEW line") is located 2500-3000 kilometers from the northern border of the United States and passes through Iceland, Greenland, and the northernmost regions of Canada and Alaska. The radar stations of this line are located so that they overlap, and can fully control the airspace in the polar region, assure detection and notification of the organs of control of the air defense forces two to three hours before enemy aircraft (including low-flying aircraft) approach the northern border of the United States. [Editor's Note # 38]

The second line of detection ("Pinetree") runs along the southern border of Canada with the USA and assures 10-15-minute warning prior to the approach of enemy aircraft to American territory.

The network of short-range detection and guidance has been deployed throughout the entire territorial United States, along the east and west coasts as well as the southern part of the country, in order to give a clear view of the airspace south of the Mexican border and south of the Gulf states. The major part of the short-range detection and guidance network is connected with the "SAGE" system, which makes it possible to utilize over 80 percent of the active air defense means according to a unified plan. The territorial United States has over 20 "SAGE" centers to assure rapid collection and evaluation of data pertaining to the air situation. ||| A reserve system of air defense control called "Buic" has also been created. |||

It is said that the existing air defense system, constantly being improved, will be sufficiently reliable against manned enemy aircraft.

The United States exerts great efforts in the creation of antimissile and antispace defense. This is caused primarily by the fact that according to the views of the military-political leadership of the USA and a number of other NATO countries, the side which first creates an antimissile (antispace) defense will have a most important strategic advantage which would allow the threatening of war or its unleashing without fear of the enemy's retaliatory strikes.

Many practical measures are being taken for this. In particular, there are three early-warning radar centers to detect the launchings of ballistic missiles; these are in Greenland (Thule Air Force Base), in Alaska (Clear), and in Britain (Fylingdales). The range of the radar stations exceeds 5500 kilometers. Presumably these stations can detect ICBM's as soon as they leave the atmosphere and thus give warnings 15-17 minutes before the strike. High-speed computers tied in with the radar stations can automatically determine the origin and the destination of the missiles from an analysis of the rocket trajectories.

In addition, the U.S. has a number of shorter-range radar stations on the Island of Shemya (in the Aleutians), in Turkey, Canada, and in the territorial United States. Their main task is constant surveillance of Soviet missile ranges. If necessary, they can be used as intermediate stations in conjunction with the ballistic missile early-warning stations.

For the detection and control of all enemy space devices the United States has created the "SPADATS" radiotechnical system whose center is located at the North American Air Defense headquarters. [Editor's Note #39]

The proposed launching of a large number of "Midas" satellites, intended for detection of launchings of ICBM's and to give 30-minute warning, should also help to strengthen the antimissile and antispace defense. [Editor's Note #40]

Beginning in 1963 the American command has concentrated efforts on working out a system, "Nike-X," the basis of which will be the "Nike-Zeus" and "Sprint" interceptor missiles developed earlier, and also new radar stations and electronic computers.

The air defense system of the European countries belonging to NATO has four PVO zones: Northern (Norway and Denmark); Central (West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxemburg); Southern (Italy, France and Turkey); and the British (United Kingdom). [Editor's Note #41]

The territory of France has its own national air defense system.

The air defense of these zones is based on the use of surface-to-air guided missiles: "Nike-Ajax" (for destroying solitary air targets flying at subsonic speeds at an altitude of 1.5 to 19 kilometers); "Nike-Hercules," with a nuclear warhead (for destroying individual or groups of air targets flying at supersonic speeds); "Hawk," with a conventional or nuclear warhead for destroying individual or groups of supersonic air

targets at low and intermediate altitudes (up to 15 kilometers), fighter-interceptors with a maximum speed of 1600-2300 km/hr and a service ceiling of 18-20 kilometers, equipped with "air-to-air" guided missiles with an 8-20 kilometer range. For air defense in the British zone, "Bloodhound" guided missiles -- and in the troops, "Thunderbird" -- are used against air targets at ranges up to 20 kilometers.

The air defense of the European NATO countries is based on cover of separate regions, of the most important economic and political centers, and also principal groupings of armed forces.

For control of the active means of air defense and for observation and warning in all four zones, numerous control and warning centers and stations have been set up, including many radar stations for diverse purposes, to assure detection of air targets up to 500 kilometers away.
[Editor's Note # 41a]

Attaching great significance to the organization of an effective control of the air defense means of the European countries, the NATO command decided on and is implementing practical measures for the creation of a single automated system of control for an integrated air defense, called "NADGE" (NADGE -- NATO Air Defense Ground Environment), designed to intercept only manned means of air attack at intermediate and high altitudes (to 30 kilometers); it is not designed to engage low flying targets and ballistic missiles.

The NADGE equipment system is to be installed on the territories of eight NATO countries: Norway, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The creation of this system is supposed to solve the problem of expanding and perfecting the national and regional air defense systems, having united them under a single control system for the air defense forces and means. The complete introduction of the NADGE system is not expected before 1970.

The Pacific Ocean air defense zone encompasses Japan, South Korea, the Island of Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands and the most important ocean basins and is based on the active use of the fighter aviation and surface-to-air guided missiles of the USA and the countries mentioned above, and also the air defense capability of the American naval strike force. The planning and overall guidance of the air defense in that region is accomplished by the U.S. Armed Forces Command in the Pacific Zone.

In this manner, the chiefs of the American coalition have, to the present time, created a comparatively strong air defense for strategically important regions, especially for the air defense of North America, and they continue to perfect it through creation of more effective active means of combat (surface-to-air missiles, interceptors and their armament), as well as by developing and introducing improved systems for detection and tracking by air defense elements. Concurrent with this, the USA is exerting great efforts to create an effective antimissile and antispace

defense, which, they say, can give them a strategic superiority in the military sphere.

General-purpose Forces. Ground Forces. [Editor's Note #42] The military chiefs of the imperialist coalition believe that to utterly defeat a resisting enemy in modern war is only possible through the coordinated efforts of all services of the armed forces, among which the most important role is played by the ground forces. They are as indispensable to an all-out nuclear war as they are to limited wars -- even the so-called police action, i.e., maintaining by force of arms the rotten regimes in dependent countries and suppressing the national liberation movement.

In an all-out nuclear war, the mission of the ground forces will consist of exploiting the results of strategic and operational-tactical strikes to complete the rout of groups of enemy troops and to occupy his territory. In those directions where offensive actions seem impossible, the ground forces are assigned to defensive or holding actions, with the aim of securing the protection of nuclear attack means, inflicting significant losses upon the enemy, and preparing conditions for transition to the offensive.

The strength of the ground forces of the countries that are participants in the aggressive military blocs (NATO, CENTO, SEATO), as well as Spain, Japan, South Korea, the Kuomintang clique on the Island of Taiwan, and South Vietnam, by the end of 1966 had reached 5,600,000 men and constituted about 63.6 percent of the total strength of armed forces. (Spain, Japan, South Korea, the Kuomintang clique and South Vietnam are included together with the three indicated blocs in the composition of the imperialistic military coalition headed by the USA because they have corresponding agreements with the USA on mutual military assistance.) Contained in their organic make-up at that time were 165 cadre divisions.

The ground forces of the American coalition are located in three basic geographical regions of the capitalist world: in Western Europe on the territories of the NATO countries, where, by the end of 1966, there were 65 cadre divisions and a significant number of individual units and subunits, especially of nuclear-missile weapons for tactical purposes; in the Far East and in Southeast Asia about 75 divisions, not counting the reserve; and in the CENTO zone, 16 divisions (8 Iranian and 8 Pakistani). Within the continental limits of the USA, there were 7 divisions and a considerable number of units to provide combat and materiel-technical support.

The USA, France, Turkey, Italy and West Germany have the ground forces with the greatest numerical strength. The ground forces of almost all the continental European countries of NATO constitute, on the average, about two-thirds of the total strength of the armed forces of those countries. This ratio is somewhat lower in the USA and England. This is explained by the fact that these countries possess strategic offensive means, large air and naval forces, as well as numerous reserves not inclu-

ded in the regular troops. Most of the NATO countries spend 25-40 percent of their military budgets on the maintenance and buildup of the ground forces.

From an organizational point of view, the divisions, separate brigades, and units of the ground forces of the USA, England, France, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and Turkey are organized into army corps, which in such countries as the USA, France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey are, in turn, combined in field armies. The higher operational groupings of ground troops -- the army groups -- are created only in the NATO bloc.

The basic efforts in the development of the ground forces of the NATO countries are directed toward a continued increase in their fire and striking power, their tactical mobility on the battlefield, the ability of the formations and units to conduct active combat operations with or without the use of nuclear weapons, the possibility of defense from weapons of mass destruction as well as improving the organizational structure of the troops.

The fire power and strike power of the ground forces are being increased by extensively equipping them with delivery means for nuclear weapons of operational-tactical and tactical designation, and by re-equipping them with the latest types of conventional arms and combat equipment.

The "Pershing" and "Sergeant" missile systems, already in use, are being perfected; the ground forces expect to get the new "Lance" guided missile with a range of 75 km, which is to replace the unguided "Honest John" and "Little John" in the divisions.

In recent years, the ground forces of most of the NATO countries have been equipped in significant numbers with the 155 mm self-propelled howitzer (range 18.5 km) and the 175 mm self-propelled gun (range to 32 km), which can fire conventional, as well as nuclear ammunition (an 0.05-0.1 kiloton nuclear shell for the 155 mm self-propelled howitzer was developed in 1963; a shell for the 175 mm self-propelled gun is also being developed). At the same time, it is proposed to retain in the formations and units the 105 mm and 203.2 mm self-propelled howitzers (the latter, atomic) which were standardized for a majority of the countries of the American coalition.

To strengthen the troop air defense and, above all, to combat low-flying enemy planes in the combat zone, along with continued perfection and introduction of the "Hawk" antiaircraft guided missile into the troops, the appearance among the armed forces of a portable antiaircraft weapons system, "Red Eye," to combat low-flying aircraft and helicopters is expected. New antiaircraft guided-weapons systems are being developed: the American, "Chaparral" system is a mobile, quadruple-mount rack for launching "Sidewinder" rockets equipped with an infrared guidance head; the English "Tiger Cat" system (a ground version of the naval antiaircraft guided missile "Sea Cat"); the Franco-West German guided missile

"Roland," characterized by its simplicity of maintenance and repair as well as its high maneuverability; and many other perspective surface-to-air missile systems.

In building up the striking power and mobility of their ground troops the command of the principal NATO countries continues to re-equip them with much improved types of armored equipment and wheeled and tracked vehicles for various purposes. The USA continues to produce and supply the M60A1 tank to their units. In West Germany, in the autumn of 1965, mass production began on the new "Leopard" tank, which is intended for armored and motorized infantry formations of the Bundeswehr.

In accordance with the agreement concluded in mid-1965, the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany are developing a basic combat tank for the 1970's. France has created a medium tank, AMX-63, which is replacing American-made tanks; England is producing a 50-ton "Chieftain" tank, which is to replace the "Conqueror" heavy tank and the "Centurion" tank.

The new tanks entering the arsenals of the ground troops, according to assessment by Western military specialists, possess a more powerful basic armament (guns of 105-120 mm, and on some American tanks, 152 mm) and increased operating range (400-480 km), much higher maneuverability, fully adequate cross-country capability and protective armor, as well as a number of other advantages when compared with previous types; they can engage in combat at night under reduced-visibility conditions.

Proceeding on the assumption that in a future war, fighting with tanks in the field of battle will remain a first-priority problem, the command element in the NATO countries continues to search for more effective means of combat with tanks and to introduce these means on a broad scale into the troops. In the opinion of foreign military experts, the antitank rockets (SS-10, SS-11, "Entac," "Cobra") possessed by the NATO armies do not satisfy modern requirements. Therefore, the principal efforts are being concentrated on development of a guided antitank rocket which would be more reliable and easier to handle, would possess a high degree of accuracy and effective firepower and would have small weight, long range, and comparatively low production cost. In the USA they are developing a wire-guided missile "Tow," which will replace the "Entac" missile and the 106 mm recoilless rifle as heavy antitank weapons. Production is being organized for the "Shillelagh" guided missiles intended for use with the "Sheridan" reconnaissance vehicle and certain models of the M-60 tank.

In West Germany, mass production is beginning on a 90-mm self-propelled antitank gun, which will be included among the armaments of the motorized-infantry and tank divisions.

Alongside improvement of the basic types of arms, more modern engineering equipment, means of communication, new standardized types of small arms and means of protecting personnel from weapons of mass destruction are under development and being issued as equipment of the ground troops. In the laboratories and on the proving grounds, intensive work

is being conducted to form and test new poisonous gases and pathogenic agents.

In NATO countries, army (troop) aviation continues to be developed, and, in the opinion of foreign military experts, in the future it will become the basic means of increasing the mobility of the ground forces in the combat zone.

As before, attention to the problem of perfecting troop organization has not slackened; such organization would satisfy the requirements for conducting a limited or all-out nuclear war. The ground force divisions of the USA, England, West Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands have been reorganized into a similar type (brigade) concept; organically, the quantity of tanks and antitank weapons, armored vehicles and automobiles, aircraft and helicopters, and means to deliver nuclear weapons on targets has increased. As a result of this, their capability to conduct combat operations with or without nuclear weapons has been increased.

The training of the ground forces of the NATO countries in Europe, particularly the joint forces, is based on a uniform program for the entire bloc, which concludes annually with major exercises and maneuvers. These troops are the most combat ready inasmuch as they have sufficient modern means for armed conflict, a high level of personnel training, the necessary administrative support organs, etc. They are employed in definite grouping along the borders of the Warsaw Pact countries, in the probable direction of attack in the event of war, and conforming to the concepts of "border outposts" or "forward defense". Being in a high state of combat preparedness, the ground forces of the NATO countries in Europe, in coordination with tactical aviation and naval forces, can conduct active combat operations both in limited wars, as well as in all-out nuclear war.

In the CENTO zone (participants of the bloc are England, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan), where there are no unified armed forces or a unified command, the basic grouping of the ground forces (with the exception of Turkey) is composed of Iranian and Pakistani forces numbering about 400,000 men (16 divisions in all), equipped with American weapons of the World War II period and of the first postwar years. As regards their possibility of combat and combat readiness these forces are far inferior to the NATO ground forces.

The grouping of the SEATO countries' ground forces in that bloc's zone, in addition to those of Japan, South Korea, the Kuomintang on Taiwan, and South Vietnam, numbers about 75 divisions and includes 13 Japanese, 18 South Korean, 23 Kuomintang, 5 American, 4 Thai, 10 South Vietnamese, 1 Phillippine, and 1 English. The best combat-trained are considered to be the American and English troops and to a lesser degree the Japanese forces.

Tactical Aviation. In spite of the increased role and potential of nuclear weapons of the "surface-to-surface" class, tactical aviation

is being further developed in most of the capitalist countries. This is explained by the fact that a definite part of the combat assignments still cannot be carried out by robot means, in particular, the performance of air reconnaissance, the destruction of mobile, small-scale and inadequately reconnoitered targets, attacking naval objectives and air-lifting men, combat equipment, and various cargoes. The significance of tactical aviation in the conduct of limited wars is increasing.

Tactical aviation is designated to isolate areas of combat operations and prevent bringing up reserves from the rear, to prevent the maneuver of forces in the theater of operations, give direct air support to the ground forces, and conduct aerial reconnaissance.

Tactical aviation consists of light bombers, tactical fighters (fighter-bombers), reconnaissance, transport and liaison aircraft, and, in the USAF, the winged rocket "Mace" and in the Air Force of the Federal Republic of Germany, the guided missile "Pershing."

The higher groups of the tactical air forces are: in the USA, Turkey, and Greece, the air army; in England, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands and in some other countries -- the tactical air command, including air divisions, wings, and detached squadrons.

In strength, tactical aviation in the air forces of the NATO countries has about 5,000 aircraft, of which a large number carry nuclear weapons, as well as more than 150 launch facilities for "Mace" winged rockets and "Pershing" guided missiles. From this collection of tactical aviation means, up to 45 percent of the combat aircraft and a large portion of the launch facilities for the operational-tactical rockets are organically contained in the combined air forces deployed in the European theater of war. A comparatively large grouping of tactical aviation is located on U.S. territory. It is intended for the most part as reinforcement for the combined air forces of NATO in Europe, as well as for U.S. air grouping in the Far East and in Southeast Asia.

American tactical aviation is composed chiefly of the F-104G, F-105, and F-4G fighter-bombers.

The air units and subunits of the tactical aviation in the majority of European countries of NATO are equipped basically with American aircraft of old and new types.

In recent years, within the framework of NATO, they have standardized certain types of aircraft and instituted their joint production in the European countries (the American fighter F-104G, the Italian G-91, the French transport aircraft "Atlantic" and "Transall," etc.).

Many foreign military specialists recognize that the development of new expensive aircraft, like other types of military equipment, has already gone beyond the means of individual capitalist countries, even

those highly-developed from a technical and economic point of view. Due to this, military aircraft development at this present stage (especially for the European countries of NATO) is characterized by their joint development and production. However, the USA uses this cooperation for their own purposes: they buy abroad only the results of the scientific research and force other countries to acquire airplanes from them or build them under license.

Such factors as the adoption of the concept of limited war as concerns the European theater of war, the removal from armaments of MRBM's of the type "Thor" and Jupiter " and subsequent winged rockets, and also the decrease of rocket weapons in the ground troops of NATO countries have an influence on the further development of tactical aviation. The military command and military theoreticians of the West, considering the prospects for the development of tactical aviation in this light, believe that, in composition, tactical aviation will remain roughly at the existing level in the coming years, however, it will undergo qualitative changes.

In future years, a further reduction in the number of types of aircraft and the adoption of a multipurpose aircraft capable of fulfilling the roles of bomber, fighter and reconnaissance aircraft can be expected. The most promising are considered to be the mass-produced American aircraft F-104G, the French aircraft "Mirage" 3E, the American tactical fighter F-111A, and others.

The armament and equipment installed on these aircraft assure aircraft operation at low altitudes; flight activities under difficult meteorological conditions against varied targets using guns, and air-to-air and air-to-surface rockets; conducting reconnaissance; and making attacks with conventional as well as with nuclear bombs.

Particularly great attention is being paid by the U.S. command to the F-111A tactical fighter with variable geometric wings which make it possible to use it at a wide range of altitudes and speeds, as well as at small airports with a grass surface. This aircraft has the following calculated characteristics: maximum speed 2500-2700 km/hour, service ceiling up to 30km; flight range, about 5000km.

One of the basic trends in the development of tactical aviation is the reduction of its dependence on large airports. With this aim in mind, in recent years, vertical or short take-off and landing aircraft have been developed; they can be used from sod airstrips, landing pads, and roads. These include the American F-5 and F-111A aircraft, the French 3-V "Mirage," the West German VJ-101D, the Italian "Fiat" 1262, the English TSR,2, P 1154, and P 1127 "Kestrel," etc. However, the cost of most of the vertical or short take-off and landing aircraft, designed in these countries, turned out to be excessively high; and guaranteed orders from other countries for the construction of a minimum, profitable number of mass-produced aircraft of that type turned out to be insufficient. For this reason, in the majority of countries about all of the programs for the construction of such aircraft were reviewed; the development of some

has been stopped, and the deadlines for building others have been extended.

In this connection, another avenue of approach has been evolved for solving the problems of short runways for tactical aviation which proposes fitting the aircraft with a device for catapulting and braking on landing which, according to Western military specialists, should lead to a cheaper and an almost as effective a solution of the problem of short takeoff and landing as the creation of a special aircraft for vertical takeoff and landing.

A very important problem on which most of the NATO countries are working is the design and mastery of various methods of overcoming present air defenses and breaking through to probable targets of attack, mainly at low altitudes using intensive radio-electronic interference.

The command element of the leading NATO countries, i.e., the USA, England, and the Federal Republic of Germany, considers that the need to increase the strategic mobility of the armed forces, especially of the ground forces, requires an increase in the quantity and an improvement in the quality of transport aviation, which is capable of assuring, in a short time, the appropriate volume of air transport from the USA and England to any theater of operations, as well as within the theaters of operations. As a result of measures taken in the last 5-6 years in that area, especially in the USA, the possibilities of American military-transport aviation have greatly increased due to the development and adoption of new types of aircraft, the increase of the number of aircraft, the payload capacity and the speed of aircraft, the mechanization of loading and unloading, etc.

The second grouping in order of importance of tactical aviation, which is composed of American aviation units, is on the territory of capitalist countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia, and an insignificant air force grouping (up to 300 combat aircraft) in the zone of the CENTO bloc (excluding Turkey). However, the aviation of most of the capitalist countries dependent on the U.S. in the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Near and Middle East, are far inferior in quality to the tactical aviation of the USA and other NATO countries.

Naval Forces. The main task of naval forces in a general nuclear war is to obtain superiority on the seas in coordination with the strategic offensive forces and tactical aviation by delivering nuclear strikes against nuclear-rocket means, ships and aircraft at naval bases and at sea, and also other enemy military and industrial objectives. A significant part of the naval forces can also be used in limited wars.

At the beginning of 1967, in the navies of the NATO, CENTO, and SEATO countries, as well as Spain, Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam, and the Kuomintang clique, there were about 1.5 million men, more than 4,000 combat vessels, and up to 10,000 aircraft and helicopters, including those in reserve.

The mainstay of the naval might of the coalition is the American

and, to a lesser extent, the British Navy, with a significant number of various types of nuclear weapons. The naval forces of the other capitalist countries, equipped primarily with conventionally armed ships, only supplement the American and British Navies and are intended only for solving problems of a support nature.

By early |||1967||| the regular Naval forces of the U.S. and Britain numbered more than 900 warships [31], including 19 assault aircraft carriers, 25 torpedo-carrying nuclear submarines, 75 guided missile ships, and as many as 3000 warplanes.

The main striking force of the U.S. and British Naval forces is carrier-based aviation.

The advanced U.S. groupings, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean -- including two assault aircraft carriers with approximately 160 aircraft (up to 75 percent bomber-carrying aircraft) -- and the Seventh Fleet in the Far East with 5 assault carriers and 400 aircraft, are the most combat-ready.

The British attack aircraft carriers, one in the Far East, and three in the Northeast Atlantic, are also quite combat-ready.

In case of necessity, the advanced groupings of carrier striking forces can be reinforced by transferring carriers from the United States to the Northeast Atlantic, to the Mediterranean, and to the Far East. This transfer can be accomplished under the pretext of maneuvers or replacement of ships in European and Far Eastern waters.

The American command believes that in connection with the recognized possibility of waging limited wars, the significance of the surface fleet and especially of carrier-based forces is growing. The latter, |||the American command believes, ||| can perform various tasks, especially in limited wars. In particular, they are capable of conducting air reconnaissance, delivering strikes against small targets, and extending direct support to ground troops and landing forces on the shore. This explains why the Americans continue to devote considerable attention to the reequipping of carrier aviation with modern planes and to the construction of new carriers.

||| Simultaneously, the tempo of construction of torpedo nuclear submarines has been increased after construction was halted in connection with the loss of the submarine "Thresher" in 1965.* |||

At the same time, ||| surface ships of various classes are being built ||| and also a considerable number of postwar ships -- primarily destroyers, patrol ships, and submarines -- are continually being modernized and reequipped with new antiair and antisubmarine equipment, ||| in particular, antisubmarine guided missiles and guided missiles. |||

* The U.S. Navy atomic submarine Thresher was lost April 10, 1963. - Ed.

In addition, the U.S. Naval Command is increasing the Navy's capability of transporting troops from the United States to Europe, the Far East, and other regions, aimed at assuring the simultaneous transport of two divisions with [Editor's Note #43] corresponding service support and their attached aviation wings. |||

In order to increase the combat readiness of the naval forces as a whole, the American command made a number of changes in the organization of the fleets and of the Marine Corps. The First and Second Operational Fleets were placed on constant operational status. Prior to this there existed only the headquarters of these fleets with command personnel; ship formations, aircraft, and Marines were attached to them only during maneuvers. In accordance with the reorganization, the First Fleet (Pacific) and the Second Fleet (Atlantic) were given personnel and assigned operational zones. Each of the above fleets contains carrier task forces, carrier-based antisubmarine groups, amphibious forces and security and service personnel. The commanders of the fleets with their staffs were transferred from shore command points to flagships of the fleet.

The reorganization of the Marine Corps also took place. The firepower and striking power of Marine divisions was increased by including tank battalions, |||guided-rocket batteries, field and atomic artillery. |||

In connection with U.S. aggression in Vietnam, in which carrier-based aircraft and the Marines are taking an active part, the American command carried out a series of measures to further strengthen its naval forces. In particular, some ships and auxiliary vessels were taken out of reserve, the number of navy personnel was increased, especially Marines, as the result of the creation of a new division, and the strength of the naval forces in the Western Pacific (the 7th Fleet) almost doubled.

In the British Navy main attention is concentrated on the construction of || nuclear torpedo || submarines and || guided missile || ships. The fleet will also be reinforced by modernizing ships and reequipping naval aviation with new planes.

In the naval forces of the other countries of the American coalition, basically, ships with conventional armament intended primarily for antiair and antisubmarine defense are being built; ||| however, with the help of the USA and Britain some of these ships are being equipped with rocket weapons. |||

THE PREPARATION OF THE THEATERS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR WAR

One of the basic measures taken by the imperialist countries in their preparations for general nuclear war is the appropriate equipping of the probable theaters of military operations and of the territory of the continental United States before the outbreak of war.

The equipping of the theaters of military operations and the territorial U.S. is organized with account taken of the influence of the

new types of weapons on the methods of waging war. Unlike the past, when main attention was devoted to the creation in the theaters of fortified perimeters and the development of railroad systems and highways allowing deployment and combat operations of ground troops, at present the main efforts are directed first of all toward assuring the necessary conditions for the effective use of rocket troops and aircraft. In the theaters of military operations, launching pads for all types of rockets and storage facilities for nuclear-rocket weapons are being built, the network of airbases, airfields, naval airbases, and the ports and sites of debarkation of troops and equipment along the coast are being improved, fixed antiaircraft and radio navigation systems are being created, reliable communications, control and warning systems are being organized, pipelines are being laid, etc.

All this, in the opinion of the U.S. and NATO commands, should make it possible to deliver surprise nuclear strikes using rocket means, aviation, and naval forces against strategically important targets in the Soviet Union and in other countries of the socialist camp.

It is also characteristic that while earlier, before the war, each country prepared its territory independently, now the preparation of territories is systematized and carried out in the interests of the military blocs which have been created. The most extensive measures for preparation of theaters of military operations have been taken in the territory of European countries (members of NATO) and in the United States. The American continent is prepared primarily as an operational base for strategic attack weapons, i.e., ICBM's and strategic aviation. In the European theaters of military operations conditions are being prepared for the use of rocket-carrying nuclear submarines, IRBM's, tactical aviation, naval forces, and large groupings of ground troops. [Editor's Note #44]

In building missile bases in the United States, the American command strives to reduce their vulnerability by considerable decentralization of the launching sites and by putting launching installations underground. Thus, at all the "Titan" and "Minuteman" bases, the launching installations are to be underground, while the launching pads at each base are 15-60 kilometers apart.

The U.S. Command also devotes a great deal of attention to the perfection and expansion of the network of airbases required by its strategic aviation. To assure maneuverability of these aircraft, to decrease their losses, and to increase the safety of the air formations and units, the airbases are built not only in the continental United States, the main base area of strategic aviation, but also beyond its confines. SAC uses more than 80 airbases, most of which (up to 50) are in the continental United States, with more than 20 in Europe and North Africa. In addition, the American Command has developed a plan, in the event of a war, to use large civilian airports throughout the country for bombers.

In the European theaters of military operations, forward bases are being built for nuclear rocket submarines in Holy Loch (Britain)

and Rota (Spain). ||| [Editor's Note #45]

The airfield requirements of the unified NATO air forces are calculated from the fact that each base is to house one squadron. For the period 1951-1960, more than 220 airfields were built according to NATO plans 32 . In addition, the command of the unified NATO air forces intends to use the airfields of the national air forces of the NATO member countries.

With regard to the construction and rebuilding of NATO naval bases and ports, the U.S. and NATO Command strives to create a system of naval bases which would guarantee reliable protection for naval communications in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Pacific area, as well as assure the offensive operations of the naval forces in these naval theaters and their coordination with the ground troops and tactical aviation in land theaters of operations.

In the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean Sea, where in time of war, according to the NATO Command, the main combat operations of the fleet will take place, there are more than 100 naval bases and support points. Admittedly, this quantity (taking into account the utilization of medium and small ports for dispersion of the fleet) of bases and points of basing is quite sufficient for support of the basing of the unified NATO naval forces as well as for the national navies.

The countries of the imperialist coalition have a large number of well-equipped ports capable of handling the necessary volume of foreign and domestic cargo in peacetime as well as in wartime. Thus, in the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean Sea, where the most important naval routes are, there are more than 600 ports of which up to 150 have an average yearly turnover of more than one million tons of cargo.

To assure a stable system of naval bases and ship moorings, taking into account the possible use of nuclear weapons, a great deal of attention is devoted to the dispersion of bases for ships and for unloading (loading) ships. It is intended to use for this purpose the medium and small ports, some of which have already been appropriately equipped: dredging operations are being conducted; the access to the ports and the loading-unloading equipment, mainly the transportable equipment, have been improved; protected warehouses are being built; and pipelines are being laid from the docks to the liquid-fuel storage depots and to the consumer. The extensive use of floating bases is provided to assure sufficient bases for the submarine forces.

In all theaters of military operations, for wartime, extensive work is being conducted on the organization of reliable communication, control, and warning systems, especially the creation of systems of radio, radio relay, tropospheric and ionospheric communications, the laying of subterranean and submarine cables, the construction of communication centers and command posts, the creation of a system of radar cover, etc. By early |||1967, ||| in the European NATO countries, a communications system was

created which covered more than 44,000 kilometers.

Taking into account the increase in the liquid-fuel requirements of the armed forces, primarily the Air Force, the U.S. and NATO Command devotes considerable attention to the development of pipelines and the construction of large storage facilities for fuels and lubricants, especially in the European theaters of military operations. By early 1967, in accordance with the NATO Command plans, up to 9,000 kilometers of pipelines were laid in the European countries and storage facilities for fuels and lubricants were constructed with a total capacity of over 2 million cubic meters. The dense network of commercial pipelines in the United States considerably facilitates the laying of pipelines to the most important air bases.

Thus, the U.S. and NATO Command is taking a number of important measures with respect to the equipment of the probable theaters of military operations. Colossal amounts of money are spent on the construction of bases for ICBM's, air and naval bases, the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, organization of communication, control and warning systems, as well as the laying of pipelines.

THE ECONOMIC PREPARATION FOR WAR

Bourgeois military science devotes particular attention to the problems of the most effective utilization of economic resources and the solution of problems connected with the preparation of the economy for war. [Editor's Note #46] The rapidly developing war economies of the largest capitalist states exert an ever-increasing influence on all spheres of capitalist production. Militarization of the economy is inseparably linked with the general aggressive course of the policy of the imperialist states, above all the United States of America.

The experience of World War II, and especially its final results, provided extensive material for the modern military strategy of imperialist countries with regard to strategic planning and mobilization of the economy for the needs of war.

The military strategy of the main countries of the Anglo-American coalition is now based on the concept that in a future war they will have little time for the development of a war industry, particularly for the organization of mass production of the most important types of weapons. Because of this, the United States and Britain after the war proceeded with demobilizing and temporarily closing down their military industry in such a manner as to maximally preserve its strength and assure, if necessary, the large quantity production of the basic types of armaments and military equipment. [Editor's Note #47]

During the postwar period, the principal capitalist countries continued, without interruption, to improve their war industry by increasing

||| its capacity, especially to produce modern means of warfare. |||

A certain change has taken place in the arrangement and relation of forces in the imperialist camp, expressed, first of all, by the fact that the United States is gradually losing its dominant position in world capitalist production and trade. Her economic and political share is gradually growing smaller. In 1965, the United States' share of capitalist production slightly exceeded 40 percent. In 1948, the USA accounted for more than 56 percent of the total industrial production of the capitalist world. The United States holds now approximately the same place among the capitalist powers that she occupied before World War II. However, the drop in the share of the United States in the capitalist camp should not be exaggerated. The U.S. continues to remain the chief economic, political, and military force in the capitalist system. The imperialist groups of the USA, in their plans of struggle for world domination, can no longer rely on their own economic and military might alone, but must shift the center of gravity to the creation, and strengthening, of military-political alliances and "associations" of capitalist states.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the main group of imperialist states. Its member nations account for more than four-fifths of current capitalist industrial production. [Editor's Note #48] The main strength of the heavy industry of the capitalist world is concentrated in these countries. They have large fuel and power, metallurgical, and chemical industries, as well as highly developed machine building industries. In them is concentrated 75 percent of the electric energy, and more than 80 percent of the steel production.

Yet, it should be noted that the majority of NATO countries depends on the import of many types of alloy metals and crude oil from the developing countries in the Near East, Far East, Africa, and Latin America. These countries continue to serve as the source of raw materials for the principal capitalist powers. Therefore, any change in the political and economic situation in these areas, and the desires of developing countries for political and economic independence, arouses hostility among the principals of the imperialist bloc, especially among the monopolist corporations of the United States. In order to retain their positions in the regions mentioned and to preserve and strengthen acceptable regimes, the United States employs provocation, conspiracy, blackmail, and the direct use of armed force. Proof of this is the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic.

The appearance of new, complex and expensive kinds of weapons and military equipment has increased tremendously the demands on the economy. At the present time only countries with a strong economy a universally developed industry, especially military industry, and a broad scientific research and engineering foundation can independently develop its armed forces and equip them with all the necessary modern means of armed conflict. These potentials are possessed, in the modern capitalist world, by the United States, Britain, and partly by France and West Germany. The other countries of the Anglo-American coalition are not capable of

providing their own armed forces with modern weapons and military equipment. The extent and the nature of the preparation of the economy of these countries is determined by their economic potentials as well as the role played by each of them in the coalition.

Since the building of the armed forces and the preparation of the economy for war are subject to the principle of mutual dependence, the production of the basic means for strategic defense is concentrated in the United States and Britain; these countries also produce the main types of conventional armaments used to equip countries with a poorly developed war industry. Other industrially developed countries of the coalition produce only conventional arms to a limited extent.

During the past five years, France has spent considerable sums for the development of her nuclear weapons and the means of delivery. A new and large-scale program in this area has been developed for 1965-70.

The degree to which various countries participate in military preparations may be judged by their share in NATO expenditures. According to official sources, military expenditures for 1965 amounted to 74.2 billion dollars. This was almost four times as high as in 1949, when NATO was created. Four countries accounted for 92.2 percent of all NATO expenditures: the United States about 70 percent; England, 8.3 percent; France, 7 percent; and the Federal Republic of Germany, 6.9 percent. The share of the remaining 11 countries was only 7.8 percent.

The United States government constantly pressures the governments of the NATO countries to increase their share of expenditures for the military preparedness of NATO.

The political and military leadership of NATO strives for and is implementing a series of measures to ensure the complete utilization of materials and financial resources of all countries of this bloc in their preparation for war. With this in mind a number of regional alliances and unions were formed within the bloc to facilitate the utilization of the economy for the preparation and waging of war. The same aims governed the development of such unified efforts as the European economic community and development, the European coal and steel community, the French-German-Italian military-industrial alliance, Euratom, as well as the unification of a number of countries for the production of operational-tactical rocket and aviation equipment. [Editor's Note #49] These unions have been called upon to become the economic foundation of NATO in Europe, a mechanism for the mobilization of the economic resources for an intensified arms race, and the preparation of war against the countries of the socialist camp. [Editor's Note #50]

The most powerful of these means is the European Economic Community (Common Market) -- a state-monopolist association of six European countries -- members of NATO (Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg) in which is concentrated more than 20 percent of the world's capitalist production. The key position

in the community is occupied by the Federal Republic of Germany which accounts for about one-half of the community output. Through the Common Market organization, the monopolist corporations of the Federal Republic of Germany are striving to acquire access to the production of modern weapons, among them atomic weapons.

West German revanchist circles are having ever more influence on the acceleration of military production and on the creation, in Western Europe, of a large combined military-industrial complex for the production of modern weapons and military equipment which will be an essential addition to the already created powerful military-industrial complex of the United States.

Regional corporations have already been formed in Europe for the production of missiles (air-to-air and air-to-ground) and jet fighters. West German monopolies, being the largest, play a major role in these corporations. American monopolies are also participating extensively in the organization of these joint ventures.

Imperialistic integration does not eliminate the contradictions between the capitalist states, but sharpens them. European integration deepened the contradictions between the countries of the "Common Market" on the one hand, and England and the United States on the other, and also between the countries of the "Common Market," themselves. The deep crisis in every military organization of the North Atlantic Alliance serves as a clear example of this; it testifies to the presence of deep processes which are leading to the shattering of the imperialist blocs and groupings.

However, it should be borne in mind that in the current stage of the rapid fall of the power of world imperialism, the class solidarity of the monopolist groups pushes them into joint political and economic actions for the purpose of preserving the capitalist system and mobilizing and rallying their forces for the struggle against the world socialist system.

The primary organizing force in this process is played by ruling circles in the USA whose main efforts are directed toward preserving and strengthening the imperialist blocs and groupings and prevent their disintegration.

In the preparation of the economy for war the main attention of the major countries of the Anglo-American coalition has been devoted in the past decade to the creation of a large, highly technically developed war industry capable of producing modern means of strategic attack as well as other types of arms. The United States and Britain have the most highly developed war industry, capable of expanding the mass production of armaments within a short time. The other countries of the Anglo-American bloc are provided with aircraft, rocket, and armored equipment by the United States and in part by Britain and Canada.

West Germany has considerable resources for producing armaments and military equipment. The West German government is intensifying its preparations for the expansion of arms production. Industry is presently

receiving large military orders; production of infantry and artillery weapons, tanks, armored carriers, jet fighters, trainers, and transport aircraft is going on, and warships are being built.

The United States expanded its war industry particularly in the process of partial mobilization during the Korean War.

This plan, realized for the most part by early 1956, provided for increasing the capacity to produce up to 50,000 military planes if necessary and 35,000 tanks per year. It also provided for further extensive development of the atomic and military chemical industry, especially in the production of new types of poisonous substances.

By that time, more than 400 reserve government military plants had been put into operation, many new military industries had been built up, and approximately 1500 private firms were involved in the production of armaments.

The war-industry plants were radically reconstructed; their equipment was substantially renovated in order to assure the production of all types of modern weapons.

In the last decade, the USA has implemented a broad program of military and economic measures aimed at the preparation of the country for war. [Editor's Note #51]

With the adoption of a strategy of flexible response in 1961, the principle of balance in the development of armed forces, and their provision with new weapons and military equipment, gained strength. Planning the development and manufacture of new weapons is being executed according to seven basic programs which anticipate providing weapons to strategic forces, air and anti-missile defense forces, general-purpose forces, air and sea transport forces, reserve components, and also programs for scientific research and experimental design projects.

Emphasis on the principle of balance in the development of armed forces led to a considerable increase in outlays for new weapons and an increase in their production.

During a five year period, (Fiscal Years 1962-1966), the United States spent 289.3 billion dollars for military preparations, 55 billion dollars more than during the preceding five years. Of the total expenditures, 149.3 billion dollars were spent for weapons and military equipment, almost 40 billion dollars more than during the 1957-1961 period.

During the 1962-1966 period, along with accelerated development of nuclear missile forces, considerable supplementary means were earmarked for the production of conventional weapons for general-purpose forces.

The portion of expenditures for new weapons and their provision to the armed forces is constantly growing in the military budget of the USA.

In fiscal year 1951 the expenditure for weapons amounted to 7.9 billion dollars, of which 1 billion went for research and development of new weapons systems. Expenditures in 1967 for this purpose are planned to exceed 32.2 billion dollars, of which 13.2 billion dollars will go for research and development. In the expenditures for research and development, there is a steady growth in spending for the study of space and the development of space technology. Spending for this purpose exceeds 7 billion dollars annually in contrast to 250 million dollars in 1958.

The rise in the cost of development, production, and operation of almost all weapons systems, particularly strategic, confronted military science and also military strategy with the problem of studying the effectiveness of expenditures. In order to solve this problem, labelled "cost-combat effectiveness," the USA enlisted large scientific forces. Broad studies are being conducted, the goal of which is to obtain greater military force per unit of money spent. These studies are also directed toward seeking a scientifically-based optimum relationship between the individual components of the armed forces, systems, subsystems, and individual prototypes of weapons and military equipment with the aim of more fully utilizing modern scientific and technical achievements in the interests of armed forces and a more rational distribution of expenditures in money and material resources.

The high level of military expenditure made it possible during this period to keep a large war industry in operation and to assure the significant production of modern weapons. [Editor's Note #52] There are more than 3 million persons engaged in the USA defense industry. The volume of military orders exceeded 30 billion dollars per year and has a tendency to continue to rise.

First among the branches of American defense industry is the so-called aerospace industry, busy with the production of aviation, missile, and space equipment. This branch employs about 1.35 million people, about as many as were employed during World War II, and the volume of annual production exceeds 20 billion dollars. It is the largest of all the branches of American industry. Key factories of this branch are maintained operational. Apart from these factories, there is a large reserve of aircraft plants temporarily closed.

The aerospace industry turns out all types of aircraft, strategic and operational-tactical missiles, and space equipment. According to the American press, there are 195,000 people engaged in space technology production. The current capacity of the aerospace industry in the United States fully satisfies the needs of the American Armed Forces and allows large deliveries of aviation equipment and missiles to other capitalist countries.

The atomic industry of the USA assures production of both strategic and operational-tactical nuclear armaments. This industry's plants employ some 120,000 people and the annual volume of production amounts to about 2.5 billion dollars.

The armored-vehicle industry has undergone a radical reorganization since the end of the war. Only portions of this industry are used for the production of armored equipment. A considerable number of plants remain in reserve, ready to commence production of armored vehicles in case of need. The annual production of armored vehicles amounts to about 250-300 million dollars.

The military-chemical industry of the United States was created during World War II. During the postwar period, the main plants of the military-chemical industry were reconstructed. Their capabilities to produce solid and liquid jet fuels continue to increase. At the present time a great many military-chemical plants are shut down.

The United States has a highly developed ship-building industry. During World War II the United States raised its annual production of warships to 3.2 million tons (standard displacement) and its annual production of freighters to 12.5 million (register) tons. At present, the ship-building industry is in the process of completing a vast program of naval vessel construction. [Editor's Note #53]

The USA program for construction of vessels during recent years envisaged mainly the development of a fleet strike force: missile-carrying nuclear submarines and assault carriers, and also antisubmarine vessels, frigates, picket ships, and nuclear torpedo submarines. There is also a vast construction program for landing ships.

Expenditures for ship-building exceed 2 billion dollars a year. [Editor's Note #54] Each year 30-35 new ships are built. At one time, more than 100 ships are under construction.

This brief survey of the present status of the main branches of military industry indicates that in the USA a powerful military-industrial complex has already been created which represents a real threat to the security of nations. The extent of the arms race in the mainstay of the military imperialist coalition confirms the aggressive plans for the preparation of a new world war.

Leading circles in the USA make extensive use of their military-industrial complex for supporting the aggressive war in Vietnam. The production of armaments is being increased and reserve defense plants are being activated. All measures in this area are aimed at expanding this aggressive war.

The U.S. Congress has already appropriated 23 billion dollars for the war in Vietnam. An increase in appropriations for the same purpose is contemplated. Total military expenditures by the USA in Fiscal Year 1967 will exceed 66 billion dollars.

The Secretary of Defense of the USA declared in this connection in February, 1966, before the U.S. Congress that the USA should immediately step up or resume the production of armaments as they are expended in military operations in order to constantly maintain the desired level

of strategic mobilized reserve of armaments which would be indispensable in the event of an all-out war.

British political and military leaders, in preparing their economy for war, start with the premise that Britain's economic potential does not make it possible to satisfy completely the requirements of modern war, even though their official opinions include the necessity for total mobilization of the economy. In the organization of the armed forces, as well as in the preparation of the economy for war, the British government counts on the fact that it will enter a war only as a member of a coalition in which the decisive part will be played by the United States with its vast economic and military might.

With respect to industrial production, Britain occupies third place in world-wide capitalist production, second only to the United States and West Germany.

The military-economic potential of Britain is determined by its broad economic base. The majority of the productive forces is concentrated in industry; agriculture is carried out on a small scale and satisfies only about one-half the agricultural requirements of the country. The country has practically no natural supplies of basic raw materials, except for iron ore and coal.

These facts indicate the tremendous dependence of the British economy on the world capitalist market; this market is indispensable for the export of its industrial production and for providing the country with raw materials and foodstuffs.

In the postwar development of the military industry, the main attention was devoted to the creation of the atomic industry, to further improvements of the aircraft industry and the reconstruction of the armored-weapons industry, and to maintaining the ship-building industry at a high level. [Editor's Note # 55]

England has a huge aircraft industry, the second largest in the capitalistic world. This branch of industry has a large number of factories and employs some 200,000 people. This aircraft industry can manufacture all types of modern aircraft. Yet, the high cost of developing new aircraft, the limited national resources, and the inability of English industry to compete with American industry forced English rulers to purchase aviation equipment in the USA. An agreement has already been made to purchase from the USA fighter aircraft worth several hundred millions of pounds sterling.

A relatively weak link in the British military industry is the production of rocket weapons. In Britain only antiaircraft missiles and air-to-air missiles are series-produced. [Editor's Note # 56] Medium-range missiles for her four missile-carrying nuclear submarines under construction will also be purchased from the United States.

England has been stock-piling nuclear weapons since 1954 and thermo-nuclear weapons since 1957. Yet, it should be noted that the capacity of English atomic industry is many times smaller than that of America.

The armored vehicle and artillery industry is much weaker than that of America. There are a few state or privately-owned plants in these branches of industry. Plans are being made to convert privately-owned plants for manufacturing these types of armaments in time of war.

England has a large number of ship-building and ship-repair facilities with an annual building capacity of 500,000 tons of standard-displacement naval vessels and over one million registered tons of merchant vessels.

Therefore, England has a rather large defense industry, capable of producing the basic means of strategic attack and many other types of armaments. The ever-increasing dependence of England on the deliveries of armaments from the USA has manifested itself in recent years.

The postwar French military industry was called upon to supply the needs for colonial wars. To do so, a high potential for production of conventional arms was maintained. An expansion of the production of modern weapons was constantly limited by lack of finances. The reequipping of the French armed forces was begun only in 1960, after the adoption of a five-year plan (1960-1964) for the technical reequipping of the armed forces and for the creation of "nuclear striking forces."
[Editor's Note #57]

This program is basically completed. Expenditures amounted to over 32 billion francs. The first five-year program envisaged the creation of a number of nuclear bombs and delivery planes. At the same time, a program was initiated to reequip the armed forces on a limited scale with conventional types of weapons and military equipment.

In December, 1964, a new six-year program was initiated to continue the build-up of French forces during 1965-1970. In this program, some 80 billion francs have been ear-marked for reequipping the armed forces. Of this sum, more than 27 billion francs are marked for expenditures on the formation of a so-called nuclear strike force.

The French military industry is being modernized. It is creating its own atomic industry. The aviation industry is the largest and most developed industry. About 100,000 men work in its factories. Rocket weapons are produced primarily by aircraft companies. The greatest successes have been achieved by the French on the production of guided anti-tank missiles, many of which are supplied to other NATO countries. A medium-range missile is under development.

The tank industry is represented by several tank plants, producing light tanks and medium tanks. The ship-building industry of France employs approximately 40,000 people; the capacity of the industry is esti-

mated at 800,000 registered tons. Approximately one-half this capacity can be utilized for military ship-building.

The French governing circles strive for independence in the development and use of their armed forces; they are attempting to rid themselves of domination by the United States in this sphere. Evidence of this is France's departure from NATO; this also indicates increased economic strength and the ability to channel more of their resources to re-equipping their armed forces with new weapons and military equipment.

The economic potential of West Germany with regard to the requirements of modern war is second only to that of the United States. By 1961, West Germany had reached the industrial production of prewar Germany, and by 1965 had significantly exceeded this level to take first place among the capitalist countries of Europe. Compared with 1950, the industrial production of West Germany has increased almost 3 times. It has created an economic base for the development of military production, a base which is the most powerful among European capitalist countries.

In May, 1955, West Germany joined the aggressive North Atlantic bloc, which assured broad participation of West German capital in the arms race and in the preparation for a new war. From 1955 through 1965, more than 160 billion marks was allotted to military preparedness.

In executing this policy, they receive ever-increasing support from the governing circles in the United States. Between the governing circles of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, a sort of bilateral military-political alliance is being formed, an alliance which is one of the most dangerous determinants in the cause of peace.

The absence of locally-developed models of modern arms forced the West German government, during the initial phase of development of the Bundeswehr, to purchase arms from abroad. The Federal Republic of Germany has spent 18.7 billion marks abroad over the past five years for the purchase of arms. Over three-quarters of this amount was spent on the purchase of arms and military equipment from the USA. [Editor's Note #58]

Concurrent with the purchase of weapons from abroad, measures were adopted to develop the production of arms inside Germany. The best foreign models of new weapons were selected for production with a simultaneous development of domestic models.

Maximum emphasis is on development in the aviation industry. This branch has been granted large appropriations and privileges. [Editor's Note #59] Having gained experience in the production of modern aviation equipment, West German factories commenced production of fighters as early as 1961. Missile production is in progress (air-to-air and antitank). Mass production of medium tanks has commenced. Artillery and infantry equipment are being produced. A large-scale program of ship-building is coming into effect.

Nurturing revenge plans and striving to acquire its own nuclear weapons, the Federal Republic of Germany has already created a scientific research base for an atomic industry. At present, about 260 German firms are participating in atomic energy research.

Experimental and power reactors are being built. Three large atomic power stations are being constructed.

The Federal Republic of Germany purchases uranium fuel, including enriched Uranium 235 for her nuclear reactors, mainly from the USA. All in all, from 1956 until 1965, the Federal Republic of Germany spent about 3.4 billion marks for studies in the field of nuclear energy.

Consequently, the modern status of defense production in the Federal Republic of Germany will permit the development, during the coming years, of a mass output of many types of modern arms. West Germany will have at her disposal the largest defense industry among all of the European countries. Because of this, the peace-loving nations of Europe see in West Germany a potential aggressor and are resolutely against the territorial claims of West German revenge seekers. [Editor's Note #60]

The revolution in military affairs, the destructive character of nuclear rocket war, introduced a number of new problems related to the use of human and material resources in the course of preparation for war, and in the course of the war proper, especially at its inception. Incommensurate growth, in comparison with World War II, of the strategic vulnerability of the economy presented military science with a number of new problems dealing with the solution of the economic support of the war. Among these is the study of the problem of effectiveness of measures and expenditures, both in money and material resources, in equipping armed forces with modern weapons systems while observing overall the principle of balanced development of the separate services of the armed forces and the branches of service.

During the past five years, the USA has conducted a broad study in this area, the primary aim of which was to make an overall evaluation of all plans and programs for the development of the armed forces and the supply of arms and military hardware. Studies are made to determine the adequacy of these plans and programs in satisfying military and political objectives set before the armed forces in the light of the strategy of flexible response, which anticipate constant readiness of the armed forces for the conduct of one or two local wars in various regions of the globe, with or without the use of nuclear weapons. As a rule, under these conditions mobilization of the economy is not anticipated. The current level of defense production should be adequate for the conduct of such wars. At the same time the armed forces must be ready for all-out nuclear war.

Great emphasis, especially in the USA, is placed on the creation and proper distribution of materiel reserves throughout the country, especially of strategic raw materials, foodstuffs, and medication, adequate to sustain the population and the economy for restoration of production

and its distribution and for normal operation during the course of the war.

The USA began to create reserves of strategic raw materials immediately after the Second World War. Calculated for a demand of a 3 year war period, the creation of reserves was basically completed; however, the level of reserves was planned for war with conventional weapons. At the present time, an attempt is being made to determine the requirements under conditions of a nuclear missile war.

Strategic reserves of raw materials and foodstuffs were also created to a lesser extent in England and in other West European capitalist countries.

American military strategy for a long time was based on the assumption that the United States will be the main and relatively invulnerable base destined to supply the arms and military equipment requirements of other capitalist countries. The loss of strategic invulnerability by the USA has forced the U.S. political and military leaders to review their views on the preparation of the economy for war and to renounce the classic formula of the development of the military industry during the war itself. In accordance with this formula, the capabilities of the military industry are held in reserve and activated with the beginning of military actions. [Editor's Note # 61]

These views were reexamined, keeping in mind that the military industry might suffer a substantial loss from the nuclear weapons of the enemy during the initial and most crucial period of the war; this may seriously affect the provision of the armed forces with the most important weapons system: nuclear, rocket, and strategic bombers and air-defense weapons. Because of this it was decided to prepare the industry in such a manner as to assure continuous production of the above weapons systems and increase their production, even under wartime conditions which would be most adverse for the United States. In order to do so, plants must be kept in operating condition even in peacetime, and be prepared to convert to mass production of the most important weapons within two or three months. It is proposed that production be organized in such a manner as to make it possible to produce weapons even under conditions of disrupted communications in the country and lack of additional labor force and industrial equipment. Provisions are made for at least twice duplicating the production of various types of armaments and equipment. [Editor's Note # 62]

During the past five years, broad studies in the USA have been directed toward establishing scientifically-based relationships between arms supplies and materiel resource levels and the volume of production, proceeding with the intention of securing an increased combat readiness of the armed forces.

The character of a possible nuclear rocket war renewed the question of an overall evaluation of manpower and material resources at the

disposal of the country at the beginning of a war. The USA, aided by modern mathematical methods and computers, is developing a pattern for the war economy of the country. A special center for the evaluation of the country's resources has been set up for the purpose of facilitating mobilization of resources.

The American press reports that a pattern has been developed for managing the economy and for its restoration following the first nuclear strike. The pattern identified as PARM (Program Analysis for Resource Management) will incorporate an estimate of key resources and activities.

Great importance is attached to estimation of the magnitude of expected damage to the country, damage inflicted on the population and the economy during the beginning period of war, as well as the development of military and nonmilitary measures to limit this damage. Broad military and economic studies have been conducted in this area during recent years in the USA, both in individual branches of the economy as well as the economy in its entirety.

In the solution of the problems enumerated, an important role has been assigned to military strategy, which is charged with the responsibility for an overall study of the military aspects of the problems outlined and with the formulation of recommendations on the political, military, and economic guidance for the country, indispensable in preparing the economy and the country as a whole for the event of war.

In studying these problems and in developing the necessary recommendations, military strategy utilizes data based on the natural sciences, technology, economics, and the social sciences. The preparation of the country for war affects all aspects of life of the society: production, distribution, services, and social relations.

The new principles of preparing the economy for war, in the opinion of Americans, have a mission to assure a significant increase in the mobilization preparedness of the main branches of the defense industry and the economy as a whole.

* * *

The military strategy of imperialist countries was developed under the influence of objective and subjective factors of a political, economic, and purely military nature.

However, the inability of bourgeois military thought, because of its class limitation, to understand fully and evaluate completely these factors often led to major miscalculations. At the same time, it would be incorrect to assume that the modern bourgeois military concept is completely incapable of scientific investigations in the military field, including the field of military strategy. The vast scientific and technical progress taking place in the main capitalist countries facilitates quite greatly the development of military strategy in accordance with the changing conditions of war. [Editor's Note #63]

The development of the military strategy of the U.S. and NATO is influenced primarily by the balance of strategic power between the West and the East. Within the relatively short postwar period, little more than 20 years, the military strategy of the U.S. and NATO changed twice: in 1953 and in 1961. [Editor's Note #64]

In the opinion of U.S. political and military leaders the main problem of today's military strategy is the proper selection of the appropriate weapons systems for the next 10-15 years or more. At the same time, one of its functions is still the determination of the most rational distribution of forces throughout the world, selection of the direction of the main blow (determination of the most suitable objectives for destruction by strategic means), the evaluation of the significance of strategic surprise, which can be achieved by starting a preventive war, the delivery of the first or pre-emptive strike, the time factor, assurance of the invulnerability of their own strategic forces, etc.

However, in this missile and space age, when the vigorous development of science and technology constantly exerts an enormous influence on military matters, selection of the most effective and economically most advantageous weapons systems which correspond best to modern strategy is, in the opinion of the U.S. command, the basic and most difficult task. This difficulty is due to the exceptional technical complexity of modern weapons, the long development periods, and the large expenses connected with their creation and production. Therefore, the best types of weapons cannot be acquired immediately in their final form; they must be created gradually on the basis of selection. It is believed that this problem can be solved by directing scientific and technical development and not by being dependent on it.

In the light of this evaluation of the importance of a proper selection of the necessary weapons systems it is admitted that military strategy must strive for the most rational utilization of budgets and resources for the accomplishment of the military aims of the country (coalition), while the appropriate military decisions must, consequently, be made only after an economic analysis of the various alternatives. To increase the military potential of a country (coalition) it is necessary to possess a powerful economy for a long time, since it is the latter that bears all the burden of the unprecedented arms race. Therefore, all actions which decrease the economic potential of a country and lower its effectiveness thus lower the military potential since the latter, in the final analysis, depends on the state of the economy. [Editor's Note #65]

The ever-increasing relation between modern military strategy and the technical-economical and social-political aspects of the activity of a country (coalition) inevitably leads to a decrease in the role and importance of the purely military functions of strategy inherent in it in the past. These conditions cast doubt on the possibility of the solution of military and strategic problems by military specialists alone. It is believed that these specialists, because of their "professional limitations," are no longer capable of grasping and evaluating the multitude of

technical-economical and social-political factors which exert a vast influence on modern military strategy.

This problem, in the opinion of U.S. leaders, can be solved only through the concerted efforts of civilian scientists of the different branches of science and the efforts of the most able representatives of the armed forces. It is, therefore, not surprising that in the United States all the main problems of military policy and strategy are being worked on by civilian scientists with the necessary aid and consultation of the appropriate military agencies. These scientists are, for the most part, members of research organizations founded soon after the end of World War II under the headquarters of the services of the armed forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense; there are several hundred prominent scientists from various branches of science in each category. The basic problem of these organizations is the perspective evaluation and selection of weapons systems to meet the requirements of modern military strategy. Consequently, the scientists not only create weapons and military equipment but also take an active part in working out problems of foreign and military policy and strategy.

In accordance with the above military strategy of the United States and NATO, there has been vast preparation of the imperialist camp, primarily the United States, for various wars against the countries of the socialist camp, primarily for a general nuclear war. Since such a war would entail the tremendous danger of mutual annihilation, the American aggressors exert all effort to assure victory in the event of the unleashing of a war, with the least losses and destruction. They see the possibility of such an outcome of a war and in achieving surprise in the creation of strong and the most combat-ready armed forces which technically [Editor's Note #66] would be considerably superior to the armed forces of the enemy.

However, the American aggressors are forced to reckon with the might of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and other countries of the Warsaw Pact and the persistent demands of the peoples of the world who protest against nuclear war and actively support the proposals for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, for general and total disarmament, and creating a sure system of international security.

Footnotes to Chapter II.

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3. The New York Times, January 13, 1954.
4. М. Тейлор. Ненадежная стратегия. Москва, 1961, стр. 120.
5. Там же, стр. 154.
6. "Survival", May-June, 1959, p. 57.
7. М. Тейлор. Ненадежная стратегия. Москва, 1961, стр. 37.

8. Developments in Military Technology and their impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy. A Study prepared at the request of the committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, December 6, 1959, p. 102.
9. ibid. p. 1. (In the future, it will be called "A Study".)
10. "A Study", p. 3.
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26. "National Security" Edited by D. Abshire and R. Allen. New York, 1963.
27. "Space as Military Arena" by Dr. Walter R. Dornberger, "Aviation Week", September 18, 1961.
28. "Aviation Week", December 16, 1963.
29. Kraft Ehrlicke. "Space Flights", New York, 1960.
30. Из выступления министра обороны США Макнамары в комиссия по вооруженным силам палаты представителей (американский журнал "Aviation Week and Space Technology", March 1, 1965).
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EDITOR'S NOTE ON CHAPTER III

This chapter, "The Development of Soviet Military Strategy (1917-1945)," is historical in content and, with certain exceptions, is much the same as in previous editions. A paragraph criticizing Stalin, which had been added to the second edition, was dropped. The paragraph read;

"The cult of Stalin had a very harmful influence on the development of Soviet strategic thought in the prewar period. The intolerable arbitrariness and dictate in the resolution of theoretical questions which had set in, acted as a brake on the development of military thought and lowered the level and the scope of military scientific research. Creative investigation of problems of military theory was replaced by a dogmatic repetition of statements made by Stalin."

Longer passages giving more criticism of Stalin, which had appeared in both the first and second editions, also were omitted. Except for the change in regard to Stalin, the basic content of the chapter is the same. Remaining in the third edition are many objective criticisms of Soviet handling of World War II.

In lieu of blaming Stalin, one section has been added to justify Soviet unpreparedness at the beginning of the invasion of 1941. "Billions of dollars" were put into the German economy between World War I and World War II to "develop her military and economic potential." These "billions of dollars," according to the Soviets, were supplied by the United States and England.

Chapter three, while presenting some aspects of strategy which can be deduced from purely factual data of earlier wars, fails entirely to show the DEVELOPMENT of Soviet military strategy, as the title indicates. This serious omission is regrettable, yet understandable when the following recently published account is taken into consideration. This appeared in the Soviet *Military History Journal*:

"In 1935 at the Frunze Military Academy, a military history department was formed. According to the department head, a 32-hour course of lectures was envisaged on the theory of strategy. The Deputy Commandant, in looking over the program, asked: 'What is this strategy course? Strategy is Comrade Stalin's personal occupation and it isn't any of our business.' The Commandant at the time was Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, one of the Soviet Union's most brilliant staff officers and he did not agree with his deputy. Shaposhnikov told the department head that the question of reading lectures on strategy had the approval of the Political Administration of the Red Army. There would be a course of lectures on strategy and his job was to prepare them. The lectures were prepared but they were never read. The department lasted one year and then was included in the newly formed Academy of the General Staff which did not have a course of lectures on strategy."

¹ *Military History Journal*, #6, 1967.

"Attempts were also made to advocate a course of strategy at the Academy of the General Staff. But according to the former Head of the Department on Operational Art, the least hint for the need to have some sort of course on strategy as a basis for operational art met with objections higher up. When this question was raised at an open meeting, the Chief of the General Staff, at that time Marshal Yegorov, asked the representative of the Academy with some irritation: 'And what strategy will you study? The plan of war? Strategic deployment? The waging of war? No one will permit you to do this because it is the business of the General Staff.' Of course no one was trying to encroach on the prerogatives of the General Staff, writes our informant, in the area of the actual work of planning and conducting war. The point here was merely one of researching questions of the theory of strategy. One merely has to note that the most talented theorists of strategy in the Soviet Union, M. N. Tukhachevsky, A. A. Svechin himself, R. P. Eideman, and N. E. Varfolomeyev were victims of the purges of the late thirties. Their works were not only placed in doubt but considered harmful. Quite naturally such an atmosphere brought a complete halt to the development of strategic theory."

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

(1917 - 1945)

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND THE FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION (1917 - 1922)

Soviet military strategy was born and developed in conjunction with the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. The theoretical basis of Soviet military strategy, as well as of Soviet military science as a whole, is the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and armies.

The great works of V. I. Lenin devoted to the political struggle of the working class, armed uprising, and proletarian revolution, developed the most important concepts of Soviet military science and Soviet military strategy.

Lenin defined the nature of wars in the era of imperialism, showed the historical conditions and causes of their springing up, exposed the tendencies in the development of military matters and made a profound scientific analysis of the state of military matters in Russia early in the 20th Century.

In developing and defining concretely the concepts of the Marxist theory of armed conflict, Lenin developed the doctrine of just and unjust wars and of the change of an imperialist war into a civil war, into a war of the workers against the exploiters, by thus armed the working class and its vanguard, the Communist party, with a clear program of action in the struggle for the liberation of the working people from capitalist slavery.

Thus, to Lenin belongs the great credit in the development of the Marxist military theory. The military theoretical views of Lenin are the foundation of the military theory of the Soviet government.

Soviet military strategy absorbed the most important concepts of the political strategy of the Communist Party and the experience of the armed conflict of the working class.

"The political question," wrote Lenin, "now closely approaches the military question...The problem of politics is also the military problem: the organization of the headquarters, concentration of material forces, the provision of the soldier with everything necessary..." [1]. This is the fundamental reason why the most important concepts of political strategy of the Communist Party -- those dealing with the significance of the proper choice of the direction of the main blow, of creating superiority of forces and means in the direction of this blow, of the changes

in form and methods of conflict depending on the situation, of the dependence of the organizational forms of the troops on the methods of warfare, of the significance of strategic reserves, and of the strategic leadership of the struggle -- are the foundations of Soviet military strategy.

In following Lenin's instructions concerning the need for knowing the fundamental laws of any war, Soviet military strategy also utilized the experience of past wars, especially the wars in the era of imperialism, as well as the most important theoretical concepts of bourgeois military science in the realm of strategy.

At the same time, the process of the formation and development of Soviet military science and consequently also of military strategy proceeded on a new basis. Despite the fact that Soviet military strategy utilized basically the same means and methods of warfare for the conduct of war as those used by the old regime, it had a number of its own peculiar characteristics when used as the strategy of a socialist state in the very first years of its existence.

Some of the most important characteristics of Soviet military strategy during the Civil War were its clarity of purpose and decisiveness determined by the class nature of the war and the nature of its political aims.

Both war, as a whole, and military strategy bear the imprint of class interests, the politics of which are reflected in a given war; the intensity of the political contradictions of the opposing sides exerts a direct influence on the decisiveness of the strategic aims of the war.

The political aim of the Civil War on the part of the working classes of the Soviet Republic, the total destruction of the interventionists and White Guardists, required a very active and decisive strategy. Only by bold decisive actions could victory be achieved, and thus conditions for the peaceful building of socialism be created.

The decisiveness of strategic aims and the drive to accomplish them within the shortest possible time permeated the whole activity of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Civil War. These aims formed the groundwork for the operational-strategic plans of all the most important operations of the Red Army against Kolchak, Denik'in, the White Poles, and Wrangel.

In planning an operation on one of the fronts, strategy was not aimed at limited objectives, but at total destruction of the enemy in a given direction and the capture of all territory occupied by him.

Thus, strategy had an unmistakably decisive nature, since there could be no talk whatsoever of coming to terms with the class enemy.

Strict calculation of the economic, political, and moral factors and of the relationship of forces is an important feature of Soviet military strategy and is one of its strongest aspects compared with the strategy

of the interventionists and the White Guardists.

Noting the importance and the need for a close survey of the military-political situation and the relationship of forces, Lenin wrote: "We need not be tied down to any one strategic maneuver. Everything depends on the relationship of forces..." [2]

The Soviet Republic was in a fiery ring of fronts. The enemy, having superior forces and equipment, pressed against it from all sides and advanced toward the vital centers of the country. At the same time, limited manpower and material capabilities did not allow the Red Army to conduct simultaneously and with equal intensity broad offensive operations with decisive aims on several fronts.

Therefore, the isolation of a decisive front from a multitude of the then-existing fronts was one of the most important problems of military strategy.

The Central Committee of the Party headed by V. I. Lenin, on the basis of a deep scientific understanding of the interrelation of politics and military strategy and of a strict accounting of the relationship of forces, solved this problem successfully throughout the entire Civil War.

During the Civil War, as is well known, the role and significance of the individual fronts changed with a change in the general military-political situation.

Thus, in the summer and in the first half of the fall of 1918, of the then-existing Eastern, Southern Caspian-Caucasian, and Northern Fronts, and the Western Defense Area, the Eastern Front was recognized as the most important front of the Republic. By the end of 1918, the Southern Front became the most important front of the Republic, by the spring of 1919 the Eastern Front was again the most important, by the middle of the summer of 1919 the Southern Front again had become the most important, etc.

Thus, the Red Army, depending on the military and political situation, directed its main efforts against the enemy first in one strategic direction, then in another, concentrating the main mass of its troops in these directions.

These combat operations were conducted not only to destroy the manpower of the enemy but simultaneously to attain sources of raw materials, bread, and fuel, without which the country could not exist.

Therefore, during the Civil War, together with the destruction of the armed forces of the White Guardists and the interventionists, the most important aim of strategic operations was also the solution of economic problems.

After defining and successfully solving the main strategic problem, i.e., recognition of the main danger and selection of the direction of

the main blow, the next important characteristic of Soviet military strategy was the decisive concentration of forces and weapons in the selected direction of the main thrust.

"To have an overwhelming advantage of forces at the decisive moment at the decisive point -- that is the 'law' of military successes..." wrote V. I. Lenin [3].

With the over-all lack of forces and weapons characteristic of the Civil War, the solution of this problem involved great difficulties and was accomplished by successive concentration of forces on the decisive front at the expense of seriously weakening the other fronts.

This created conditions for the fulfillment of the main strategic aim presented by politics. In the history of the Civil War, there are known cases when, in the interest of strengthening the main front or deciding the main strategic problem, other fronts were weakened to such an extent that our troops were forced to retreat or even suffer temporary defeat.

This was the case, for example, with the Eastern Front by the end of 1918 and early 1919, when the concentration of the main forces on the Southern Front caused an excessive weakening of the Eastern Front.

The principle of mass concentration of forces and weapons in the direction of the main blows was widely applied in frontal sectors. This principle of Soviet military strategy was strictly observed in the execution of major offensive operations. For example, in the direction of the main thrust of the Southern Group, || commanded by M. V. Frunze, || of the Eastern Front there were concentrated, on a 200-220 kilometer sector, 49,000 infantry and cavalry with 152 artillery pieces, while on the remaining sectors of the Southern Group, extending some 700 kilometers, there were only 22,500 infantry and cavalry with 70 artillery pieces. During the July offensive on the Western Front || commanded by M. N. Tukhachevsky, || in 1920 there were concentrated in the direction of the main thrust along a 120 km sector three armies and one cavalry corps totalling 60,000 men, while on the auxiliary sector of some 300 kilometers there was only one army and a small operational group.

However, in individual operations of the Civil War, the principle of mass concentration of forces in the direction of the main thrust was not always observed, which often impaired the success of the operation. This was the case, for example, during the August offensive in 1919 by the troops of the Southern Front and the May offensive in 1920 by the troops of the Western Front.

Soviet military strategy during the Civil War was also characterized by a variety of types and forms of armed conflict. Following the dictum of Lenin that the methods of the struggle against the enemy must be changed with changing conditions, the Soviet military leaders exhibited exceptional flexibility in their selection of methods of warfare to fit

the circumstances.

Together with the offense, which was the main and the most important type of military operation during the Civil War, defense and retreat were also used. || Forced || defense and retreat were followed by a counter-attack or a general offensive on one or two fronts.

The offensive operations of the Red Army were conducted with the decisive aims of totally defeating the enemy and in a number of cases were conducted to a great depth without any operational pauses. The major offensive operations, as a rule, consisted of a series of successive operations, unified by an over-all strategic effort in a given direction; each of the operations was as a link in the chain leading to accomplishment of the final aim of the entire operation.

On the broad and mobile fronts of the Civil War, the enemy, after the first defeats, could withdraw his troops and reorganize a defense or even offense. It was only by repeated blows, only by continuous and successive operations that the total destruction of the enemy was accomplished. The combination of the uninterrupted offensive operations and relentless pursuit was a characteristic feature of the offensive operations of the Civil War.

Thus, the offensive operations of the troops of the Eastern and Southern Fronts against the armies of Kolchak and Denikin included a number of successive operations unified by a single aim. During the period of the offensive from the Volga to the Urals (April-July 1919), the Buguruslan, Belebey, Ufa, Zlatoust and Chelyabinsk operations were undertaken for a total penetration of up to 900-1000 kilometers; from August to November, the first Tobol'sk, Petropavlovsk and Omsk operations were undertaken. From November 20, 1919, to March 8, 1920, the troops of the Eastern Front pursued Kolchak's armies from Omsk to Irkutsk, i.e., to a depth of 2500-2800 kilometers.

The strategic offensive operations of the armies of the Southern Front aimed at the destruction of Denikin's forces and consisted of a number of successive operations unified by a common aim: the Orel-Kromy, Voronezh-Kastornoye, Khar'kov, Donbas, and Rostov operations.

The major strategic offensive operations of the Red Army in most cases were conducted on a wide front, but the main blows, as a rule, were delivered on narrow sectors, comprising some 25-28 percent of the total front length.

The strategic offensive operations, as a rule, were conducted by the forces of a single front, acting in the given strategic direction and consisting of two to six armies of two to five divisions each. In some operations (against Denikin in the fall of 1919, and against the White Poles in 1920), the offensive was carried out by the forces of two fronts.

The operations of the Civil War substantially differed from the

operations in World War I and were characterized by their greater scope.

The data on the scope of certain strategic operations are given in Table 3.

The table shows that the operations of the Red Army during the Civil War were continuous and extended to great depth; they were also of long duration (some of them lasted for several months).

The attainment of the decisive aims of offensive operations required that the strategy be extraordinarily flexible in the creation of groups and the utilization of the available forces and weapons. Therefore, during the Civil War, up to 75 percent of the entire strength of the Red Army was subjected to strategic transfer from one front to another; some divisions were transferred from one front to another as many as five times.

Under conditions of mobile war and limited quantities of forces and weapons, defense was of great importance. It is well known that if offensive operations were conducted on the main front where the main forces and weapons were concentrated, then primarily defensive operations were carried out on the other fronts, and in some directions the Red Army was even forced to retreat. Thus, during the active offensive operations of the troops of the Eastern Front against Kolchak, the troops of the Southern Front were forced to abandon the Donbas and withdraw to the central regions of the country, while the troops on the Western Front conducted strenuous defensive operations in the direction of Petrograd.

In the fall of 1919, when the battle with Denikin's armies on the Southern Front entered the decisive phase, the forces of the Eastern Front, under the pressure of superior enemy forces, retreated to the Tobol River while the forces on the Western Front again resumed the stubborn defense in the direction of Petrograd.

Defense and offense were combined even on the same front when an unfavorable relationship of forces was established. An example of this is the military action on the Eastern Front in the spring of 1919 when, together with the counterattack on the central frontal sector, both flanks were engaged in stubborn defensive battles.

The defensive operations of the Red Army during the Civil War were clearly of an active nature and were accompanied by decisive counterattacks to the flanks and rear of the enemy. They were intended to exhaust and bleed the enemy white, to eliminate his maneuverability, and to prepare conditions for a counterattack. An example of such operations is the defense of Tsaritsyn in the summer and fall of 1918, and also of Petrograd in the summer and fall of 1919.

Soviet military strategy during the Civil War acquired valuable military experience in the organization of cooperation between fronts and army groups. Thus, in defeating Kolchak's army, cooperation was organized between the Southern and the Northern Groups of the Eastern Front; during the struggle with Denikin, cooperation was organized between the Southern

TABLE 3

The Extent of the Most Important Strategic Operations of
the Red Army During the Civil War

Operation	Forces and weapons participating	Divisions Infantry and Cavalry	Width of offensive in km.	Depth of offensive in km.	Duration of operation in days	Average rate of advance per day in km.
Counterattack of Southern Group of Eastern Front:						
on the entire front	8	73,500	up to 1000	up to 400	March 28, 1919-June 19, 1919 (53 days)	7-8
in the direction of main thrust	approx. 6	49,000	200- 220			
Offensive of Southern Front against Denikin:						
on the entire front	20/5*	95,000	1400	150- 900	Oct. 10, 1919-Jan.10, 1920 (92 days)	8-10
in the active sector	13/5	70,000	600			
Offensive of Western Front against White Poles:						
on the entire front	20/2	89,000	500	700- 750	July 4, 1920-August 15, 1920 (43 days)	16-18
in the direction of main thrust	13/2	60,000	140			

* The first figure gives the number of infantry divisions, the second gives the number of cavalry divisions.

and the Southeastern (Caucasian) Fronts.

However, there were instances in the history of the Civil War when the cooperation between fronts was disrupted. It is known that the disruption of the cooperation of the Western and Southwestern Fronts in 1920 was one of the reasons for the unsuccessful outcome of the Warsaw operation.

In the operations of the Red Army during the Civil War, different forms of operational-strategic maneuvers were used. Vast use was made of such forms of maneuvers as the wide envelopment and the close envelopment of the enemy by rapid flanking attacks combined with deep penetration by the cavalry into the enemy rear. Flanking attacks were widely used by our troops in the destruction of the armies of Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel.

In the counterattack on the Southwestern Front against the White Poles, the double enveloping attack was used, with simultaneous penetration of the cavalry army to the rear of the enemy, which led to the encirclement of a large enemy grouping in the Kiev region.

Together with flanking attacks and deep penetration, the Red Army used operational-strategic maneuvers such as the deep cleaving attack, first used in the fall of 1919 in the defeat of Denikin's armies.

Soviet strategy also succeeded in solving the problem of breakthrough of the enemy front throughout its entire depth under the specific conditions of the Civil War. This problem was solved by massed use of cavalry organized into cavalry armies.

Cavalry armies supported by artillery, armor, infantry, and aviation were used to deliver strong attacks to the enemy rear and for combat with his operational reserves.

Thus, during the Civil War, in accordance with the situation, various forms of operational-strategic maneuver were widely used, while the interventionists and White Guardists used primarily only such maneuvers as a frontal attack over a wide sector. The linear offense was the main feature of most interventionist and White Guardist operations.

The general economic and political conditions exerted a great influence on the nature and the aims of strategic operations in the Civil War.

In planning major offensive operations, Soviet strategy proceeded not only on purely military considerations, but also on the need for solving general political and economic problems. In a number of cases the solution of these problems was the main aim of an operation. Thus, in the report of the Supreme Commander on the strategic state of the Republic presented to V. I. Lenin on October 7, 1918, it was noted that "in developing our efforts primarily toward the south, we will obtain more rapidly the necessities of life, without which the center of the country

could not exist" [4].

A characteristic feature of the Civil War was the extremely limited amount of necessary strategic reserves at the disposal of the Soviet Command.

Despite the fact that the Red Army enjoyed the advantage of internal operational lines, the war required a large number of strategic (operational) reserves. However, until 1920, the fronts which were accomplishing the main strategic aims were reinforced primarily by the transfer of troops from other less active fronts; this was done with great difficulty.

An idea of the difficulties involving the great lack of reserves which Soviet military strategy had to overcome can be gotten from the following report of the Supreme Commander to V. I. Lenin in March 1919, i.e., during Kolchak's offensive: "The troops at the fronts have been fighting in their positions without any relief for almost a year. As a consequence of the vast extension of the combat sectors (frequently one division per 200 versts*) and the direct onslaught of the enemy, no army reserves or even front line reserves could be detached. The military units constantly on the front lines cannot be organized, reinforced, or correctly formed into a combat unit. In order to accomplish the strategic transfer of units from one front to another it is often necessary to take them directly from the battle lines, imposing the burden of defense on the neighboring units and often weakening the front seriously" [5].

To create reserves, the Red Army Supreme Command late in 1918 planned to form eleven infantry divisions within the inner military districts. With the formation of these divisions by the spring of 1919, the Red Army Supreme Command could obtain a reserve of 150,000-200,000 infantry personnel. However, the worsening military situation on the Southern and Eastern Fronts made these measures impossible. Of the eleven divisions, seven were sent to the front even before they had completed their training. As a result, when the Kolchak offensive began in 1919, the Supreme Commander had only approximately 60,000 infantry personnel; these reserves were not fully prepared since the units and formations lacked artillery pieces and machine guns.

Because of insufficient reserves, the regrouping of forces within the front was of great significance for the successful accomplishment of the outlined strategic tasks. The Soviet Command throughout the entire Civil War resorted widely to the regrouping of forces from secondary sectors to the direction of the main attacks, thus creating significant superiority in forces and weapons.

The Central Committee of the Party headed by V. I. Lenin devoted serious attention to the question of the training and the utilization of the reserves. The measures taken by the Central Committee of the Party during the Civil War constituted a broad program for the creation not only of manpower but also of material reserves.

*A Russian unit of length, equal to 1.0668 kilometers or 3500 feet.

In the second half of 1919 reserve armies were formed; these played an important part in the training of the reserves. The reserve army of the Republic at Kazan from July 1919 to December 1920 alone supplied 34 percent of the replacements to all the fronts, and up to 40 percent to the most active fronts. To create reserves for the active armies, special administrations were created at the frontline headquarters to deal with manning and with the formation and training of the troops (UPRAFORMS) which formed their own reserve units.

The centralized system for training the manpower reserves made it possible, within a very short time, to reform units and formations at the front and aided in the creation of shock groups.

A very important part in the reinforcement of the fronts was played by Party, Komsomol, and trade-union mobilization.

Together with Party and trade-union mobilization, an important role in providing replacements for the active army was played by local mobilization of the workers in the liberated territories. For example, by the time the armies of the Eastern Front crossed the Ural Mountains, the personnel had been almost completely replaced by the added Ural workers.

The Fifth Army of the Eastern Front had 24,000 soldiers on the Tobol River in August 1919; already by October 1919, due to local mobilization and despite the losses sustained, it had increased its number to 37,000 soldiers. Such a growth of forces was characteristic of all the armies of the Eastern Front during their offense and the pursuit of the Kolchak army. The same was true in the armies of the Southern Front during the destruction of Denikin's forces.

A characteristic feature of Soviet military strategy during the Civil War was the skillful coordination of the military activities of the Red Army with the partisan movement to the rear of the interventionists and White Guardists.

The unpopular terrorist regime of the military dictatorship, set up by the White Guardists with the active cooperation of the imperialists of Britain, France, and the United States on territory temporarily seized by them, caused profound universal indignation of the working masses. Despite the severe terror, repressions, and persecutions, the workers and the peasants under the leadership of underground Bolshevik party organizations rose up to a decisive fight with the interventionists and White Guardists.

The partisan movement developed vigorously to the rear of Kolchak and Denikin and played an important part in the destruction of their armies. With their quick surprise attacks the partisans paralyzed the functioning of the White Guardist rear and disorganized the supply lines to the front and control of the troops. The partisan struggle to the rear of the interventionists and White Guardists was of broad scope. There

was a total of 80,000 partisans active in Siberia in September 1919. In the Far East, in the Amur Oblast, a 25,000-man partisan army was operating. Strong partisan forces also existed in the Eastern Transbaikalian region, in the Maritime Province, and in the Amur region.

By the fall of 1919, vast regions had been captured by the partisan movement to the rear of Denikin's forces.

The Soviet Command during the Civil War, when planning and conducting major offensive operations, closely coordinated the combat activities of the Red Army with partisan activities. During troop operations on the Southern Front on the Don against Krasnov and Denikin in the fall of 1918, an important part was assigned to insurrectional movements to the rear of the White Guardists.

In preparing the counterattack of the forces of the Southern Front in October 1919, the Central Committee of the Party informed the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine of the strong support given to the Red Army by the Ukrainian partisans.

The Zafrontburo,* in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, supplied detailed directives to Ukrainian partisans demanding the immediate initiation of military operations against Denikin, the capture and retention of the most important control points and railroad lines, and the disruption of the lines of retreat; the partisans were also to prevent the enemy from destroying railroad lines, bridges, and other major railroad communications in the path of the advancing forces of the Red Army.

In accordance with these instructions, the Ukrainian partisans increased their attacks on Denikin and, as the troops of the Red Army approached, entered into direct contact and assisted the advancing formations. The numerical strength of the partisan units and of the forces of the up-rising, commanded by the Revolutionary Military Council, according to G. A. Kolos, Commander-in-Chief, reached 50,000 soldiers in December 1919 [6].

The military operations of the Soviet troops were also closely coordinated with partisan activity during the destruction of the armies of Kolchak, Miller, Yudenich, and Wrangel.

The selfless heroic struggle of the workers, under the leadership

*The Zafrontburo (rear area Bureau) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine was formed in July 1919 to guide the underground communist organizations of the Ukraine and, through them, the up-risings and partisan movements in the rear area of the enemy. The Zafrontburo was headed by S. V. Kosior, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine. The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on September 8, 1919, approved the creation of the Zafrontburo.

of the Communist Party in the rear areas of the interventionists and White Guardists, played an important part in the successful outcome of the Civil War.

Strategy in the Civil War was inseparably linked with the policy of the Soviet state. Soviet military strategy, like its policy, was permeated with a unity of purpose, supported by the firm and unified leadership by the Central Committee of the Party headed by V. I. Lenin.

The Central Committee of the Party was the fighting headquarters, the true organizer and inspiration of the Soviet people in their fight with the interventionists and White Guardists.

The Central Committee of the Party examined the most important questions dealing with the conduct of war: the building and reinforcement of the armed forces, the strategic war plans, the creation and distribution of reserves, the appointment of commanders, etc. The strategic plans of all the most important campaigns of the Civil War and all the measures connected with their execution were developed under the direct leadership of Lenin and were fully discussed in the plenums and sessions of the Central Committee of the Party. For example, the questions connected with the preparation and conduct of the major strategic operation aimed at the destruction of the Kolchak army were examined by the plenums of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on April 13 and May 4, 1919, at the session of the Politburo on April 24, and at the joint session of the Orgburo and Politburo on April 29, 1919.

The operation aimed at the destruction of the Denikin army was based on the decisions of the July and September plenums of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the decisions of the Politburo of October 15 and November 6 and 14, 1919.

The plenums and sessions of the Central Committee of the Party developed the general strategic plans of an operation, outlined the measures dealing with the raising of the defense potential of the country, the improvement of supply of the active armies, the strengthening of leadership of the front and the armies, the strengthening of political agencies and Party organizations, improvement of political Party work among the troops and the population.

In his speech at the closed session of the VIII Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on March 21, 1919, Lenin remarked that "the questions of military construction were discussed at literally every session of the Central Committee. There was never a single question of strategy which had not been evaluated by the Central Committee or a bureau of the Central Committee and put into execution" [7].

The struggle at the fronts, as is known, was only one aspect of the activity of the Central Committee of the Party. Simultaneously and in parallel with the leadership of the armed conflict, the Central Committee of the Party led the building of the Republic. Therefore, the history

of the Civil War is inseparable from the history of the entire country. The close operation of the army and the people is one of the strongest aspects of Soviet military strategy as compared with that of the interventionists and White Guardists.

In leading the defense of the country, the Central Committee of the Party encompassed all the aspects of its life and activity and created favorable internal as well as external conditions for Soviet military strategy in the execution of its tasks assigned by policy.

As a result of vast organizational and political activity, the Communist Party changed the country into a single military camp and mobilized for the Red Army a maximum of manpower and material resources.

The peace-loving foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, inexorably pursued from the first victorious days of the socialist revolution in our country to the present day, played a major part in the victory over the interventionists and White Guardists.

The State of the Theory of Military Strategy During the

Period of Peaceful Building (1922-1941)

The period between the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War was of great importance in the building of the Soviet Armed Forces and in the development of our military theory. This process was closely allied with the economic and political strengthening of the Soviet state.

As a result of the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture the Soviet Union became a powerful industrial country with a large mechanized agriculture. During the years of the pre-war five-year plans approximately 9000 major factories were built, and new branches of industry were developed: the tractor, automobile, aviation, chemical and machine-building industries. This made it possible to strengthen even more the defensive potential of our country.

The military-economic foundation of the Soviet Union was strengthened as a result of the development of industry in the eastern part of the country. In 1940, this area produced 28.5 percent of the cast iron, 32 percent of the steel, 32.1 percent of the rolled stock, 36 percent of the coal, and over 12 percent of the petroleum in the country [8]. This not only made our rear areas more invulnerable but also made it possible to conduct war simultaneously on two fronts, should the need arise.

The strengthening of our military-economic foundation was also expressed in the increased amount of state reserves and mobilization reserves of strategic raw materials, assuring the functioning of the national economy for two or three months and up to four months for certain types of raw materials.

Finally, the strengthening of the military-economic foundation of

the country was influenced greatly by the growth of the cultural level and the technical literacy of the Soviet people. This had an immense effect on the national economy and its reorganization for war as well as on keeping the Red Army up to strength.

All these facts clearly indicate that the Communist Party and the Soviet government in all their practical activity were guided strictly by Lenin's instructions that for the conduct of war it is indispensable to have strong and well-organized rear areas and an army that is well equipped and provided with all necessities.

The successes achieved in the industrialization of the country made it possible within a short time to radically rearm the Soviet Armed Forces, without which it would have been impossible to solve successfully the problem of strengthening the defensive potential of our country.

[Editor's Note # 1]

During the prewar five-year plans, the Red Army became an up-to-date army with regard to the amount and quality of arms and military equipment and with regard to the level of combat training answering at that time to the demands for waging war. During the period 1934-1938, the number of tanks in the Red Army increased almost three-fold, the number of planes 2.3 times, the artillery by almost 80 percent and the personnel of the Red Army was doubled during this period [9].

The quantitative growth was accompanied by an improvement in the organizational structure of the Red Army. The striking power and the firepower of the infantry were considerably increased. Because of the increasing danger of war and in order to further strengthen the defensive potential of the country, raise the combat readiness of the forces, and remove the discrepancies between the degree of technical equipment of the army and the territorial system of forming our troops, a decision was adopted in 1938 to convert to the principle of cadre structure of the Armed Forces. At the same time, deployment of new units and formations of all the services of the Armed Forces was taking place. As a result of these measures, the total strength of the Armed Forces in the period 1939-1940 was increased by a factor of more than 2.5, the strength of the armored troops was increased by a factor of 4.8, and that of the Air Force by a factor of 2.1.

Together with the improvement in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces and their numerical growth there was intensive scientific development of the theory of Soviet military strategy. This task was accomplished in line with the Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army, the political and economic state of our country, and the critical utilization of past military experience.

Soviet military strategy considered that a new war would be worldwide in scope; taking into account the existence of two opposed social systems, the impending world war was seen primarily as a war of a coalition of the capitalist countries against the Soviet Union. The sharply pronounced class character of this war determined the extreme decisiveness

of the military-political aims and excluded all possibilities of any compromise.

A future war was regarded as a war of long duration and high mobility, requiring large armies and a tremendous strain on all the economic and organizational forces of each country, and as a war in which victory could not be achieved by one blow. [Editor's Note #2]

In accordance with this concept in our military theory it was considered necessary to conduct a series of successive campaigns and operations.

The mobile nature of the impending war had been determined by the extensive mechanization and motorization of the troops and by the mass adoption of strong offensive means, tanks and aviation, making possible penetration of the defense and the development of an offensive in depth. [Editor's Note #3]

Prewar Soviet theory held that in the course of the war various methods of armed conflict -- offense, defense, and retreat -- could be used.

At the same time, our military doctrine always gave obvious preference to the principle of offensive battle action as the only means by which total destruction of the enemy could be accomplished. [Editor's Note #4]

Our theory held that the main objective of strategic operations was the enemy armed forces in a given theater of military operations, based on the indisputable concept that only by delivering a decisive defeat to the enemy armed forces could total victory be achieved.

The concept of an active offensive method of warfare was reflected widely in our prewar instructions and directives as well as in the plans of the operational-strategic games and field maneuvers. The essence of Soviet offensive doctrine was most clearly expressed in the draft of the Field Service Regulations of 1939. "Any enemy attack against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be met by a crushing blow of the entire might of our Armed Forces..."

"If the enemy forces us into a war, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will be the most aggressive of all the aggressive armies that ever existed."

"We will conduct an offensive war, carrying it into enemy territory."

"The combat operations of the Red Army will be aimed at destruction, at the total annihilation of the enemy..." [10]

While considering the offensive as the main method of conducting armed conflict, Soviet strategy at the same time acknowledged defense to be a completely rational means of conducting combat actions. However, the problems of organization and conduct of defense had not been developed fully in our prewar theory. It was considered that defense, playing a subordinate role with respect to offense, would be conducted within the framework of strategic attack only in isolated directions and not along

the entire front. In principle, our prewar theory allowed for forced retreat of the troops in isolated sectors. However, the problem of withdrawal of large forces from under enemy strikes was not developed, either theoretically or practically.

During the prewar years, our military theory reached a proper conclusion concerning the methods for unleashing a future war. It was believed that under modern conditions, wars as a rule will be begun by surprise, without a formal declaration of war. However, no proper conclusions were drawn from this concept with regard to the content and nature of the initial war period. The initial war period was understood to mean the time interval from the beginning of military operations to the commitment of the main mass of the armed forces.

The duration of the initial period was determined as fifteen to twenty days from the moment war began. It was proposed during this time to deploy the covering forces and to achieve air superiority, with simultaneous initiation of the mobilization, concentration, and deployment of the main forces. Thus, only limited military operations were to take place during the initial period. This erroneous view of the content of the initial period of the war was to exert a negative influence on the preparation of our Armed Forces.

The period between World Wars I and II was characterized not only by further perfection of the existing services of the armed forces, but also by the appearance and rapid development of new services of the armed forces and branches of service. Instead of being an auxiliary arm, aviation became an independent service of the armed forces, and new branches of the ground troops came into being such as armored troops, air-defense troops, and paratroops.

In this regard Soviet military theory devoted great attention to working out the problem of determining the role and position of the different services of the armed forces in a future war. In solving this problem it was assumed that victory in war can be achieved only by the combined efforts of all services of the armed forces and branches of service.

In view of the predominantly continental nature of a future war, the main role in the armed conflict was relegated to the Ground Troops. However, as a result of incorrect conclusions drawn from the experience in the Spanish Civil War, insufficient importance was attached to the capabilities of large armored formations in solving independent operational problems.

The Air Forces were intended primarily to support the troops on the ground by means of operations directly over the battlefield. At the same time, they could be used for independent operations. However, the theory of these operations had not been developed by the beginning of the war. The possibilities of bomber aviation were underestimated and insufficient attention was devoted to its construction. [Editor's Note #5]

The Navy, which is a component part of the Armed Forces of the USSR, was designed for the active defense of our sea boundaries. The theory of Soviet military strategy envisaged that the tasks assigned to the Navy in each maritime theater of operations, tasks proceeding from the over-all plan for the war, might call for both the conduct of independent operations as well as in operations in cooperation with the ground forces. Cooperation between the various branches of the Navy was considered a basic condition for the successful conduct of combat operations. Surface vessels, however, were considered as the means capable of resolving basic combat tasks on the sea. With this, large surface vessels -- battleships and cruisers -- were considered the nucleus of the fleet, inasmuch as they were considered to be the Navy's chief and universal weapons. This resulted in great attention being devoted to the construction of large expensive surface vessels. The role of the submarine fleet and naval aviation in a future war was underestimated.

By carrying out an extensive program of construction of surface ships we aimed at strengthening the striking force of the fleet. [Editor's Note # 6] However, it was not taken into account that two of our fleets were based in inland seas and it was difficult to bring out the Northern and the Pacific fleets onto the high seas. Under these conditions, the main emphasis should have been on the development of a submarine fleet and naval aviation. [Editor's Note # 7]

Our prewar theory placed great importance on the use of paratroops in solving the problem of increasing the depth of penetration and tempo of operations. The paratroops were regarded as means of the Higher Command and were to be used to solve operational-tactical problems in enemy rear areas and to assure continuous action throughout the entire depth of the enemy defense. However, these correct theoretical concepts were not augmented by the necessary material counterparts, since the practical application of airborne troops was limited by insufficient development of air transport aviation.

Further development of aviation, especially bomber aviation capable of delivering powerful strikes not only against troops but against distant economic objectives and political centers of the country, made more acute the problem of antiaircraft defense of the troops and of rear objectives. It was proposed that this problem be solved by coordination of the efforts of the Troops of PVO and aviation operationally subordinate to the Troops of PVO in the regions. The air defense system was based on the principle of protection of individual objectives.

On the whole, the air defense system before the war corresponded to the level of development of the means of aerial attack. One of its shortcomings was the violation of the principle of the unified command of fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery in air defense zones and also the fact that the Troops of PVO lacked the latest means of reconnaissance and control.

|| Allowing for the fact that the forthcoming war against the Soviet ||

Union would be a war of coalition, our strategy adhered to the principle of a progressive destruction of the coalition, with the main efforts to be directed each time against the enemy who was most dangerous under the specific conditions and whose destruction would yield the major military and political results of decisive influence on the subsequent course of the war.

Soviet prewar theory devoted serious attention to the problem of strategic cooperation. Strategic cooperation was understood as the coordination of the operations of all the services of the armed forces and branches of service with regard to purpose, time, and place. The questions of strategic cooperation were developed not only on the theoretical plane but also found practical solution in operational-tactical maneuvers and games. [Editor's Note # 8]

Soviet military theoreticians, in the development of strategic theory devoted special attention to the problems of the creation, utilization, and rehabilitation of strategic reserves. The concept of "strategic reserves" included not only the troop formations at the disposal of the Supreme High Command, but also the manpower and economic resources of the country to assure the conduct of a demanding war of long duration. However, in the practical solution of this problem, significant errors were committed which manifested themselves by the fact that despite the permanent war threat, we did not have the necessary reserves of weapons and military technology for the mobilizational requirements of our Armed Forces. [Editor's Note # 9]

Soviet Military Strategy During the Great Patriotic War

(1941-1945)

The Great Patriotic War was [Editor's Note #10] a severe test of the moral and physical strength of our people. The epoch-making victory won by the Soviet Union in this war was clear and convincing proof not only of the strength and viability of the Soviet social and governmental system, but also of the might of the Soviet Armed Forces and the high level of development of Soviet military art. Soviet military art [Editor's Note #11] developed systematically during the war and was perfected and enriched by the valuable experience of organizing and conducting armed struggle under various military-political situations.

The continuous development of Soviet military art was a natural consequence of the advantages of our socialist system which assure the rapid mobilization of all the efforts of the people to repel the enemy, and the systematic growth of the technical equipment of our Armed Forces. For example, by early 1945 the Field Forces had 1.5 times more rifles and carbines, 3 times more submachine guns, 8 times more tanks and self-propelled guns, and 5 times more combat aircraft than in December 1941. During this period, the quality of the weapons and military equipment of the Red Army was also significantly improved. The development of Soviet military art was conditioned not only by quantitative and qualitative

improvements in the arms and military equipment but also by improved organization of the troops, which strengthened even more the might of our Armed Forces.

One of the most important factors determining the development of military strategy was the high combat morale of Soviet soldiers and officers, conditioned by the moral-political unity of our people. During the Great Patriotic War, approximately eleven thousand soldiers and sailors were given the high honor of Hero of the Soviet Union, and more than seven million soldiers and officers were given orders and medals of the Soviet Union [11].

The constant development and perfection of Soviet military art during the Great Patriotic War were assured by the wise policy of the Communist Party, which, guided by Lenin's concepts of the defense of the socialist Motherland, correctly determined the military-political aims of the war against fascist Germany, organized and inspired the Soviet people and its soldiers for a just war against the fascist German aggressors, achieved unity of political and military strategy in the struggle against the enemy, and with the motto, "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" skillfully utilized all the resources of the country to achieve victory in the armed battle against a strong and dangerous enemy.

Together with the development of military art, its main and most important part, strategy, was developed and perfected; this development found expression primarily in the organization and conduct of strategic offense.

The past war fully confirmed the vitality of the main concept of Soviet military doctrine which states that only by decisive attack can the armed forces of the opponent be destroyed, his territory be conquered and his will to resist be crushed, thus achieving final victory in war. To attain this general war aim the Soviet Armed Forces conducted a number of major offensives. Each of these accomplished a major military and political aim of the general war plan. The most characteristic aims of strategic offensives were: the destruction of the main groupings of the enemy on one or two most important sectors; the liberation of economically and politically important areas; putting the allies of fascist Germany (Finland, Rumania, and Hungary) out of commission; and finally, liberation from the German aggressors of the occupied territories and subjugated peoples of the countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. The problem of organization and conduct of major strategic operations was successfully solved by Soviet strategy during the war. In spite of the difficult conditions of armed conflict, the Soviet command, on the basis of critical assimilation of military experience, correctly solved all problems connected with the preparation and conduct of strategic operations. Beginning with the second phase of the war strategic operations became the main method of conducting strategic offensives. During the third phase of the war, up to 70 percent of the frontal offensives were conducted within the framework of strategic operation.

In defining the aims of strategic operations, the Soviet Supreme High Command always started with the main political aims of the war, the economic and moral capabilities of the belligerent countries, and the strategic situation at the beginning of each strategic operation.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet command successfully solved the important problem of the proper selection of the direction of the main blow. In accord with the military-political aim of the particular stage or period of the war and with the strategic situation at the front, and depending on the balance of power at the front and in the strategic directions, the Soviet Supreme High Command in the past war selected that direction for the main thrust in which the enemy was most vulnerable and which would assure the decisive destruction of the largest or most dangerous enemy grouping and assure the accomplishment of major military and political results leading to a sharp change in the strategic situation throughout the entire front in favor of the Red Army. It was taken into account that the selected directions should have the necessary operational capacity to permit the deployment of large forces and large amounts of equipment, and the execution of broad maneuvers by troops and weapons along the front as well as in depth.

In the winter operations of 1941-1942, the Soviet forces delivered the main blow in the direction of Moscow against the largest enemy group attacking Moscow. The destruction of this group resulted not only in a sharp change in the military-political situation on the Soviet-German front, but also forced Japan and Turkey to refrain from open hostilities against the Soviet Union.

In the operations of the second phase of the war and in the winter of 1944, the Red Army delivered its main thrust in a southwestern direction. The transfer of the main thrust from the western direction to the southwestern direction was conditioned by the fact that the most powerful and active enemy group was in this area. The destruction of this group led to a sharp change in the situation along the entire Soviet-German front and led to the liberation of such economically important areas as the Stalingrad industrial region, the Northern Caucasus, the Donbas, Krivo-rozh'ye, Kerch', and the regions of the Ukraine east of the Dnieper River. The results of these operations had an enormous influence on the course of the entire Great Patriotic War and World War II.

The summer operations of 1944 and the winter operations of 1945 saw the main efforts of the Red Army concentrated in the westerly direction. The transfer of the main efforts toward the west made it possible for the Soviet forces to deliver their blow to the enemy's most vulnerable front sector, to reach German territory within a short time and to complete Germany's destruction.

In selecting the direction of the main thrust the Stavka of the Supreme High Command took into account not only the requirements of strategy, but also those of policy and economy. In this problem the connection between strategy, politics, and economy was fully manifested. Thus,

in deciding during the second phase of the war and in the winter operations of 1944 the direction of the main thrust on the Southern flank of the Soviet-German front, the Stavka could not disregard the following important conditions. First, a main thrust on this front sector would expel the enemy from such economically well-developed areas as the Northern Caucasus, the Donbas, Krivoy Rog, Nikopol', and the Eastern Ukraine; their liberation would increase the economic potential of our country. Second, the approach of Soviet forces to the borders of Rumania would increase the contradictions between fascist Germany and her satellites in Southeast Europe and create favorable conditions for the elimination of German satellites from the war.

The proper selection of the direction of the main thrust in the strategy indicates the skill of the Soviet Supreme High Command in foreseeing the future aspects of the war and at each stage deciding upon the decisive link in the entire chain of military events.

Having determined the direction of the main thrust, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command concentrated large masses of troops and military equipment on it. The strategic operations conducted in the direction of the main thrust were characterized by a decisive concentration of troops and combat equipment, and by the formation of powerful attack groups which were significantly stronger than the groups operating in other directions. These operations, covering sectors constituting 20-37 percent of the entire length of the Soviet-German front, involved 25-50 percent of the personnel, 25-52 percent of the guns and mortars, 20-70 percent of the tanks and self-propelled guns, and from 30 to 98 percent of the aircraft of the Field Forces.

The concentration of large forces and weapons in the direction of the main thrust made it possible within a short time to crack the strong and deeply echeloned enemy defense, to rapidly develop an attack in depth, and to destroy large enemy groups. In support of this, the following examples suffice. During the winter offensives of 1942-1943, the Soviet troops destroyed two German Army Groups, "B" and "Don," and their component 8th Italian, 2nd Hungarian, 3rd and 4th Rumanian, 4th Tank, and 5th Armies, as well as the "Hollidt" Operational Group. In the course of these operations, a total of 100 enemy divisions was destroyed, 98 in the direction of the main thrust.

In the summer and fall operations of 1944, our troops destroyed, in the direction of the main thrust, two German army groups, "Central" and "Northern Ukraine," and their component 9th, 4th, and 2nd Field Armies, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Tank Armies, and the 1st Hungarian Army. In the direction of the main thrust 137 divisions were destroyed, or more than one-third of all the divisions destroyed during the strategic offensive. The enemy losses were just as great in the direction of our main attack in the operations of 1945 in the Central European theater of operations. Here our troops destroyed the German "Weichsel" and "Central" Armies and their component 2nd, 11th, 9th, and 17th Field Armies as well as the 3rd and 4th Tank Armies. In this direction, a total of 191 divisions

were destroyed, or more than one-half the divisions destroyed during the offensive on the entire Soviet-German front. The destruction of such large forces in the direction of the main thrust, forcing the enemy to transfer to these areas not only his reserves but also significant numbers of troops from other sectors of the Soviet-German front, created favorable conditions for the Soviet offensives in other directions.

Decisive political and strategic aims were accomplished in this stage of the war by conducting a series of operations along the front and in depth or by concerted strategic operations, along the entire strategic front, unified by a single strategic design.

In determining a certain method for a strategic offensive, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command would select a method which would best correspond to the military-political conditions, to our economic capabilities, and to the combat potential of the Soviet troops, a method which in the final analysis would assure in the best possible manner the original aims.

During the period when the Red Army still had no decisive superiority over the enemy, the Soviet Supreme High Command executed strategic offensives by performing consecutive strategic operations along the front and in depth. Such a method of attack made it possible to accumulate the necessary amounts of equipment, ammunition and fuel for subsequent operations and to create in the chosen directions strong shock groups, as well as to achieve superiority over the enemy in all operations with regard to forces and equipment. This superiority increased constantly throughout the war. The use of this method of strategic attack made it possible for us to defeat the enemy piecemeal, leaving us the choice of the most convenient and advantageous time and direction for the next thrust.

The German Fascist Command, in order to parry the consecutive Soviet troop attacks, was forced to transfer their reserves from one direction to another. This led to a weakening of the enemy groups in the directions selected for the next blow. The sequence of offensive operations in different directions led to a rapid broadening of the strategic offensive front. While at the beginning of the strategic operations the active front comprised some 500-600 kilometers, with the beginning of the offensive of our forces in other directions the sector of concerted action increased to 2000-3000 kilometers, i.e., the offensive was conducted simultaneously on a front comprising 50-70 percent of the length of the entire strategic front.

In the winter operations of 1945, which took place in an entirely different military-political atmosphere than those of the preceding phases of the war, the strategic offensive of the Soviet forces was concentrated in a powerful concerted attack along the entire Soviet-German front. This method was also used successfully by the Soviet Command in its operations of 1945 in the Far East against the Kwantung Army of Imperialist Japan. The development of a simultaneous offensive in a number of adjacent strategic directions assured further strengthening of the military economic

foundation of the Soviet Union and a significant reduction of the entire front.

The advantage of this method of strategic attack lies primarily in the fact that within the shortest possible time the strategic front of the enemy was cleaved and split up and his groups were surrounded and simultaneously destroyed in a number of strategic directions. The enemy was deprived of the possibility of maneuvering along the front to create large groups for parrying our attack. All this made it possible for the Soviet troops in the 1945 operations to achieve major military-political results within the shortest possible time.

In accomplishing the strategic offensive operations the Stavka of the Supreme High Command selected one form or another for these operations, taking a number of factors into account. The most important of these were: the composition of the Soviet groups and especially the presence of mobile units and formations; the contour of the front line; the composition of enemy groups and the existence of weak and strong places in his defense; and the nature of the theater of military operations. The methods of the strategic operations were characterized by the variety of form; the predominant methods were the encirclement and destructions of major enemy groups.

The main forms of strategic operations in the past war were:

- the encircling of large enemy formations and their subsequent destruction;
- the splitting of the strategic front of the enemy; and
- the break-up of the strategic front of the enemy with subsequent isolation of enemy groups.

The encirclement of major enemy groups was accomplished by different methods. The most important of these were:

- simultaneous strikes in two directions with breakthrough of the front on the flanks of the enemy groups and deployment in depth along converging lines (the Stalingrad, Lvov, Yassy-Kishinev, and other operations);
- one strong enveloping blow aimed at pushing the enemy against natural barriers (the liberation of the Baltic area and the East Prussian operation);
- in isolated instances, the encirclement of large enemy groups was accomplished as a result of the breakthrough of the front in several directions with subsequent development of attacks in converging directions and encirclement of enemy troops throughout the operational depth (the Belorussian and the Berlin operations).

The conduct of strategic offensive operations by cleaving of the

strategic front of the enemy was accomplished by delivering an attack in depth by cooperating fronts throughout the entire depth of strategic disposition of enemy groups (the liberation of the Eastern Ukraine, and the East Pomeranian operation).

The break-up of the strategic front of the enemy was accomplished by a series of strong attacks in several directions and the development of the offensive on a broad front along parallel or even divergent lines. In this case, the defensive front of the enemy was broken up; this facilitated liquidation of isolated enemy groups deprived of operational contact (Vistula-Oder operation).

These are, in brief, the most typical forms of strategic offensive operations. However, it should be kept in mind that strategic operations often took more complex forms. Sometimes these forms were combined or changed from one into another.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military strategy successfully utilized the factor of strategic surprise as one of the means of attaining the established goals. Strategic surprise was achieved by the following measures, which were aimed at misleading the German Command concerning our plans:

- the development of a major attack in a direction least expected by the enemy; this was the case in the winter of 1942-1943, when the Red Army delivered its main attack at Stalingrad while the enemy expected an attack in a westerly direction, and in the summer of 1944, when contrary to enemy expectations the main attack of the Red Army was delivered not to the south but in Belorussia;

- the secrecy of measures taken to prepare for the offensive, as was the case at Kursk, || and in the operations of the Red Army against imperialist Japan, || and keeping the plans of the Soviet command secret;

- misleading the enemy with regard to the place, time, and strength of our attack; this measure was especially widely used by the Soviet command during the third phase of the war and exerted an important influence on the successful conduct of strategic operations.

However, it should be noted that the Soviet command was not always successful in achieving full strategic surprise. This was the case, particularly in the summer of 1943 and in the winter of 1944, when the enemy succeeded in discovering beforehand and in quite some detail the plans of the Soviet command, since we could not conceal from the enemy the concentration of strategic reserves (summer of 1943), the regrouping of troops, and the creation of shock groups at the fronts. The badly-handled dissemination of false information in the preparation for the offensive in the Eastern Ukraine also resulted in German discovery of the actual regrouping and detection of the regions of false troop concentrations.

The Great Patriotic War was characterized by systematic increase in the extent of strategic attack and strategic operations; this was expressed, to a great extent, in the extension of the front lines and by the increase in forces and weapons engaged in strategic attack (Table 4).

TABLE 4

The Extent of Strategic Offensives in the Great Patriotic War

Time of the offensive	Extent of the Soviet- German front at the Start of the offensive		Number of active army groups		Depth of penetration of Soviet forces, km.
	Total, km.	Offensive sector, km.	Total	Participating simultaneously during offensive	
Winter 1941-1942	4000	1000	10	7	200-400
Winter 1942-1943	6000	3200	12	8	200-700
Summer and fall 1943	4300	2000	11	7	200-600
Winter 1944	4400	2900	11	10	300-500
Summer and fall 1944	4250	4250	12	10	600-1100
Winter 1945	2400	2100	10	8	400-700

The table shows that the attack front of the Soviet forces in 1942-45 was 2 to 3 times longer than in the winter of 1941-42; the number of army groups simultaneously engaged in the offensive increased by a factor of almost 1.5, and the depth of the advance by a factor of 2-2.5. The zone of advance in the strategic operations also increased significantly and in the closing period of the war reached 1000-1400 km. The increased scope of the strategic operations was also expressed in the increased rates of advance. While in the strategic operations of the initial phase of the war the average rate of advance of Soviet troops was 4-5 km per day, in the operations in 1944-45 it reached 15-20 km.

The increased scope of strategic operations during the war years is also evident from the increased forces and weapons engaged in strategic operations. This can be confirmed by the data in Table 5.

Table 5 shows the general trend of the increased number of forces and weapons engaged in strategic operations. A particularly sharp rise is noted in the amount of military equipment.

The table shows that during the war the number of troops engaged in strategic operations increased by a factor of 2, that of guns and mortars by a factor of 3-5, tanks by 3-9, and airplanes by 3-6.

The increased amounts of military equipment in the army groups and armies caused qualitative changes in the Ground Troops as the main means of destruction of the enemy armed forces. The continuous quantitative increase and perfection of the technical-tactical qualities of artillery and tanks, and the further mechanization of the Ground Troops resulted

in increased firepower, making for more powerful and deeper attacks as well as for higher mobility. These qualitative changes in the Ground Troops helped to increase the decisiveness and effectiveness of strategic offensive operations leading to the liquidation of large enemy groups and to the liberation of vast territories with important economic regions and political centers. The decisiveness and effectiveness of the strategic operations can be judged from the data in Table 6.

From Table 6 it is evident that major strategic operations resulted in destruction of 34-90 percent of the enemy divisions opposing our forces.

A strategic operation is accomplished, as a rule, by the efforts of several army groups with the participation of long-range aviation, and with the participation of naval forces in coastal regions. The strategic operation as one consisting of an array of army groups was a new phenomenon in

TABLE 5

The Number of Troops and Weapons Involved in Strategic Offensive Operations in 1941-1945 (Forces and Weapons Engaged in the Moscow Counteroffensive Are Taken as 100%)

Operations	Divisions, Personnel,		Guns and Mortars, %		Tanks and self-propelled guns, %		Airplanes,	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Moscow counteroffensive	100	100	100		100		100	
Stalingrad counteroffensive	80	100	190		128		108	
Orel operation	69	80	238		339		250	
Belgorod-Kharkov operation	61	96	183		385		125	
Liberation of the Eastern Ukraine	176	215	384		371		200	
Belorussian operation	171	209	500		860		666	
Lvov-Sandomierz operation	74	97	207		314		266	
Yassy-Kishinev operation	84	114	233		264		162	
Vistula-Oder operation	155	209	423		950		466	
East Prussian operation	122	152	341		491		250	
Berlin operation	179	227	520		894		666	
Manchurian operation	90	220	313		772		326	

Soviet military art during the Great Patriotic War. In prewar years, our theoretical literature contained views stating that an offensive operation with a strategic aim shall be conducted by one army group and that an offensive operation can be best developed within the scope of an army group capable of solving major strategic problems.

The strategic operation of a group of fronts came into existence during the Great Patriotic War not suddenly, but as the might of the Soviet Armed Forces increased and experience was acquired in the organization and direction of offensive troop operations.

The operation of a group of fronts came into being during the period of the Moscow counteroffensive realized by the forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, as well as by the right wing of the Southwestern Front. Later came the Stalingrad offensive, also conducted by forces of three fronts. With the Kursk counteroffensive in 1943, the strategic operation as an operation of a group of fronts became firmly entrenched in the practice of Soviet troops during strategic attack.

TABLE 6

The Effectiveness of Strategic Offensive Operations in the Great Patriotic War

Operation	Number of enemy divisions		% of enemy divisions defeated	
	taking part in combat operations	defeated during the operations	with respect to the number of divisions taking part in the operations	with respect to number of divisions active on Soviet-German front
Moscow counteroffensive	74	25	34	13
Stalingrad counteroffensive	65	49	75	18
Kursk counteroffensive	92	39	33	13
Offensive in the Eastern Ukraine	135	76	56	31
Belorussian operation	114	76	68	32
Vistula-Oder operation	70	58	83	32
Berlin operation	116	100	90	55
Manchurian operation	44	44	100	100*

* In relation to the divisions operating against the Red Army.

During the Great Patriotic War, an operation of a group of fronts was prepared, supplied and conducted directly by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command with the active participation of the command of the front. The centralized leadership of the operation by the Stavka assured coordination of the efforts of the fronts with respect to time, place, and aim, especially under drastically changing conditions; in the final analysis it assured the solution of major military-political aims.

The increased scope of strategic operations was brought about mainly by the further strengthening of the military and economic foundation of the Soviet Union, which made it possible to improve the technical equipment of the Armed Forces, the maneuverability of the troops, and the range of the artillery fire. The increase in scope was also strongly influenced by the mechanization of supply transport and the increased rate of reconstruction of railroads conducive to more regular delivery of ammunition and other materiel to the forces during an operation.

Other important accomplishments of Soviet military strategy include solution of the problem of breaking through the strategic front of the enemy. During the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army repeatedly broke through the strategic front of the enemy. This was accomplished in the winter of 1942-43, in the winter of 1944, twice in the summer of 1944, and once again in January 1945 in the direction of Berlin.

|| This problem was also resolved very successfully in the operation ||
|| which resulted in the route of the Kwantung Army. ||

A breakthrough on the strategic front of the enemy afforded the Soviet troops the possibility for further development of the offensive in great depth.

The German command required considerable time and large forces to bridge the gap and create a new front. To do so, it was forced to withdraw its troops a considerable distance (500-600 km) and to transfer to the breakthrough area some 30-60 divisions taken from other sectors of the Soviet-German front or from Germany and its occupied countries. The enemy, as a rule, created his new defensive front along major natural barriers: rivers or mountains.

Successful breakthrough of the strategic front of the enemy was accomplished by creation of large strategic groupings assuring a strong initial thrust, the destruction of the opposing enemy groups within a short time, and increased efforts during the development of the offensive in depth, especially by the commitment of large armored forces. The breakthrough of the strategic front of the enemy was also assured by the high rates of advance during which the Soviet troops outmaneuvered the enemy and impaired his organization or intermediate defense lines, by the fact that the Soviet command had a sufficient number of strategic reserves and used them properly, and by the skillful choice of the forms for conducting the strategic operations.

The Great Patriotic War, characterized by the vast extent of the front and the multitude of problems arising during armed conflict, required that the Soviet military leaders solve a most complex problem -- the organization of strategic cooperation between major groups of the Armed Forces operating in various directions according to a unified plan. The essence of strategic cooperation consisted in the coordination of efforts of formations and commands of the services of the Armed Forces participating in the strategic offensive with respect to the time, place, and aim for achieving the strategic goals of the operations. The foundations of strategic cooperation were laid by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command in the development of operational plans. They were reflected in the assignments of tasks to major groups of Soviet forces, in the determination of the role and location of each front in the strategic operation, the form of conducting the strategic offensive, the sequence for accomplishing the tasks assigned to the fronts, and in determining the problems of the services of the Armed Forces and the methods for solving them.

Strategic cooperation was accomplished by various methods: in some instances, by coordination of the efforts of strategic groups of Soviet troops operating in various directions and solving independent problems (this type of cooperation was successfully applied in the winter operations of 1942-1943, in the summer-fall operations of 1943, and in the closing stage of the war in 1945); in other instances, by conducting consecutive operations by groups of fronts in different theaters of military operations and by fronts in adjacent strategic directions. This method of strategic cooperation was widely used in almost all offensives, but it was used with special success in the summer-fall operations of 1944 when the Red Army delivered 6 powerful successive thrusts against the enemy. As a result of these thrusts, the enemy was not only tied down along a broad front but was also deprived of the chance to use his reserves and take any serious countermeasures. Each thrust created favorable conditions for the next thrust in another direction.

Under conditions of conducting strategic defense, the organization of strategic cooperation provided for the combination of defensive and offensive operations in a number of strategic directions. This decreased the ability of the enemy to strengthen his main group by removing forces from other sectors of the front and enabled us to slow down the enemy offensive, gaining time to accumulate reserves for a counteroffensive.

The cooperation of the Ground Troops and the Navy was manifested in the combined operations in the coastal areas (the Odessa, Crimea, Petsamo-Kirkeness, and East Prussian operations), in the protection of coastal flanks of the Ground Troops, and in the maintenance of communication of the Ground Troops.

Strategic cooperation between fronts, groups of fronts and the National PVO Troops was achieved by coordination of effort in the battle against enemy aviation.

However, when solving such an important problem as the organization and realization of strategic cooperation, the Soviet command also permitted serious errors to occur. In the winter offensives of 1941-42, the Soviet Supreme High Command did not succeed in properly coordinating the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk Fronts to the west and the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts at Leningrad. This was one of the reasons for the indecisiveness of the winter operations of 1941-42 and the grave situation in which our forces found themselves in the spring of 1942. There was no real strategic cooperation between the fronts and the Stavka of the Supreme High Command in the Kharkov offensive in May 1942, as a result of which the offensive of the Southwestern Front against Kharkov became isolated without the active support of adjacent fronts. This made it possible for the enemy to freely maneuver his forces and to deliver strong thrusts to the flanks of the shock group of the Southwestern Front, resulting in the defeat of our offensive forces. There were also shortcomings in the organization of cooperation between the Ground Troops and the Navy. For example, during the battle to destroy the Kurland group of the enemy, the Soviet command was not able to effect a naval blockade of the enemy; this not only had a negative effect on the liquidation of this enemy group, but also complicated the actions of our troops in the winter of 1944-45 in the direction of Berlin, to which the enemy transferred up to 10 divisions from Kurland.

The success of a strategic offensive and its increased scope also depended considerably on the presence and utilization of strategic reserves. The creation and reinforcement of reserves took different forms depending on the presence of forces and conditions of warfare. During the first phase of the Great Patriotic War, the reserves of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command consisted primarily of new formations. Subsequently, strategic reserves were reinforced primarily by withdrawing units and formations from the fronts which were engaged in the concluding stages of operations in separate operational directions (the 4th Ukrainian Front after the liberation of Crimea and the Karelian Front after Finland had been removed from the war) or from those fronts which, due to changing conditions, could complete their tasks with smaller forces (the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts blocking the Kurland group of the enemy).

During the Great Patriotic War, the main mass of strategic reserves was used in the main directions to which the Stavka directed 50-70 percent of their reserves.

At the various stages of the war the Stavka reinforced fronts by withdrawing from its reserves 60-155 infantry divisions, 5-16 cavalry divisions, 57-68 infantry brigades, 24-25 tank brigades, 3-22 tank corps and 4-10 mechanized corps.

It should be stressed that during the Great Patriotic War the strategic reserves were used to solve the most diverse problems:

- to create strategic groups in the course of the preparation for operations; for example, in preparing for operations in the summer of 1944,

five combined, two tank and two air armies were used for this purpose; in the preparation for the winter offensive of 1944-45, eleven combined and four tank armies were used;

- to strengthen the fronts for counteroffensives, as was the case at Moscow when the Western Front was reinforced with four combined armies;

- to increase the efforts in the development of an offensive in the direction of the main thrust; for this purpose in the summer offensive of 1943, the reserves of the Stavka there (nine combined and two tank armies) were contributed to the fronts;

- to protect the flank of a group delivering the main thrust by developing an offensive in the adjacent sector; in the winter of 1944, the Stavka, in order to safeguard the flank of the shock group conducting the offensive in the Eastern Ukraine, deployed at the area of contact between the 1st Ukrainian and the 1st Belorussian Fronts a new front, the 2nd Belorussian Front, implemented by two combined armies and one air army from its reserves;

- to strengthen the fronts for the solution of new problems arising during a strategic offensive, as characterized by the Belorussian operation when, because of a change in mission, the 1st Baltic Front was reinforced with two combined armies;

- to strengthen the troops operating in the outer encircling front; it was for this purpose that the Stalingrad Front was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Army to repel the German counteroffensive in the direction of Kotel'nikov in December 1942;

- to strengthen the fronts for an offensive after stopping an enemy counteroffensive; in December 1943, the 1st Guards Army was used in this manner at Zhitomir and the 9th Guards Army at the Lake Balaton region in March 1945.

The experience of the past war indicates that the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, constantly observing the development of the armed conflict, made the necessary regroupings and sent strategic reserves in good time to those sectors where they could be used most effectively and influence the development of the offensive. The introduction of major strategic reserves assured maintenance of the necessary superiority over the enemy with regard to forces and weapons, contributed to increasing the efforts in the development of an offensive along the front as well as in depth, and also made it possible for the fronts to solve new problems arising during the operation. However, there were also serious errors in the utilization of the strategic reserves. This was true primarily of the first phase of the war when the Soviet command, striving to develop an offensive in all main strategic directions, permitted the forces and weapons to be scattered, making it impossible to achieve decisive superiority in any one direction. [Editor's Note # 12]

The Great Patriotic War yielded very valuable experience in the solution of such a complex and acute problem as the conduct of armed combat during the initial phase of the war. The complexity of its solution was compounded by the surprise of the enemy attack on the Soviet Union. [Editor's Note #13]

The experience of the initial phase of World War II showed very clearly that the aggressor had created beforehand, in peacetime, strong, well-prepared armies for invasion. Such armies made it possible for Germany to start war by surprise with the immediate development of decisive active operations not only in the air but also on the ground. The attacked countries were forced from the very first days of the war to repulse the attacks of the main armies of the aggressor under extremely unfavorable conditions and at the same time to mobilize and deploy their armed forces as well as to switch the national economy to a war footing. However, Soviet military strategy failed to draw the appropriate practical conclusions from this experience. [Editor's Note #14]

It is known that a number of extensive measures dealing with the Armed Forces and the defense of the country as a whole had been instituted and were in the process of being implemented prior to the war, yet these measures were insufficient to seriously affect the relationship of forces and war preparedness, which favored fascist Germany.

The relationship of forces of states in modern wars is determined not only by the condition of the armed forces but above all by the military and economic potential of the nations as a whole. Nations wage war using the full power of their economic, military, scientific, and moral resources. At the time fascist Germany attacked the Soviet Union she could employ almost the entire economic and technical resources of Western Europe as well as those of her satellites. It should also be remembered that between World War I and World War II the German economy was primed to develop her military and economic potential with billions of dollars, principally from the United States and England. The Soviet people and their Armed Forces had to exert titanic efforts, perform gigantic tasks and display mass heroism both at the front and in the rear to employ all the resources of the state, and it required much time in order to change the relationship of forces in the war in her favor and achieve final victory.

The surprise attack by a previously mobilized army of the aggressor and its mass use, in the early stages of the war, of such equipment as tanks and aircraft for a simultaneous thrust in great depth changed the conditions of strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces of the country being attacked and, consequently, the entire nature of operations during the initial phase of the war.

The country was confronted with the necessity to carry out mobilization, concentration, and deployment of its Armed Forces during the enemy invasion of our territory, which had already begun.

Under the changing conditions, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command

on June 25 decided to create a defense of the troops of the Northwestern and Western Fronts along the West Dvina and Dnieper Rivers. An Army Group was created of the reserves of Stavka to prepare and occupy defense positions along the line Sushchevo, Vitebsk, Chernigov, the Desna River, and the Dnieper River, up to Kremenchug.

However, our troops were not able to execute the outlined measures with regard to the organization of a continuous defense front.

By June 29 the enemy, having forestalled us in capturing these lines of defense, had captured a bridgehead on the West Dvina River, cutting the lines of retreat of the main forces of the Western Front in the region to the west of Minsk, and began to approach Bobryusk.

In order to prevent an enemy breakthrough toward Moscow, the Stavka decided to create a deeply echeloned defense in the direction of Moscow. The troops of the Stavka's reserve army group were to advance and establish a defensive perimeter on the line Kraslava, the Polopskiy fortified region, Vitebsk, Orsha, and the Dnieper River up to Loyev. The 16th Army was to be regrouped to this position from the Ukraine. To the east of this perimeter, some 180-200 kilometers away, the 24th and 28th Armies were to take up the defensive. At the same time, a Stavka reserve army group was sent to the Western Front, in effect signifying the creation of a new Western Front. [Editor's Note #15]

Late on July 9 the advancing enemy troops reached the defense perimeter of the Soviet troops from Disna to Zhlobin, taking a bridgehead in the vicinity of Disna and capturing Vitebsk.

In the southwestern direction, our troops, although offering strong resistance to the enemy and repeatedly delivering strong counterattacks, were nevertheless forced by July 10 to retreat to the line Korosten', Proskurov, Mogilev-Podol'skiy, and the Prut River.

Thus, the Great Patriotic War began by commitment of the main forces of both sides. Within the first ten to twelve days, up to 70-80 percent of the ground troops and 100 percent of the air forces of both sides were engaged in bloody battles. These operations were characterized by high speed, vast maneuvers of forces and weapons, and high intensity of the military operations. [Editor's Note #16]

The experience of the Great Patriotic War enriched Soviet strategy with regard to organization and conduct of strategic defense. As previously mentioned, our prewar theoretical views conceived of strategic defense as a method of armed conflict accompanying a strategic offensive. It was presumed that strategic defense was to be applied in directions of secondary importance to save manpower and weapons for the creation of strong shock groups in the decisive directions or theaters of military operations.

During the Great Patriotic War, this method was resorted to three

times by the Soviet command. In two cases, in the summers of 1941 and 1942, this was a forced measure, and in one case, in the summer of 1943, it was planned. But in all these cases, the aim was to repel (retard) the enemy offensive, to wear down and exhaust the enemy troops, to gain time, and to prepare conditions for a decisive counteroffensive. The strategic defense was needed for various reasons. In the summer of 1941, it was determined by the surprise attack of the enemy and by the loss of the strategic initiative as a result of the unsuccessful outcome of the initial phase of the war, which resulted in an abrupt change in the relationship of forces in favor of the enemy. By this time, a significant part of the strategic reserves (five armies out of nine) had already been used up. The turning of the Red Army to strategic defense in the summer of 1942 was a result of the defeat of our forces in the Crimean and Kharkov operations, during which the Red Army sustained tangible losses. [Editor's Note #17] [Editor's Note #18]

The turn to strategic defense in the summer of 1943, unlike that of the previous years, was planned. The Soviet command, having taken the strategic initiative and having, by the summer of 1943, large reserves (eight combined and two tank armies, as well as a number of separate formations -- fifty-seven infantry divisions and nine cavalry divisions, twenty-one rifle brigades, four mechanized, and seven tank corps), was thus able to forestall the enemy and take the offensive. However, it was decided to temporarily take the strategic defensive so as to force the enemy to initiate the offensive and to exhaust and bleed white his shock group in defensive battles; then, after bringing up fresh strategic reserves a decisive counteroffensive could be started.

The most important problems of strategic defense solved by Soviet military strategy during the last war are: to determine the direction of the main thrust of the enemy; to create a strategic defense and methods for reinforcing of the strategic fronts, methods of defense and utilization of strategic reserves; and the creation of conditions for a counteroffensive.

The success of the strategic defense in 1941 in many respects depended on the correct determination of the direction of concentration of the main effort of the Armed Forces. Even during the first days, the Stavka arrived at the correct conclusion that of the three strategic directions the most important and decisive was in the west. This was determined by the fact that it was in this very direction that the enemy committed his strongest group and delivered the main thrust. The importance of this direction was also determined by the fact that it would permit the German troops by the shortest possible way to reach the central industrial region and our capital -- Moscow. The successful defense of our troops in this direction to a significant extent determined the stability of the entire strategic front. It is for this reason that the Stavka of the Supreme High Command allotted the main part of its reserves to reinforce the western direction: 150 infantry divisions and 44 infantry brigades, or 52 percent of the divisions and 47 percent of the brigades sent to the Field Forces from June 22 to December 1, 1941. Such purposeful utilization of reserves

allowed the Soviet command to check the enemy advance and to change the relationship of forces in our favor in this most important direction and thus exert a decisive influence on the outcome of the battle in 1941.

In the defense campaign of 1942, the Soviet Supreme High Command first considered that the main thrust of the enemy would follow in a westerly direction and the secondary thrust would take place in a southwesterly direction, from the Donbas to Rostov, and further to the Northern Caucasus. This evaluation of the situation to a certain extent resulted from the fact that the main group of German forces was to the west by the spring of 1942; this group had been created during the winter operations of 1941-42. The evaluation was also based on the significance of Moscow as the capital of the country and as the important economic and strategic center of the country.

As the events of the summer of 1942 showed, this prediction by the Soviet Supreme High Command with regard to the intention of the enemy was not confirmed. The enemy, while retaining a strong group in the central direction toward Moscow, concentrated his main efforts on the southern flank and, as is well known, delivered his main attack in the summer of 1942 in a southwesterly direction.

The thrust of the enemy in this direction led to the defeat of our forces and to the withdrawal of our entire left flank beyond the Don and to the invasion to the North Caucasus by the enemy. Consequently, the amount of forces and weapons employed in the German offensive in this direction was unexpected by the Soviet command.

The Soviet Supreme High Command arrived at the conclusion that the enemy was delivering his main attack not in the westerly but rather in the southwesterly direction only in early July 1942 when the German offensive toward Voronezh was already underway.

The true art of strategic prediction was shown by the Soviet command in the preparation of the summer operations of 1943. The intention of Hitler's command to develop the main operations in the direction of Kursk was discovered quite accurately two or two-and-one-half months before the battle at Kursk; this made it possible for our forces to undertake general preparations in order to repulse the blow of the enemy.

In the Kursk frontal sector, comprising 13 percent of the entire Soviet-German front, we concentrated up to 28 percent of our personnel, 20 percent of our guns and mortars, over 40 percent of our tanks and self-propelled guns, and over 33 percent of the airplanes which, in the summer of 1943, operated with the Field Forces.

Depending on the strategic situation, on the presence of the forces, on means, and on the time factor, the depth of the strategic defense of Soviet forces in the past war, taking into account the defensive positions occupied by the troops as well as the prepared defense perimeters, varied from 250 to 600 kilometers. In 1941 (the middle of July) it extended in

the direction of Moscow, 250-300 kilometers, from the upper Dnieper to the Mozhaysk line of defense. In the Leningrad direction, the depth of defense was 100-200 kilometers and was accomplished by creation of the Luzhak line of defense, the Krasnogvardeisk fortified region and the defense perimeters directly at the outskirts of Leningrad. With the further advance of German forces from the Dnieper to the east, the depth of defense was increased by the creation of the Moscow defense zone and by the setting up of state defense perimeters to the east of Moscow.

However, it was not possible to utilize the prepared lines of defense with sufficient effectiveness. First, the enemy, who possessed a superiority in mobility as a rule, forestalled our occupying these lines of defense. Second, our troops retreating from the front because of great losses were normally not able to build up a strong defense in the rear areas, and the Soviet command lacked the reserves needed to occupy these defense lines in advance. Of the 291 infantry divisions and 66 infantry brigades sent to the Field Forces from the reserve of the Stavka during the summer campaign of 1941, only 66 divisions and four brigades were used for advance occupation of the defense perimeters.

By the summer of 1942, the total depth of defense which was fortified, taking into account the rear defense areas on the Volga in the process of preparation, increased to 500-600 kilometers. In the summer of 1943, however, when the strategic initiative was in the hands of the Soviet command which planned, after the repulsion of the enemy advance, to develop a powerful attack with decisive aims, the depth of the prepared defense zone did not exceed 300-350 kilometers.

During the initial phase of the war, the Soviet troops gained great experience with regard to the restoration of the strategic defensive front. It is well known that the enemy during this time succeeded four times in breaking through our strategic front to the extent of 300-500 kilometers. The creation of a continuous stable strategic defensive front after the breakthrough of the summer of 1941, with the continuing retreat of the significantly weakened Soviet forces and a continuous advance of the enemy, was possible only because the Stavka of the Supreme High Command had significant strategic reserves and opportunely sent them to the front. Thus, during the period of June 27 to July 10, 1941, alone, the Stavka transferred to the commander of the Western Front five combined armies for restoration of the strategic defensive front. Later, in order to create a large strategic group an additional thirteen combined armies were sent to the west. A stabilized front in the direction of Leningrad and Kiev was also attained by means of the reserves of the Stavka; 140 infantry divisions and 50 infantry brigades were sent in these directions.

In the summer of 1942, the strategic front on the southern flank was reestablished by strategic reserves. To create a continuous front along the Don and in the Northern Caucasus, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command in July and August 1942 sent to the army groups acting in these directions six combined armies, two tank armies, and a number of separate formations with a total of twenty-six infantry divisions,

twenty-five infantry brigades, up to five tank corps, and one cavalry corps.

In isolated instances the restoration of the strategic defensive front was accomplished by regrouping of forces and weapons of the active army groups and the utilization of retreating forces. For example, after a breakthrough by the enemy in October 1941 of the defense of the Bryansk, the Reserve, and the Western Army Groups, the strategic front was reestablished on the Mozhaysk line of defense by regrouping the forces of the left flank of the Northwestern and the right flank of the Western Fronts, as well as by using the reserves of the Stavka.

Thus, only the strategic reserves at the disposal of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command made it possible to restore the strategic defensive front, deeply echelon it (from 250-500 kilometers) to create major strategic groups in the most important strategic directions, and thus assure the successful conduct of defensive operations.

One of the most characteristic features of the strategic defense of the Red Army was its aggressiveness. Stubborn defense of the fortified perimeters and major towns was combined with strong counterattacks and offensive actions in a number of directions by the forces of one or two fronts. For example, the stubborn defense in 1941 of the prepared perimeter in the most important strategic direction -- Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev-Rostov -- was combined with strong counterattacks conducted during the Smolensk campaign, the Lug and Kiev defensive operations, the counterattacks of Tikhvin and Rostov, etc.

As the experience of the Great Patriotic War was to demonstrate, however, the stubborn holding of lines and of large cities should be coordinated with a realistic evaluation of the strategic situation at the front. Violation of this principle had serious consequences. The Kiev defensive operations of 1941 might well serve as a confirmation of this, where, as a result of the unfounded demands of the Stavka that the Kiev region continue to be held, our troops suffered a serious defeat.

In 1942, the stubborn defense of the prepared perimeters was combined with strong counterattacks of Soviet troops in the areas of Voronezh and Stalingrad, in the Northern Caucasus, and with the offensive operations of the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts at Leningrad, the troops of the Northwestern Front against the Dem'yanov enemy group and the forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts in the direction of Smolensk. During the defensive operations in the summer and fall of 1941 and in 1942, the Red Army conducted over thirty frontal offensives. The high activity of our defense, even during the initial phase of the war, made it possible to check the enemy attack and slow the tempo of his advance. Thus, during the first eighteen days of the war the Germans advanced at an average daily rate of 20-30 kilometers, while later, in September-October 1941, their average daily rate of advance in the northwesterly direction was reduced from 20 to 5, in the westerly direction from 30 to 2.5, and in the southwesterly direction from 20 to 6 kilometers. Because of the stubbornness and great aggressiveness of our defense, the enemy was forced to commit

significant forces to secure the flanks of his striking forces in order to defend against our attacks, thus weakening his own attack groups, significantly delaying his rate of advance and aiding in the disruption of his blitzkrieg plans. The German forces sustained tremendous losses. During the first six months of the war alone, according to the data of the German command, the German land army lost over 800,000 troops on the Soviet-German front.

The defensive operations in the most important strategic directions were conducted simultaneously by several cooperating army groups with the participation of long-range aviation and, in the coastal regions, with the cooperation of the Navy. The extension of the front in defensive operations in the separate strategic directions varied from 450 to 800 kilometers. As the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces increased and the relationship of forces changed in our favor, especially after the offensive by Soviet troops in the winter of 1941-42, the enemy could no longer conduct offensive operations along the entire strategic front and was limited to offensives only in individual strategic directions. In light of this the extension of our front in strategic defensive operations was constantly reduced.

In the summer of 1941 the defensive operations were developed along the entire 4,000-kilometer front, while in the summer of 1942 the Red Army conducted defensive operations along a 750-2100 kilometer front, and in the summer of 1943 only along a 600 kilometer front. The conduct of the defense on the significantly contracted frontal sectors made it possible for the Supreme High Command to utilize strategic reserves more purposefully for the strengthening of the defense and the delivery of counterattacks in these directions.

The most important strategic defensive operations were the Smolensk, Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, Caucasus, and Kursk operations. As is well known, some of these operations for a number of reasons culminated in the defeat of our troops. The main reasons were the overestimation of our capabilities and underestimation of the enemy potential, especially of the maneuvering capabilities of his tank groups and armies, which, in a number of cases, led to the encirclement of our forces; the unjustifiable retention of the frontline troops in the occupied perimeters under conditions of imminent threat of encirclement, as was the case in June 1941 with the forces of the Western Front in the Belostok salient, and in September 1941 in the defensive operation of the forces of the Southwestern Front on the left bank of the Dnieper; and the unsatisfactory organization and execution of operational and strategic cooperation and the weak protection of junctions. An example of the latter was the defensive operation of the forces of the Central, Bryansk, and Southwestern Fronts in August 1941 and the defensive operations of the forces of the Bryansk and Southwestern Fronts in the direction of Voronezh in July 1942. The Kursk defensive operation was better planned, prepared and provided for by the Soviet command both operationally and with regard to materiel and equipment. During the operation, the fascist German forces, having sustained huge losses, did not succeed in breaking through our operational defense, and seven to ten days after the beginning of the enemy offensive our troops counterattacked, culminating in the defeat of the enemy.

Despite the unfavorable results of the initial phase of the war, the Red Army nevertheless coped with the problem of organizing and conducting strategic defense. The Soviet command, by conducting a strategic defense and skillfully coordinating its operations, exhausted and bled white the enemy and set the stage for a radical change in the course of the war. Because of its aggressive method of strategic defense, the Soviet command accumulated extensive experience in the organization and conduct not only of defensive, but also of offensive operations.

Such are the main lessons of the Great Patriotic War in the realm of organization and conduct of strategic defense.

The problem of strategic utilization of the services of the Armed Forces was also successfully solved during the Great Patriotic War. Soviet military strategy, starting from the fundamental position that victory in war can be achieved only by the combined efforts of all the services of the Armed Forces, investigated fully the problems of the most rational utilization of the strong points of each service. At the same time, in the last war the role and significance of one service of the Armed Forces or another, or branch of service and, consequently, its relative position in the composition of the Armed Forces, did not remain constant. They changed during the war in accordance with the growth of our military-economic potential, the development of science and technology, and with the changing tasks put before the Armed Forces.

The most numerous service of the Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War was the Ground Troops. They comprised from 80 to 86 percent of the entire personnel of the Armed Forces. They played the main part in the conduct of the war since they were the foundation of our strategic groups. In the last war, all the most important tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces were accomplished primarily by the Ground Troops. In the defense, they were the force against which the enemy attack broke. In stubborn battle, they exhausted and bled white the enemy, reestablished the strategic front, and themselves delivered powerful counterthrusts against the enemy. In the offensive, they were the deciding force in breaking up the strategic front of the enemy, destroying his groups, and capturing his territory.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Ground Troops were widely developed, primarily along the lines of increasing their striking power and firepower and increasing their maneuverability.

The infantry, the main body of the Ground Troops, exhibited high combat qualities and the ability to act under any conditions of terrain, at any time of day or year, and in conjunction with tanks, artillery, and aviation to solve successfully the most complex combat problems. Close-range fire remained the main method of operation of the infantry; as a result of this the last war was characterized by high losses in personnel.

Armored troops were the main striking power of the Ground Troops during the last war. The appearance of large tank formations and units decisively changed the nature of the operations. They made it possible

to break up rapidly the enemy defense throughout its entire depth and to encircle successfully and liquidate large enemy groups, as well as to pursue rapidly the enemy to a great depth and independently solve important operational tasks.

Next in importance as a branch of the Ground Troops was the artillery; its importance increased even more during the war. It became the basic and decisive source of neutralization of firepower and destruction of the enemy in defense as well as offense. The increased firepower of the artillery was aided by the broad development in the Red Army of rocket artillery, which made it possible to create a high density of fire within the shortest possible time. Characteristic features of the use of artillery during the past war were a sharp increase in the density of fire per time unit, wide maneuvering on the battlefield, simultaneous suppression of enemy defense throughout a great depth and, finally, the destruction and suppression of enemy action throughout a large territory.

At the same time, the Great Patriotic War showed that our Ground Troops, as the main service of the Armed Forces, needed further improvement along the line of increasing maneuverability and firepower.

The second most important service of the Armed Forces during the past war was the Air Forces. They were widely used for defense as well as for offense. The main efforts of our Air Forces were directed toward the support of the operations of the Ground Troops and the destruction of enemy personnel and equipment directly on the battlefield. To achieve these aims during the past war, over 46 percent of our total flight missions were required.

During the past war, the problem of participation of the Air Forces in joint offensive operations with the Ground Troops and the Navy was successfully solved by way of conducting an air offensive. This form of support of the offensive operations was fully justified throughout the war. The first air offensive was planned and partially executed during the Stalingrad counteroffensive. It was fully developed during the battle of Kursk and in the 1944-45 operations.

The next most important strategic problem involving the use of the Air Forces was the battle for air superiority. Approximately 35 percent of all the flights made during the last war were used for this purpose.

The main method in the battle for air superiority during the past war was fighter combat. The destruction of enemy planes on the airfield by means of special air operations during the war was not widely used, even though this method yielded the greatest results. It required, on the average, some thirty flights for each German airplane destroyed in the air, while for each airplane destroyed on the ground, only five flights were required. The main reasons for the relatively small number of flights by Soviet aircraft against enemy airfields were the qualitative and quantitative weakness of our bombers, the complexity of this type of military operation, and a significant underestimation, on the part of some air

commanders, of the effectiveness of strikes against airfields.

During the Great Patriotic War, the Air Forces were also used to solve independent tasks by means of special aerial operations. These were conducted primarily to destroy large enemy air formations. These operations involved not only long-range aviation, but also the air armies of the fronts.

Independent air operations were also conducted to suppress and destroy the economic and political centers of the enemy. However, due to the lack of the necessary Soviet aircraft during the past war, such operations were rare and were conducted with limited forces and had no major influence on the course of the armed conflict.* Consequently, we were not able to solve the problem of destroying the enemy strategic rear and undermining his economic potential and national morale during the past war. Throughout the war, long-range aviation made a total of 215,000 flights, of which only 3.9 percent were aimed at the economic targets of the enemy [12].

Finally, independent air operations were conducted in order to destroy enemy rail and maritime transportation and to provide aid to the partisan forces. Such operations were conducted mainly in 1943-44.

Thus, the activity of the Soviet Air Forces during the past war was characterized primarily by its operational nature. The decisive role in these operations was played by the front line aviation, which executed over 76 percent of all flights performed by the Soviet Air Forces.

In the course of the war, the problem of aerial reconnaissance, especially for strategic purposes, was not fully solved. This was due chiefly to the fact that we did not have special reconnaissance planes. The great demand for aerial reconnaissance data and the lack of special reconnaissance planes forced our command to use, for this purpose, fighter, combat-support, and bomber aviation, which made up to 80 percent of all reconnaissance flights.

A weak aspect of the Soviet Air Forces was the absence of special air transport aviation, even though it was created during the war. This condition had a negative effect on the use of paratroops, as well as on the organization of air supply to rapidly advancing forces, especially in the closing stages of strategic operations.

A very important role during the Great Patriotic War was played by the National PVO air defense Troops. The experience of the war showed that the organization of a reliable air defense of rear objectives was a most important strategic task, whose successful solution determined, to a considerable extent, not only the uninterrupted functioning of the rear of the country, but also the morale of the people and, consequently, the entire course of the armed combat. Therefore, the efforts of National PVO Troops were directed primarily toward the defense of large political administration centers, important industrial regions and objectives from enemy air attacks. In 1941-42, this required the use of 60 to 87 percent

*During these operations, our aviation made only 6607 flights, which was only 0.2 percent of all Soviet flights during the war.

of the fighter aviation and from 60 to 80 percent of the antiaircraft artillery of National PVO Troops. Later, when the Red Army went on the strategic offensive, the number of forces and weapons relegated to the defense of the rear area objectives was significantly curtailed.

The second most important task performed by National PVO Troops during the past war was to provide cover for the attack troops of the fronts, for important objectives of the frontal and army rear areas, and most of all for the front lines of communication 300-500 kilometers from the front line. This was due to the fact that: 1) the German command used its aviation almost exclusively for operations over the battlefields and on targets in the prefrontal area, and 2) our fronts, as a rule, did not have sufficient forces of PVO and weapons to protect reliably the numerous objectives to the rear of the fronts, nor at times even the shock troops, against enemy air attacks.

The third important problem of National PVO Troops was the battle for air superiority. This task was performed in close cooperation with the air forces of the fronts.

The National PVO Troops also took part in antiaircraft operations. These operations were conducted by National PVO Troops independently, as well as in conjunction with fighter aviation and the antiaircraft artillery of the fronts and fleets.

In individual cases, the aircraft of National PVO Troops were also used to cover naval convoys and to escort bombers. However, this was not their usual application.

Very valuable experience was gained in strategic use of the Navy.

As is known, our prewar theory stated that in a future war the operations of the Navy would consist primarily of independent operations or large formations of surface vessels. However, the Navy was characterized not by independent operations, but rather by strategic operations in conjunction with the Ground Troops and the Air Forces. The main efforts of the Navy were aimed at cooperation with the Ground Troops in solving the main problem of destroying fascist Germany and its armed forces.

In participating in joint strategic operations, the Navy performed a number of varied tasks. The most important of these were the covering of coastal flanks of the Ground Troops, coastal defense, amphibious landings on the sea coasts and on rivers, blockade of surrounded enemy groups from the sea and support of regroupings of the Ground Troops.

In addition to participating in combined strategic operations with the Ground Troops and the Air Forces, the Navy during the war also performed a number of independent strategic operations against the maritime communication lines of the enemy and in the defense of our own sea, lake, and river lines of communication. The battle against enemy sea communication lines was conducted in order to prevent delivery to Germany of strategic raw

materials (nickel from Finland, iron ore from Sweden, etc.), as well as to disrupt the enemy supply line to his coastal groups and to prevent their evacuation. During the first and second phases of the war the operations against sea communications were carried out primarily by the day-to-day activity of the navies. However, combat experience showed that this method was not sufficiently effective and did not always guarantee fulfillment of the task put to the naval forces. From the second half of 1943 on, when our navies were reinforced with torpedo-carrying and attack aviation and radar, and also with the increased combat training of the fleet personnel, the fight against the naval communication lines of the enemy was organized by conducting special operations. This sharply increased the effectiveness of the combat operations of our navies. The number of enemy vessels sunk in 1944 is 2.5 times greater than in 1942.

The next type of independent operations of the Navy was the operations aimed at the defense of our sea and lake communications. The Great Patriotic War showed that despite the relative independence of our country on external communication lines (compared with other nations) the naval communication lines were of extreme importance for us. During the entire war more than 105 million tons of various cargo were transported.

A very important part in the solution of the problem of safeguarding naval communications was played by the Northern Fleet. It is sufficient to say that during the war it safeguarded the passage of 1624 convoys, comprising 4414 various vessels. On the Baltic Sea, during the war, there were 1022 convoys with 3223 transport vessels.

All arms of the fleet were used in naval combat to protect naval communication lines. In isolated operations, frontal aviation and National PVO Troops were also used.

Mine-laying operations must also be included among the independent operations of the Navy. During the war, over 40,000 different mines were laid. [Editor's Note #19]

However, in the solution of this problem the Naval Command committed errors; an example was the unjustified laying of minefields in the Black Sea in 1941. In view of the absence of major enemy naval forces in this theater of operations, there was no practical need for these measures. Subsequently, these minefields greatly hampered the operations of the Black Sea Fleet, causing more damage to us than to the Germans.

The Great Patriotic War redefined the role and place of the various arms of the Navy. Naval aviation, a supporting arm in prewar times, came to occupy a leading position among the arms of the Navy due to its combat potentials and operational results. Another important arm was submarines which, together with the Air Forces, were the main means of armed conflict in naval theaters of military operation. Large surface ships, considered before the war to be the mainstay of our fleet, lost their leading role in solving tasks placed before the Navy.

An important role in the defeat of fascist Germany was played by the partisan movement, which was a component part of the national struggle against the fascist usurpers.

The creation of partisan detachments by the Communist party in territory occupied by the enemy led to these detachments carrying on a merciless war of assault upon the enemy. These detachments destroyed the enemy's garrisons, punitive detachments, and occupation authorities, inflicted massive blows against the enemy's communications, thus putting out stretches of main railroad lines for long periods and preventing the Hitlerites from transporting troops and military cargoes. They also carried out reconnaissance and kept groups of enemy forces under observation.

When the Red Army shifted over to the offensive, the partisan movement became larger and larger with every day and was then used in a more organized manner. The Central Committee of the Communist party and the Stavka of the Supreme High Command provided the partisans with regular aid, planned and directed the activities of the partisan detachments, and coordinated their activity with that of the Red Army. Beginning with 1943, the partisans took an active part in almost all operations of Soviet troops, carrying out their activities in both operational and tactical cooperation with advancing Soviet troops.

With the aim of aiding in the resolution of important operational and strategic tasks which faced the Red Army, the partisans carried out important and large-scale operations in the rear of the enemy, as for example, the "Concert" and "Rail War" operations, etc.

As the partisan movement increased, thus presenting a serious danger to the rear-area communication lines of the German Fascist Army, Hitler's Command was forced to tie up large groups of forces in the areas under occupation, and even forced to remove individual units from the front. According to preliminary statistics, the number of enemy troops engaged against the partisans, beginning with the summer of 1942, was about 10 percent of the total ground forces of the Fascist Army on the Soviet-German front.

Thus, the activities of the Soviet partisans in the rear of the enemy were of important strategic significance.

The past war once again demonstrated that the partisan movement is a characteristic feature of war in the defense of our socialist Fatherland and that it is one of the most important factors in the victory of our people in their just, liberating wars against foreign usurpers.

One of the most important tasks in the field of strategy during the Great Patriotic War was the constant perfection of the organizational forms of the Armed Forces.

A successful solution to this problem depended primarily on the economic capabilities of our country in being able to supply the Armed

Forces with military equipment and materiel.

In solving the problems of the organization of the Armed Forces during the war, the Soviet Supreme High Command was guided by the concept of military science which states that this organization is not arbitrary, but must correspond to the forms and methods of the armed conflict. Changes in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces were to a considerable extent determined by the development of new means of warfare and the perfection of older military equipment.

During the war, intensive investigation of the forms of organization of the services of the Armed Forces and service arms was conducted so as to determine those which would best correspond to our economic capabilities, the changing nature of military operations, the solution of strategic problems during various phases of the war, new models and types of arms and weapons.

In the organizational buildup of the Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Supreme High Command did not rely exclusively on any one arm or service of the Armed Forces. It assumed that the strategic utilization of each of the services of the Armed Forces should be based on those problems which can be solved most expeditiously by its strongest sides.

The Soviet Armed Forces entered the war with an organizational structure which corresponded, for the most part, to the requirements of modern warfare. However, at the beginning of the war, because of the loss of economically important regions and the evacuation of the industry to the east, the production of arms and military equipment in the country decreased. It was difficult to recover from the losses and to set up new supply sources. All of this forced changes in the troop organization.

As a result, during the first months of the war infantry corps were disbanded and the infantry divisions were reorganized. Some of the artillery weapons were removed from the divisions. New types of infantry units (separate infantry brigades and regiments) as well as fortified areas of the field type, were formed. In place of the disbanded tank and mechanized divisions, independent tank brigades and battalions were formed, designed primarily for cooperation with the infantry. During this period, it was decided to form powerful artillery reserves for the Supreme High Command using the artillery from the disbanded infantry corps and at the expense of temporarily weakening the artillery of the infantry divisions; these reserves could be maneuvered to strengthen the forces in the most important directions or sectors of the front.

Changes in the organizational structure of the Ground Troops during the period of strategic defense also pertained to the special forces, including the engineer troops. The construction, in the fall of 1941, of the rear defense perimeters in the most important strategic directions required formation of strong engineering reserves. Under these conditions 10 engineer armies were formed and placed at the disposal of the Supreme High Command. With the changing situation, these armies were disbanded in 1942

and their personnel used for the creation of units and formations of engineer troops.

The organization of the Air Force at the beginning of the war was changed by decreasing the number of planes in the regiments and the number of regiments in the divisions. Air regiments were to have 32-22 airplanes instead of 61. The number of regiments in a division was decreased from four or six to two. New ground-support regiments and light night-bomber regiments were formed.

The lack of unified control of the PVO Troops at the beginning of the war necessitated the introduction of a new air-defense system and the organization of PVO Troops. In November 1941, there was instituted the post of commander-in-chief of National PVO Troops in charge of all air defense means, including fighter planes, which were previously controlled by the Air Force commanders-in-chief of the individual military districts. Except for the Southern and Far Eastern Districts, the air defense zones were replaced by corps and divisional air defense regions.

Air defense aviation was organized from November 1941 to January 1942. This made possible unified command of the aircraft in the Troops of PVO. [Editor's Note # 20]

In 1942 a qualitatively new period began in the development of the organizational form of the Soviet Armed Forces, due to changes in the economy of our country to serve the needs of war.

As a result of the measures taken by the Communist Party and the strenuous labor of the people, the production of arms and fighting equipment gradually increased beginning in 1942. During the same year the Red Army, after difficult and strenuous defensive operations, went on the counteroffensive. It was necessary to reorganize the forces in accordance with the changes in the methods of warfare. In the solution of this problem great importance was attached to organization of the services of the Armed Forces and the service arms which would assure coordinated operations in the solution of strategic, operational, and tactical problems during offensive operations.

The main attention in the buildup of the Armed Forces during this period was devoted to further qualitative improvements and an over-all increase in their combat potentials.

The development of the Ground Troops took the form of further improvement in their organizational structure and a general increase in their firepower, striking power, and mobility.

In 1942-1943 the infantry corps were reinstated; this had a beneficial effect upon the administration of the troops and the organization of cooperation between the various branches of service. The amounts of automatic weapons, artillery, and mortars were increased in the infantry divisions, greatly increasing their firepower. At the end of 1942 the infantry brigades were disbanded or reorganized into infantry divisions.

The organizational development of the artillery was brought about by the creation of artillery divisions and breakthrough corps, antiaircraft artillery divisions, and antitank artillery brigades. This made it possible to concentrate the artillery in the most important directions and to clear more effectively the path for infantry and tanks as well as to cover the troops more reliably from enemy aviation.

The change in the organizational structure of the tank troops consisted in the creation of strong tank units and formations. In the spring of 1942 tank corps were created, and in the fall of 1942 mechanized corps were created, although as yet they had no reinforcements. Their organization was constantly perfected, their armament was improved, and there was a continuous increase in their firepower and striking power. This process was manifested in a quantitative increase in the number of tanks, improvements in their quality, and reinforcement of the tank units by artillery.

In 1942 mixed tank armies were formed (tank corps and infantry division) but, as was shown by the experience of the offensive operations at Stalingrad, this type of organization of tank armies was not justified. Therefore, in 1943 we changed from mixed tank armies to tank armies consisting of tank and mechanized corps. The army received considerable artillery weapons. This measure greatly increased the mobility of the tank armies and their combat potential in solving major operational problems.

In addition to the organization of formations and large units of tank troops, there was continued creation of tank regiments and brigades designed to reinforce the infantry with immediate tank support. The offensive operations of the Soviet troops showed that tanks and infantry are in great need of continuous artillery support, and therefore regiments and brigades of self-propelled artillery were formed.

On the whole, the perfection of organizational forms of the tank troops brought about by the Red Army's offensive initiative, greatly increased the striking power of the Ground Troops and increased their capabilities for breakthrough of enemy defense and rapid development of the offensive in depth.

From the end of 1942 on, major organizational changes were made in the engineer troops. The units and formations of the High Command reserve were especially highly developed. The greater the activities of the Soviet Armed Forces became, the greater the increase in the role of the engineer forces in safeguarding offensive operations. They became involved in the direct breakthrough of the enemy defense. To fulfill this task, engineer assault brigades were formed within the engineer troops; from 1944 on they included tank-engineer and tank-flamethrower regiments.

With the changeover of the Red Army from strategic defense to the offensive, important changes in the organizational structure of the Air Forces took place. The organizational buildup of the Air Forces had to satisfy the requirement of best possible support of the offensive actions of the Ground Troops.

In 1942 all frontal aviation was removed from the general army and combined into air armies under the direct control of the frontal commanders. The creation of air armies was an important stage in the organizational development of aviation. The frontal commanders received powerful weapons for support of the Ground Troops. In addition, the capabilities of concentrating aviation in decisive directions were greatly increased. At the same time air corps and divisions of the Supreme High Command reserves were created to reinforce the air armies of the fronts in the most important directions. Long-Range Aviation was organized within the framework of the Air Forces directly subordinate to the Stavka of the Supreme High Command.

An important measure in the development of the organizational structure of the Air Forces during the war was the change from mixed units and formations to uniform air divisions and regiments of bomber, ground support, and fighter aviation, thus increasing the mobility of air units, assuring the purposeful use of aviation to solve operational problems, and facilitating the organization of cooperation with the Ground Troops.

The numerical growth of National PVO Troops, caused by the need for defending important industrial objectives, made for the creation of operational formations -- army and frontal PVO. The air regiments given to PVO Forces were formed into divisions and corps. In 1943, together with the organization of the fronts and armies of PVO, there were formed commands of fighter aviation of the fronts of PVO and also an air fighter army for the defense of Moscow. The organization of the antiaircraft artillery was also significantly changed. Antiaircraft artillery divisions were formed within the framework of the PVO Troops in the summer of 1943 and antiaircraft brigades were formed in the spring of 1944.

The organization of the PVO Troops during the war assured flexible command and rapid concentration of forces and weapons in the most important direction in order to protect the troops and the most important objectives from the air strikes of the enemy.

During the Great Patriotic War combat operations in the naval theaters were conducted on a relatively small scale and were subordinated mainly to the interests of safeguarding the operations of the ground forces. For this reason there were no major changes in the organizational structure of the Navy. The formations of surface vessels and submarines were refined somewhat to bring their organization into accord with the conditions for carrying out operational missions. In the aviation formations of the Navy, as well as in the Red Army Air Forces there was a change from mixed organization to uniform formations. Because of the need for creating a precise, unified air defense system, base PVO regions were established in place of PVO districts. This significantly increased the possibilities of organizing air defense throughout the entire zone of a naval base or in a definite region of the naval theater of operations.

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, on the basis of a careful

tally of all economic and political conditions and the forms and methods of warfare, Soviet military strategy introduced such changes in the organization of the Armed Forces as would best correspond to the requirements of war.

Footnotes to Chapter III.

1. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч., т. 35, стр. 36,38.
2. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 36, стр. 37.
3. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 40, стр.6.
4. ЦГАСА, ф. 4, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 43-50.
5. ЦГАСА, ф. 4, оп. 2, д. 125, л. 37.
6. История гражданской войны в СССР. Москва, Госполитиздат, 1959, т. 4, стр. 315.
7. VIII съезд РКП(б). Протоколы. Москва, Госполитиздат, 1959, стр. 14.
8. См. Достижения Советского Союза за 40 лет в цифрах. Москва, Госполитиздат, 1957, стр. 87,92.
9. XVIII съезд ВКП(б). Стенографический отчет, стр. 191-195.
10. Полевой устав РККА (проект). Москва, Воениздат, 1939, стр.9.
11. Данные взяты из труда "История СССР. Эпоха социализма". Москва, Госполитиздат, 1957, стр. 641.
12. In the course of these operations, our aviation made only 6,607 sorties in all which composed about .2 per cent of all sorties made by our aviation during the war.

EDITOR'S NOTE ON CHAPTER IV

The chapter entitled "The Nature of Modern War" starts with a section on "The Essence of War in the Modern Era." Any treatment of this subject involves the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Before examining the changes in this chapter, a brief background to discussions that took place in the Soviet press between the second and third editions of *Military Strategy* will put the subject in context.

In September 1965, Lt. Colonel Ye. I. Rybkin published an article "On the Nature of Modern Nuclear War." This started a discussion in the Soviet press on whether war, with the use of the nuclear weapon, would remain the "continuation of politics by other (that is, violent) means." This latter expression is from Lenin, paraphrasing Clausewitz' famous dictum. The article was from the "Lectures and Consultations" section of *Communist of the Armed Forces*, to be used by officers, Admirals and Generals studying certain themes. Therefore, it was an official article not just Rybkin's opinion.

Certain Soviet writers, particularly the well-known General Major N. A. Talensky, had stated that it was a dangerous illusion to think that thermonuclear war would still serve as an instrument of politics, and that political goals could be achieved by using nuclear weapons. In July 1966, Colonel Grudin, a Professor, and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, took Rybkin to task for an obscure point but upheld his criticism of Talensky. "Such an assertion," Grudin writes, "is not only in error, but is harmful because it shakes one's assurance in our [Soviet] victory over the aggressor." This argument was carried one step further in an unusual article in *Red Star* in January 1967, "On the Essence of War." The article made it clear that the earlier articles were prompted by Communist Chinese accusations of revisionism. To the non-Marxist such arguments may be tedious, but they are important in understanding the Soviet assertion that socialism will win in a future war even if fought with nuclear weapons.

The second section of this chapter contains a discussion of "the causes of war in the modern era." Because economics plays such a great role, the following change is quite interesting. The second edition had read:

"The countries of the world socialist system now occupy 26 percent of the territory of the world and included about 35 percent of its population. They have huge natural resources, produce almost half the world's grain production and more than one-third of the industrial production. The industrial out-put of the socialist countries has already attained more than half the size of the out-put of the developed countries of the capitalist world. The per capita industrial production of the world socialist system taken as a whole has already caught up with the world capitalist system."

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The third edition contains more modest claims:

"The countries of the world socialist system now occupy 26 percent of the territory of the world and include about 35 percent of its population. They have huge natural resources. The economy of the socialist countries is developing faster than in the countries of the bourgeois world."

The most important section of this chapter is that dealing with the categories of wars. Having noted that "while imperialism and colonialism exist, national-liberation revolutionary wars are unavoidable," the authors then list the various kinds of wars. These categories were revised in the second edition in 1963, but this sentence was added in the new edition:

"The USSR will render, when it is necessary, military support, as well, to people subject to imperialist aggression."

Although all three editions have stated that Soviet military strategy is studying "small-scale local wars" in order to prevent them from developing into world war and "to bring quick victory over the enemy," the authors fail to give any concrete details as to how this will be accomplished.

In the third section of Chapter IV, "Modern means of armed combat and their effect on the nature of war," the "revolution in military affairs" can be seen at work. Here is a sentence as it appeared in the 1962 edition of *Military Strategy*:

Taking into account the fact that the Soviets created hydrogen weapons before the United States, and, most important of all, that the United States does not possess superpowerful thermonuclear charges, with a power of several tens of megatons, such as those possessed by the USSR, we consider our superiority over the Western bloc in nuclear weapons to be indisputable." (Underlining added.)

In 1968, the underlined phrase was omitted and this sentence added:

"By the admission of competent American specialists, our superiority in total nuclear might of strategic rocket weapons is very considerable."

The revolution in military affairs, as has already been noted, resulted in the nuclear rocket weapon being introduced into all the services and even the creation of a new service, - the Strategic Rocket Troops. In 1962, only the Strategic Rocket Troops possessed a significant number of missiles. In the intervening years, technical advances have produced submarines which carry nuclear missiles, long-range aircraft which carry nuclear missiles, and land-based mobile launchers. Operational-tactical missiles revitalized the Ground Troops.

"In addition to nuclear and rocket weapons," note the authors in all three editions, "there has emerged on the scene still another new, very important military-technical factor, which in the future will undoubtedly

have a very serious effect on the nature of war. We are speaking of military radioelectronic devices, electronic computers, and devices for automating the processes of control."

This is the third phase of the revolution in military affairs, sometimes called the "cybernetics revolution." The third edition has added the words placed in italics: "Military radioelectronics assures not only the use of missiles, *antimissiles*, and other technical means of combat, but *also reconnaissance*, the control of troops, forces and weapons as a whole."

All three editions assert that victory "over the aggressor" can be achieved only by the "combined efforts of all means of waging war: Ground Troops, National PVO (aerospace defense) Troops and the Navy, with the active participation of the people."

The conclusion of this part of the chapter states that a future world war will be "above all, a nuclear rocket war."

The final section, "the military strategic features of a future world war" - reads as it did in the first edition, except for some changes in discussion of the Soviet ABM system. Below is the text as it appeared in the first edition:

"Because the probable enemy considers 'nuclear' attack to be the main means for achieving the goals of a future war, and because he considers strategic bomber aviation and 'ground-to-ground', 'air-to-ground', and 'ship-to-ground' missiles to be the main means of delivery of nuclear warheads to the target, one of the cardinal problems₂ for Soviet military strategy is the reliable protection of the rear₁ from nuclear strikes antimissile and air defense.

"A further improvement of the methods of conducting³ antimissile and air defense based primarily on the automatic control of 'surface-to-air' missile complexes, the creating of an effective means of combatting enemy ballistic missiles in the air and mastery of the methods of using them, organization of defense against other means of mass destruction and also the carrying out of other measures should reduce as much as possible the losses from enemy nuclear attacks and ensure the vital functioning of the rear areas and the fighting capabilities of the Armed Forces." (underlining added.)

The third edition omits the underlined material and adds 1) "tasks", 2) "of the country", and 3) "in the means of", at the places indicated.

This is followed by two paragraphs which contain important deletions. Originally, the paragraphs had read:

"At the same time it must be taken into account that under present day conditions the methods and means of nuclear attack definitely predominate over the methods and means of protection against them. Consequently, the threat of a surprise massive nuclear attack by the aggressor remains.

"The possibility of a surprise attack by an aggressor making mass use of nuclear weapons immeasurably increases the requirements for constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces." (underlining added.)

In the 1968 edition, the underlined words were deleted. The omission of the word "surprise" is very important, and has to do with the growing possibilities of reconnaissance, which are discussed in Chapter VI.

This chapter of the first edition contained two "inevitable" sentences which stirred up quite a controversy in the American and Soviet press. They were:

1. *"It should be emphasized that, with the international relations existing under present-day conditions and the present level of development of military equipment, any armed conflict inevitably will escalate into a general nuclear war if the nuclear powers are drawn into this conflict."*

2. *"In the event of the unleashing by the imperialist bloc of war against the USSR or any other socialist state, such a war inevitably will take the nature of a world war with the majority of the countries of the world participating in it."*

An American edition of *Military Strategy* which contained a foreword by Herbert Dinerstein, Leon Goure and Thomas Wolfe, quoted sentence 1. In a criticism published in *Red Star*, four of the Soviet authors of *Military Strategy* took the American authors to task for using the word "inevitably". They then proceeded to quote sentence 2 in which "inevitably" had been replaced by "might" in the second edition. Then they testily concluded: "Obviously, the words 'might' and 'inevitably' have different meanings."

Thus we see the Soviet authors did change the word "inevitably" to "might" between the first and second editions, but in another paragraph!

The Soviet authors continued to criticize the American version in their *Red Star* article, this time referring to sentence 1:

"Secondly, nowhere in the book does it state that any war 'must... take the form of a world nuclear war,' as the authors of the American foreword assert. Indeed, they themselves cite the place in the book where it clearly and plainly states that: 'with the international relations existing under present-day conditions and the present level of development of military equipment, any armed conflict will develop into a general nuclear war if the nuclear powers are drawn into this conflict.'" (Emphasis in original)

Here the Soviet authors quote sentence 1, but omit the word "inevitably", yet "inevitably" has remained without change in sentence 1 in all three editions. Only in sentence 2 had it been changed to read "might".

The only thing that is clear from all this is that general nuclear war will be inevitable if the nuclear powers are drawn into it, according to the Soviets, and all this misquoting and criticizing may have been simply a ruse to get this very point stressed. Moreover, this point of view has not changed in the six years which have passed since the first edition was published.

In closing the chapter "The Nature of Modern War," the XXIII Party Congress is again referred to and their statement quoted that military might depends on the economy of the country. "A decisive factor for the outcome of a future war will be the ability of the economy to assure the maximum strength of the Armed Forces in order to inflict a devastating strike upon the aggressor during the initial period of the war."

These points are made about a future war in the conclusion. It will be:

- "--a world war representing a decisive armed clash to two opposed social systems;*
- "--a war naturally ending in victory for the Communist system over the capitalist system;*
- "--a war in which the economic potential of a country is a decisive factor;*
- "--a coalition war;*
- "--a war waged by mass armed forces;*
- "--a nuclear rocket war;*
- "--a war involving unprecedented spatial scope;*
- "--a war in which the initial period of the war will be of decisive importance;*
- "--a war in which victory in the shortest possible time is the goal, although a protracted war is possible."*

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF MODERN WAR

One of the primary tasks of the theory of military strategy is the study and determination of the nature of wars, of their military-strategic and military-technical peculiarities. A correct scientifically-founded solution to this problem is possible first of all on the basis of Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army, of an analysis of the specific historical conditions of social development, which makes it possible to establish the social-political essence, the causes and conditions for the origin of a particular war, and the state of the material base for its conduct.

The importance of scientific foresight into the nature of a future war is that only under this condition can the governmental and military leaders guide the building of the armed forces without error along the most correct path and rationally solve the problems of preparing the country as a whole for war. [Editor's Note # 1]

In the present situation, correct foreknowledge of the nature of the initial period of a war has taken on exceptional importance for the solution of the theoretical as well as the practical problems of military strategy. The effect of armed conflict during this period upon the course and outcome of modern war will be decisive, and fundamentally different in comparison with past wars. Therefore, serious new demands are now being made on our Armed Forces, the country, and the people. [Editor's Note #2]

THE ESSENCE OF WAR IN THE MODERN ERA

The question of the essence of war is the determining one for solving all the principal theoretical and practical problems of military strategy. It is also of paramount importance in explaining the nature of any specific war. A genuinely scientific answer to this question is contained in the tenets of historical materialism, in Marxist-Leninist teaching on war, and in the most important program documents of the communist and workers' parties determining their theoretical, political and practical activities under modern conditions. The military events of our era are convincing proof of the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist concept of the essence of war and the causes and conditions of its origin.

This thesis requires special emphasis because in recent years, due to the aggravation of the ideological struggle in the international arena, the ideologists of imperialism, the revisionists and dogmatists [Editor's Note # 3] of various schools of thought, have sharply increased their attack on Marxism-Leninism, [Editor's Note # 4] and their attacks even touch directly upon military and political questions. Western military ideologists

of imperialism have become active propagandizing various "new" military-philosophical theories which support the interests of imperialist monopolies and directed at justifying aggressive wars under the flag of anticommunism.

War, teaches Marxism-Leninism, is a socio-historical phenomenon arising at a definite stage in the development of class society. It is an extremely complex social phenomenon, and its essence can be revealed only by using the only scientific method -- Marxist-Leninist dialectics. Speaking of the use of Marxist theory of knowledge in the study of war, Lenin stated that "dialectics requires a comprehensive study of a given social phenomenon in its development and also of information external, apparently, to the fundamental motivating forces, to the development of industrial forces, and to the class struggle" [1] .

The experience of history shows that even the largest world war, no matter how all-encompassing it may be, represents only one side of social development; it is entirely dependent upon the course of this development, and upon the political relationships between classes and countries.

V. I. Lenin stressed that war is part of a whole, and this whole is politics. He also pointed out that war is a continuation of politics, and politics also "continues" during war. This Leninist thesis is a principal one, and extremely important: it notes the bourgeois theories of the universal, all-absorbing nature of war, of the "class peace" during war; it explains that during war politics continue, i.e., the class relations and the class struggle in all its forms, with all its means (ideological, political, economic, etc.), do not cease.

The correct understanding of these principal theses also makes it possible to disclose the essence of war. "As applied to wars," wrote Lenin, "the main thesis of dialectics...consists of the fact that 'war is simply a continuation of politics by other (namely, violent) means' ...And it was always the point of view of Marx and Engels that every war was a continuation of the politics of the given interested powers -- and of the various classes within them -- at a given time" [2] It must be stressed that Marxist-Leninists always meant, by the phrase "violent means," as applied to military action, means of armed conflict, the armed forces, and the military organization as a whole as a means of conducting war. F. Engels, in his work "The Theory of Violence," wrote that violence is at the present time represented by the army and the navy; he explained that violence is a political act. [Editor's Note # 5]

Starting from these Marxist-Leninist positions, it can be said that war is armed violence, organized armed conflict between the various social classes, governments, groups of governments and nations in the name of achieving definite political goals.

Classes, countries, and nations in peacetime always strive to attain their goals by using the most diverse means and forms of conflict: ideo-

logical, political, economic, etc. Under conditions of the sharp aggravation of contradictions, however, they have resorted to the use of the means and forms of armed conflict, to war.

All of this shows that war is only one of the resources of politics, only one of the forms of the political, the class struggle. V. I. Lenin said, in particular, that "civil war is the most acute form of class struggle, when a series of economic and political clashes and battles, being repeated, accumulated, widened, sharpened, results in the conversion of these clashes into armed conflict..." [3]. Another Leninist concept is that "in certain periods of acute economic and political crises, the class struggle develops into direct civil war, i.e., armed conflict..." [4]

The following Leninist position is of great importance for a proper understanding of the essence of war as the continuation of politics precisely by violent means, using military operations: "War is a continuation, by means of violence, of that policy which had been pursued long prior to the war by the ruling classes of the belligerent powers. Peace is a continuation of the same policy, with a write-in of those alterations in the relations between the forces of the opponents which have been brought about by military operations" (underlining ours -- Author). [5]

Lenin's statements that war is a continuation of politics by other, violent means imply that war is not equivalent to politics in general, but makes up only a part of it and that politics has available, in addition to war, a large arsenal of various nonviolent means which it can use for achieving its goals, without resorting to war. Under present conditions, this is the strict guideline of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government in calling upon the Western powers to solve all disputed international issues by negotiation, not by war.

The theory of Soviet military strategy also takes into consideration the other side of the problem, the fact that as opposed to other political means, war has its own special specific nature. In order to conduct a war, a special system of military organizations is created, the weapons for armed conflict are produced, and combat methods are developed. The waging of war itself has always represented a specific form of human activity, when the belligerent sides directed their efforts toward destruction of each other, toward the capture of enemy territories or the holding of their own territory, striving, as a result, to attain their political goals.

The present era is characterized by an enormous growth in the productive forces of society which stipulate the appearance of new super-powerful means of mass destruction, and also by radical changes in the conditions of political struggle brought about primarily by the formation of a world system of socialism. Under these conditions, the political aims of the sides in a future world war will be achieved not only by the defeat of the armed forces, but also by complete disorganization of the enemy economy and lowering of the morale of the population. Therefore, the essence of war as a continuation of the politics by means of armed violence and the specific nature of war appear today more distinctly than in the

past, and modern means of violence acquire ever-increasing importance.

Armed conflict has now become a still more specific form of human activity. This is stipulated by the following reasons. First, huge masses of people are drawn into modern war due to growth of armed forces and widespread enlisting of the civilian population to solve a number of military and semi-military problems in guarding the interior of the country. Second, the complexity of modern military equipment demands special military knowledge and skills. Finally, modern war, as never before, involves the utmost strain on the economy in order to provide the needs of war and particular materiel and scientific-technical resources specially created for satisfying the needs of military conflict.

However, despite the fact that hundreds of millions of people are drawn into a war, war is only one side of social life, one of the forms of the political, the class struggle, while social development, the inter-relations of classes, countries and nations are phenomena which are immeasurably more widespread than war. Therefore, no world war ("total" or "global") can encompass all of these phenomena. And during war an uncompromising class struggle goes on, and must go on, simultaneously. This means that confusion and identification of two such social phenomena as war and the class struggle, war and politics, is not permissible || even in contemporary circumstances. ||

At the same time there have recently appeared in various foreign military publications statements to the effect that it is wrong to consider war as a continuation of politics by violent means. || In these publications, || war, politics and the class struggle as a whole are essentially equated.

|| Thus do the military ideologists of imperialism attempt to justify || war which they allege not to be violence any more. The British military theoretician Liddel Hart, in his book, The Strategy of Indirect Action, asserts that the term "means or war" must now be understood not only, and not so much, the armed forces, but also various "nonmilitary" means of struggle: economic pressure, propaganda, diplomacy, subversion, etc.

|| On the basis of such assertions, the conclusion is drawn that war || is a conflict using all the resources of politics, the "complex" of all its resources and forms of struggle.

It is entirely evident that the means of waging a war are the armed forces and its symptom nothing else than armed conflict, whose beginning and end determine in fact the beginning and end of the war. [Editor's Note # 6]

|| Certainly, || war as a social phenomenon, as the extreme resource for the implementation of the policy of certain definite classes is not isolated from the other phenomena of social life. The experience of modern wars shows that, as soon as they start, states attempt to mobilize to the maximum their resources and means for the attainment of victory.

Once it has come to war, Lenin pointed out, everything must be subordinated to the interests of the war.

The role and importance of the various means and forms of conflict with the aid of which a policy is effected will vary. Both in peacetime and in wartime they are going to alter depending on the over-all setup. In wartime the basic and decisive resource of policy is the armed forces and the armed struggle. All remaining resources -- economic, ideological, diplomatic and others -- are directed in the first instance to collaborating with the armed forces and the other military formations brought into being on the basis of a broad-scale enlistment of the masses of the people for the attainment of political goals by way of armed violence.

It must be stressed again that Lenin saw the essence and specificity of war in the continuation of politics, by means of violence, by way of the conduct of armed conflict, military operations.

It was namely as a result of military operations, armed conflict, and the use of means of violence, and not "nonmilitary" and "indirect" operations in World War I that 10 million people were killed and over 20 million wounded and maimed. World War II took almost fifty million lives. Many countries suffered colossal material losses. In the Soviet Union alone, over 70,000 towns and villages and 1,710 cities were completely or partially destroyed and burned, and more than 20 million were killed.

This is the actuality which reflects the essence of war as a continuation of politics by means of armed conflict. A future war, in which the basic means of violence would be nuclear weapons -- weapons of mass destruction -- would lead to immeasurably greater losses and destruction.

As a result of the rapid development of productive forces, science, and technology, the resources for waging war have become so powerful that, from the purely military point of view, the possibilities for attaining the most decisive political goals by the use of armed conflict have grown immensely. This means that counting on "nonmilitary" means of conflict in the course of a future war does not correspond to the methods for conducting it or to the laws of development of the means of conflict. The attempts of certain Western ideologists to propagandize "nonmilitary" methods for conducting war are designed to veil the horrors of a future nuclear war and to divert the attention of broad masses of people from the preparation for war by the imperialist forces.

The teachings of Marxism-Leninism on war were creatively developed in the resolutions of recent Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in the new Program of the CPSU, in the documents of the conferences of the Communist and Workers' Parties, and in the statements of prominent party and state figures of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp. Of especially important value are the positions on the nature of the modern era, the absence of the fatal inevitability of wars and the possibilities of preventing world war, [Editor's Note # 7] on the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems,

the military function of a socialist country under present conditions, the development of the world socialist system and the future degradation of imperialism, the outcome of a future war between them in favor of socialism, and the means of conducting war.

The positions of the nature of coexistence between two world systems, which were developed by the Communist Party, have great significance for correct understanding of the fundamental problems of war.

It was pointed out at the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union regards the coexistence of states with different social structures as a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. The USSR at the same time supports normal and peaceful relations with capitalist countries; it stands for non-intervention in the internal affairs of all states, for the sanctity of their territories, and respect for their sovereign rights. The Summary Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Congress at the same time emphasized that the principle of peaceful coexistence does not apply to the internal processes of class and national-liberation struggles in the capitalist countries and colonies. Struggles between two social systems are and must be carried out by peaceful means -- economic, political, ideological, but not military.

From this follows the completely clear and logical conclusions that the desire of bourgeois ideologists to muddy the fundamental distinction between war and that struggle presently being conducted in the international arena by peaceful, nonmilitary means, is deeply incorrect and dangerous.

The leaders of the Soviet government have stressed [Editor's Note # 8] that if countries disarmed completely and had no means of conducting war, i.e., no nuclear or rocket weapons, land armies, navies, or air forces, then all international problems would be solved not by the strength of weapons, but by peaceful means. With destruction of weapons and abolition of armed forces, it would be materially impossible for countries to pursue any policy but a peaceful one.

In summing up all that has been said, it should be emphasized that: 1) war is coercion in the relations between countries; 2) as the means of coercion or means of waging war is meant the armed forces of countries; and 3) the Leninist concept of war as a continuation of class politics by forcible means and the concept of war as armed conflict in the name of definite political aims remains in force even in the present era.

The Marxist-Leninist thesis concerning the class nature of politics, of which war is a continuation, plays a paramount role in the proper grasp of the essence of war.

It has been in the varying interpretation of this fundamental question that the radical difference has lain between Marxism-Leninism

and the doctrines of the bourgeois ideologists, the majority of which later, while admitting that war is the continuation of politics, have nevertheless covered up its class bias.

Marxism-Leninism asserts that the basic question in an analysis and evaluation of war must be the question as to what is the class character of a given war, what classes are waging it and for the sake of what goals, by what classes it was prepared and directed. The whole history of class society is the history of the struggle of the classes and this struggle constitutes the basic content of social development. The class struggle finds its clearest expression in the political struggle. It is a well-known fact that politics is a relationship between classes.

Hence follows the crucially important conclusion that war, being as it is the continuation of class politics, always has a class character. Any and every war is inextricably bound up with that political order out of which it flows.

Bourgeois ideologists, by denying the class nature of politics and war, always strive to represent politics as an expression of the common interests of countries and peoples.

The modern ideologists of imperialism and their agents in the international workers' movement -- revisionists -- contradict the reformist theory of "class peace," deny the class struggle, and distort the Marxist-Leninist position on war, on the defense of the socialist Fatherland, and on proletarian internationalism.

The American bourgeois ideologists and reformists announce, in particular, that modern American capitalism is not the capitalism about which Karl Marx wrote, but rather a popular, humane, and peaceful capitalism.

In the Program of the CPSU it is stated that the defenders of the bourgeois system, by striving to hold the masses in spiritual captivity, invent newer and newer "theories" which mask the exploitative nature of capitalism and embellish it. They believe that modern capitalism has changed its essence and that it has become the "people's capitalism," in which classes disappear and class contradictions are erased. In reality, the development of modern capitalism proves the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the growth of contradictions and antagonism in capitalistic society.

Certain military writers attempt to prove that in the capitalist world today, the entire country and all the people conduct war, and that under present conditions war has been converted to conflict of one armed people with another, directing all their military, labor, and spiritual forces toward defeat of the enemy.

All these theories depart from objective reality, conceal the class contradictions of modern capitalism, and mask the real essence of war and

its contradictory class nature. "War in our time," wrote Lenin in 1914, "is the people's war. From this truth it follows not that it is necessary to drift in the 'popular' current of chauvinism, but that in wartime the class contradictions which rend the population continue to exist and will become manifest in war and through the war" [6] .

In order to prove this Leninist thesis by present-day facts, it is sufficient to use the United States, the richest country in the capitalist world, as an example. During the last world war, there was a vast strike movement in that country. In 1941, there were 4,288 strikes involving 2,400,000 people; in 1943, (during eleven months) there were 3,425 strikes in which 3,500,000 people participated; and in 1944, there were 4,956 strikes with 2,100,000 participants.

The refusal of a group of capitalists to convert their enterprises to war production also attests to the "unity" of the American people and the country in the last world war. "The capitalists," writes William E. Foster, "even arranged the unique 'Italian strike' and continued it until the government accepted their usurious conditions" [7].

The experience of imperialistic wars attests to the fact that actual unity of the people in such wars is unthinkable. The situation is different when conducting just wars. Speaking of the causes of the victories of the Soviet government over external enemies during the period of foreign intervention and the Civil War, Lenin stated that a mass of people such as never before was enlisted for active participation in the war, and "...in no political regime was there even one-tenth as great a response as under the Soviets." [8] This was confirmed to an even greater extent by the experience of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Hitler's Germany.

The positions of Marxism-Leninism on the class nature of wars and on war as a continuation of politics by violent means, are fundamental in Soviet military strategy. They permit correct solution of the basic problems of training the armed forces and the people for war with an aggressor, and permit the nature of modern wars and the methods for conducting them to be revealed, and also permit solution of other important problems of the theory and practice of strategy.

WARS OF THE MODERN ERA, AND THE CONDITIONS AND CAUSES OF THEIR ORIGIN

Marxism-Leninism teaches that it is impossible to understand a given war without understanding the era. The characteristics of the modern era have had profoundly scientific and universal treatment in such important documents of our day as the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted at the historic XXII Party Congress and the Declaration and Appeal of the Conference of the Representatives of Communist and Workers' parties in 1960. These outstanding theoretical and political

documents also allow correct understanding of the probable nature of modern wars, the conditions of their origin, and the ways in which they develop.

Lenin's approach to the characteristics of the era consists in the fact that all great events of history can be correctly understood only through consideration primarily of two points: 1) considering them from the point of view of the struggle of two fundamental historical trends -- capitalism and socialism; and, 2) from the point of view of just the specific historical relationship of forces between them, i.e., when taking into account the regular growth and consolidation of the positions of socialism.

At the beginning of the 20th Century, capitalism was the single, all-encompassing system; it ruled undivided in the international arena and unleashed war at its discretion, causing revolutionary uprisings against it. In these conditions, Marxism-Leninism correctly raised the question of the "era of imperialism, war and revolution."

The Great October Socialist Revolution opened a new era in the history of mankind, an era of the downfall of capitalism and the consolidation of socialism. The victory of the socialist revolution in Russia was directly connected with the first world imperialistic war. Socialist revolution in European and Asian countries, which led to the formation of the world socialist system, was the outcome of World War II.

Today the countries of the world socialist system occupy more than 26 percent of the territory of the world and include about 35 percent of its population. They have huge natural resources. [Editor's Note # 9]
||| The economy of the socialist countries is developing faster than in the ||| countries of the bourgeois world.

The socialist method of production more and more obviously demonstrates its clear supremacy over capitalism. The relationship of forces in the international arena in the modern era favors socialism; this predetermines the course and nature of international relations.

||| One of ||| the most important factors of today is the national-liberation revolutions which are destroying the colonial system of imperialism. The international revolutionary movement of the working class is expanding.

The Program of the CPSU states that the present era, the fundamental make-up of which is transition from capitalism to socialism, is an era of conflict between two opposite social systems, an era of socialist and national-liberation revolutions, an era of the downfall of capitalism and the liquidation of the colonial system, the era of the transition of more and more nations to socialism, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a worldwide scale. The international working class and its chief offspring, the world system of socialism, are the focal point of the modern era.

In characterizing the modern era, Marxist-Leninists stress the new fact that this is not an era of imperialism and war, but the era of the decay of imperialism as a world system, an era of revolution and of the triumph of socialism and communism on a worldwide scale. This basic content of the era is definitive in explaining the fundamental problems of war and peace.

||| Now ||| imperialism has entered a period of decline and death; it has irrevocably lost its power over the majority of mankind. Now the main content, direction, and feature of the historical development of mankind is being determined by the world socialist system, by forces struggling against imperialism for the socialist reconstruction of society.

World War I and the Great October Socialist Revolution were the start of the general crisis of capitalism. During World War II and in socialist revolutions in a number of countries, the second stage of the general crisis of capitalism began. Now world capitalism is entering the new, third stage of this crisis.

One of the expressions of this crisis is the further unprecedented strengthening of militarism. The imperialist countries have built huge armed forces, on which they spend an ever-greater part of their state budgets. The imperialist countries have become militaristic and military-police states.

In one generation, imperialism has involved mankind in two world wars in which tens of millions of people have been killed. A new world nuclear [Editor's Note #10] war, being prepared by world reaction, threatens nations with horrible disasters -- the death of hundreds of millions of people and the destruction and devastation of cities.

Under present conditions, as a result of the unevenness in the development of capitalism, the economic, political and military center of imperialism has shifted from Europe to the United States. American monopolistic capital has seized the main sources of raw materials, the markets, and the spheres of application of capital; it has created a private colonial empire and has become the most powerful world exploiter. U.S. imperialism today plays the role of a world gendarme, coming out against democratic, revolutionary transformations and has unleashed aggression against peoples who are fighting for their independence. ||| The clearest example of this is the barbaric war of the USA in Vietnam. |||

The American monopolists and their [Editor's Note #11] allies in NATO have again aided the rise of West German imperialism after defeat. Thus a dangerous breeding ground for war, a breeding ground for new aggressive power, threatening the peace, has been created in the center of Europe.

Another dangerous breeding ground for war is the Far East, where the American monopolists have revitalized Japanese militarism.

The areas in which it is further most probable that the imperialists will launch aggressive wars are the Near and Middle East and Africa, where the contradictions of the colonial powers and the peoples fighting for their independence collide most sharply; Cuba, against which the U.S. is systematically organizing provocations; Korea, inasmuch as considerable armed forces, particularly of the U.S., are being maintained in South Korea; the island of Taiwan, an ancient Chinese possession on which the Chiang Kai-shek clique and the American occupation forces have entrenched themselves; Vietnam and other regions of Southeast Asia where the USA does not hesitate to intervene militarily in the affairs of freedom-loving peoples.

Thus, Soviet military strategy must take into consideration the possibility of the unleashing of new predatory wars by imperialist aggressors at diverse points on the globe.

It is impossible to exclude, in the present era, the possibility of wars between imperialist capitalist countries. The fact of the matter is that the capitalist world is torn by deep contradictions. There is a savage competitive battle for markets, spheres of investment of capital, and for sources of raw materials. This battle has become quite pitched, since the number of territories dependent on capital has been greatly reduced. Contradictions increase between the principal imperialist powers: Anglo-American, Franco-American, West German-American, Anglo-West German, and Japanese-American. Political crises arise periodically in imperialist military blocs.

In this respect it is interesting to refer to the experience of the past, to the remark of former Hitlerite General Kammhuber, who today occupies the post of inspector of the West German Air Force. In an article entitled "The Art of War," published in one of the West German magazines, he wrote that if the Nazis had had the atomic bomb, they would have completely destroyed England and France and won World War II. It must be assumed that today there are no guarantees that the Bonn revanchists, having obtained atomic weapons, will not use them against their present NATO partners, and would not commit crimes even more cruel and vile in comparison with those which the fascists committed during the last war. [Editor's Note #12] P. Edwards, British labor leader, writes in the brochure "America -- Ally or Boss?" that the West German revanchists have convinced the United States that there are too many communists in France and too many socialists in England, and, therefore, both England and France are very unreliable military allies. This is advanced as one of the arguments for the necessity of equipping the West German Army with atomic weapons, so that under extraordinary conditions it could "neutralize" England and France.

Our era is characterized by universal-historical victories of the international revolutionary movement of the working class. In the capitalist countries, social forces are being built up and strengthened in order to assure the victory of socialism. These countries constantly stir up class struggles. The ruling circles suppress strikes by using the armed

forces. The imperialists create military blocs and bases not only for battle with the socialist countries, but also for the defeat of revolutionary workers' and national liberation movements.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that socialist revolutions do not necessarily involve war, although both world wars unleashed by the imperialists ended with socialist revolutions. The great aims of the working class in the present era can be accomplished without world war and without civil war -- by peaceful means. However, when the exploiter classes resort to violence toward the people, it is necessary to keep in mind the possibility of nonpeaceful conversion to socialism. And this means that revolutionary wars and peoples' uprisings are not to be excluded.

The modern era is characterized by stormy, national-liberation revolutions, one after another, which sweep away the colonial system and undermine the foundations of imperialism.

The imperialists exert every effort to maintain their rule in colonies. They employ all possible means: colonial wars, economic pressure, subversion, conspiracy, terror, and bribery.

The colonialists do not grant people independence voluntarily. Therefore, the colonies are liberated by stubborn conflict, including armed conflict. As long as imperialism and colonialism exist, national-liberation and revolutionary wars are unavoidable.

Socialist, national-liberation, anti-imperialist and peoples' democratic revolutions, vast peasant movements, the struggle of the masses to overthrow fascist and other tyrannical regimes, and the general democratic movements against national oppression are all merged today in a general worldwide revolutionary process undermining the foundations of the imperialistic camp.

Revolution cannot be imposed on a nation from outside; it arises as a result of the serious internal and international contradictions of capitalism.

Together with other Marxist-Leninist parties, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as stated in the Program of the CPSU, considers it its international duty to summon the peoples of all countries to merge and mobilize all internal forces for action and, guided by the power of world socialism, to prevent the interference of imperialists in the affairs of the people of any country rising up in revolution or to give them a decisive repulse. The CPSU also considers it its international duty to aid countries going the way of winning and strengthening national independence, all peoples fighting for the complete abolishment of the colonial system.

Whatever path the nations which have thrown off the yoke of colonialism choose, capitalistic or noncapitalistic, is their own business. But with the present correlation of forces in the world arena and the real

possibility of powerful support from the world system of socialism, the people of former colonies can solve this problem in their own interests.

All these Marxist-Leninist theses are starting points for a correct understanding of the social-political essence of modern wars.

Studying the nature of these wars, Soviet military strategy starts with the fact that in the present era the following basic categories of war are theoretically possible:

War between the imperialist and socialist camps which, if not prevented, would be, by its political essence, a decisive armed conflict between two opposing world social systems. Such a war would be an aggressive, predatory, and unjust, on the part of imperialism, and a liberating, just, revolutionary war on the part of the socialist community. This would be a world war between the two big coalitions, so far as its scale is concerned.

Imperialistic wars undertaken by the imperialists for the purpose of suppressing national liberation movements, for the seizure or retention of colonies and for the attainment of other aggressive aims. These wars are also predatory, unjust and anti-national on the part of the imperialists.

National-liberation wars, civil wars and other popular wars aimed at the repulsion of aggressive predatory attacks of the imperialists, at the fight for freedom and independence. Such wars are the opposite of imperialist wars and are just, liberating and revolutionary. Both imperialist and national-liberation civil wars in size, are small, local wars.

The communists have always been the most resolute adversaries of world wars and, in general, against wars between countries. Such wars are necessary only to the imperialists for the capture of foreign territories and enslavement and robbing of the people.

The CPSU and all the Soviet people, as stated in the Program of the CPSU, have always opposed and will always oppose any and all predatory wars, including wars between capitalist countries, and [Editor's Note #13] wars directed at smothering the national-liberation movements and consider it our duty to support the sacred struggle of oppressed peoples and their just wars of liberation against imperialism. This duty the Soviet Union discharges consistently and steadily by helping the peoples in their struggle with imperialism not only ideologically and politically but materially as well.

The USSR will render, when it is necessary, military support as well to people subject to imperialist aggression.

It is quite understandable that the conditions for the origin and development of such wars will differ each time.

There will be a sharp distinction between the military-political and the strategic aims of the participants, and also between ways and means for conducting these wars. This poses a serious problem in the development [Editor's Note #14] of the theory of military strategy: to study and elaborate the problems of modern war not in general but quite specifically as applied to a given specific war.

The distinguishing characteristics of the present era have allowed the Marxist-Leninists to raise the question of war and peace in a new way.

The XX Congress of the CPSU, on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the radical change in the correlation of forces between the two world systems, and of the international situation as a whole, concluded that when the world socialist camp has been converted into a powerful political, economic, and military force and the forces of peace over the entire world have been strengthened, war will not be a fatal inevitability.

Developing this position, the XXI Congress of the CPSU resolved that even before socialism is completely victorious in the world, while capitalism still exists in part of the world, there is a real possibility of eliminating war from the life of society. This conclusion is based on the fact that [further successes] in building a communist society exert a strong influence on the entire international situation, lead to the consolidation of the forces of peace and the weakening of the forces of war, cause enormous changes not only in our country but throughout the world, and bring about a decided shift in the area of economics in the world arena in favor of socialism. Economics, as is well known, is the main field of peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism.

The XXII Congress of the Communist Party defined the general strategic line of the Soviet Union for the historical period in the near future: the period of the extensive building of the communist society. The main problems of this period are the creation of the material-technical foundation of communism, the most complete fulfillment of the needs of the people, and, simultaneously, further strengthening of the economic and defense might of the USSR. [Editor's Note #15] The fulfillment of the five-year plan of development of the economy of the USSR for the 1966-1970 period, adopted at the XX Congress CPSU, will be a new important stage in solving these historical tasks.

The foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government depends on the successful fulfillment of these tasks. It is directed at creating the most favorable conditions for building communism, for strengthening the might of the world system of socialism, and universal support of the struggle of peoples for national and social liberation, strengthening the peace and averting new world war, for affirming the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of governments with different social structures.

In the present era, the struggle for peace [Editor's Note #16] assumes, above all, the steady strengthening of the military might of the

Soviet Union and of the entire socialist camp by development of production forces and continuous growth of its material-technical foundation. The historic necessity of solving this vitally important problem is due to the fact that as long as imperialism exists, the economic basis of wars is preserved, and that reactionary forces representing the interests of capitalist monopolies will in the future strive for military adventures and aggression. Our military strategy must take into consideration the fact that, despite the presence and the growth of factors ensuring the preservation of peace, there remains a danger that the imperialists will unleash new predatory wars and attack the socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union.

The imperialist camp, as stressed in the Program of the CPSU, is preparing a horrible crime against mankind: a nuclear world war which might cause the unprecedented destruction of entire countries and exterminate whole nations. The problem of peace and war has become a problem of the life and death of hundreds of millions of people.

This is why the CPSU and the Soviet government consider it their main task to avert nuclear war. This task is acute, since the united forces of the powerful socialist camp, the peace-loving nonsocialist countries, the international working class and all people defending the cause of peace are interested in its accomplishment. The XXIII Congress CPSU stressed that the conclusion of the international communist movement on the possibility of keeping the aggressor in check and averting a new world war keeps its validity.

Considering the conditions of the origin and the nature of modern wars, Soviet military strategy starts first of all with the presence and struggle of two world social systems: the socialist system, traveling along the path of the building communism, and conducting a policy of peace; and the capitalist system, which has entered the third stage of the general crisis of capitalism and which is conducting an aggressive policy aimed at the unleashing of new wars.

Peaceful coexistence between these two world systems -- socialism and capitalism -- is a continuation of the class struggle of these opposing systems on an international scale. But this is a conflict by peaceful means, without the use of violence. However, despite the fact that the socialist camp is consistently conducting a policy of peaceful coexistence, the imperialist bloc might make an adventuristic attempt to achieve its aggressive aims by the force of weapons, i.e., by war.

The main source of the military threat today is the aggressive course of American imperialism, which reflects the striving of US capitalist monopolies for world domination.

The aggressive course of the imperialistic policy is expressed in the constant opposition of the ruling circles of the United States and other countries in the aggressive military blocs to the peaceful settlement of international problems; to the liquidation of the remains of World

War II; in proclaiming the so-called "policy of liberation" of the countries of Eastern Europe; in the continuous arms race; the stockpiling of nuclear weapons; the creation of missile, air force and naval bases directed against the countries of the socialist camp; and in the intensified preparation of the armed forces and the future theaters of military operations for conducting a nuclear war. The Western powers attempt to draw together all the new countries into military blocs, to unite the existing aggressive groups such as NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, into a unified bloc under the control of the United States, and to scrape together new blocs directed against the socialist camp.

This aggressive course is manifested in the ever-increasing militarization of the economy and science, in the intensification of the political and economic enslavement of underdeveloped countries, in the striving by armed might to preserve the remnants of colonial rule, in the systematic provocations of military conflicts in various parts of the globe, including the territories of the socialist camp. The aggressiveness of imperialist policy is also expressed in the military-ideological preparation for a future war under the pretense of a fight against Communism, in the propaganda of a "preventive war" against the Soviet Union.

A particular danger for the cause of peace is the policy of the revival of West German militarism by the ruling circles of the United States, the restoration of the West German military economy, the expansion of its armed forces, and the arming of West Germany with nuclear rocket weapons. In Western Europe and other regions of the world, the aggressive imperialistic blocs headed by the United States maintain strong armed forces in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the socialist countries. [Editor's Note #17 and 18]

In accordance with the imperialistic policy of the Western powers, the leaders of their armed forces and the general staffs have developed detailed plans for military attack against the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp. These plans are clearly of an aggressive nature, in aim and content.

This indicates that the threat of military attack against the USSR has by no means diminished. Moreover, recently (in the 1960s) the danger of the conflagration of a world war has become more real than previously. War against the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp as a whole might be unleashed by direct attack against the USSR or other socialist countries or as a result of some aggressive local war against one of the nonsocialist countries, if this war infringes on the basic interests of the socialist countries and creates a threat to peace in the world. In any of these cases, the unleashing of a war by an aggressor will, obviously, lead to a new world war, in which the countries of the socialist camp will be on one side, and the imperialist countries and capitalist countries dependent on them which are united in aggressive military blocs, will be on the other. The overwhelming majority of the countries of the world would be drawn into such a war. It would indeed have the nature of a world coalition.

Certain nonsocialist countries might take the part of the socialist camp in a future war, especially during the war. The possibility of forming a coalition of countries having different social-political structures is supported by the experience of World War II, when the Soviet Union and individual capitalist countries formed an antifascist coalition.

War between the socialist and imperialistic camps, if the aggressor succeeds in unleashing it, would be an extreme means for solving a historical problem: armed conflict between the socialist and capitalist social structures.

In Soviet military strategy the position is clearly expressed that the acute class nature of such a war would predetermine the extreme decisiveness of the political and military aims of both sides. In addition, the widespread use of means of mass destruction would give the war an unprecedented destructive nature. Our Armed Forces must be prepared for such a grim, intense, and exceptionally violent war.

In a new world war, the imperialist bloc would strive for maximum destruction of the armed forces and the deep interior of the socialist countries, attempt to liquidate their social-political system and establish capitalist systems instead, and enslave the people of these countries.

The Soviet Union and the countries of peoples' democracy, in order to protect their socialist achievements, will be forced to adopt no less decisive aims directed towards total defeat of the armed forces of the enemy with simultaneous disorganization of his interior zone, and towards suppression of the enemy's will to resist, and rendering aid to the people to free them from the yoke of imperialism.

Evaluating the real balance of all the political, economic and military forces of the two world systems, our military strategy assesses the situation as follows: the socialist camp has everything at its disposal for the successful repulsion of an attack by any aggressor and for his complete defeat. The basis for this conclusion is the complete and final victory of socialism in the USSR, the strengthening of the unity of the socialist countries, the vigorous development of their economy, science, and technology, and the continual growth of military power. In addition, the socialist camp in its just fight against aggressive forces can count on active support from colonial and dependent countries who are waging a courageous battle against imperialism and colonialism, and also on the support of the people in capitalist countries who are deeply concerned with the preservation of peace. Our evaluation of the military-strategic situation of both camps as a whole is that the position of the socialist camp is considerably more advantageous and will ensure victory in the case of imperialist aggression. "Such powerful, invincible forces now oppose the aggressors that if they unleash war, then they will get nothing except their own destruction" -- such was the conclusion made in the Report of the Central Committee to the XXIII Congress CPSU.

It is entirely clear that both gigantic military coalitions will

put out massive armed forces in a future decisive world war; all modern powerful and long-range means of combat, including ||multi||megaton ||nuclear-rocket weapons, will be used in it on a huge scale; and the most decisive methods of military operations will be used. An enormous strain on the moral forces of the people [Editor's Note #19] will be required in order to assure ||victory|| in such a war.

From this it follows that the Soviet government and all the countries of the socialist camp and their armed forces must be ready primarily for a world war, for a war against a militarily and economically powerful coalition of imperialist powers. The most probable and, at the same time, most dangerous means for the unleashing of a war by the imperialist bloc against the socialist camp would be a surprise attack. Soviet ||military strategy takes into account the features of a real aggressor and ||considers that in contemporary circumstances, even a large war might arise ||suddenly, without the threatening period characteristic of the past. ||

Simultaneously with preparing for a decisive battle with the aggressor during a world war, the armed forces of the socialist camp must also be prepared for small-scale local wars which might be unleashed by the imperialists. The experience of such wars which have repeatedly arisen during the postwar period shows that they are conducted by ways and means which differ from those used in world wars. Therefore, Soviet military strategy calls for the study of the means for conducting such wars in order to prevent them from developing into a world war and to bring quick victory over the enemy.

In order to correctly understand the conditions of the origin of wars, it is necessary to distinguish the reasons for wars and the cause for their unleashing.

The reasons for the origin of modern wars lie in the operations of the law of unevenness and spasmodic nature of the economic and political development in capitalist countries, in the contradictions inherent to the capitalist system, and in the struggle of the imperialists for world domination. The direct causes of wars arising in the present era are the aggressive imperialistic and predatory policies followed by the United States and other strong capitalist countries, which are directed primarily against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The most diverse events can become causes for unleashing war. The ruling classes of the aggressive imperialist countries, as history has shown, usually resort to direct fabrication of the reasons for an attack. In the present situation, however, this problem is considerably complicated in view of the great possibility for the so-called accidental origin of war.

With the frenzied arms race there is a serious danger that even a small miscalculation by the state leaders of one country or another can lead to the unleashing of a new war.

Nuclear weapons can be launched not only upon command of |||one bourgeois |||government or another, but also at the discretion of individuals at the control panel.

Careless operation of radar systems can cause incorrect interpretation of instrument readings, and this could lead to the beginning of military operations. Incorrect understanding of an order or the mental disorder of an American pilot flying a bomber armed with nuclear bombs could cause the bombs to be dropped on the territory of another country. ||| Indicative in this thought was the extremely dangerous episode in 1966 ||| when as the result of an aviation catastrophe of American airplanes over Spanish territory, four thermonuclear bombs fell. Faults in electronic equipment in combat nuclear rocket systems could also start a war. All this requires the greatest vigilance by our Armed Forces; it requires great wisdom and insight by our government, political, and military leaders to prevent the accidental start of a war.

These are the fundamental problems relating to the categories of wars and to the conditions and causes of their origin in the present-day situation.

MODERN MEANS OF ARMED COMBAT AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE NATURE OF WAR

The modern age is an age of enormous growth of productive forces and the development of science. Mankind is entering a period of the greatest scientific and technical revolution resulting from the mastery of atomic energy, the conquest of space, the development of chemistry, the automation of production and electronic machines, and other outstanding achievements of science and technology. To a great extent this determines the nature of a future world war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing one.

Therefore, in military strategy, when studying the possible nature of a modern war, we cannot fail to take into account the present state and the future prospects of development of science and technology.

Especially favorable conditions for the development of science and technology have been created in the Soviet Union. In solving the main economic problem of the party and the people as outlined in the Program of the CPSU -- the creation of the material and technical base of communism -- a large role is given to science, which, as it develops further and its relationship to the practice of the building of socialism is strengthened, should become, in full measure, a direct productive force.

||| As the CPSU Program says, ||| the creation of the material-technical foundation of communism entails the complete electrification of the country and the resulting improvements in engineering, technology, and the organization of social production ||| in all branches of the national economy; |||

the comprehensive mechanization of production processes and their ever-increasing automation; the widespread use of chemistry in the national economy; the utmost development of new, economically efficient branches of production and new forms of energy and materials; the organic union of science and production and rapid rates of scientific-technical progress; a high cultural-technical level of the working people; considerable superiority over the most developed capitalist countries with respect to the productivity of labor, which is the most important condition for the victory of communism.

The creation of the material-technical support for communism simultaneously solves the problem of strengthening and developing the material-technical base for supplying our Armed Forces with the required amounts of modern military equipment. The first-class heavy industry already created in the Soviet Union is the basis for further technical progress, and for increasing the economic might and defense capabilities of the country. The measures being taken by the CPSU to develop heavy industry serve as a reliable guarantee that the defense needs of the country will be fully ensured. This will be aided to a considerable extent by the further achievements of our science, which occupies an important position in the world.

Soviet science in a number of important branches already firmly occupies the leading place in the world. The discoveries made by our physicists in the field of the theory of the atomic nucleus and the theory of elementary particles, in the field of low-temperature physics, and others, are among the greatest achievements of physics. The country has an advanced atomic industry, and the ways are open for the study of controlled thermonuclear reaction. Important investigations in the field of mathematics have been carried out, and significant progress has been made in the creation of electronic computers.

The achievements of science technology have enabled the Soviet Union to be the first to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to blaze a trail into space.

Priority in such outstanding stages in knowledge of the universe as the launch of the first sputnik of Earth, the first flight of man in space, the first group flight of men in cosmic space, the first cosmic flight in the world of a woman, the first exit of a man into open interstellar space, belongs to the Soviet Union. The landing of an automatic station on the surface of the moon and also flights of automatic stations to Venus are outstanding achievements of our science. The Soviet Union created the most powerful rockets in the world -- the carriers of cosmic objects. The Soviet Union was the first in the world to create the hydrogen bomb and the intercontinental ballistic missile, and also a number of new kinds of rocket armaments which are new in principle.

The achievements of modern science, technology, and industry in the creation and production of nuclear charges, rockets of different types and classes, and military radio-electronics constitute the base upon which

the entire system of armament of a modern army is constructed. It must be assumed that in the near future radical corrections will be able to be introduced into this system as a result of the incorporation of various cosmic means. All of this in turn conditions the nature of a future war, the methods of waging it, and the principles of organization of the armed forces.

History has shown that with the growth in productive forces, particularly industrial production, science, and technology, the means of armed combat and military equipment as a whole develop steadily, and their role in war increases. Moreover, the development of means of combat inevitably also causes a change in the methods of carrying out military operations.

The means of armed combat developed continuously and were improved during the centuries of history of human society. However, never before in history has this development taken place so intensively as in the middle of the 20th Century, especially at the beginning of the second half of it. This is due mainly to the rapid industrial and scientific-technical progress and the outstanding discoveries in physics, chemistry, and other natural sciences. The development of means of armed combat is also affected by the aggressive policies of the principal imperialist powers, directed against the socialist camp, and by the arms race initiated by them.

The distinguishing feature of the development of the means of armed combat under present-day conditions is the appearance of qualitatively new types of weapons and military equipment and their rapid mass introduction into the armed forces, which sharply increased the fighting capabilities of the latter and led to a fundamental break in the organizational forms of the armed forces and the means for carrying out military operations on every scale. In military strategy, in military art, in military affairs as a whole, a revolution has taken place.

In World War II the main role was assumed by ground troops, the major portion of which consisted of nonmechanized infantry, armored troops, and special auxiliary forces. The main means of fire action against the enemy at that time were cannon artillery and aircraft, the striking depth and power of which were relatively small. The methods used at that time for carrying out military operations corresponded to the existing armed forces and means of waging armed combat.

The main events in the war occurred in land theaters of action, and the results of armed combat in these theaters, in final analysis, determined the outcome of the entire war. The nature of the war was one of mutual destruction of the armed forces on the fronts with simultaneous solution of the problems of seizing or holding territories. The available means of destruction did not permit realization of a rapid change in the balance of the participant powers, and thus there was a relatively slow development of military operations. In World War II, although it was more mobile than World War I, stabilized forms of combat and a certain linearity in the formations and operations of the troops were nevertheless

retained. Action by the belligerent parties against the enemy's deep interior owing to the absence of appropriate means of destruction, was negligible and had no significant effect on the outcome of the war.

A fundamentally new stage in the development of means of armed combat during World War II was the use, at the end of the war, of long-range rocket weapons (the V-1 and V-2), especially for the destruction of objectives in the enemy's interior, as well as the use of a new powerful fire-weapon -- the atomic bomb. This marked the appearance of completely new means of armed combat, which should have produced and actually did produce a fundamental revolution in military science, a revolution immeasurably greater than that caused by the appearance of gunpowder and firearms.

|| The appearance of nuclear weapons is a result of the latest discoveries of the natural sciences. The first half of the 20th Century || ended with the technical solution of the problem of the utilization of the enormous energy reserves of heavy atomic nuclei of uranium and thorium. The solution of the problem of atomic fission led to the creation of the atomic bomb. The second-half of the 20th Century will, in the opinion of scientists, be a century of space and thermonuclear energy, which cannot || fail to influence the development of corresponding means of destruction || and of the means for their delivery to the target.

Nuclear weapons appeared in the Soviet Union at the end of the 40s and the beginning of the 50s in the form of atomic, and then hydrogen aviation bombs, and somewhat later in the form of nuclear charges for rockets of different types and for torpedoes. In the 60s all services of the Soviet Armed Forces -- Strategic Rocket Troops, Ground Troops, Air Forces, the Navy, and National PVO Troops -- have been equipped with nuclear weapons. [Editor's Note #20] Taking into account the fact that the Soviets created hydrogen weapons before the United States, and, most important of all, that the United States does not possess superpowered thermonuclear charges [Editor's Note #21] || such as those possessed by the USSR, || we consider our superiority over the Western bloc in nuclear weapons to be indisputable. By the admission of competent American specialists, || our superiority in total nuclear might of strategic rocket weapons || is very considerable.

As concerns the level of development of our nuclear-munitions industry, the production of nuclear ammunition assures the output required for the solution of all the problems of a possible major war. The stockpiling of nuclear weapons and the widespread introduction of these weapons into all services of the Armed Forces enables the strategic leadership to use them simultaneously both to inflict massive losses on the armed forces of the aggressor, as well as to destroy his material-technical war machinery and to disrupt government and military administration.

Nuclear weapons can be used in a modern war to solve problems of every scale: strategic, operational, and tactical. From a purely military point of view, the use of nuclear weapons can give incomparably greater results than conventional means of destruction. It allows us to

carry out combat assignments within a considerably shorter period of time than was the case in past wars. Therefore, nuclear weapons are considered by specialists to be the most powerful and effective means for destruction of the enemy when conducting all types of operations and war as a whole. The introduction of these weapons into the Soviet Armed Forces sharply increased their fighting capabilities and placed at the disposal of Soviet military strategy a powerful means for restraining an aggressor and for defending the achievements of socialism and assuring peace.

The armed forces of the aggressors are also being widely equipped with nuclear weapons. The main nuclear power in the West is the United States. Great Britain has certain nuclear-weapon reserves, while France is beginning to create them. Revanchist West Germany is taking exceptionally feverish measures to obtain nuclear weapons from the United States, in addition to organizing its own production of them.

The West German revanchists are openly demanding atomic weapons. Thus, the Munich extremist newspaper, Deutsche National Zeitung und Soldaten Zeitung, wrote in May 1966, that "such a great and powerful country as the Federal Republic of Germany has the right to decide its own fate and to act independently, it must have atomic bombs and rockets."

It is not impossible that in time still other countries belonging to both military groups will have nuclear weapons. [Editor's Note # 22]

The nuclear industries of the Soviet Union and the United States are on such a plane that the stockpiles of nuclear charges have reached enormous dimensions in these countries.

If nuclear weapons are not destroyed and if the aggressors unleash a world war, there is no doubt that both sides will use these weapons. The intentions of the aggressors in this respect are well-known. The statement made by French Marshal Juin, former Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Armed Forces in the Central European Zone, during an interview on November 4, 1960, is characteristic in this regard. Juin stated that nuclear weapons would be used by NATO in the event of war even if the enemy did not resort to their use at the start of military operations. At the beginning of 1962 the same thing was confirmed by the then U.S. President, J. Kennedy, who called for the use of nuclear weapons from the very start of a war, regardless of the consequences of this step.

Taking all this into account, we have concluded that the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries must be prepared above all to wage war under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons by both belligerent parties. Therefore, the correct and profoundly scientific solution of all the theoretical and practical questions related to the preparation and waging of just such a war must be regarded as the main task of the theory of military strategy and strategic leadership.

In the last decade along with the nuclear weapon the rapid development of combat rockets of different types and classes began, especially

rockets intended for the destruction of ground and air targets. By the end of the 50s rocket weapons began to be introduced into the Soviet Armed Forces in large quantities.

The rapid development of rocket weapons is due to their extremely advantageous properties. These weapons have unlimited range, enormous speed and flight altitude, great striking accuracy and great firing maneuverability, and the ability to carry a nuclear warhead of enormous power. [Editor's Note #23] All this enables missiles to inflict surprise attacks and rapid and reliable destruction of a large number of objectives simultaneously deep in the interior and at the front, which other means of armed combat cannot do.

The above-mentioned qualities of missiles advanced them to first place among all other means of armed combat. The development of rocket weapons necessitated a serious reevaluation of the role of bombers and artillery, which were the main means of destruction in the last war.

The use of strategic missiles [Editor's Note #24] will have an especially great effect on the nature of war as a whole. Their quantitative and qualitative development in the Soviet Union has achieved such a level that it has now become possible to destroy simultaneously the necessary number of objectives of an aggressor in the most remote regions of the earth and to put entire countries out of the war as a result of massed missile attacks.

The intensive development and the enormous combat capabilities of strategic ||| land-based ||| missiles led to the creation of a new service of the Soviet Armed Forces -- the Strategic Rocket Troops. These troops can, if necessary, be used for the solution of the main ||| strategic ||| missions of the war, the destruction of the aggressor's means of nuclear attack -- the basis of his military might -- for the destruction of the main groupings of his armed forces, as well as for the destruction of ||| all ||| vitally important enemy objectives.

The execution of these tasks by the Rocket Troops will create the conditions for conducting successful operations by other services of the Armed Forces, for defending the interior of the country against enemy nuclear attack and for rapidly attaining the military-political and strategic goals of the war and final victory.

The Strategic Troops now have such a quantity of launching devices, rockets, and nuclear charges for them, including multimegaton power, that they are in a position to completely solve the problems with which they are confronted.

||| Simultaneously with the Strategic Rocket Troops, the main force ||| for keeping the aggressor in check and for decisively defeating him in war ||| is the atomic rocket-carrying submarine fleet.

In addition to strategic rockets, [Editor's Note #25] rockets are

also being developed which have been introduced into the National PVO Troops, the Ground Troops, the Navy, and the Air Forces. These rocket weapons are becoming the basic means of destroying land, air, and sea targets. They have fundamentally altered the appearance of all former services of the Armed Forces and immeasurably increased their fighting possibilities.

Thus, rockets are the most effective and the most promising means of armed combat. The massive use of nuclear rockets substantially alters the nature of war and the methods of waging it and imparts to war an extremely decisive and destructive character.

One of the important positions of Soviet military doctrine is that a world war, if unleashed by the imperialists, will inevitably assume the nature of a nuclear-rocket war, i.e., a war in which the main means of destruction will be nuclear weapons, while the main means of delivering them to the target will be rockets.

The mass use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons with unlimited possibilities of delivering them to any target in a matter of minutes with the aid of rockets will make it possible to achieve within the shortest time possible military results of the utmost decisiveness at any distance and over enormous territory.

It should be emphasized that, with the international relations existing under present-day conditions and the present level of development of military equipment, any armed conflict will inevitably escalate into a general nuclear war if the nuclear powers are drawn into this conflict.

The logic of war is such that if a war is unleashed by the aggressive circles of the United States, it will immediately be transferred to the territory of the United States of America. All weapons -- ICBM's, missiles from submarines, and other strategic weapons -- will be used in this military conflict.

Those countries on whose territory are located military bases of the US, NATO, and other military blocs, as well as those countries which create these military bases for aggressive purposes, would also be subject to shattering attacks in such a war. A nuclear war would spread instantaneously over the entire globe.

The enormous destructive power of the already existing types of nuclear weapons is well known. This power, multiplied by the mass use of nuclear charges with the help of rockets, a reliable and accurate means of delivering them to the target, gives an idea of the nature of a nuclear-rocket war and its consequences.

The power of the types of thermonuclear bombs existing at present exceeds several times over the power of all the explosives used during World War II and even during the entire existence of mankind. It suffices to point out that while during the period 1940-1945 Anglo-American

aircraft in a huge number of air raids were able to drop about 2 million tons of bombs on objectives in Germany and in German-occupied countries, at present one strategic missile is capable of delivering to a target a nuclear charge || ten || times more powerful than the total explosive power of the conventional explosives contained in these 2 million tons of bombs.

According to the calculations of scientists, up to 1.5 million people can be annihilated immediately and approximately 400,000 more people may perish from the subsequent radiation as a result of the explosion of one ||| thermonuclear ||| bomb in an industrial region. Even a ||| thermonuclear ||| bomb of average power would suffice to wipe a large city from the face of the earth.

British scientists have concluded that four megaton bombs, one each on London, Birmingham, Lancashire, and Yorkshire, would annihilate a minimum of 20 million people.

Soviet and foreign specialists have calculated that approximately 100 nuclear charges in the 2-megaton range dropped within a short space of time on a country with a developed industry and territory of approximately 300-500 thousand square kilometers would suffice to transform all of its industrial regions and administrative-political centers into a mass of ruins and its territory into wasteland contaminated with death-dealing radioactive materials.

Of special interest are the data concerning the possible losses in the United States. [Editor's Note # 26]

In one of the official documents of the U.S. Congress it is mentioned that if in the initial period of the war 263 thermonuclear strikes with an average TNT equivalent of approximately 5 megatons each are made on the most important objectives in the United States, these strikes will destroy, according to the calculations of the authors of the document, 132 large military objectives, many different important industrial plants, and 71 large cities. The total area of radioactive contamination will amount to almost half the nation. As a result, 50% of the population of the United States will be subject to destruction by nuclear weapons.

According to calculations of the U.S. Health Service, as a result of a nuclear attack on American cities, [Editor's Note # 27] the majority of these cities would be destroyed, the water supply will be 90 percent destroyed, and a large quantity of medicine will become unusable. Naturally, under these conditions mass fatal infectious diseases would be unavoidable.

||| A few years ago, the American scientists, William Kellogg and Charles Shafer in their report to a special sub-committee on radiation of the USA Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy presented rudimentary calculations on the probable results of nuclear strikes against the USA in the event of war. At that time in the USA, it was considered that 250 nuclear strikes with a total power of 2500 megatons can be delivered to |||

their objectives. It was asserted in the report that, as a result of these strikes in the very first day of the war, 42 million people will be killed (out of the US population of 175 million).

Later (at the end of 1963), the well-known US scientist, Nobel prize winner, Linus Pauling, wrote that according to his calculations, the Soviet Union has a total nuclear-strike capability of more than 10,000 megatons in force, and that as a result of such a strike against the USA "almost all the people will be killed and the whole country placed in ruins."

Studies conducted by the scientists Hugh Everett and George Pugh (Institute for Defense Analysis in Washington), led them to conclude that with a nuclear missile strike with a total power of 10,000 megatons, 170 out of 190 people in the USA will perish within 60 days after the beginning of the war; 15 million will suffer seriously and 5 million will remain relatively unharmed, if one does not include the results of the radioactive radiation. In addition, the American scientists underline that the number of victims mentioned is not indicative from the viewpoint of the over-all number of the dead and wounded: "The disorganization of the society, the breakdown in the means of communication and information, the destruction of livestock, the genetic harm, and the slow manifestation of radioactive poisoning from the penetration of organisms by radioactive substances together with contaminated food products can, to a large extent, increase over-all losses."

In the fundamental work Strategy of Survival based on studies employing mathematical methods, the Americans T. Martin and D. Letem, gave an analysis of the probable losses as a result of nuclear strikes, not only against cities, but also against military objectives in the USA. Such a method of calculation is, without doubt, correct, inasmuch as the strikes against the military objectives will likewise inevitably lead to substantial losses among the population.

According to the calculations of the authors of the Strategy of Survival, several tens of millions of citizens, living in areas located near launch facilities for intercontinental missiles, near bases for strategic aviation and other military objectives, as well as the inhabitants of 303 US cities, in the event of war, will be subjected to destructive nuclear strikes. The authors point out that about 100 million Americans may find themselves subject to the effect of a shock wave and light irradiation and 80 million subject to the threat of contamination by radioactive fallouts.

According to the calculations of other American specialists, published in the magazine Saturday Evening Post in the article with the characteristic title "Only Few Will Survive," a strike against American bases for strategic aviation, submarine and missile bases will lead to an immediate loss of 56 million people and to the fatal irradiation of an additional 117 million.

Such is the general picture of the results of nuclear strikes against the USA drawn by American scientists.

The unavoidable enormous losses of the USA in the event of a nuclear war were also openly discussed by certain official representatives in American government circles and in particular by Secretary of Defense R. McNamara. Thus, in 1965, he officially admitted that a strike by the Soviet strategic missiles against only 200 US cities, could, in a few hours, lead to the destruction of almost 150 million people and two-thirds of the American industrial potential.

It should be emphasized that a significant part of the statistical material presented since it was taken from foreign sources far from corresponds to the probable results of nuclear blows. The fact is that if the Soviet Union is forced to fight, it will have fully sufficient means to deliver nuclear strikes against an incomparably greater number of most varied objectives belonging to any aggressor and with charges of a much greater force than 5 megatons. It goes without saying, that the use of super-powerful thermonuclear charges, undergoing still further development, will have increased the destructive and exterminating character of a future war to a colossal degree. [Editor's Note # 28]

The losses in a world nuclear war will not only be suffered by the USA and their NATO allies, but also by the socialist countries. The logic of a world nuclear war is such that in the sphere of its effect would fall an overwhelming majority of the world's states. As a result of a war many hundreds of millions of people would perish, and most of the remaining alive, in one respect or another, would be subject to radioactive contamination.

This is why we are talking of the unacceptability of a world nuclear war, of the necessity for its prevention, of the realization of total disarmament and of the destruction of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

The supreme catastrophic threat of a world nuclear rocket war is hovering like a spectre over mankind. It can break out suddenly as a result of an initially local military conflict. The alternative to a devastating world nuclear war is the peaceful coexistence of states with different social orders.

In addition to nuclear and rocket weapons, there has emerged on the scene still another new, very important military-technical factor, which in the future will undoubtedly have a very serious effect on the nature of war. We are speaking of military radioelectronic devices, in particular, the introduction into the armed forces of electronic computers and machines of different types and purposes, as well as other devices for automating and mechanizing the processes of control of combat equipment and troops as a whole.

The further development and mass introduction into the armed forces of the latest military radioelectronic devices, mainly electronic computers,

will significantly increase the fighting capabilities of the armed forces. This, in turn, will alter the methods and the nature of military operations and will increase their maneuverability and mobility.

The exceptional importance of radioelectronic and automation devices in a modern war is determined primarily by the fact that they constitute an integral part of missile control systems, and without them neither the development nor the use of these decisive weapons is possible. [Editor's Note # 29]

Military radioelectronics assures not only the use of missiles, antimissiles, and other technical means of combat, but also reconnaissance, the control of troops, forces, and weapons as a whole. It is the basis of the solution of the problem of complex automation of the processes of staff activity. Without complex automation, effective command of the armed forces and consequently their successful use in a modern war will be impossible.

More and more attention has been devoted in recent years to the creation of comprehensive automated command systems in the armies of the biggest countries. Such systems, based on the use of new automated communications systems and electronic computers designed especially for military use, are being developed and incorporated into all services of the armed forces. They embrace command echelons from general staff to subunits and take in launch sites, individual aircraft and submarines. Space craft can only be guided by automated systems.

The development and introduction of nuclear and rocket weapons, as well as of radioelectronic equipment, has led to fundamental changes in almost all other means of armed combat. As a result, the importance and strategic significance of the services of the armed forces, as well as the methods of using them in war, have changed profoundly, thus imparting an entirely new nature to war.

It is entirely obvious that no matter how important the role of such means of strategy as Strategic Rocket Troops and rocket-carrying submarines may be in a future war, victory over the aggressor can be achieved only by the combined efforts of all means of waging war: Ground Troops, National PVO Troops, Air Forces, and the Navy as a whole with the active participation of the people.

In order to achieve these decisive political and military goals with which the socialist coalition will be confronted in a future war, it is not nearly enough to destroy the enemy's means of nuclear attack, to defeat his main forces by nuclear-rocket attacks, and to disorganize the interior. For final victory in this clearly expressed class war it will be absolutely necessary to bring about the complete defeat of the enemy's armed forces, to deprive him of strategic bridgeheads, to liquidate his military bases, and to seize strategically important regions. Moreover, we must not allow enemy ground armies, air, and naval landing forces to invade the territories of the socialist countries; we must hold these

territories; the internal security of the socialist countries must be protected from subversive actions of the aggressor. All these and a number of other problems can be solved only by the Ground Troops in cooperation with the other services of the Armed Forces.

Therefore, the Ground Troops will undoubtedly play an important role in achieving the final goals of the war.

The equipping of the Ground Troops with operational-tactical rockets [Editor's Note # 30] gives them new fighting qualities, increases their capability for defeating enemy groupings in land theaters, and eliminates the necessity of carrying out military operations with large compact masses of motorized infantry.

The main means of fire of the Ground Troops are now their operational-tactical rocket units and formations, armed with nuclear and other rockets with a range of several to many hundreds of kilometers. In addition, conventional weapons, in particular, artillery, play an important role in the Ground Troops. The theory of Soviet military strategy anticipates that even in a nuclear-rocket war conventional weapons will be widely used and that they must be skillfully used in conjunction with nuclear weapons; they must supplement them.

Let us point out the following fact. The Soviet motorized infantry division, with respect to number of personnel, is smaller than at the end of the last war. On the other hand, however, the weight of one of its salvos, without taking rocket weapons into account, has increased more than fourfold. There are more tanks in the present Soviet motorized infantry and tank divisions than in the motorized infantry and tank corps during the Great Patriotic War or in the corresponding divisions of any NATO country.

The capabilities of the probable aggressor with respect to the infliction of mass nuclear attacks on vitally important centers of the countries of the socialist camp and the main groupings of the armed forces of these countries lead to the conclusion that in a future war the role of the PVO (air defense) and PRO (antimissile defense) will increase significantly.

Characteristic of PVO and PRO at the present stage of its development is the equipping of these forces first of all with rockets of various ranges and altitudes of destruction, new types of fighter planes, radioelectronic devices for long-range detection, and automated control systems. The introduction of these means has greatly increased the fighting capabilities in combat with present-day means of aerospace attack.

The reequipping of the National PVO Troops from antiaircraft artillery to surface-to-air rockets has produced exceptional fighting advantages. This is clearly illustrated by the following facts. During the last war an average of 400-600 shells were used to destroy a single enemy plane by means of antiaircraft artillery. A modern plane, on the

other hand, traveling at an enormous speed and at an altitude twice that which can be reached by antiaircraft shells, can be knocked down with the first, or, at most, the second rocket. This has been fully confirmed by the combat actions of the PVO Troops of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

An investigation of the present and future development of modern means of armed combat indicates that the Air Forces in a future war will play a different role than in the last war. At that time aircraft were the longest-range means of destruction in the zone of combat operations of troops and the only means of striking objectives in the enemy's rear areas. Aircraft also had the most powerful ammunition in comparison with other types of weapons.

Now the situation has changed sharply. Rockets are now a longer-range, more powerful, and more effective means of destruction. Moreover, modern PVO has become almost insurmountable for bomber aircraft. Consequently, its role in war has changed; aviation itself has undergone great modernization.

Thus, obsolete military piston planes have been entirely replaced by modern jet planes, including supersonic long-range bombers. Cannon-machinegun aircraft weapons have been replaced by rocket weapons. In recent years the speed and ceiling of military planes has increased by a factor of 1.5-2.5. Rocket-carrying aircraft are being more and more widely introduced; these are capable of inflicting nuclear rocket attacks on an aggressor from great distances without entering the air defense zone.

Such tasks of aviation as reconnaissance and transporting of troops and materiel will obviously occupy a very important place in a future war.

The development and mass introduction into the Armed Forces of nuclear rocket means of destruction have led to a reconsideration of the importance and the role of the Navy in war. In a future war the importance of the fleet as a whole will be determined by the nature of the new problems which it will be required to solve, in destroying objectives of the enemy both on the high seas and on dry land.

The main fighting weapons of the Navy of the USSR are now submarines which in a nuclear rocket war are incomparably more effective than surface vessels. Moreover, strategy considers atomic submarines armed with powerful nuclear rocket weapons as the basis of our submarine fleet. Naval rocket-carrying aviation will carry out combat operations in conjunction with submarines.

The strength of our fleet has been greatly increased by equipping it with new means of combat. It has become capable of solving the active missions entrusted to it far beyond the confines of Soviet waters. Modern atomic rocket-carrying submarines are armed with ballistic missiles with underwater start and great range of launch.

The development of the services of the Armed Forces will be considered in detail in Chapter V.

This brief survey of the state of the basic modern means of armed combat and their effect on the nature of war has enabled us to draw the entirely well-founded conclusion that a future world war, from the point of view of means of armed combat, will be above all a nuclear rocket war. The basis of waging it will be the mass use of nuclear rockets by all services of the armed forces, but primarily by the Strategic Rocket Troops and atomic rocket-carrying submarines. We must anticipate that in this war the aggressor will use chemical and bacteriological weapons in combination with nuclear weapons.

THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC FEATURES OF A FUTURE WORLD WAR

The use of qualitatively new means of combat in the future world nuclear rocket war will naturally lead to significant changes in the military-strategic goals of both sides and will cause a fundamental break in the methods of waging war and military operations.

In all previous wars the main military-strategic goals of the belligerent parties were the defeat or weakening of the enemy's armed forces and, as a result of this, the seizure and retention of vitally important regions or administrative-political centers. The achievement of these goals generally assured the realization of the political goals which were set in the war.

Under these conditions the adversaries, depending on their political and military-strategic goals, as well as on the possibilities of their armed forces, used offensive or defensive methods of waging war or a combination of both methods. The main events occurred in theaters of action (ground and naval) with direct contact between both sides, since there were no long-range strategic means of destruction.

In World War II, as a result of the appearance of such strategic means as long-range bomber aircraft, the belligerents acquired the ability to inflict attack not only on the armed forces of the enemy to a greater depth than formerly, but on objectives in the enemy interior. As a result, aerial bombardment was added to the military operations directly on the battlefield for the purpose of disorganizing the interior.

It should be noted in this regard that attacks on objectives in the interior of the belligerent parties had no decisive effect on the course and outcome of World War II. The military-strategic goals of the war were, in essence, attained by defeating the enemy's armed forces in theaters of military operations and by seizing vitally important regions and administrative-political centers of the enemy.

What will be the characteristic features of a war of the future

from the point of view of its military-strategic goals and the means of waging it?

On the basis of the above-considered political and military goals of the two camps, it may be assumed that the belligerents will use the most decisive means of waging war with, above all, the mass use of nuclear rocket weapons for the purpose of achieving the annihilation or capitulation of the enemy in the shortest possible time.

The question arises of what, under these conditions, constitutes the main military-strategic goal of the war: the defeat of the enemy's armed forces, as was the case in the past, or the annihilation and destruction of objectives in the enemy interior and the disorganization of the latter?

The theory of Soviet military strategy gives the following answer to this question: both of these goals should be achieved simultaneously. The annihilation of the enemy's armed forces, the destruction of objectives in the rear areas, and disorganization of the interior will be a single continuous process of the war. Two main factors are at the root of this solution of the problem: first, the need to decisively defeat the aggressor in the shortest possible time, for which it will be necessary to deprive him simultaneously of his military, political, and economic possibilities of waging war; second, the real possibility of || our || achieving these goals simultaneously with the aid of existing means of armed combat.

|| The probable enemy's targets, comprising his military might and his economic and moral-political potential, are located over an enormous area, deep within his territory and on other continents. In order to annihilate and destroy them, long-range strategic means of destruction and the methods of armed combat corresponding to these means will be required. The proportion of these military operations in the entire armed combat will increase sharply. At the same time, the military operations which will have to be carried out over a relatively small depth, where groupings of enemy ground troops are concentrated, will in a future war be much less important. [Editor's Note # 31]

All this shows that the relationship between the role and importance of armed combat waged by forces in direct contact with the enemy in the zone of combat action, employing || simultaneously || tactical, operational and || strategic || means of destruction on the one hand and the role and importance of armed combat waged beyond the confines of this zone by strategic means || alone || on the other hand has shifted abruptly toward an increase in the role and importance of the latter.

Thus, the means of acting against an enemy, the methods and ways of armed combat, the methods of waging a future world war as a whole, will, in principle, differ from those in previous wars, World War II in particular.

Mass nuclear-rocket strikes will be of decisive importance for

the attainment of goals in future world war. The infliction of these assaults will be the main, decisive method of waging war.

Armed combat in ground theaters of military operations will also take place differently. The defeat of the enemy's groupings of ground troops, the destruction of his rockets, aircraft, and nuclear weapons in carrying out any operations, will be achieved mainly by carrying out nuclear-rocket strikes. This will lead to the formation of numerous zones of continuous destruction, devastation, and radioactive contamination. Great possibilities are created for waging extensive maneuverable offensive operations with the aid of highly-mobile mechanized troops. Trench warfare is obviously a thing of the past. It has been replaced by rapid, maneuverable fighting operations carried out simultaneously or consecutively in individual regions at different depths of the zone of military operations.

While in the past war the main problem of attack was the methodical breakthrough of deeply echeloned, strongly consolidated defense zones, now the possibility of the wide use of the nuclear weapon removes this problem from the agenda.

Formerly an attack was usually carried out along a solid front in closed battle formations, slowly, against the defending enemy who assumed the same operational position. Now it will be carried out by mobile shock groupings along the main directions at lightning speeds with rapid appearance at a considerable depth of the enemy's position. Formerly, attacking troops were usually confronted with the task of seizing an entire locale within the boundaries of the attack, while now they have only to seize those individual vitally important regions and centers which are not destroyed or demolished by nuclear-rocket strikes.

The means of defensive troop operations are also changing fundamentally. Defense will be conducted on the basis of lightning maneuvers of groupings of highly mobile troops, and counterattacks in combination with stubborn retention of the main regions. The defense will be based on the retention of the main regions in the probable directions of enemy attack. Linear defense constructed on continuous zones will obviously not be used.

Profound changes will take place in the methods of carrying out military operations in naval theaters. It is characteristic that already during World War II up to half of all fleet losses were the results of aircraft operations. With widespread use of strategic nuclear rocket weapons the main task in naval theaters will also be accomplished by means of these weapons. [Editor's Note #32] The waging of military operations based on the use of large formations of surface ships will disappear from the scene, together with the surface ships themselves. In a future war the tasks of destroying shore targets, of defeating groupings of the naval forces of an aggressor, his assault carrier formations and rocket-carrying submarines at bases and on the high seas, disruption of sea and ocean communications, will be accomplished by

strikes of rocket troops and mobile operations of rocket-carrying submarines cooperating with rocket-carrying aircraft.

Because the probable enemy considers "nuclear attack" to be the main means for achieving the goals of a future war, and because he considers [Editor's Note #33] "ground-to-ground" [Editor's Note #34] and "ship-to-ground" missiles to be the main means of delivery of nuclear charges to the target, one of the cardinal problems for Soviet military strategy is the reliable protection of the rear of the country from nuclear strikes [Editor's Note #35] -- PRO antimissile defense .

A further improvement in the means of antimissile [Editor's Note #36] defense, based primarily on the automatic control of surface-to-air missile complexes, [Editor's Note #37] and mastery of the methods of using them, organization of defense against means of mass destruction, and also the carrying out of other measures should reduce as much as possible the losses from enemy nuclear attacks and ensure the vital functioning of the rear area and the fighting capabilities of the Armed Forces.

At the same time it must be taken into account that under present-day conditions the methods and means of nuclear attack unquestionably predominate over the methods and means of protection against them. Consequently, the threat of a [Editor's Note #38] nuclear attack by the aggressor remains.

The possibility of an [Editor's Note #39] attack by an aggressor making mass use of nuclear weapons immeasurably increases the requirements of constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces. At the present time the bringing of troops into combat readiness must be measured not by days and in a number of cases not even by hours. For many units and formations it is now a matter of minutes. This applies particularly to the Rocket Troops|||and atomic rocket-carrying submarines,|||the main means of inflicting mass nuclear attacks on the aggressor, and also to the National PVO Troops whose duty it is to repel any enemy attack by air and to protect the most important regions and objectives of the country, and the Armed Forces, from nuclear attack. The troops in the frontier military district, as well as fleets and aircraft, must be in a state of constant combat readiness. Every unit, every formation must be ready, at a signal or upon command, to proceed immediately to the execution of its combat assignment. Only such an exceptionally high degree of readiness of the basic forces and weapons can assure the solution of the problem of frustrating an enemy attack and repelling his [Editor's Note #40] strike.

A future world war will require of the Soviet Armed Forces, of the entire socialist camp, the use of the main military forces from the very outset of the war, literally in the very first hours and minutes, in order to achieve the most decisive results in the shortest time possible. This requirement of strategy derives from the fact that the very first mass nuclear assaults by the aggressor may cause such losses in the rear and such troop losses that the people and the country will be placed in an extremely serious situation. Therefore, not only is a high degree of combat readiness of the Armed Forces required, but the entire country

must be specially prepared for war against the aggressor.

The waging of war by the above-mentioned ways and means may fundamentally alter the former notions of the development of armed combat according to periods or stages of war. It simultaneously attests to an extraordinary increase in the role of the initial period of the war.

The peacetime stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their carriers -- [Editor's Note #41] may be used in full measure by the belligerents from the very first minutes of the war to destroy and annihilate the most important enemy objectives throughout his territory, in order to achieve the main political and military-strategic goals within a brief period of time at the very outset of the war. Therefore, the initial period of a present-day nuclear-rocket war will obviously be the main and decisive period and will predetermine the development and the outcome of the entire war. Armed combat in this period will obviously be the most violent and destructive.

One of the characteristic features of a future war will be its enormous spatial scope. The decisiveness of the political and military goals of the adversaries will cause armed combat to be waged not only in the zone of contact between the adversaries, but, in essence, over the entire territory of the countries in the belligerent coalitions, since both sides will strive to completely disorganize the enemy rear. The mass nature, the high degree of strategic maneuverability, and the long-range nature of the means of destruction will assure the placing of the enemy under fire over his entire territory, including its most remote regions. As a result of the enormous dimensions of these territories and the features of the military-geographical positions of the adversaries, the war would encompass practically every continent of the world. The war will be waged not only on land and sea, but along long-distance lines of communication as well. The concept of "geographic expanse" of war in the future will require a substantial supplementation inasmuch as military operations may embrace outer space.

The enormous spatial scope of a future war requires the development and improvement, above all, of those means of destruction which would be capable of really solving the problems over any distance. Such means include strategic rockets, rocket-carrying nuclear submarines, and, to a certain extent, rocket-carrying aircraft.

For a correct explanation of the special features of modern war the Leninist teachings concerning the role of the masses in war are of fundamental importance.

Concerning the defeat of Czarism in the Russo-Japanese War V. I. Lenin wrote: "Wars are now waged by the people, and therefore a great characteristic of war stands out very sharply in our time: the unmasking, before the eyes of tens of millions of people, of the disparity between the people and the government, which up to this time has been apparent to only a small class-conscious minority." [9] In modern wars the

disparity between the interests of the people and the aggressive policy of the imperialist government stands out even more sharply. Depending on the level of political maturity and the aggregate of objective conditions, the masses, during the waging of predatory wars by their governments, either passively resist the continuation of war, or wage an active struggle against it. The result of the class contradictions which, according to Lenin, rend peoples asunder during waging of predatory, unjust wars, always was and always will be the absence of unity within imperialist countries and the impossibility of inducing all the people to support the war.

The political goals of just wars, wars of liberation, in the defense of a socialist state are close and comprehensible to the broadest masses, and therefore during the entire war they consciously and actively support and carry out the policy of their government. In this sense, the countries of the socialist camp have an indisputable and reliable advantage over the countries of the capitalist world.

A future war will be a clash between two military coalitions with vast human resources at their disposal. [Editor's Note # 42]

A future war will require an approach to the use of the human contingents of a state that differs from the approach used in the past. Modern complex military equipment requires a large number of maintenance personnel, particularly engineers and technicians.

The proportion of engineering and technical personnel is growing continuously in all the armies. In the Soviet Armed Forces at the end of the last war there was one regular unit of engineering and technical personnel for every 4.2 regular units of command personnel, and in the Ground Troops there was actually one for every 5.7 major units. In the postwar years the picture changed sharply; now there is one regular unit of engineering and technical personnel for every 1.5 regular units of command personnel in the Armed Forces as a whole and for every 3 units in the Ground Troops. By the beginning of 1960 the engineering and technical personnel constituted almost thirty-eight percent of all officers. There were twice as many as in 1941. It is characteristic also that of every hundred officers in the Rocket Troops 72 of them are engineers and technicians. The increase in the number of engineers and technicians in our Armed Forces is undoubtedly due not only to the complexity of modern military equipment, but to the ever-greater degree to which the Armed Forces are technically equipped.

An increase in the proportion of engineering and technical personnel will also be determined, to a considerable extent, by the extensive introduction of nuclear and rocket weapons and radioelectronic military devices, the appearance of which led to the creation of special formations of troops, both combat and maintenance, as well as staff apparatus in the armies and in the central agencies of the Armed Forces.

The widespread use in a future war of means of mass destruction will cause considerable losses in the personnel of the armed forces, as

a result of which there arises the need for having a large quantity of military-trained manpower reserves to replenish the active armies and create new formations. Serious losses due to weapons of mass destruction will be inflicted not only on the active armies and the strategic reserves, but also on the civilian population in the interior of the country. Therefore, large contingents of medical personnel will be required and also different kinds of specialists for organizing sanitary measures and eliminating the consequences of a nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological attack by the aggressor.

Enormous manpower losses were characteristic of belligerent states in the previous world wars. During World War I these losses amounted to 7.5 million men in the German Army, 7 million in the Russian Army, 4.6 million in the French Army, and 3.1 million in the British Army.

According to the Western press, during World War II Germany lost 12 million men, mainly on the Soviet-German front.

The data concerning the losses of our former allies in this war are of special interest. The irrevocable U.S. losses amounted to only 417,000 men, while those of Britain amounted to 771,000. This by the way, clearly attests to how passive the military operations of the U.S. and British Armed Forces were in the struggle against the Fascist bloc.

As the experience of wars indicates, the mass introduction into the armed forces of increasingly complex and highly effective equipment leads naturally to an increase in the makeup of the most technically equipped services of the armed forces and service arms, as well as to an over-all increase in the manpower of the armed forces, both in troops directly carrying out military operations and in different types of maintenance units, institutions, headquarters, etc. Taking all this into account, Soviet military strategy has concluded that, in spite of the extensive introduction of nuclear weapons, as well as the latest types of military equipment, a future world war will require mass armed forces.

The massiveness of the armed forces is determined, moreover, by the fact that a large number of countries will be involved in the war on both sides, as well as by the increase in the spatial scope of the war and, consequently, by the need for protecting and defending the enormous territories of the interior regions and communications of all types and of great length.

Consequently, we cannot fail to point out the complete groundlessness of modern bourgeois theories which advocate, for class reasons and out of fear of arming the masses, the idea of waging war with small professional armies, highly equipped technically. Similar theories have been advocated in the past. Before World War I, in official documents of certain general staffs, as well as in military literature, attempts were made to prove that with the increasing power and rapidity of fire of the weapons of that time it would be quite sufficient to rely on the forces of mobilized troops and reserve armies and the armament reserves which had been stockpiled in peacetime. However, the actual situation, as is known, upset all these calculations.

At the present time the largest capitalist countries maintain mass armies even in peacetime. It is known that the U.S. armed forces in 1966 contained more than 3 million men.

These data show that modern armed forces, with respect to their numbers, are already mass armies in principle, and in the event of the unleashing of an aggressive war by the imperialist countries they can be considerably increased.

Thus, a future world war between two coalitions of countries belonging to the imperialist and socialist camps will undoubtedly be waged by mass armed forces, despite the high level of their technical equipment and the most extensive use of nuclear-rocket means of destruction with their enormous combat effectiveness.

It goes without saying that mass multimillion-man armed forces can be organized in a future war only by countries with enormous populations. But this is not all there is to the matter. The rational use of the manpower resources of a country, both for call-up into the Armed Forces as well as for work in the national economy, depends to a great extent on the nature of the social and political system, on the level of development, and on the special features of organization and planning of the economy. The experience of the Civil War and, in particular, the Great Patriotic War showed that the Soviet socialist system possesses in this respect an indisputable and important advantage over the capitalist system.

Not only the mobilization possibilities of countries, but also the quality of the personnel of the armed forces depend on the nature of the social and governmental system. The level of prosperity and culture of a people decides an aspect of personnel which is very important for war, namely, the physical and, in a modern war, the technical training.

Under conditions where the armed forces include tens of millions of men, and war assumes an exceptionally intense and violent nature, the importance of the morale and the combat esprit of the troops increases to a greater degree than in any war in the past. With wide-spread use of nuclear means of destruction, the personnel are required to endure extremely great moral and physical stress; there must be exceptional organization, discipline, courage, steadfastness and the ability to fight effectively under any conditions, even the most difficult, and to use the military equipment to the utmost.

As was shown by the Great Patriotic War all these qualities are possessed in full measure by the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces rallying around the Communist Party, ready to endure any privations and hardships, to defend their socialist achievements and their socialist Fatherland from the encroachments of any aggressor.

* * *

This analysis of the essence of modern war, the conditions under which it arises, and the ways and means of waging it makes it possible to draw the following fundamental generalized conclusions concerning the possible nature of a future war.

In the modern era, despite the fact that war is not fatally inevitable, and despite the unrelenting struggle for peace by the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp, as well as by all men of good will, the occurrence of wars is not excluded. The bases for such a conclusion are the insoluble economic and political contradictions of imperialism, the violent class struggle in the international arena, the aggressive course of the politics of world reaction and, above all, the U.S. monopolists, as well as the intensified preparation for war by the imperialist countries.

If a war against the USSR or any other socialist country is unleashed by the imperialist bloc, such a war might [Editor's Note #43] take the nature of a world war with the majority of the countries in the world participating in it.

In its political and social essence a new world war will be a decisive armed clash between two opposed world social systems. This war will naturally end in victory for the progressive Communist social-economic system over the reactionary capitalist social-economic system, which is historically doomed to destruction. The guarantee for such an outcome of the war is the real balance between the political, economic, and military forces of the two systems, which has changed in favor of the socialist camp. However, victory in a future war will not come by itself. It must be thoroughly prepared for and assured.

One of the fundamental questions is the problem of assuring quantitative and qualitative military-technical superiority over the probable aggressor. This requires the possession of an appropriate military-economic base and the broadest enlistment of the forces of science and technology to resolve this problem.

The XXIII Congress CPSU stressed that from the condition of the economy of a state hangs its defensive might. This is especially true in modern conditions when complicated and expensive weapons production needs a high level of science and technology. The Soviet Union is persistently developing its economy, strengthening thereby its defense capability, the might of all the socialist camp. The revolutionary gains of our people and other peoples -- as pointed out at the Congress -- would be threatened if they were not directly or indirectly supported by the enormous military might of the countries of the socialist camp, and primarily, of the Soviet Union.

The ability of a nation's economy to engage in mass production of military equipment, especially nuclear rocket weapons, to create a superiority over the enemy in modern means of armed combat determines the material prerequisites of victory. A decisive factor for the outcome of a

future war will be the ability of the economy to assure the maximum strength of the Armed Forces, in order to inflict a devastating strike upon the aggressor during the initial period of the war.

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government are constantly devoting their most diligent attention to this, aiming at practical resolution of the basic questions of the build-up, not only of the Armed Forces as a whole, but also of the services and branches of service; they are also giving key attention to the development of military equipment and new weapons of war; and, which is the main thing, in raising the potentials of the country's economy.

The correct military-technical policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the successes of industry and the outstanding achievements of Soviet science and technology have enabled us to create, in a comparatively short period, a powerful, qualitatively new materiel-technical base for the outfitting of the army and navy with modern military equipment, in the first instance missiles.

The present line of development of the Soviet Armed Forces, adopted during the post-war years, is the result of a wise solution of all the basic problems of military affairs; it is the result of an enormous organizational work in this field by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Suffice it to say that the entire fundamental reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces occasioned by the incorporation into them of nuclear and rocket weapons and of radioelectronic gear and other new equipment has been and is being effected on the basis of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee which made a scientific determination of the general line of development of modern means of fighting and of the probable nature of a future world war between the camps of imperialism and socialism.

A new world war will be coalition war. The military coalition of the capitalist countries will be on one side, while the coalition of the socialist countries will be on the other side.

Given the acute class nature of a future world war, in which each side will set for itself the most decisive political and military goals, the attitude of the people toward the war will acquire tremendous importance. Despite the fact that large amounts of qualitatively new military equipment will be used in the war, the armed combat will be waged by mass armed forces. It will necessarily involve many millions of people. Therefore, the attitude of the mass populace toward the war will unavoidably have a decisive effect on its final outcome.

From the point of view of the means of armed combat, a third world war will be first of all a nuclear-rocket war. The mass use of nuclear, particularly thermonuclear, weapons will impart to the war an unprecedented destructive and devastating nature. Entire countries will be wiped off the face of the earth. The main means of attaining the goals of the war and for solving the main strategic and operational problems will be rockets with nuclear charges. Consequently, the leading service of the

Armed Forces will be the Strategic Rocket Troops, while the role and purpose of the other services will be essentially changed. At the same time, final victory will be attained only as a result of the mutual efforts of all services of the Armed Forces.

The basic method of waging war will be massed nuclear-rocket attacks inflicted for the purpose of destroying the aggressor's means of nuclear attack and for the simultaneous mass destruction and devastation of the vitally important objectives comprising the enemy's military, political, and economic might and |||also |||for crushing his will to resist and for achieving victory within the shortest possible time.

The center of gravity of the entire armed combat under these conditions is transferred from the zone of contact between the adversaries, as was the case in past wars, into the depth of the enemy's location, including the most remote regions. As a result, the war will acquire an unprecedented spatial scope.

Since modern means of combat make it possible to achieve exceptionally great strategic results in the briefest time, the initial period of the war will be of decisive importance for the outcome of the entire war. In this regard the main problem is the development of methods for reliably repelling a surprise nuclear attack as well as methods of frustrating the aggressive designs of the enemy by the timely infliction of a shattering attack upon him.[10] A satisfactory solution of this problem is determined primarily by the constant high level of combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, especially the Strategic Rocket Troops |||and atomic rocket-carrying submarines.||| This task, which follows from the decisions of the XXIII Congress of the CPSU, is the main one for our Armed Forces. It must always be the center of attention of commanders and staffs of all ranks and of the political and party machinery.

The enormous possibilities of nuclear-rocket weapons and other means of combat enable the goals of war to be attained within a relatively short time. Therefore, in order to insure the interests of our country and all the socialist camp, it is necessary to develop and perfect the ways and means of armed combat, anticipating the attainment of victory over the aggressor first of all within the shortest possible time, in the course of a rapidly moving war. But the war may drag on and this will demand protracted and all-out exertion of army and people. Therefore we must also be ready for a protracted war and get the human and material resources into a state of preparedness for this eventuality.

Victory in war is determined not only by military and technical superiority, which is as assured, on the whole, by the advantages of the social-economic and political systems, but also by the ability to organize the defeat of the enemy and to use effectively the available means of combat. For this purpose, a thorough scientifically well-founded preparation of the nation for war against an aggressor and a high level of military art of the commanders and troops are required. Success in a future war will also depend on the extent to which the level of development of military strategy corresponds to the requirements of a modern war.

Footnotes to Chapter IV

1. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч., т. 26, стр. 223.
2. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 26, стр. 224.
3. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 34, стр. 215.
4. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 14, стр. 8.
5. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 27, стр. 269.
6. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 26, стр. 41.
7. Уильям Э. Фостер. Очерк политической истории Америки.
Москва, Изд-во иностранной литературы, 1955, стр. 614.
8. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 42, стр. 140.
9. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 9, стр. 154.
10. Речь Маршала Советского Союза Р. Я. Малиновского на XXII съезде КПСС.

EDITOR'S NOTE ON CHAPTER V

The Soviet Armed Forces, as the self-appointed *okhrana*, - protector, - of the socialist camp, must be well-organized. Chapter V deals with "problems of organization of the armed forces."

This chapter represents considerable change between the first and the second editions of *Military Strategy*. There is little change between the second (1963) and the third (1968) editions, despite the five years between their publication. The first section starts with "factors determining the organization of armed forces", and discusses foreign "imperialist" armies. Of particular interest is the omission of France in the third edition; for example, this sentence no longer appears in the book:

"The French army has been responsible for more than ten years of unjust colonial wars in Vietnam and Algeria since the end of World War II."

This sentence also has been omitted:

"An example of this type of recruiting is found in the airborne units of France, which were used for conducting the 'dirty war' in Algeria."

The Armed Forces of the United States are treated with special venom. They are pictured as being filled with anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda, the preaching of militant chauvinism, slander against socialism and inflamed with hatred toward the Soviet people." "The idea of the exceptional nature of the American way of life is instilled in their minds. They are convinced of a special predestination of the American army, of the superiority of America; allegedly called upon to stand at the head of the entire world and to decide the fate of the world."

The armed forces of socialism are described in glowing terms. The very attributes so condemned in foreign armies become virtues in their own, since "the armed forces of the socialist states are armies that epitomize the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples, they are always ready to come to each other's aid to stand fast in defense of the world system of socialism; they are imbued with the sentiment of socialist internationalism."..."They are armies of peace. The highly humane moral code of the Soviet man ... is instilled in the soldiers and officers by the entire system of civilian and military training." "It is absolutely obvious that the inculcation of highly humane qualities in Soviet soldiers does not exclude the cultivation of burning hatred for the enemy who would encroach on our Motherland."

The authors seem to be unconscious of the parallel they have drawn in their descriptions of the two armies.

The first edition of *Military Strategy* ends its discussion on the building of the armed forces. However, one of the major changes in the second edition was the addition of ten pages to the section, increasing its length by half. This section, which is without change in the third edition, contains a long discussion on human resources. "Wars are waged by people", said Lenin. A very important place in determining the future manpower needs "is played by the study of the probable enemy and also the nature of the way being prepared by him." However, "not a single state, no matter how powerful it may be economically, is in a position to maintain in peacetime such massive armed forces as it requires for the attainment of the goals of war."

The second half of this chapter tells of the basic direction taken in building the Soviet Armed Forces. All three editions contain the statement that "the notion that 'nuclear weapon strikes alone can win a war' is false." The point is stressed that other weapons will also be needed. Electronic warfare, a new factor, is becoming very important. Also unchanged in all three editions is the opinion that future war "without doubt will be waged by massive multimillion-man armed forces." The rest of the chapter, which deals with each service in turn, remains the same for all three editions.

CHAPTER V

PROBLEMS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

FACTORS DETERMINING THE ORGANIZATION OF ARMED FORCES.

The organization of armed forces involves the solution of all problems connected with their recruitment, organizational structure, armament, the system of training and educating the personnel, and mobilization and combat readiness of the troops. It is determined by many factors and in the first instance by the character of the social system of the given state, the capacities of its economy and the policy it is pursuing, the extent of its population and the moral-political qualities and national peculiarities of that population. The geographic position of the state, the extent and nature of its territory also exert a definite influence on the organization of the armed forces.

A mandatory condition for the proper solution of questions of the organization of armed forces is a calculation of the combat potentials and trends in the development of the armed forces of the probable enemy and of the nature of the war which that opponent is preparing.

These factors which we have just listed operate and are taken into account both in the capitalist and in the socialist states, but their effect on the organization of the armed forces and on objective potentials for the utilization of these factors are entirely different.

The socialist states dispose of the broadest possibilities for the utilization of these factors for the creation of the most combat-ready troops with high moral and combat qualities, because here the interests of the state, the interests of the people and the interests of the armed forces are identical. In the capitalist states, on the contrary, these possibilities are limited, since the essence and aim of the armed forces conflict with the interests of the people. Therefore the combat capability and morale of the armies in these countries is maintained artificially, via the most elaborate system of deception and ideological processing of the personnel.

The main and crucial factor in the organization of the armed forces is the social system of the state in question. On this depends in the first instance the nature and aims of the armed forces, their structure, the recruitment, training and education and also their moral and combat qualities.

Armed forces originated together with a country, and are its most important organ. In capitalist countries they are one of the main weapons of the bourgeoisie, used to strengthen their rule and to oppress the masses within the country, to capture foreign lands and enslave other peoples, and also to defend their own economic and political rule in the event of invasion by other stronger and more aggressive capitalist countries.

Lenin wrote apropos of this that militarism is used for two purposes: "...as a military force to be used by capitalist countries in their external conflicts ... and as a weapon in the hands of the ruling classes for suppressing any kind of movement (economic and political) of the proletariat..." [1].

In brief, the armed forces of capitalist countries are the tools of oppression, robbery, and coercion in the hands of the ruling classes.

True, the imperialists and their ideologists make every effort to cover up this socio-political nature of their armed forces with talk about the army being outside of politics, of its having a national character and existing for the defense of the interests of the state and consequently for the defense of the whole of the people, etc. But this deception is immediately shown up for what it is the minute we take a look at the present-day armies of the capitalist states.

The army of fascist Germany [Editor's Note #1] was, in the recent past, the instrument of the most brutal reaction and overt terror at home and abroad. [Editor's Note #2] Such is its successor, the West German Bundeswehr. The imperialists and the often-defeated generals of Western Germany, having restored their armed forces, are again using them as an instrument in instituting a reactionary policy at home and for attaining their revanchist objectives abroad. Forgetting the lessons of the past war, they openly demand that the Bundeswehr be armed with nuclear weapons, that state boundaries established as a result of World War II be reviewed and that the German Democratic Republic be forcefully annexed to the Federal German Republic. In Western Germany, the policy of revenge which is supported by one of the largest armed forces among Western European nations, has been raised at present to the level of state policy. It is fraught with the threat of a new world war.

The armed forces of the USA have been, and still are, the main means of implementing the imperialist policy. At present, American imperialism, supported by enormous armed forces and numerous military bases built by them in all parts of the world, performs the function of world gendarme. It interferes openly in the internal affairs of other, weaker states, supports reactionary dictatorships and decadent monarchies, opposes democratic, revolutionary changes, and unleashes aggression against nations and states fighting for their independence. American imperialists disgraced themselves forever by unleashing the most cruel and barbaric war against the peace-loving Vietnamese nation.

The armed forces of England, Holland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and many other capitalist states have been and still are playing an equally nasty role in the campaign against the national-liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries. [Editor's Note #3]

The growth of the political omnipotence of the monopolies and the ever intensifying process of their coalescence with the military-bureaucratic state machinery is causing the armed forces of the capitalist states

to become more and more dependent on these monopolies and to be converted into their obedient tools. This is especially typical of the situation in the US, where the process of coalescence of the interests of the monopolies and the military department is taking the form of the appointment of representatives of the war industry monopolies to leading posts in the Pentagon and its institutions, the inclusion of generals and admirals in the directorial boards of the richest firms and biggest banks, as also the coordination of the policy of the monopolies with the plans of the defense department. The result is that the entire activity of the armed forces of the USA is presently determined to a considerable extent by the interests and plans of the financial magnates.

This subordination of the armies to the capitalist monopolies and their use as an instrument of aggression predetermines their socio-political essence. Despite the fact that the capitalist armies are basically composed of [Editor's Note # 4] representatives of the working classes of the population they are the tool of reaction, the loyal servant of capital in the fight against the people both at home and abroad.

The class essence, the functions, and the purpose of the armed forces of the capitalist countries as tools of the imperialists also predetermine the building up of these forces to strength, and the entire system of training and educating their personnel.

At the present time, the armies of the capitalist countries, as a rule, are recruited on the basis of universal military obligation; all population levels are called up. However, this does not mean that class selection and class distinction are absent. The bourgeoisie fear their people, and when recruiting armed forces, they employ various devious methods of class selection. "...All governments in the world," wrote Lenin, "have come to fear a peoples' army, which is open to peasants and workers; they have begun to revert secretly to all possible means of selection of military units, specially picked from the bourgeoisie and specially equipped with ultramodern equipment" [2]

Special selection in recruiting was most characteristic in its time of the fascist German army, in which were formed, according to this principle, the SS troops, tank units and commands, the air force and other special troops. In modern capitalist armies the units and commands which are armed with nuclear rocket weapons, special aviation units, paratroopers and certain other special troops are the most reliable, according to the bourgeoisie. For example, the most reliable soldiers and sergeants are specially selected to bring units of the U.S. Strategic Army Corps up to strength. This corps is designed to suppress revolutionary uprisings of the people in other countries, and also to suppress the national-liberation struggle in the colonies and dependent countries. Therefore, such personnel are selected as will carry out, without question, any orders from their masters. [Editor's Note # 5]

Especially carefully carried out is the selection for the officer corps and for the command posts in the armed forces. In the capitalist states, "the officers and generals," Lenin pointed out, "for the most part either belong to the class of the capitalists or defend its interests" [3]. In the US, the most powerful industrial corporations have, since the moment when the Defense Department was created, been holding in their own hands the portfolio of the Secretary of Defense, to which post they appoint their most loyal representatives. The Defense Secretary's deputies and assistants, the Army, Air Force and Navy secretaries; and their deputies and assistants, have all without exception always been representatives of the largest monopolies. The same situation extends to the other capitalist armies as well, where the whole of the supreme command is dependent on the financial magnates.

But a special system of class selection for recruiting the armed forces in capitalist countries is only one way of making them obedient servants of the imperialists. The main efforts in this direction are employed in the educating and training of personnel, especially soldiers and sailors. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense McElroy, said that "the first and most important problem is the struggle for the minds of the people. Everything else is subordinate to this battle." In fact, the struggle for the minds of the people in all the armies of capitalist countries is carefully organized and thought out, and is conducted at every turn.

The entire system of education and training in the capitalist armies is directed towards the extermination of class consciousness among the soldiers; it represents the army as a non-class organization, intended supposedly to carry out the will of all the people of the entire nation. By crafty ideological training of personnel, the bourgeois ideologists strive to smooth over existing contradictions between the social composition of armies and their purpose. Even before being called into the army, the youth in capitalist countries are trained in the militaristic chauvinistic spirit. All the resources and methods of ideological propaganda -- the school, the press, radio, cinema, TV, the theater, advertising and the church -- are utilized for this purpose. A plethora of reactionary youth organizations have been founded -- social, political, religious, sports, student and other.

Various fascist and semi-fascist organizations are playing an ever increasing part in the business of corruption of youth in West Germany, the US, [Editor's Note #6] Spain, Portugal and other capitalist countries.

The ideological indoctrination of the youth of the capitalist countries with the militaristic, chauvinistic spirit is still further intensified upon their induction into the army.

The U.S. Army is most characteristic in this regard. The ideological training of personnel is a carefully planned system of propaganda directed toward assuring the domination of bourgeois ideology among the personnel, and toward training soldiers and sailors for war against the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp. The main role in this training is played by anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda, the preaching of militant chauvinism, slander against socialism and the inflaming of hatred

toward the Soviet people.

At the same time, the propaganda apparatus of the army is aimed at embellishing the facade of decrepit capitalism. The soldiers are told that they are supposedly protecting the "national structure," "the best interests of society," "the peoples' capitalism," "the free world," etc. There is the most shameful profiteering by slogans of equality, freedom, and brotherhood. The military forces of the imperialist countries, primarily of the United States, are glorified in every possible way, and various justifications are given for the union with West German revanchists and the existence of aggressive imperialistic blocs.

The buildup of interests in supremacy, profit, private ownership, the development of animal instincts, and the instilling of the poison of bourgeois nationalism, chauvinism, and racism all play a large part in the conditioning of American soldiers and sailors. The idea of the exceptional nature of the American way of life is instilled in their minds. They are convinced of a special predestination of the American army, of the superiority of America, allegedly called to stand at the head of the entire world and to decide the fate of nations.

The ideological training of soldiers in other capitalist armies is conducted along these same lines. In the West German Bundeswehr the hatred of mankind reigns again. Hitler's former generals and officers are striving to re-establish the worst traditions of the defeated fascist German army.

The propaganda for militarism is here pushed under the flag of revenge and the re-establishment of the German Reich up to the 1937 borders. Nor do the West German militarists spare effort to falsify the history of World War II, to rehabilitate the predatory fascist German army, to surround it with a halo of glory and to prepare the youth for a march to the East.

The imperialists, who are directly interested in predatory, plundering wars, try to impart to the soldiers in their armies a personal interest in war and to make them into professional plunderers. The fascist German army was especially characteristic in this regard; it not only assured the predatory tendencies of the German militarists, but also was occupied itself with violence and open pillage of the local population of temporarily occupied territories.

The whole of the life, the internal routine and the system of instruction are geared to isolating the soldier from the people, to taking him away from politics, to blunting his class consciousness and making him a blind agent of the will of the ruling class.

Having in their hands the power of the state and by using various ways and means for influencing the minds of the soldiers, the imperialists convert their armed forces into obedient weapons for class and national oppression, into tools of militarism and reaction; this is a serious threat to the cause of peace and security.

But these instruments do not always pass the tests of war and often begin to betray the imperialists. In addition to the difficulties of combat life, class consciousness is restored among the soldiers, and they begin to understand that war is conducted in the interests of a small number of imperialists and that this brings privation and sorrow to the vast majority.

Then the war machine of the capitalist countries begins to creak, weaken, and fall to pieces. So it was with many armies in World Wars I and II, and so it will be in World War III which the imperialists are preparing against the countries of the socialist camp.

The ideas of aggression, pillage, and enslavement of other peoples cannot serve as a reliable foundation for high morale in belligerent armies. Lenin stated that "it is impossible to lead the masses into a predatory war...and hope that they will be enthusiastic"[4].

Such is the nature, in general terms, and the political essence and designation of the armed forces of capitalist countries.

In the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the organization and development of the armed forces represents an inseparable part of the overall organization and development of the state and is subordinated to the basic interests of the state which reflect the interests of the people as a whole. Here, too, the nature of the social system is also a determining factor in the organization and development of the armed forces. But this is an entirely new, advanced, progressive social system. Predatory wars against other nations are alien to it. The foundations of the policy of the socialist countries toward other countries are the principles of peace, equal rights, self-government, respect for independence and the sovereignty of all countries and peoples, and peaceful coexistence of countries having different social systems. The socialist system is the natural center of attraction for all peace-loving forces on the earth.

This nature of the socialist states determines likewise the socio-political features of the armed forces, their assignments and functions. These are armed forces of an absolutely new type, the armed forces of a people freed from capitalist enslavement, destined to protect the freedom and independence of the people from the infringements of imperialist aggressors.

The creation of armed forces in socialist countries is not due to internal conditions, but is primarily due to the need for protecting countries from invasion by foreign enemies and due to the military danger from the imperialist camp. Only this forces the Soviet Union to maintain its Armed Forces and to keep them at a level of combat readiness which will ensure the decisive and complete defeat of an enemy who would dare infringe upon its freedom and independence. [Editor's Note # 7] These same problems determine the necessity to create and maintain high combat readiness of the armed forces in all other socialist countries as well.

Close combat comradeship has been established and is being developed between the armed forces of the socialist states, based on the common character of their goals and missions which flows from the unity of the policies of these states and their socialist essence. There cannot be anything like this, nor will there ever be, in capitalist states.

In contrast to the capitalist armies, the armed forces of the socialist countries are not instruments for exploiting classes but are instruments of all of the people, who have been freed from capitalist slavery. These are really the peoples' armies. They have sprung from the people, are inseparably bound to them, and protect the great achievements of socialism, the freedom and independence of the peoples of the socialist countries and the interests of their governments.

The unity with the people is the inexhaustible source of their high moral and combat qualities. It was what inspired the Soviet troops to immortal exploits in the years of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War and it is the thing that guarantees future victories over aggressors.

The armed forces of the socialist states are armies that epitomize the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples, they are always ready to come to each other's aid and to stand fast in defense of the world system of socialism; they are imbued with the sentiment of socialist internationalism and trained to respect the peoples of other countries and to give fraternal assistance to peoples who are fighting for liberation from class and national oppression. The armed forces of the socialist states are a crucial weapon for the defense of world peace. They are armies of peace.

Such are the social nature and designation of the armed forces of the socialist countries. These also determine their system of the recruiting, education, and training of personnel. Service in the armed forces of the socialist countries is the honorable duty of all citizens. Here there is no class selection, all citizens have the same rights, and the same duties to protect their country. Here there is no class antagonism between enlisted men and officers, which is characteristic in capitalist armies. In the armies of the capitalist countries an officer is a servant and performer of the will of the imperialists, while in the socialist countries an officer is a servant and performer of the will of the entire nation. Here the basic criterion for selecting the officers is not class affiliation, but devotion to one's country and the socialist Motherland, as well as high moral, political and business-like qualities, and the personal abilities of the individual.

So far as the instruction and training system in the armies of the socialist states is concerned, it is entirely geared to developing in the personnel, high moral-political qualities which are characteristic of a new man, a member of the most progressive society, in order to strengthen the norms of communist morality, the most humane morality in the world.

The personnel of the armed forces of the socialist countries are inspired with a high level of political consciousness, a great love for their Motherland and solemn hatred of its enemies, unlimited devotion to

the people and selflessness in fulfilling their military obligations, genuine humanism and camaraderie among themselves and in their dealings with the civilian population, a high conscious military discipline, courage and heroism, and regard for human dignity and the rights and customs of the people of these countries which the troops of socialist countries must enter during a war or in peacetime for fulfilling allied obligations.

The highly humane moral code of the Soviet man and of the men of the other socialist countries is also obligatory for all personnel in the armed forces. It is instilled in the soldiers and officers by the entire system of civilian and military training.

It is absolutely obvious that the inculcation of highly humane qualities in Soviet soldiers does not exclude the cultivation in them of burning hatred for the enemy who would encroach on our Motherland, on its freedom and independence. The Soviet Army always has shown and will continue to show lenience and generosity to the enemy, if he ceases to resist, but if the enemy does not surrender, he must be mercilessly destroyed.

The fundamental basis for building the armed forces in the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries is leadership of the armed forces on the part of the Communist and Workers' parties. They carefully train the armed forces, reinforce their fighting efficiency and combat readiness, arouse and inspire the soldiers to great feats of arms in the interest of all the peoples of the socialist countries.

The armed forces of the socialist countries are strong in the knowledge of their great debt to the people; they are not afraid of any difficulties or adversities of war. This has been proven more than once to the world by the Soviet Armed Forces, especially in World War II.

Such are the two entirely opposite foundations for forming, recruiting, and training the armed forces in the capitalist and socialist countries. This is so because of the difference in the social-political essence of their social systems, the difference in their domestic and foreign policies [Editor's Note # 8]

The next cardinal factor which determines the principles of the organization and development of the armed forces of states is the condition of the economy of the states in question, the level of the development of their industry, transport, agriculture, science and technology, the quantity and quality of the population. The economy can be said to exercise a direct or indirect influence on literally every aspect of the organization and development of the armed forces, both in peacetime and especially in wartime. The higher the level of economic development of a state and the more numerous its population, the greater will be its capacities for maintaining large armed forces and providing them with the latest types of weapons and other military equipment. And via its influence on weapons and personnel, the economy also exercises an influence upon the methods of conduct of military operations: on tactics, operation art and strategy. More briefly, the economic potential of a state determines its military might.

The economic system of countries has always been the material basis for building the armed forces, their quantitative and qualitative foundations. In this regard, it is useful to recall the well-known thesis of Engels: "...the entire organization and military method of armies... are dependent on material, i.e., economic conditions: on human material and on weapons and, therefore, on the quality and quantity of the population, and upon technology" [5].

These words, spoken by Engels more than 80 years ago, carry a special meaning today. They pertain to that period when armies were comparatively small and consisted only of ground troops and a navy, when progress in military equipment, which depended upon the level of development of social production, was relatively slow and it was not necessary to create large stockpiles of material resources for conducting war, since the outcome was usually decided by one, and sometimes a few major battles. However, even then the expenditures for maintaining armies and for buying weapons exhausted the state treasury, and a great burden was laid on the shoulders of the people.

As the predatory aspirations of the capitalist states grew, their conflicts of interest became more intense, leading inevitably to numerous bloody wars. The result was a constant build-up of armed forces, a rapid development and perfection of military equipment; armies came to depend increasingly on the level of development of production and the economic potential of the state. While in the recent past armies were equipped with rifles and guns, they are now equipped with the most complicated and costly machinery, the last word in science and technology: nuclear rockets, atomic submarines carrying nuclear armament, supersonic jet aircraft, complicated radioelectronic equipment, not to mention tanks, trucks, armored troop carriers, prime movers, the latest artillery systems, and military engineering and other complex military equipment. The latest achievements of science and technology are used primarily for the production of armaments, and huge amounts of material resources are expended on this.

With the development and modernization of military equipment, the cost grew exorbitantly and the expenditures of countries for equipping their armies have increased many times. The American Martin bomber cost \$38,000 in 1920, and the B-29 cost \$680,000 during World War II; [Editor's Note # 9] now the B-58 cost \$17.6 million. Each American Minuteman [Editor's Note #10] missile costs the country more than \$1 million; and the cost of a single nuclear submarine equipped with [Editor's Note #11] Polaris missiles amounts to about \$115,000,000.

The nature of military expenditures has changed in accordance with the increase in the cost of military equipment. Before World War I, more than 80 percent of military budgets was spent for personnel, and the expenditures for buying weapons and other military equipment did not exceed 11-15 percent. At the present time, however, the greater part of military expenditures are for equipping armies. For example, the United States, during World War II, spent \$89.7 billion in 1944; of this, \$60.2 billion was spent on arms, equipment, and building up the army, i.e., 67 percent, while \$29.5 billion, or 33 percent of all military expenditures, was spent

for maintaining personnel, etc.

In peacetime, the nature of military expenditures has not changed in principle. [Editor's Note #12] Thus, the USA, during the period from 1950/51 to 1964/65 fiscal years, spent about \$178 billion on the maintenance of armed forces' personnel, which composed a little more than 25 percent of all direct military expenditures. At the same time, for the purchase, maintenance and operation of military equipment, on military construction and military-scientific research during this same period, more than \$450 billion was spent, that is, 63 percent of all direct military expenditures. The remaining part of the military budget was spent on the commission of atomic energy, on exploring space, on civil defense and on military aid to foreign governments.

Huge sums of money are spent to maintain the armed forces. In peacetime, military expenditures in many imperialist countries devour more than 50 percent of the entire budget, while in wartime, they are increased to 70 percent and more of the general budget. War and the costs of war have become a real burden for the people and the greatest source of revenue for the capitalist monopolies, which conduct their business with the blood and sorrows of millions of people.

"The imperialist countries, " states the Program of the CPSU, "maintain enormous armed forces even in peacetime. Military expenditures absorb an ever-increasing share of state budgets....By enriching individual groups of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, militarism leads to the impoverishment of nations and to the destruction of countries languishing under the burden of debt, increasing inflation and high prices." [Editor's Note #13] Thus, the USA, during the years 1946-1964, on direct military expenses alone spent about \$800 billion which exceeded by 1.5 times similar expenditures of the USA from the very beginning of their formation through 1945. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, the military expenditures were \$47 billion, in the present year they are \$54 billion, and in the future year they will be about \$60 billion. The price of the dirty war being waged by the American imperialists in Vietnam has already reached \$12 billion a year.

On the whole, the capitalist countries have spent 15-20% of the entire national income for weapons and armed forces.

A powerful war industry has been created in the capitalist countries for war preparation and the production of arms; this industry produces the most modern means for annihilating people and destroying their valuable creations. Many branches of nonmilitary industry are to some degree committed to this same purpose; all of the greatest achievements of science and technology are used first of all for this. For example, in the United States 48 percent of all government allocations for the needs of science is spent on research for the preparation for war. The course to war has become a constant element of the capitalist economy.

In the Declaration of the Moscow Conference of Chairmen of the Communist and Workers' Parties it is pointed out that only a very small group of monopolists and war speculators, who extract fabulous profits from war

production, are interested in the arms race. [Editor's Note #14] Thus, 60 percent of all the turnover and 75 percent of the profits go to 500 of the largest monopolies in the USA. The dirty war in Vietnam in just the last year alone gave the monopolists of the USA \$45 million in pure profit. This is more than twice the average annual profits which were received by the monopolists of the USA during the Korean War and four times the average annual profits from the Second World War.

At the present time in the United States, as acknowledged by former President Eisenhower, a sinister union has been compounded between the colossal military organization and the great military industry, in which millions of people are working, and which controls billions of dollars. Its universal effect -- economic, political, and even spiritual -- is felt in every city, in every state government, and in every branch of the federal government. This union, or, as Eisenhower called it, "the military and industrial complex," actually determines the entire domestic and foreign policies of the United States of America.

The military expenditures of countries would increase even more with the beginning of a war. In essence, the entire economy of belligerent countries would be diverted to supply its needs, and the bare necessities of the population would be held to a minimum. The cost of war itself to mankind is very high. During a war, whole countries are devastated, thousands of towns and villages are destroyed, and the fruits of labor of many generations of people are lost.

According to the calculation of the French economist, A. Claude, war destruction in Europe during World War II was estimated at \$260 billion, 50 percent of which was suffered by the USSR. The direct military expenditures of all participants in this war were \$1,117 billion, and the total cost of material damage as a result of the war is the astronomically high figure of \$4 trillion. Such is the price paid by mankind for the piratical politics of imperialism.

The thesis concerning the dependence of the armed forces upon the economy is applicable not only to the capitalist states but to the socialist states as well. The build-up of the military might of the imperialist states has an overtly aggressive character and is directed in the first instance against the countries of the socialist camp. This compels the socialist states to have such armed forces as would be capable of not only repulsing an aggressor in the event of an attack, but of routing such an aggressor completely. Lenin has written that "...without an army, and very serious economic preparation, there can be no waging of a modern war against advanced imperialism." These words are still valid.

Following these Lenin instructions, the Soviet Union and the other socialist states are developing their economy in a way that takes account of the necessity of an over-all enhancement of their defensive power. Naturally they have to deflect for this purpose considerable economic resources and expend large amounts of money. But the military expenditures

of the socialist states are many times lower than those of the capitalist states. [Editor's Note #15]

Thus, the military expenditures of the Soviet Union in 1965 composed 12.9 percent of the government budget, and in 1966, they are expected to be 13.4 percent, at a time when the budget of the USA allocated for military purposes for many years has marched far beyond 50 percent of the federal budget.

But the military expenditures of the socialist and the capitalist states differ not only quantitatively; there can be no comparison of their purpose.

In the imperialist states, the military outlays bring in enormous profits to the capitalist monopolies while the build-up of the military might of the armed forces is utilized by those monopolies for the aggravation of international tensions and for the launching of an aggressive war at the moment that suits them. In the socialist states, on the contrary, the strengthening of their armed forces serves as a sort of counterweight to the capitalist armies, creates a reliable guarantee for the preservation of peace and increases the chances of preventing war. Imperialism reckons only with naked force and such a force at the present juncture is the Soviet Army and the armies of the other socialist states.

The influence of the difference of the economic systems on the organization and development of the armed forces and on the maintenance of their combat-readiness and combat capacity makes itself felt with special force in wartime. In this respect the potentials of the socialist states [Editor's Note #16] are significantly higher than those of the capitalist countries. Thanks to an indisputable superiority in economic organization and in the moral-political spirit of the people, the Soviet Union succeeded during the Great Patriotic War not only in resisting but in routing the main forces of fascist Germany and its former allies.

Packed by the unprecedented labor enthusiasm of the people, the Communist Party and the Soviet government succeeded in creating in a brief span of time a smoothly functioning war economy and supplying the front with everything needed for the rout of the enemy.

Not a single capitalist state was in a position to mobilize in so short a space of time and to utilize so fully its economic resources in wartime as did the Soviet Union.

The military theoreticians of the capitalist countries are trying to prove that, in a future nuclear war, the economic potentials of the states involved and the human resources of these states will not be so important as in previous war, that everything will be decided by the production of nuclear weapons. In their opinion, there will be no need to reorganize the economy to war production in a future war because of its shortness and great destructiveness; therefore the preliminary economic preparation made by the country will be of crucial significance.

There is no doubt that the preliminary economic preparation of a country for a future war has acquired at the present juncture exceptionally great importance.

However, planning on conducting a war, no matter how short and swift-moving, with only the reserve materials accumulated in peacetime, would be a big mistake. It can be conjectured that in a future war the role of the war economy will not only remain what it used to be, it will even increase in importance. In this respect, too, the objective potentials of the socialist states are incomparably higher than those of the capitalist states. The socialist system is capable of answering any blow of enemies "by an increase of the concentration of forces and economic might" [7] as was clearly proven by the last war.

Capitalism spreads and retains its rule by fire and the sword, whereas the weapons of socialism are its superiority over capitalism in government structure and in economic organization of society, in raising the living standard and cultural level of the people. The economy of capitalism is the main source of the aggressiveness of its armed forces, while the economy of socialism is the basis for its peace-loving aims which are supported by the great combat might of army and navy.

There can be no doubt about the fact that the enormous exertion of a future war is going to be able to be borne only by states having a stable social and governmental system, enjoying the support of the whole of the people and possessing a highly developed economy, capable of assuring the maintenance of large full-time armies, their further drastic multiplication in the event of war, their outfitting with all the modern types of weapons for the execution of military-political and strategic missions of war. In a word, a modern economy must be able, in the shortest possible time, to provide the armed forces with the maximum number of modern means of warfare, and to provide them completely and regularly with everything necessary in case the duration of the war is extended. The economy must be prepared for this in peacetime.

The economic system of a country, which is the material foundation for the development of armed forces, also determines the basis of its organization. The more stable the economic system of a country and the higher the development of its industry, science, and technology, the greater the possibilities it has for quick development both quantitatively and qualitatively, while this, in turn, is what determines the courses for building the armed forces, their structure, and the form of organizing troops, and also the methods for conducting war: tactics, operational art, and strategy.

The level of development of military art is one of the important factors in determining the building-up of the armed forces. Military art develops subject to the laws of dialectics. One of these laws which determines the onward march of military art is interrelationship and mutual dependence between military equipment, the forms of organization of the armed forces, and the methods for conducting military operations. These factors are in a state of constant motion and change. Their developments are mutually conditioned. When one of these factors changes, the others

must undergo some sort of change. The determining factor of this inter-relationship and mutual dependence is the industrial product, the product of the economy: military equipment, primarily weapons. It is the most revolutionary element, exerting a direct influence on the methods of warfare and on the development and building of the armed forces.

This can be seen from specific examples of the development of military art. The invention of gunpowder and the subsequent development of firearms caused a complete revolution in military affairs and ushered in a new era in the development of military art and in the organization of armed forces. As a result of the introduction of these weapons into the armies and the approval of them as basic means of warfare, the concentrated troop formations which had been used for many centuries disappeared forever. They were replaced by a new linear combat formation, requiring a more flexible organization of troops. The subsequent adoption of rifled weapons having greater range and accuracy compared with smooth-bore weapons contributed to the development of a new method of combat: infantry skirmishes. The invention of automatic weapons and the development of engineering gave rise to group combat formations and served as one of the main reasons for the origin of trench warfare. Airplanes, tanks, and vast artillery of various types gave rise to new mobile methods of conducting combat operations. Finally, modern nuclear weapons have brought about the complete revolution in military affairs, have caused a re-examination of all the principles of military art which had been proved over the centuries, and have required the search for and development of completely new methods of waging war and new forms of troop organization.

The appearance of new weapons has not only influenced the means of offense and defense but has often caused the appearance of new specific methods of conducting combat actions; involving protection from these weapons, for example, antichemical defense, antiaircraft and antitank defense, protection against weapons of mass destruction, submarine defense, etc. It has introduced radical changes in the methods of control of the troops, in the organization of material, technical, and medical supply operations, and in many other areas of troop combat activity.

New combat methods caused by new types of weapons have had a direct effect on the organizational structure and on the building of armed forces. They have caused the creation of not only the appropriate subdivisions, units, and formations, but even entire branches of service and services of the armed forces. This has caused the appearance of such services of the armed forces as air forces, air defense troops, and rocket troops, which not only have forced the traditional services of the armed forces (ground troops and the navy) to give ground to them, but in some cases have come to occupy the top position.

At the same time, even the old services of the armed forces have undergone serious quantitative, qualitative, structural and organizational changes, caused by the advent of new types of weapons and new branches of service. Thus, certain branches of service which in the past played a rather considerable role in war have gradually lost their value and sometimes have left the scene completely. Not so long ago, at the beginning of World War I,

in all fighting armies the cavalry was a rather large branch of the ground troops and played an important role in military operations. In World War II, it was preserved to a small extent as a branch only in the Soviet Armed Forces. At the present time, the cavalry has ceased to exist as a branch of service in all countries. The horse as a means for maneuvers has given way to the truck, tank, armored troop carrier, automobile, and prime mover and airplane. The role and battle designation of various services of the armed forces and types of weapons have undergone substantial changes. And so it will be in the future: obsolete weapons will give way to new improved ones. Such is the dialectics of development||| of the armed forces.|||

At the same time combat methods and the forms of troop organization also will not remain indifferent to the means of armed conflict. By changing, they in turn impose new requirements on military equipment, weapons, and troop organization, compelling military scientific theory to work constantly to improve and develop them.

Thus, production, being fundamental to the development of means of armed conflict, also influences, through man and military equipment, the methods of conducting war, tactics, operational art and strategy, and has a determining influence on the development of organizational forms of the armed forces and their build-up. In turn, the advent of new forms of troop organization and new methods of waging war has a reverse effect on the development of military equipment, and through it, on the development of industry. Such is the continuous process of the historical development of military art, at the center of which stands man.

It is in fact man, with his reason and will, with his knowledge and ability, who creates weapons for his own destruction and determines how these weapons will be used or how wars will be conducted using the weapons he has created. The higher the level of consciousness or, more accurately, class consciousness in a person and the greater his understanding of his historical mission, the more effectively he will use these weapons against the reactionary and aggressive forces of the old order and against imperialist countries in the event they unleash a war, i.e., in the final analysis, for the elimination of wars themselves and to insure victory for the new communist society in which wars remain only as a grim reminder of past history.

But the objective laws of nature and society, including the laws of the development of military art, do not always manifest themselves; only under definite conditions are they manifested. Weapons, too, do not always cause radical changes in methods of waging war and in the forms of the organization and building of the armed forces. This happens only when new weapons possess markedly different and better combat properties than the older ones, when they are manufactured and used in massive quantities to equip the armies and when they become the fundamental, or one of the fundamental, means of waging war, when such new weapons introduce radical changes in the combat capabilities of the armed forces and these changes take on a new quality which ceases to correspond to the previous methods of warfare, i.e., when the correspondence between the means and the methods of warfare is destroyed, a contradiction between them will arise.

Under these conditions, any attempt to use the new weapon within the framework of obsolete methods of combat or to use these obsolete methods without taking the changed combat capabilities of the troops into account will be doomed to failure or at best will not produce the required effect. During the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) the enemy armies were armed with new rifled weapons which had more firepower, range, and accuracy than smooth-bore weapons. However, neither side took this into account; they did not introduce the necessary changes in the organization of their armies or in the methods of combat and, as before, they attempted to fight with close-order troop formations, using company and battalion columns in line formation. This necessarily led to great troop losses, and the soldiers, often against the will of their officers, broke the obsolete battle formations and found new, more appropriate formations for combat against rifled weapons. In this war, the company and battalion columns broke down under rifle fire and the soldiers' instinct found a more appropriate form of combat: a dense skirmish line.

Here is another example. The advent of tanks at the end of World War I and their use within the framework of the then-existing methods of conducting military actions did not allow their combat possibilities to be fully exploited and resulted only in local tactical successes, while certain operations during the final phase of World War I, particularly the battle at Cambrai and the Amiens operation, showed that tanks, even though they were far from perfect at that time, when their combat capabilities were fully utilized and when they were massed in the main direction of attack, were in a position to assure that the troops could accomplish the more decisive aims in defeating the enemy.

The history of wars and military art shows that the correspondence between the weapons and methods of armed combat is restored not by the use of new weapons in accordance with existing methods of conducting combat operations, which would be a step backwards, but by seeking those methods of conducting armed combat and those forms of troop organization for which the combat possibilities of new weapons can be used most fully and effectively. New forms of troop organization and new combat methods do not occur immediately, but evolve gradually within the framework of the old methods. As a rule, the old forms of troop organization and combat methods are first adapted to the new weapons, or vice versa, and then the new methods are born, gradually develop, and improve until they call for other, still more effective weapons.

Thus any new weapon undergoes a period of formation and proving. During this period the combat properties of these weapons are studied and mastered, and the combat methods and forms of troop organization which are appropriate to them are sought. The duration of this period varies. It depends on the level of development of industry and the state of the economy of the country. The higher the level of industrial development and the greater the economic capabilities of the countries the less time is required for assimilating new military equipment and for supplying it to the armed forces and, therefore, for determining new forms of troop organization and methods of waging war. For example, firearms first appeared in Western

Europe in the first half of the 14th Century. However, it took about four centuries for these weapons to be perfected enough so that they could become the basic means of combat and bring about a complete revolution in military affairs. About three hundred years were required to develop rifled weapons to the point where they could replace smooth-bore weapons and play a decisive role in warfare and in determining new forms of troop organization and new combat methods.

With the development of industry, the subsequent manufacture and proving of new weapons and development of the corresponding forms of troop organization and combat methods take less time, especially now, in the 20th Century. Machine guns were first used, on a small scale, in the British army in the Boer War (1899-1902), while twelve years later, in World War I, they were already used on a large scale by both sides and, together with fortifications, they strengthened defenses so much that the war quickly acquired a positional nature. In this same war, aviation was first used as a combat means, and at the end of the war tanks appeared. After only twenty years, during World War II, tanks and aircraft became the most important means of warfare and introduced new changes in combat methods bringing them up to a high degree of perfection. Finally, in 1945 the American aviation dropped two atomic bombs; but after only ten to twelve years these terrible weapons have reached such a level of development that they are, unconditionally, the principal means of destruction in all modern armies.

The advent of nuclear weapons, like the invention of gunpowder and firearms, marks the beginning of a new era in the development of the armed forces and military art. Nuclear weapons and the modern means for delivering them to a target -- rockets -- are essentially new combat weapons which were unforeseen previously. They have enormous destructive capabilities which, for the first time in history, convert weapons from means of supporting and assuring the combat activities of troops into means of independent fulfillment of operational and strategic missions. Strategy, operational art and tactics have at their disposal a new powerful weapon whose combat properties require new methods for conducting military operations, new forms of troop organization and leave their mark on all problems of building modern armed forces.

The extensive introduction of nuclear weapons and other new military equipment into the armed forces has radically changed the quality of these forces, which has already ceased to correspond to established combat methods and authoritatively demands not that they adapt to the new weapons, but that new methods be created which are more appropriate to the combat possibilities of modern means of war. At present, military art is undergoing a period of formation and testing of nuclear weapons, a period of seeking new methods of conducting military operations, new forms of troop organization, and new directions in the building of the armed forces. A distinctive feature of this period is the fact that not much time is required for forming and testing nuclear weapons as a basic means of armed conflict. In a very short time they have consolidated themselves in this role by their enormous combat potentials. However, the search for new methods of conducting war, new forms of troop organization, and new directions in the building of the

armed forces which are appropriate for these powerful weapons has proven to be a difficult problem; military art theoreticians and practitioners both here and abroad are laboring diligently to solve this problem.

This, generally speaking, is the influence of economics on the development and building of the armed forces and on the development of ways and means of waging war.

Armed forces are an instrument of war. However, they do not themselves launch a war nor does the war just break out by itself. The war has been being prepared by the whole of the preceding policy of the states and classes involved and is the continuation of this policy by violent means. But politics is inseparable from the economic system of the state. It is, to use Lenin's expression, the concentrated expression of the economy. An aggressive, predatory politics corresponds to the economic system of capitalist states; a peace-loving politics is proper to the economic system of the socialist states. Thus the difference of the policy of the capitalist states from the policy of the socialist states naturally makes itself felt also upon the organization and development of their respective armed forces.

It would therefore be quite wrong to assert that the quantitative and qualitative complement of the armed forces is determined only by the economic capacities of the states in question. The policy of the states and classes in question exercises no less an influence. It poses the military tasks of strategy and taking into account these demands determines the forces and resources needed for the execution of these missions. Thus, the economy influences the organization of the armed forces not directly but rather via politics and by the instrumentality of policy.

The economically stronger a capitalist country is, the more aggressive is its policy and the more decisive predatory tasks it imposes on strategy. But the strategic aims of a war must always correspond to the combat possibilities of the armed forces of a given country, and to the ability of its economy to supply the armed forces with everything necessary for waging war and to maintain the vital activity of the country and its population at the necessary level.

Violation of the principle of the correspondence of strategic aims of war to the means of armed conflict at the disposal of a given country leads to adventurism in war and in politics and, in the final analysis, to destruction. The sad lesson of Germany in two world wars is a graphic example of this.

In World War I, the aims of German imperialism were fundamentally adventuristic. War on two fronts was too much for Germany and the armies of her allies. The German economy could not withstand the continuous strain and led the Kaiser's army to an ignominious end.

In World War II, the armed forces of fascist Germany were no stronger than the combined armed forces of other Western European countries, but against the armed forces of each of these countries separately the German army was many times stronger. Adopting the strategy of defeating the enemy piecemeal, Hitler's Germany in a short time had almost all of Western Europe

on its knees, subservient to it and its entire economy. In this case, the war aims of Germany corresponded to the existing forces and means of armed conflict and to the methods of combat which she used.

The situation was entirely different when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Here she encountered more powerful armed forces and a country which was stronger economically and politically. The goal set -- to enslave the Soviet Union -- did not correspond to means of combat and the economic possibilities at the disposal of fascist Germany.

The predatory aspirations of Germany were met with the fiery patriotism, the staunchness, and the courage of the Soviet people. This war once and for all convincingly demonstrated the indestructible power and invincibility of socialism.

The growth of the predatory aspirations of the imperialist countries forces them to strengthen their armed forces more and more and to expend vast resources, using for this the main part of their economy. This unavoidably leads to a continuous arms race in the capitalist countries, to the search for new, more powerful means of armed combat, to the modernization of organizational forms and combat methods. The economies of these countries take on a one-sided military development which cannot be continued ad infinitum. It either leads to war or, as a result of unproductive expenditures for armed forces and other military aims, to economic bankruptcy and total subservience to another more powerful capitalist country. Such development was characteristic of fascist Germany, Italy and Japan. At the present time, the United States, Britain, [Editor's Note #17] West Germany, and several other countries united into aggressive imperialistic blocs, are following the same path.

Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and a number of other countries, which are in fact completely dependent on the United States, are examples of the subservience of certain capitalist countries which have entered into aggressive imperialistic blocs with other more powerful imperialist countries. [Editor's Note #18]

By nature, the socialist countries are peace-loving. Wars are alien to them as a means of carrying out foreign policy by force. Their policy pursues peaceful aims. The foundation of their policy is the peaceful coexistence of countries having different social systems. However, the arms race and the aggressive predatory policy of the imperialist countries, openly directed against the countries of the socialist camp, and primarily against the Soviet Union, have forced us to undertake appropriate retaliatory measures by strengthening our armed forces and by maintaining our defense capabilities at the necessary level. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have thus been compelled to have their armed forces in a degree of combat readiness which would completely guarantee the security of all countries of the socialist camp from the aggressive actions of the imperialistic countries. [Editor's Note #19]

||| In the Report of the Central Committee, CPSU, to the XXIII Congress of the party, it was said: "he CPSU shows tireless concern for strengthening |||

our country's defensive might and consolidating our military union with other socialist countries. Our party sees its duty in keeping the Soviet people in a state of unceasing vigilance with regard to the intrigues of the enemies of peace and does everything to prevent the aggressors, if they try to violate peace, from ever taking us by surprise, and to make certain retaliation overtakes them inexorably and promptly."

Therefore, in the socialist countries as well, policy is one of the main factors determining the building of the armed forces. But our policy is one of peace, and the aim of our armed forces is not to capture foreign lands and enslave weaker nations, but to ensure the peaceful labor of the people of socialist states defending their freedom and independence.

Thus, politics, along with economics, is one of the decisive factors of the development and of the building of the armed forces. [Editor's Note #20]

But in speaking of the organization and development of the armed forces, it must not be forgotten that their quantitative and qualitative composition is determined not only by the economic capacities of the state and the demands of strategy and policy, but in the first instance by the human resources available, the number and quality of the able-bodied adult population. In 1905, Lenin wrote: "The days have gone forever when wars were waged by mercenaries or by representatives of a caste more or less divorced from the people. Wars are now waged by the peoples..."[8] Precisely the people have presently become the determining factor in the organization and development of the armed forces, since it is upon the people in the final analysis that the military, economic and moral potentials of the state depend.

The greater the scope which wars have come to have, the more extensively are the masses of the people being involved in war and the greater has become the importance accruing to the question of human resources. They are essential not only for reinforcement of the armed forces but also for work in the rear to supply the needs of war and to assure the vital functions of the state. Therefore a sensible distribution of the human resources as between the front and the rear, between the armed forces and the economy of the country, exercises a great influence on the quantitative and qualitative composition of the armed forces in peacetime and in wartime.

But whereas the quantitative composition of the armed forces is limited by the size of the population and the economic possibilities of the country, their qualitative composition is determined by the moral-political state of the people and the level of development of military equipment. People and military equipment constitute the foundation of the armed forces. The intimate interaction and most rational combination of man and equipment are the basis of the organizational development of the armed forces and the starting point for all methods of waging war.

The problem of human resources, especially from the point of view of their moral-political state, is a most critical one for the capitalist

states. It is the people which nourish the army with ideas and attitudes and determine its fighting spirit.

The high moral-political level among the people and, consequently, among the armed forces in time of war is primarily determined by the just goals of the war in question. But how can there be any talk of a just war for the aggressive imperialist states? Such a war they do not wage and cannot wage. But in predatory wars, the interests of the people and those of the ruling class of the capitalists are in sharp contradiction and it is very hard to enthuse the people to fight in such a war, even with the help of deception.

But for the socialist states, moral-political problems do not exist. The just nature of the wars which they are compelled to wage against aggressors is the source of the high morale of the people and armed forces.

The socialist countries with their planned economy also have immeasurably higher potentials for rational distribution of their human resources between the armed forces and the national economy, as compared with the capitalist states. The experience of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War confirmed this fact.

Despite the great manpower losses of the Red Army at the front, especially at the beginning of the war, and the occupation by the Germans of a considerable territory, the planned socialist economy made it possible to not only fully restore but even considerably increased the complement of the armed forces, constantly made up for their losses and simultaneously supported at the necessary level the war industry and agricultural production.

The question of a broad-scale enlistment of the general public for work in the war industry and in the national economy as a whole acquired great significance in the USSR in the last war as a result of the mass call-up into the Armed Forces and the occupation by the enemy of a considerable territory. The able-bodied population not employed in consumer goods production in rural and urban areas had to be mobilized for work in industry. In 1943 alone, the labor mobilization of the general public yielded 7,609,000 persons, including 1,320,000 for industry and construction, 3,830,000 for work in agriculture and 1,295,000 for work in lumbering operations. [9]

A crucial question during the war was the training of skilled personnel. In the period from 1941 to 1943, a total of 11,600,000 workers were trained via a system of courses and short-term schoolings and also via individual study while working in industry. Furthermore, 1,600,000 skilled workers were trained in these same years via mill-factory schools, artisan and railway schools. [10]

As a result of the call-up into the Armed Forces of a considerable portion of the male population in the USSR in the period of the war, there was a considerable increase in the percentage of work done by women, adolescents and men over 50. Thus, the percentage of women among white-collar

and blue-collar workers in the national economy increased from 38 percent in 1940 to 53 percent in 1942. In agriculture, this percentage was still higher: it rose from 52 percent at the beginning of 1939 to 71 percent at the beginning of 1943. The percentage of women in administration also rose. The percentage of workers and office employees under the age of 18 employed in industry rose from 6 percent in 1939 to 15 percent in 1942; the percentage of those over 50 rose from 9 percent in 1939 to 12 percent in 1942. [11]

Despite the enormous difficulties of wartime, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government managed, with the active backing of the people, to effect a mass enlistment into industry of new staffs and to organize the training and the proper distribution of manpower. Therefore the war industry in the USSR did not experience any serious difficulties from manpower shortage. This made it possible to free many millions of persons subject to military service for the Armed Forces.

At the same time, Fascist Germany proved incapable of resolving the problem of the proper distribution of human resources as between the armed forces and the sphere of material production despite the use of huge masses of foreign workers imported from the occupied territories and of prisoners of war. England, the US, Japan and other capitalist states likewise experienced great difficulties in solving this problem during World War II.

The last world war showed that the problem of human resources, bound up with the necessity of a 100 percent participation of the general public in the labor and military efforts of the country, is one of the most acute problems of capitalism.

Thus, the degree of utilization of human resources and moral potentials of the state in the organization and development of the armed forces also depends on the character of the state's socio-economic and political system.

A definite influence on the organization and development of the armed forces is likewise exerted by the national peculiarities and geographic location of the state.

The national peculiarities of a people find their expression in such typical traits of an army as idealism, patriotism, sense of duty, honor, discipline, bravery, endurance and others. Here, for example, is how the well-known German General Guderian characterizes the Soviet soldiers and commanders: "The Russian soldier has always been distinguished by special stubbornness, firmness of character and great steadfastness. It became evident in World War II that the Soviet high command also is highly capable in the realm of strategy. It would be right to expect in the future, too, from the Soviet commanders and troops a high degree of combat training and a high morale and to assure at least an equal training of our own officers and men. A native trait of Russian generals and soldiers is obedience. They did not lose their presence of mind even in the extremely difficult situation of 1941. The history of all wars bears

witness to their stubbornness. Our soldiers ought to be trained in the same firmness and stubbornness." [12]

And here is how the Portuguese military writer Miksche characterizes the German soldier: "The German soldier is well-trained, very disciplined, devoted to duty and punctual and reliable. He has a highly developed feeling of responsibility and to a certain extent of initiative... But the well-known inclination of the Germans toward accuracy sometimes develops into the opposite, operating like a boomerang. Everything must go according to plan down to the most trifling details; but if for some reason the plan of operation suffers a lesion, then the whole meticulously prepared system goes to pieces." [13]

Miksche remarks that the American soldier is characterized by dynamism and poor discipline, technical skill, low morale and narrow political horizon.

The national peculiarities of individuals exercise an influence on the procedure for formation of units and sub-units, on the methods of tactical operations of troops, on their combat capacity and combat qualities.

For the capitalist armies, heterogeneous as they are in their composition, and also for the combined military forces of the imperialist military blocs, the national peculiarities of human beings are an acute problem, which it is impossible to solve in the context of a capitalist society founded on antagonistic contradictions, including those bound up with the national question. In World War I, the Austro-Hungarian army went to pieces at the very first serious blows; the coalition of armed forces of the fascist states proved unstable in World War II. The operations of the armies of the Western allies in both world wars were characterized by the presence of serious discord. Nor are the military blocs of imperialist states founded recently free of acute contradictions and internal conflicts.

For the armed forces of the socialist states, no such national problem exists. Their personnel are trained up in the spirit of equality, unity and fraternity among peoples, in the spirit of socialist internationalism, and are welded together by the single common goal of the fight for the freedom and independence of their own states against aggressors. This is the basis of their internal solidity and steadfastness. A model of such armed forces is the Soviet Army. Multinational in its composition and unified in its military organization, it withstood the most difficult tribulations in the years of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War. Such armies are invincible.

A definite influence on the organization and development of the armed forces is exercised also by the geographic location of the state in question, the dimensions and nature of its territory. The geographic position influences in the first instance the structure of the armed forces, the correlation in them of the various arms. The sea powers, for example, see their military power in the creation of a powerful fleet and give preference to its construction. Continental states, on the contrary, devote their main attention to the development of ground forces.

It is likewise in function of the country's military geography that the special units and divisions are created which are capable of operations in special terrain: mountain rifle, ski, airborne and other forces.

Finally, the organization and development of the armed forces cannot be effected without taking account of the combat potential and trends in the development of the armed forces of the probable enemy, as also the nature of the war being prepared by him. On these two factors depend to a considerable extent the composition of the armed forces, their organizational structure, their disposition, the various types of weapons and methods of waging war. The enemy's resources and methods of attack and of waging war must be opposed by still more powerful means and effective methods for delivering retaliatory blows.

Such, in brief, are the chief factors governing the organization and development of the armed forces.

The influence of each of these factors upon the organization and development of the armed forces cannot be considered in isolation one from another nor yet apart from the over-all policy line and economic development of the state. They are all intimately interconnected and interdependent. However, their influence on the organization and development of the armed forces is not identical.

Some of them, for example, the character of the social system, the economy, politics, the number and composition of the population, exercise a decisive influence on the organization and development of the armed forces in all states, while such factors as the national peculiarities of the population, the geographic position of the state, are not of identical significance for the various countries.

Aside from the factors listed, other factors proper only in the given state also exercise in each state a certain influence on the organization and development of the armed forces, for example, the military traditions of the state in question, the nature and extent of its borders, its relations with neighboring countries, its role in international affairs, and the like. These are all definitely taken into consideration in the resolution of the questions of the organization and development of the armed forces, but they are not common to all states.

An integral and very important element of the organization and development of the armed forces is their training for mobilization and deployment in the event of war. Not a single state, no matter how powerful it may be economically, is in a position to maintain in peacetime such massive armed forces as it requires for the attainment of the goals of war. These forces are always kept at the minimum strength required to assure the safety of the state at the outset of war and to provide for the preparation of military trained reserves. It is true at the present time that the Soviet Union, together with the other socialist countries are compelled to keep deployed large armed forces, with a portion of them always ready for combat due to the threat of a surprise attack with nuclear weapons on the part of the aggressive imperialist states and the presence in these states of professional armies, many millions strong. But even these forces of the Soviet

Union and the other socialist states will not be sufficient for the waging of a war. Their ranks will be swelled by new formations deployed in accord with the mobilization plan.

This question is considered in detail in Chapter VII.

An integral part of the organization and development of the armed forces is the elaboration of questions of military science, the creation of scientific principles both for the organization and development of the armed forces as such and for the treatment of questions connected with the general problems of war, problems of operations, combat, combat training and military training of personnel of the armed forces. The conclusions and tenets of military science on all these questions find their most concentrated expression in the appropriate regulations, instructions and manuals.

The military science of the capitalist and of the socialist states serves a different policy and pursues entirely opposite aims. Therefore, the questions with which they deal find likewise a differing solution.

Bourgeois military science is the paid servant of monopolistic capital. It is called upon to justify the preparation and waging by the imperialist states of predatory aggressive wars, to prove the inevitability and even necessity of such wars, to hide from the masses of the people the true causes and goals of war, to iron out the antagonistic contradictions and conflicts in the organization and development of the armed forces, to train and prepare them as obedient troops of the largest banking houses.

Soviet military science and the military science of the other socialist states is a science of a most progressive and forward-looking social system, on whose banner is etched: Peace, Labor, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Prosperity. Its chief task is the clarification of the real nature of war, the discovery of its objective laws, the demonstration of the role of man and of equipment in war, the determination of the ways of organizing and developing the armed forces, the working out of methods for the fullest possible utilization of the objective potentials and the subjective factors proper to socialist society for the attainment of victory in a war in the event of a war being launched by the aggressive imperialist states.

The irresistible force and superiority of the military science of the socialist states lies in the fact that its methodological basis is the Marxist dialectical method which makes possible a scientifically grounded discovery and clarification of all the phenomena of war, both in the past and in the present and in the future.

Neither a scientifically grounded organization and development of the armed forces, nor any development of military affairs as a whole is possible, unless account be taken of the conclusions and demands of military science. It studies and collates the historical experience of human society and shows the ways to practical solution of any questions of military affairs in concrete historical conditions. Therefore the constant development and enrichment of military science is a crucial part and a

mandatory condition of the organization and development of the armed forces.

Finally, in speaking of the organization and development of the armed forces, it must be borne in mind that it is carried out in strict accord with the military doctrine accepted in the state in question. Military doctrine is reflected most vividly in the organization and development of the armed forces. It can be said without fear of error that as the armed forces are, so is the military doctrine, for the armed forces are the material basis of the military doctrine of any state.

The factors determining the organization and development of the armed forces are objective quantities. Their operation is governed by certain definite laws. In some instances they exercise a favorable influence, in others an unfavorable one. Everything depends on the conditions in which these factors operate, and also on the potentials of the state and the capacity of the strategic command to utilize them with the greatest effectiveness.

The tasks of strategy and of the strategic command consist precisely in directing the organization and development of the armed forces, on the basis of a proper regard for the objective laws governing them, in strict accord with the potentials of the economy and the demands of a future war, in rationally coordinating the various services of the armed forces and the arms within them, and in finding the most efficient forms of organization of them. Any defection from these demands in time of peace will inevitably make itself felt in time of war.

In the context of capitalist states it is impossible to utilize fully the objective factors in the interests of the most appropriate solution of questions of the organization and development of the armed forces. There the very aim of the organization, development and purpose of the armed forces clashes implacably with the objective factors which determine the organization and development of the armed forces; primarily it clashes with the utilization of the masses of the people, who are not interested in the predatory aggressive wars of imperialism and oppose its aggressive aspirations.

In the capitalist state, there stand behind each service of the armed forces the all-powerful monopolies with vested interests in extracting from the government as many orders for war materials as possible, so as to live off the profits of this business. The objective laws operating in the realm of the organization and development of the armed forces are of no particular interest to them. Here the decisive influence is exercised by another law, to which the capitalist monopolies lie in thrall, namely the law of the making of maximum profits. The more complex a weapon is, the more it costs and the greater the profits it brings in for the capitalists. The race for profits is the chief motive force in the development of new means of waging war of new kinds of weapons and other military equipment.

Therefore the trends in the organization and development of the

armed forces in the capitalist states are determined primarily by the war industry monopolies. These monopolies which are economically the more powerful and are closest to the government and whose reading of the military situation and market is the most accurate become masters of the situation, while the role of the strategic command, headed by the puppets of these same monopolies, is frequently limited to functions of the distribution of military orders.

This does not, of course, mean that no account is taken in the capitalist states of the nature of modern war or of the other factors influencing the organization and development of the armed forces. These are indeed all taken into account but they are measured not by criteria of strategy but rather by the criteria of excess profits to which strategy is compelled to accommodate itself. The economic politicking of monopolistic capital in the matter of the organization and development of the armed forces gives rise to a competitive battle between the various services of the armed forces for an increase in budget allocations and is one of the main reasons for the incessant arms race.

The situation is entirely different in the socialist states. Here the trend in the organization and development of the armed forces is determined not by the narrow selfish interests of individual groups of persons but rather by the interests of the state, the interests of the people as a whole. The foundation of the organization and development of the armed forces in the socialist countries is the Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army, which provides a scientific basis for the role of the objective and subjective factors in the organization and development of the armed forces and shows the ways in which they may rightly be used in concrete historical situations.

Every opportunity exists in the socialist states for the most effective exploitation of the objective factors in the organization and development of the armed forces. Not only do they here not come into conflict with the resolution of the basic question of the organization and development of the armed forces; their intelligent utilization even increases the potentials of the state and makes possible the most effective utilization of the economic, moral and scientific-technical resources.

But the objective factors are merely the possibilities and prerequisites of a successful fulfillment of one task or another. To convert these possibilities into actuality there is need further for the conscious activity of human beings, for their capacity to discover these possibilities and make maximum use of them in the interests of the organization and development of the armed forces. This conscious human activity may either improve or adversely affect the organization of the armed forces, lower or enhance the quality of armaments and other military equipment, speed up or slow down the instruction of personnel, etc.

Therefore an exceedingly important and responsible role in the solution of questions of the organization and development of the armed forces accrues to the strategic leadership. On the basis of a meticulous

consideration of the latest tendencies in the development of the means and methods of waging war, of the economic potentials of the state and of the nature of the war being prepared by the probable enemy, the strategic leadership determines the basic lines along which the organization and development of the armed forces shall be pursued, the main lines of their training to repel aggression and also the chief tendencies in personnel training and instruction. The strategic leadership has the obligation of elaborating scientifically grounded proposals in regard to the quantitative and qualitative composition of the armed forces and in regard to the attainment of the most rational proportions between the various services of the armed forces and service arms, in regard to the creation of the most up-to-date weapons and other military equipment and the determination of the organizational structure of the troops.

The work of the strategic leadership on the organization and development of the armed forces is not limited to peacetime. It continues even during the course of war. Whereas in peacetime the whole sense of the assignments of strategy and of the work of the strategic leadership consists in assuring the appropriate and efficient organization of the armed forces and their training to repel aggression, in wartime the assignment of the strategic leadership consists in introducing, on the basis of combat experience obtained, timely corrections into the organizational structure of the armed forces into the methods of their combat use, into the development of weapons and of other military equipment, and also into the training of numerous and most varied reserves for the armed forces.

The socialist social system, with its highly organized economy and inexhaustible moral potentials enables the strategic leadership most properly to resolve all the crucial questions of the organization and development of the armed forces both in peacetime and in wartime. These potentials have been extensively utilized by the Soviet Union and have withstood the test of the Great Patriotic War. The organization and development of the armed forces in the socialist states is being presently effected in a way which takes account of this rich experience. And it must be assumed that the superiority of socialism over capitalism in this area is going to play a decisive role also in a future war, if the aggressive imperialist states should launch such a war against us.

The Basic Directions in the Organization of the Armed Forces

The problem of directions to be followed in the building of the armed forces is, in essence, a question of the nature and the methods of waging war. Whatever the forces and weapons for armed conflict in the hands of one country or another, such are the methods of waging war. The larger the armed forces and the more powerful their weapons, the more decisive are the aims placed before them and the more active and decisive are the methods of their operations.

Throughout the history of all countries, the main preference in the building of the armed forces as a whole, and of each service separately, has been given to the development and improvement of those forces and means of armed conflict with which these countries planned to assure the achievement of their political aims by means of war. || We have already indicated ||

that the sea powers as a rule gave preference to the development of their navies, while the continental powers gave preference to ground forces. The basis of development of each service of the armed forces was the most powerful weapons available and military equipment with a potential for improvement, chosen so that superiority over the enemy should be assured, both in destructive power and in the methods of its use in combat.

Until recently, the basic weapon of all services of the armed forces was artillery. It was rightly considered the "god of war," since it was the main firepower of armed forces. Together with artillery, bombing strikes of aviation and automatic weapons played a large part in the last war. Therefore, all military equipment and the methods of its application were modified so as to use most effectively artillery, aircraft, and automatic-weapon fire during the war. The means of transportation and control, and engineering and other similar military equipment also developed along these lines. Therefore, a combination of high firepower and a high rate of troop mobility with continuous and firm control of them served as the groundwork for the development of the armed forces.

Now let us see how this situation has changed at the present time, and along what lines, from the point of view of technical equipment, the development and buildup of the armed forces is possible under modern conditions.

In nuclear war, [Editor's Note #21] the basic weapon which will be used to solve the main problem of war on land, in the air, and at sea is the nuclear weapon; therefore it will primarily determine the directions of the development and buildup of the armed forces. The colossal destructive power of this weapon and the possibility of making nuclear strikes at any distance now make it possible to solve strategic problems and to achieve the strategic aims of war not by successive destruction of the armed forces of the enemy on the battlefield or by seizing his territories, but by simultaneous attack on the most vulnerable targets over all enemy territory and against the most important groupings of his armed forces. [Editor's Note #22] The targets for destruction will now include not only and not so much armed forces deployed in theaters of military operations, but in the first instance the economies of the belligerents which are the material basis for the conduct of the war, the strategic offensive nuclear weapons, deployed outside of military theaters, the system of governmental and military control and the main communications centers.

Consequently, the influence of combat means is now spread over the entire territory of belligerent countries, so that in a future war the boundaries between the front and rear will be erased and real possibilities will be created for the rapid destruction and withdrawal from the war of entire nations, especially those with small territories. [Editor's Note #23 and 24]

Thus, the nuclear weapon as the chief means of destruction in a future war is presently determining the main line being taken in the organization and development of the armed forces and in the methods of waging

a future war. It is being introduced more and more intensively into all services of the armed forces and is radically changing them from the qualitative point of view: it increases their combat potential, changes the role and purpose of conventional weapons, makes necessary further improvement of the technical equipment of the armed forces and the improvement of their organizational structure and requires the use of combat methods which are new in principle. The nuclear weapon is already the basis of the combat might of all services of the armed forces. Creating the advantage over the enemy in this weapon and methods of its use is the most important task in the building up of the armed forces in peacetime as well as during the course of a war.

It must be taken into account in this that in creating an advantage in strategic nuclear weapons at the present time, the main significance is attained not by the quantitative side but by the qualitative exponents of the combat peculiarities of these weapons and the methods of their use. [Editor's Note # 25]

According to the American National Security Council, the United States and the Soviet Union now have huge stockpiles of nuclear ammunition of varying caliber and designation. The American scientists Harrison Brown and James Riehl in the brochure The Society of Fear wrote that the United States and the USSR together have stockpiles of explosive materials, the destructive power of which is equivalent to approximately thirty billion tons of TNT, or about ten tons for each inhabitant on the earth. |||At the present time, the stores of nuclear weapons have grown even more and will continue to build up even more.||| In such a situation, of course, the deciding factor will be not the quantity but the quality of the nuclear weapons, the means for delivering them to their targets, and the methods of using them.

The enormous scale of the devastating and destructive effect of nuclear weapons of unlimited range and the complexities of battle with ballistic missiles have contributed basically to the fact that in the military-theoretical literature [Editor's Note #26] the opinion is becoming more and more prevalent that it is possible to use nuclear weapons alone to achieve the aims of war, as if no other combat means can play any significant role. According to the adherents to these opinions, massive strikes of the nuclear weapon can disrupt the economy and disorganize the vital processes of even the greatest countries to such an extent that other types of military operations will not be of any real consequence.

For example, Professor Bernard Brodie, the well-known author of many articles and books on military strategy and an employee of the RAND Corporation, writes:

"When we say that strategic bombing will be decisive, we mean that if it occurs on the grand scale that existing forces make possible, other kinds of military operations are likely to prove both unfeasible and superfluous" [14].

Starting from this thesis, he pushes strongly for preventive war against the Soviet Union and suggests the concept of a preemptive strike as a version of such a war. This concept is highly dangerous not only to the Soviet Union but to all mankind, because American militarism from day to day becomes more insolent and spreads openly across America, publicly proclaiming that complete eradication of the Soviet system must become the national goal of the United States.

It is well known that nuclear weapons have terrible devastating might and destructive power, that they are able, with one blow, to erase from the face of the earth entire countries with small [Editor's Note #27] territories. Enormous damage can also be done in large countries, especially when massive nuclear strikes are made against the most densely populated industrial regions. However, in order to completely defeat an enemy it is necessary to eliminate his ability to resist, to destroy [Editor's Note #28] his means of nuclear attack and to eliminate his naval bases. These problems can be solved only by complete defeat of the enemy's armed forces and by seizure of his territories. [Editor's Note #29]

It is not possible to accomplish all these tasks with nuclear weapons alone. Other types of weapons will also be needed, as well as different kinds of fighting equipment. In particular, in a future war one may expect the employment of chemical and bacteriological weapons the development of which is being given great attention in the Western countries especially the United States.

The wide introduction into the armed forces of radioelectronic equipment and its wide use in all areas raises the question of war in the ether (electronic warfare).

This struggle is based on the use of radioelectronics which is directed, on the one hand, to completely cancel or to limit the effectiveness of enemy radioelectronic equipment, and, on the other hand, to assure successful use of one's own radioelectronic equipment and protect it from jamming by the enemy.

One of the main missions of such warfare is to disrupt the direction and control of troops and weapons by active radio interference and destruction of the enemy's most important radiotechnical systems and installations. This involves: destruction or jamming of the electronic fuses of bombs and missiles by radiation; interception of radio signals and creation of interference in the radioelectronic equipment of enemy airplanes and missiles; interdiction of enemy use of radioelectronic equipment for aerial reconnaissance, navigation, bombing and guiding of missiles in flight; and the disruption of the working of the enemy's ground radioelectronic means used for directing troops.

Merely to list the uses of radioelectronics indicates what a large scope may be assumed by the campaign against the radioelectronic systems and resources of the enemy and defense of one's own radioelectronic resources from interference and jamming by the enemy and how serious the

consequences of these measures can be. Therefore, the development of radioelectronic devices has by now acquired the same important significance as the development of nuclear rocket weapons which, by the way, cannot be used without radioelectronic equipment.

Along with the development of new types of weapons, conventional weapons, which still have not lost their combat capabilities and can be widely used in local wars as well as in a world war for solving the most diverse problems both independently and in conjunction with new types of weapons, continue and apparently will continue to be developed and improved.

These are the outlined tendencies in the development of modern armament and other military equipment. These tendencies allow certain assumptions to be made about the paths of development of the armed forces and about the main directions in their build-up.

The advent of nuclear rocket weapons and the development of aviation and other means of armed conflict have, as we have already indicated, again brought to life the notorious theory of the possibility of the waging of war by small but technically well-equipped armies. The advocates of such theories fail to consider that the new weapons and the new military equipment, far from reducing the requirements of the armed forces for personnel, increases them both in respect to combat personnel and in respect to support personnel. The necessity of massive armies is also occasioned by the fact that large simultaneous losses from nuclear blows require considerable reserves for the reinforcement of the troops and the restoration of their combat capacity. Furthermore, the increase in the geographic extent of the war and the creation by nuclear blows of enormous zones of destruction and radioactive contamination require a large number of troops for the defense and protection of national borders, rear targets and communications, and for the liquidation of the consequences of the atomic blows delivered by the enemy. Therefore, there can be no doubt about the fact that a future war will be waged by massive multimillion-man armed forces.

It is entirely evident that massive armed forces well trained in the use of modern military equipment will be required from the very first days of war, since both the belligerent sides will be striving to achieve their strategic and military-political aims in the shortest possible time. Combat activities with the vast use of nuclear weapons will develop immediately on a large scale on the ground, in the air, and at sea, and will assume a most decisive and violent nature. Under these conditions, it is hardly possible to count on a more or less protracted period of time in which to carry out complete mobilization and deployment of armed forces as was the case in past wars. At the same time, not even a very economically strong country is able to keep its armed forces fully deployed in peacetime.

[Editor's Note #30] The solution to this problem would be to maintain

in peacetime those armed forces which would be in a position to reach at least the nearest definite strategic war objectives before successive echelons are mobilized and put into action. It is not by chance, therefore, that the most aggressive imperialist countries, primarily the United States, West Germany and the other NATO members, already maintain enormous armed forces at a high degree of combat readiness and surround the countries of the socialist camp with a dense ring of missile, naval, and air bases. Not only do they not reduce their armed forces, but they are continually increasing their military might, especially the means for nuclear attack. Moreover, in planning to obtain definite advantages in the use of nuclear weapons, the US armed forces are on constant military alert: with nuclear rocket installations in the launching position, airborne strategic bombers carrying nuclear bombs of enormous destructive power, and nuclear submarines at sea armed with "Polaris" missiles. Of course, to agree to general disarmament or even to a reduction in the armed forces would mean that the United States and her allies in the imperialist blocs would have to give up their aggressive predatory aims and their piratical policy, which is dictated by the capitalist monopolies. They will hardly do this voluntarily. They can only be forced to do this by the joint efforts of all peace-loving nations, all the forces of peace and progress.

But whatever the nature of the peacetime armed forces, it will be impossible for them to achieve all their war aims even using nuclear weapons. All the same, it is necessary to mobilize troops for replacements in the peacetime armed forces, as well as for achieving the subsequent strategic war aims. This mobilization will apparently take place in part during a time of threat when international tension is mounting and will be complete during active combat operations. [Editor's Note #31]

At the present time the armed forces in the majority of states are divided into services: ground forces, air forces and naval forces. In the Soviet Union, the Strategic Rocket Troops and the National PVO Troops are also separate services of the Armed Forces.

The reasons for the division of the armed forces into services are the peculiarities of their strategic use, the capacity of each service more or less independently to execute strategic and operational missions, the necessity of the most effective utilization of the combat potentials of the various weapons of war and of achieving greater smoothness and efficiency in the command of troops and the organization of supply. It is bound up with the combat properties and the purpose of the various types of weapon, with the character of the combat missions executed by them and the methods of their use in combat. For purposes of the most effective utilization of the various types of weapons, each service of the armed forces is further subdivided into arms or forces and special troops.

The basic principle of the organizational structure of the armed forces is the coordination of the organizational forms with the demands of war, the methods of conducting combat operations, the attainment of the most advantageous combination of combat equipment and fighting man, so as to assure a maximum effectiveness in the use of the various weapons.

The foundation of contemporary mass armed forces will be |||rockets ||| [Editor's Note #32]. They are a decisive force in the hands of the high commands since it is primarily they who will be entrusted with achieving the main war aims: destruction of strategic and operational means of enemy nuclear attack throughout his territory, disrupting war economy, disorganizing the government and the military leadership, disrupting communications, and defeating the strategic reserves. At the same time, Rocket Troops will carry out a number of tasks in theaters of military operations, in particular: defeating important groupings of ground troops and aviation; destroying operational means of nuclear attack, naval forces in the regions where they are based, and supply bases; and disrupting the command and communications systems of the enemy. The solution of all these problems will create favorable conditions for successfully conducting combat operations with ground troops and other services of the armed forces and for accomplishing the war aims.

Strategic Rocket Troops, as compared with other services of the armed forces, possess the highest degree of combat readiness and are able, in the shortest time, to destroy and demolish enormous numbers of objectives over wide areas and at any depth, and are capable of causing the enemy irretrievable losses, and in some cases forcing him to surrender. All this places Rocket Troops first among other services of the armed forces and requires constant attention to their development and improvement.

Regardless of whether Strategic Rocket Troops are an independent service of the armed forces, as in our country, or whether they are a component part of other services, as in the United States, they have the main role in solving fundamental problems in a future war. Therefore, the creation and constant maintenance of quantitative and qualitative superiority over the enemy in this means of armed conflict and in methods of using it is one of the most important problems of the building of modern armed forces. The armed forces of the [Editor's Note #33] biggest countries are taking this same course at the present time.

In addition to the development of Strategic Rocket Troops, nuclear rocket weapons are also being widely introduced into other services of the armed forces. While Strategic Rocket Troops are the decisive means of the armed forces as a whole, rocket troops and rocket weapons of the other services of the armed forces are the basic means of combat for each of them.

Understandably, modern missiles, like any other new weapons, require further improvement and refinement of their tactical-technical properties and simplification of their use in combat. There must be further increases in effectiveness and target accuracy; shortening of the time required for getting them ready for launching; improvement of their maintenance properties and launching equipment; the development of missiles using highly efficient fuels simple in preparation and easily handled; and development of the simplest and most suitable methods, in field conditions, for delivering rockets, charges, and fuel components using all forms of transportation including air transport.

It is entirely understandable that no matter how significant the role of Strategic Rocket Troops may be in a future war, they will still not be able to solve all of the problems of war. In order to achieve victory in war it is still not sufficient to destroy the military potential of the aggressor, his strategic combat weapons, and his main groups of armed forces, and to destroy his government and military leadership. For final victory it is absolutely necessary to defeat the armed forces of the enemy, capture his military bases, if for some reason they cannot be destroyed, and to seize strategically important regions. In addition, it is also necessary to defend one's own country from invasion by land, air, and naval forces. These tasks and a number of others can be performed only by modern Ground Troops who are reasonably strong in composition, armament, and organization. They will play a very important part in achieving the final war aims. Therefore, Ground Troops remain the most numerous service of the Armed Forces and they will have the task of solving the main problems of war in the land theaters of military operations.

The organization and composition of the Ground Troops are continually being modernized in accordance with the changing nature of war. The basic qualities of Ground Troops under modern conditions are: high firepower, mobility and maneuverability, the ability to make long marches over great distances with or without roads, and adaptability of units and formations to air maneuvers. The Ground Troops have great striking power and are able to fight under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons. Principal attention in their buildup is concentrated on the development of those service arms and those types of weapons which will best assure that the troops will have the above-mentioned qualities and will correspond to the requirements and nature of a nuclear rocket war.

For success in combat operations by the Ground Troops it is absolutely necessary to have firepower superiority over the enemy, for which the Ground Troops must have those types of nuclear and conventional weapons which would allow them to destroy any targets throughout the depth of operational formation, independent of weather, visibility, or enemy countermeasures.

Therefore, rocket troops gain developmental advantages in the Ground Troops, just as in the other services of the Armed Forces. In time they will become the basic branch with the ability to destroy any objectives in the interest of achieving operational goals. [Editor's Note #34]

The Ground Forces' rocket troops will be the basis of their combat might. They will be used to destroy the crucial targets and any groupings of enemy troops which have for any reason survived the nuclear missile blows of the Strategic Rocket Troops. Thereby the way will be cleared for tank and motorized troops to carry out rapid penetration in depth. And this same arm will be able, in case of necessity, to halt the surviving advancing enemy groupings by hitting them with nuclear blows. In order to solve these problems, the rocket units of the Ground Troops must have sufficient numerical strength and be an independent branch having high mobility, the ability to carry out maneuvers with tank and motorized

infantry troops and to work closely, when necessary, with Strategic Rocket Troops.

Of the conventional means of fire support, Ground Forces need those weapons which can provide simultaneously a large mass of fire for suppressing enemy nuclear rocket weapons and his centers of resistance and for destroying tanks. Chiefly, these are rocket artillery and anti-tank rockets which, obviously, must be further developed.

In the Ground Troops the specific importance of tank troops will apparently be even further increased. Tanks are more resistant to the effects of nuclear weapons, possess high powers of penetration and high speed without the need for roads, and are able to accomplish fast maneuvers and make strikes in great depth. They can quickly pass through enemy zones of radioactive contamination and use the results of their nuclear strikes with the greatest effect.

Tank units and larger units and formations have high artillery firepower and are able, like artillery, to destroy and overwhelm open and concealed targets. With competent organization they are in a position not only to use effectively the results of nuclear strikes, but also with their many guns and armored strikes to remove from their path survivors of resisting enemy troops; they can make swift strikes along their flanks and to the rear and can make continuous deep penetrations. Of all the service arms, tank troops are best suited to war with nuclear rockets.

However, it must be taken into account that present-day tanks have become very vulnerable to antitank weapons, the development of which today forestalls the development of tanks. Therefore, trends in the further improvement of tanks are to increase the protective properties of armor against antitank weapons and penetrating radiation, and to increase the power of their armament, rated cruising range, mobility and maneuverability, and to increase their terrain-penetrating capabilities over soft ground.

In general, the problem of increasing the speed and maneuverability of Ground Troops is of primary significance in contemporary circumstances.

The ability of Ground Troops for quick motion and swift maneuvers must exceed that of past wars. To achieve victory in a future war, it is not enough to have nuclear weapons and to have means for delivering them to a target with high accuracy; it is also necessary that the Ground Troops be able to move into regions which have been subjected to nuclear strikes. Only when this problem has been solved can one speak of the effective use of the results of nuclear strikes by tanks and infantry for final defeat of the enemy, deployment of wide maneuvering actions, and the development of a decisive offense in depth. The old principle of combining firepower and high-speed troop mobility when they are under continuous control has taken on now new, even greater significance. Today, together with increased speed, mobility, and terrain-penetrating ability of tank troops, the necessity has arisen of providing even motorized infantry troops with fast, cross-country vehicles, which have high survivability, and with which it would be possible

not only to cover great distances but also, without haste, to carry out combat operations under the most complex conditions of terrain and situation, and which when necessary could be airlifted together with the troops.

Dismounted attack in a future war will obviously be a rare phenomenon. Destruction of the enemy will be achieved primarily by nuclear weapon fire; in close combat, when it is impossible to use nuclear weapons, the firepower of conventional weapons alone will be used, particularly that of tanks, aviation, artillery, and infantry, combined with high mobility and maneuverability. It must be borne in mind that under modern conditions success in battle and operations will often be attained by the destruction with nuclear weapons, of individual enemy groupings carrying out combat operations along a wide front and in great depth, and by the swift penetration of tank and motorized infantry troops for surprise attacks along the flanks and in the rear areas against surviving and resisting enemy groupings.

In addition, it must be taken into account that when carrying out maneuvers, troops may encounter in a future war insurmountable obstacles in the form of vast zones of destruction and radioactive contamination created as a result of nuclear strikes. Therefore, speed in carrying out land maneuvers at the high rates of development of modern combat operations will not always assure timely fulfillment of the mission assigned to the infantry. If we also take into account the necessity in modern operations of partial movements of troops to the enemy interior, it becomes obvious that air maneuvers will be most appropriate to the requirements of a nuclear rocket war. This is the most suitable method for accomplishing maneuvers in modern warfare. For most timely and effective use of the results of nuclear strikes, it is necessary to shift troops to the appropriate regions fast enough so that the enemy there does not have time to organize himself or to shift his troops there from other areas. Therefore, modern motorized infantry, with the exception of units and subunits with heavy weapons, must be able to be transported quickly by air over both short and long distances. This will become, for the infantry, an ordinary phenomenon such as railroad or automobile transportation, for example.

Solution of the problem of transportation of tank and motorized infantry troops by air does not eliminate the necessity of having special airborne troops trained to make parachute drops, airborne landings, and to perform tasks in the enemy rear areas. Moreover, it should be expected that the role of airborne troops in the operations of a future war and their importance among Ground Troops will increase considerably. This can be explained by the changing nature and increased number of tasks to be performed. In the last war, airborne troops were used chiefly for support of ground troops in defeating enemy groupings, while now they must also perform independently such missions as capture and retention or destruction of nuclear missile, air force and naval bases, and other important objectives deep within the theaters of military operations.

Because of the fact that tactical aviation in many armies will soon

become one of the basic means of employing nuclear weapons, air defense troops take on increasing value in the Ground Troops. They will have the main role in repelling enemy nuclear air attacks against groupings of ground troops and rear-area operation objectives. In order to solve these problems, the troops of air defense of the Ground Troops must have improved surface-to-air missiles in order to reliably intercept and destroy enemy airplanes and tactical missiles at sufficiently long ranges and at low and medium altitudes. Fighter aviation [Editor's Note #35] must have such tactical-technical data and such rocket and radar weapons as would allow them to positively destroy enemy aerial targets at any altitude and at ranges which would provide protection for its troops from the effects of means of enemy aerial attacks.

Speaking of the development of the Ground Troops as a whole, it is necessary to bear in mind that it involves not only the introduction of new and the improvement of old military equipment, but also thorough improvement of the organizational structure. We know that the mobility and maneuverability of troops depend not only on the means of transportation, but also on the organization of units, the command system, the combat methods employed by them, and, finally, the training and coordination of combat organisms and the moral-political condition of the troops.

A typical feature of the organizational structuring of ground forces in all advanced states at the present time is the effort to increase the maneuverability and mobility of the units and divisions with a simultaneous enhancement of their striking and fire power. This is achieved by reduction of personnel, complete motorization and mechanization, and the introduction into armament of tactical nuclear weapons with sufficient range and high degree of mobility.

Due to the development of the means of air attack, particularly the nuclear rocket weapon, the role and importance of National PVO Troops has increased immeasurably in the system of the Armed Forces. This service of the Armed Forces was created for the purpose of antiair (PVO) and anti-missile (PRO) defense of the country. Its mission, in conjunction with the PVO troops of the Ground Forces, is to prevent penetration by enemy means of air attack into the air space of the country and to prevent his nuclear attacks against the most important regions and objectives of the country and against groups of the Armed Forces: rocket troops, air, and naval bases; areas of the location and organization of strategic reserves; materiel storage bases; control points; communications; and other important objectives. If we say that in a future war rocket troops will have the main role in making nuclear attacks on objectives throughout the enemy territory, then the National PVO Troops will play the principal part in protecting the country from these attacks, in repelling enemy nuclear attack. The National PVO Troops can also play a large part in safeguarding the operations of the other services of the Armed Forces.

In order to solve these problems, the National PVO Troops need highly effective means of detecting, sighting, and destroying aerial targets. Today, the backbone of the active means of air defense is the surface-to-air missile troops, whose weapons have considerable range and

high accuracy for destroying enemy planes.

The most important prospect for the development of the surface-to-air missiles, in addition to increased length of range, is the increase in their extreme vertical range, making it possible to destroy enemy aircraft at those distances and altitudes which would fully exclude them from using "air-to-ground" missiles against important targets.

When account is taken of the prospects and trends in the development of strategic and tactical aircraft both in our country and abroad, it can be said that fighter aircraft will apparently play a considerable role in the air defense system of the country for the next few years. Its development with regard to increasing the speed, altitude, and range, and improving missiles and radar, will allow it to conduct successful combat in the future against enemy bombers. A modern air defense plane must be able to remain aloft for a long time and carry out radar patrols and to shoot down an enemy in the air at any altitude at which he appears.

The rapid development of nuclear rocket weapons and their evolution into the basic means for making nuclear strikes on objectives in the interior of a country poses a very serious problem for all countries in the matter of creating an effective antimissile defense capable of destroying enemy ballistic missiles in the air. In principle, the technical solution of this problem has now been found.

The rapid development of spacecraft and specifically of artificial earth satellites, which can be launched for the most diverse purposes, even as vehicles for nuclear weapons, has put a new problem on the agenda, that of defense against space devices -- PKO. It is still early to predict what line will be taken in the solution of this problem, but as surely as an offensive weapon is created, a defensive one will be too.

Radio-engineering troops acquire increasing importance in the National PVO system; they detect aerial targets and guide surface-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft to them. In order to ensure fulfillment of these missions, it is important, in the air defense system of the country, to have a continuous radar coverage with the boundary of detection as far as possible from the borders of the country and from protected targets, in order to have enough time to prepare the active weapons of PVO for repelling the enemy air attack. The radar coverage is planned so as to assure detection and guidance at all altitudes at which modern means of enemy air attacks might be used.

There must be a big-scale development in the air defense system of jamming devices which can be used effectively against the guidance systems of manned and unmanned air-attack weapons.

The most important problem in the area of the development of PVO Troops is improvement in the automation of systems for orientation, target designation, and guidance of surface-to-air missiles, fighter aircraft, and radar troops.

Thus, air defense systems and equipment must be developed along the following lines: an increase in their effectiveness and reliability, an increase in the range and jamming resistance immunity to surface-to-air and aviation missile complexes, the wide introduction of automation in commanding troops in order to assure positive destruction of any aerial targets, using countermeasures at all altitudes and with a minimum expenditure of air defense weapons.

However, the development of National PVO Troops must consist not only of improvement in military equipment, but also of improvement in their organizational structure, which will allow them to use their combat capabilities to the utmost. Simultaneous solution of these problems will assure the creation of a PVO and PRO system which would be insurmountable by all modern means of enemy air attack, or at least would reduce to a minimum the possibility of breakthrough to protected objectives.

Today, the Air Force is in a special situation. In recent years, there has been keen competition between the bomber, the missile, and air defense weapons. In this competition, air defense weapons have gained a great advantage over bomber aviation. Long-range bombers, whose flight it is practically impossible to conceal, given the modern radar reconnaissance resources, have become especially vulnerable. In covering great distances at relatively low flight speeds, long-range bombers will often be forced to be in an air defense zone for extended periods of time, which seriously complicates their carrying out combat operations.

Consequently, the missions of destruction of targets deep in the enemy's territory will be executed more reliably by the Strategic Rocket Troops.

True, "air-to-ground" type missiles with range up to 400-600 kilometers and more have been developed on a broad scale abroad. This is considerably expanding the capacities of long-range bombers which are beginning to be converted into rocket carriers capable of delivering blows at enemy targets without entering the zone of his air defense. Thus, for example, the "Hound Dog" missile (range of about 800 kilometers) has been incorporated into the U.S. Strategic Air Force's arsenal; and in England the "Blue Steel" missile (range: 600-1000 kilometers) is being developed. But even in this case the strategic bomber aircraft cannot regain its lost importance. Its speed is too low as compared with that of ballistic missiles.

A considerable portion of the missions formerly executed by frontal (tactical) bombers are also beginning to be handed over to operational-tactical missiles. But even this type of aircraft has not entirely exhausted its combat potential. The arming of bombers and fighter bombers with various classes of missiles enables them to operate successfully on the battlefield and to execute successfully enough combat missions in support of ground forces, especially in zones with a weak anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, there are many specific missions, for example the destruction of moving targets, which can be executed more successfully by bombers or fighter bombers than by missiles. The further improvement of aircraft

missile equipment may considerably increase the effectiveness of action of bomber aircraft on the battlefield. But evidently the nature of their missions and the method of execution of these missions will be correspondingly changed.

The combat potential of frontal fighter and fighter bomber aircraft enable them effectively to support ground troops on the battlefield and, in conjunction with surface-to-air missile troops, will be able to carry out missions of covering troop concentrations and important objectives from attack by enemy aircraft deep within the service areas of a front. But for this they must have greater speed and altitude than the enemy. Frontal aviation could be especially effective in destroying the enemy's means of nuclear attack, primarily rockets, on the battlefield. Applying the method of "sweep tactics" and using even conventional weapons, it is able to disorganize the actions of enemy rocket troops, and if not frustrate, at least seriously decrease the effectiveness of their nuclear attacks.

Aircraft have the important mission of aerial reconnaissance for all services of the Armed Forces, especially Rocket Troops. Hence, means of reconnaissance aviation are continually being improved in the directions of increasing their capacity to detect enemy targets at high speeds and altitudes at any time of day and in any weather and automatically transmit the reconnaissance data directly from the plane to the appropriate headquarters over great distances.

As has already been stated, modern war imposes especially high requirements on air transport. High load-carrying capacity, the ability to accomplish mass troop movements and carry huge loads over any distances using the most primitive landing fields and even without landing fields, remain the most important of these requirements.

Speaking of the development of aviation as a whole, it should be acknowledged that it has still not exhausted completely its combat possibilities and prospects in modern war. Taking into account the trends in the development of missiles and radioelectronic equipment, the further improvement of aviation, its adaptation to airdromeless bases, and improvement of technical and flying qualities can considerably increase its combat capabilities in performing missions on the battlefield and in operations in the theaters of military operations.

Long-range bomber craft, armed with long-range missiles, retain the capacity of delivering independent blows to enemy targets, especially at sea and in the ocean, but also on the coast and in the deep areas of the enemy territory. At least for the immediate future, the air force will still retain likewise such combat missions as joint operations with ground and naval forces, especially the conduct of aerial reconnaissance, landing of troops and transport of materiel, evacuation of wounded and sick and assurance of communications.

The direction in the building of Naval Forces, as in all other services of the Armed Forces, is determined not only by the nature of weapons and other military equipment, but also by those missions which they will be

designated to perform in a future war. Imperialist countries with aggressive policies directed against the USSR and the other socialist countries are directing the main efforts in the development of their navies to the building of offensive forces and in the first instance aircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines which are able to make nuclear attacks on important objectives in coastal regions as well as deep within the territory of the socialist camp. [Editor's Note #36]

At the same time, the Navy will keep such important tasks as combatting the enemy's naval forces on the sea and at bases and also disrupting his ocean and sea transport. These problems can be solved most effectively by submarines and planes armed with nuclear rocket weapons and torpedoes. A certain number of surface ships are also necessary to safeguard the activities of submarines and to perform secondary missions such as protection of naval communication lanes and coordination with Ground Troops in operations carried out in coastal regions.

The most important features which submarines should have are: high autonomy, high speed, the ability to fire missiles when submerged, a reasonably large supply of missiles and torpedoes, high protective capabilities and particularly great depth and speed of submersion, and the ability to remain submerged for long periods of time.

These features allow submarine forces to make nuclear rocket strikes against coastal objectives and to engage in successful combat with the navy of the enemy.

Naval aviation must be able to attack enemy warships at sea at a distance at which they will not be able to use their aircraft-carrier forces and missiles for attacking targets in the socialist countries. In addition, naval aviation will be called upon to destroy enemy transportation at sea and at their bases.

In order to safeguard naval combat operations, it is necessary to have sufficient reconnaissance and antisubmarine aircraft, and also special antisubmarine (PLO) and air defense (PVO) ships, radar patrol ships, minesweepers, etc.

Account must also be taken, in the development and organization of the Navy, of the problem of assuring joint operations with Ground Troops and, primarily, the mission of bringing ashore amphibious landing forces.

The organizational structure of the fleet must correspond to the projected methods of combat at sea and to the requirements of a future war.

When speaking of the building of the Armed Forces as a whole and of each service separately, it must be taken into account that the most important principle of Soviet military art -- victory in war by the combined forces of all services of the Armed Forces and of all means of armed conflict with maximum utilization of all their combat capabilities --

remains in force at the present time. Therefore, the requirement of the need for developing and improving all services of the Armed Forces and service arms, their armaments, equipment, organization, and training must serve as the foundation for building the Armed Forces. However, the main emphasis must be placed on those forces and means of armed conflict which will be used for solving the chief problems and achieving the main aims of war, i.e., to develop primarily those forces and weapons which will play the most active role in the war.

In a future nuclear rocket war, this force and these resources will be the Strategic Rocket Troops and the nuclear rockets in all the other services of the Armed Forces. And they must be given preference. It is self-evident that, in the course of the war, the role and relative importance of the services of the Armed Forces, their branches and their armament must vary in accordance with the course of the war itself and the nature of the missions which the troops will perform during its individual stages.

These, in our opinion, are the basic courses to be taken in the building of the Armed Forces; they are determined by the present-day military-political situation, economic factors, and the development of armament and other military equipment. These lines of development are more or less characteristic of all highly developed countries at the present time.

However, it must be borne in mind that trends in the development of armed forces are not constant. They always undergo, and will undergo in the future, various changes depending upon the changes in the military-political situation, economic factors, and the development of technical means of waging war. In military strategy, timely study and consideration of these changes must be made when determining the organizational structure of the armed forces and methods of waging war.

In the building of the Armed Forces of the USSR, it is also necessary to consider all the trends of development in enemy armed forces in order that there be a countermeasure for each new type of weapon developed by the enemy. The main thing here is to have continual superiority over the enemy in the basic services of the Armed Forces and in the basic means and methods of warfare. It is especially necessary to have continual superiority over the enemy in firepower, mobility, and maneuverability.

But to have technically well-equipped Armed Forces still does not mean that all of the problems of their development have been solved. It is necessary that the Armed Forces completely master this equipment and that they be able to use it skillfully in war, in order to achieve victory with minimum human losses. Military equipment can be quickly restored and put back to service, or new equipment can be produced, but it is impossible to replace loss of personnel. Therefore the constant improvement and perfection of the combat skill of the troops is an immutable law for the Armed Forces. The crucial principle of instruction is to teach the troops what they need for war, to prepare them for operations in the complex and difficult situation of a future war. The successful solution of

	this problem is possible only on condition of a strict observance of	
	the principle of the unity of military and political instruction and	
	training, the instilling into all the personnel of the Armed Forces of	
	a high degree of Communist conviction and devotion to the discharge of	
	their military duty.	

The most important quality of the Armed Forces under modern conditions is their high combat readiness and their ability to immediately initiate and conduct combat operations in any, even the most difficult, situation in the event war is unleashed by an aggressor. This is assured by the entire system of the building of the Armed Forces, the necessary staffing of personnel and modern military equipment, in unity and formations and by maintaining a high morale and combat spirit among personnel. Troops must be constantly well-prepared for action under conditions when all modern destructive means, especially nuclear weapons, might be used. Troop location must ensure the fastest possible combat deployment. High combat readiness of the Armed Forces is also assured by the early creation of a system of troop command which will satisfy the requirements of modern war, by highly trained commanders and command elements, and by their ability to accomplish firm and continuous command of troop combat activities. [Editor's Note #37]

Footnotes to Chapter V.

1. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч., т. 17, стр. 187.
2. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч., т. 41, стр. 195.
3. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч., т. 31, стр. 459.
4. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч., т. 34, стр. 197.
5. Ф. Энгельс. Анти-Дюринг. Москва, Госполитиздат, 1953, стр. 160.
6. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 35, стр. 390.
7. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 39, стр. 321.
8. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 9, стр. 154.
9. См. Н. Вознесенский. Военная экономика СССР в период Отечественной войны. Москва, Госполитиздат, 1948, стр. 110.
10. См. там же, стр. 115.
11. См. там же, стр. 111-113.
12. Итоги второй мировой войны. Москва, Изд-во иностранной литературы, 1957, стр. 133.
13. Ф. О. Микше. Атомное оружие и армии. Москва, Изд-во иностранной литературы, 1956, стр. 39.
14. Б. Броди. Стратегия в век ракетного оружия. Москва, Воениздат, 1961, стр. 190.

EDITOR'S NOTE ON CHAPTER VI

Following the discussion of "the nature of modern war and the organization of the armed forces" in the past chapter, the editors of *Military Strategy* next consider "methods of conducting warfare."

In the first two editions of this book, Chapter VI contained four sections: (1) Development of Methods of Warfare, (2) War Plans of the Imperialists and Their Possible Method for Initiating a New War, (3) Methods for Conducting Modern Warfare and (4) Problems of Using Outer Space for Military Purposes.

As already noted, two of these sections have been moved to Chapter II. These were the second section listed above, "War Plans of the Imperialists and their Possible Method for Initiating a New War" and the "Problems of Using Outer Space for Military Purposes." Insofar as the latter section is concerned, the Soviets could not admit to designs of "using outer space for military purposes" since the signing of the Test Ban Treaty. Still wanting the subject discussed, but without any motives attributed to themselves, they have placed this section under "The Military Strategy of the Imperialist Countries."

Therefore, this chapter, "Methods of Conducting Warfare," consists of two sections, (1) Methods of Conducting Past Wars and (2) Methods of Conducting Modern War. In these two sections, nine of the pages are completely new to the third edition.

In the first edition of *Military Strategy*, the editors had noted that "Soviet military strategy should study methods of conducting both world and local wars." The third edition is more specific:

"...the scale of war must be taken into consideration - whether it is world or limited, local, civil or national liberation; whether it has been unleashed by a surprise attack or by the gradual involvement in the war of separate countries, and whether the aggressor uses nuclear weapons in the very beginning of the war or in the course of its waging..."

This added paragraph follows, in general, the stated purpose given in the foreword to the third edition is that "more light has been shed upon the ... question of categories of war in the modern age."

The first section, "Methods of Conducting Past Wars", starts out with but slight changes from the earlier two editions. In the latter part of the section, the third edition introduces "the post-World War II period." Readers are told that new weapons "brought about radical changes in the methods of waging war up to and including a complete revolution in all areas of military art." The section ends with a paragraph explaining the importance of studying Soviet military theoretical writings.

"During peacetime, when there is an absence of combat experience, military science and theoretical foresight possess decisive significance in developing the methods to conduct an armed conflict. ... Military theory must outstrip the development of the means of armed conflict, actively influence their development and, at the proper time, determine the changes in the methods of conducting armed conflict."

In considering the statement by these Soviet military theoreticians that "military theory must outstrip the development of the means for armed conflict", the reader should turn to the first edition of *Military Strategy*. In 1962 the Soviet editors made references to PRO (antimissile defense) and to PKO (antispaces defense). At that time it was highly unlikely that the Soviets actually had the hardware to go with the concepts discussed.

The most significant changes to this chapter are in the second section entitled "Methods of Conducting Modern War." The editors note that "classical military art was based on the principle that the chief objectives of the actions of a combat means were the armed forces, the ground force groupings, the naval forces, and aviation deployed in the theaters of war." The next paragraph points out that "under modern conditions, the situation has radically changed. ... The presence of nuclear charges of unprecedented destructive power and rockets as the means of delivering these charges to the targets makes it possible almost instantly, in a matter of minutes and hours, to destroy any objective in enemy territory." After a short discussion of nuclear rocket strikes, a one sentence paragraph is added:

"This principle has now become indisputable. It is accepted as the basis of official military doctrine by the most aggressive imperialistic states."

This statement is of added interest to those who follow Soviet military writings. The entire section on "Methods of Conducting Modern War" is very similar to an article Marshal Sokolovsky and General Major Cherednichenko coauthored and published in April 1966 entitled "On Contemporary Military Strategy." The Soviet editors' attempt to attribute concepts for waging nuclear war only to "the most aggressive imperialistic states" is not likely to be believed, even by the Soviet reader.

The theme continues. In the discussion of nuclear warfare various "schemes" are attributed to the United States. Soviet readers are told: "Other schemes are also being advanced"; one massive nuclear strike lasting several days and negotiations over a peaceful settlement, if that appears possible; a limited war, regulated (controlled) nuclear strikes, military operations in the theaters using nuclear weapons and simultaneous negotiations, etc.

After discussing these various nuclear models attributed to theoreticians in the United States, the editors finally note that: "from the multitude of concrete situations, it is necessary to choose the most probable and construct schemes for solving its theoretical and practical problems."

After this, the Soviets conclude that "... in nuclear world war, the initial phase will be of particular significance. The nuclear-missile weapons and other new means of combat sharply increase the possibilities of a surprise attack." This is followed by the assertion that "possibilities of averting a surprise attack are constantly growing. Present means of reconnaissance, detection and surveillance can ... in the very first minutes locate the mass launch of missiles and the takeoff of aircraft and ... warn the political leadership of the country about the impending danger. Thus, possibilities exist not to allow a surprise attack by an aggressor; to deliver nuclear strikes to him at the right time."

The editors state that the military leaders of the major imperialist countries plan the delivery of massive strikes ... "with the aim of inflicting decisive defeat on the socialist countries." These plans must be countered "... above all, (by) the strategic nuclear forces and strategic defense forces, which would assure the frustration of the aggressive intentions of the enemy and his complete destruction by subsequent operations."

In all three editions the authors note that the most effective conduct of modern warfare depends on the solution "to the questions of the types of strategic operations and the specific nature of their manifestation." In the third edition the editors have added:

"Around these questions there are polemics. But in essence, the argument is about the basic method of conducting future war: Will it be a land war with the use of nuclear weapons as a means of supporting the operations of the ground troops, or a war that is essentially new, where the main means of solving strategic tasks will be the nuclear rocket weapon."

No specific attempt is made to answer this provocative question, and not a single new sentence or paragraph is added to the remainder of the chapter. The discussion on "methods of conducting modern warfare" continues in detail for another twenty-two pages, and is identical to that in the first two editions.

CHAPTER VI

METHODS OF CONDUCTING WARFARE

||| [Editor's Note #1] The successes of the socialist economy, science, and technology have allowed the Soviet Union to create a qualitatively new material-technical base for equipping the Armed Forces with the latest armaments and to carry out their radical reorganization. |||

However, for the decisive defeat of an aggressor it is not sufficient to have modern means of armed combat; it is also necessary that the Armed Forces know how to use these weapons effectively for solving military-political and strategic problems or, in other words, it is necessary to develop and assimilate the most modern methods of conducting armed combat.

History knows of many examples in which governments with powerful and well-equipped armed forces suffered defeat in wars due to the fact that they had not mastered effective methods of waging war.

||| The term the methods of waging war is used to indicate the aggregate of the procedures for waging military operations, the forms and methods of using the means of struggle, the armed forces as a whole, the services of the armed forces and the service arms, operational commands, formations and units, for fulfilling the political, military, strategic, operational and tactical tasks. The methods of waging war depend on the social and governmental structure of the country, the degree of drawing into the war the productive forces of the government, the general nature of the armed forces, their structure and level of technical equipping. |||

Marxism-Leninism teaches that the basic factor which determines the development of the methods of waging war and military art is the creation and the introduction into the armed forces of new means of combat, new weapons, and new combat equipment, while this in turn depends on the state of the economy, the level of production, and the degree of scientific development. Engels has noted that "...achievements in technology almost forcibly, often against the will of the military command, have caused changes and even revolutions in the methods for conducting battle" [1].

The roots of any war should be sought in the economic and political structure of the society, but they are not generated automatically and spontaneously by the economy. Each war is deliberately prepared for by classes and governments according to specific political aims, and therefore the methods for conducting war, as all military art, depend on those political goals which these classes and governments pursue in war, on the balance of power in the world, and on the international political situation.

The methods of conducting war are also greatly influenced by geographical conditions under which military operations arise and develop. ||| Finally the methods of unleashing and the scale of the war must be taken |||

into consideration -- whether it is world or limited, local, civil or national-liberation, whether it has been unleashed by a surprise attack or by the gradual involvement in the war of separate countries, and whether the aggressor uses nuclear weapons in the very beginning of the war or in the course of its waging.

Only by taking into account all the aforementioned factors and conditions can the methods of waging war be correctly determined and skillfully applied in each concrete instance.

In order to explain the conditionality and the basic historical tendencies in the development of the methods of conducting war, which should also be taken into account under present-day conditions, it is necessary, if only in general outline, to discuss historical experience and to extract the most important lessons of history in this field of military art.

METHODS OF CONDUCTING PAST WARS

Wars originated with the division of society into classes, as a means of solving irreconcilable contradictions between classes, and have accompanied the development of mankind throughout the ages.

Under capitalism, wars became a constant phenomenon, acquiring unforeseen scope and violence. World wars are monsters bred by imperialism. No other ruling class has committed such crimes against mankind as the capitalist class -- the class of exploiters. Therefore, it would be well to analyze briefly the development of the methods of the most important wars if just from the beginning of the twentieth century to our day.

Of all the wars of the era of imperialism, in size, cruelty, and influence on the development of methods of waging war, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 and especially the First World War, 1914-1918, might be selected.

The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, on the one hand, was an example of the treacherous predatory strategy of Japanese imperialism, and on the other hand it demonstrated the rottenness of the Russian autocracy and the economic and political backwardness of Czarist Russia, which led to indecision of its military strategy and conservatism in the selection of the combat methods.

The preparation of Russia for war was slipshod, although the government had information on the active preparation of Japan for a military attack. The technical equipment of the Russian Army was at a low level. The army was trained for frontal attack in closed skirmish formations without sufficient fire preparation, while in the armies of a number of countries the infantry deployed for attack in skirmish formation and maneuvered on the battlefield. The war caught the Russian command by surprise.

By the start of the war the Russian armed forces had not been deployed. The troops were scattered over a vast territory, including Manchuria, the Maritime and Amur regions, and the Transbaikál. It was planned to conclude deployment of the infantry only six months after the start of military operations.

Gross miscalculations occurred in the dispersion of the naval forces. The main forces of the first squadron, based at Port Arthur, were not free for operational maneuvers. The forces in Vladivostok were weak. Individual ships were scattered in ports of Korea and China. The second squadron was located at ports in the Baltic Sea.

Having prepared for war, Japan achieved great superiority over Russia. She had basically completed her intended program for buildup of the armed forces, particularly the navy. By the start of the war Japan had prepared, for landing in Manchuria and Korea, vast forces of ground troops, and her fleet was more advantageously deployed. Japan first of all strove for naval superiority, and then began the landing of ground troops.

Russia, in essence, gave up command of the Sea of Japan without a fight. This permitted Japan to begin the landing of her armies in Korea and on the Liaotung Peninsula undisturbed. Despite the concentration of sufficient forces of the Russian army, the Russian commander, General Kuropatkin, intended to shift to offensive operations only after final concentration and deployment of the Russian army had been accomplished, i.e., six months after the start of the war. Thus, the initiative in the land-based theater of operations was voluntarily handed over to the Japanese.

The strategy of the Russian Army in the land theater in this war was distinguished by extreme passiveness, by a defensive plan of operations, by the commitment of troops piecemeal in going over to the offensive, and underestimation of the role of artillery support, which greatly reduced the results of the offensive operations. The war also demonstrated the backwardness of Russian naval art at that time.

The Russo-Japanese war introduced many innovations into methods of waging war. In this war there appeared the rudiments of the positional means of armed combat; use was made of machine guns and magazine-loading rifles, which reinforced the defense. The troops began to dig in and to create a solid defense front over a vast area; this hindered turning movements and envelopment, and therefore it was necessary for the advancing troops to break through the defense front, where it was necessary to overcome with artillery the firepower of the enemy. The basic types of military action were offense and defense, but withdrawal was also employed. Great battles developed in the naval theaters. The basis of the naval combat operations was the firepower of large surface ships -- battleships and cruisers.

The forms of armed conflict became complicated. The general battle left the scene, and a new form of armed conflict took its place -- the long campaign, consisting of a number of battles or operations, conducted simultaneously or in succession. For the conduct of operations in the Russo-

Japanese War, groups of forces were created consisting of armies, corps, and detachments and, in the navy, of squadrons and detachments. The Russo-Japanese War gave birth to the army operation and squadron operations.

The next step in the development of combat methods was World War I.

A great influence on the development of methods of conducting this war was exerted by the strategic views of the representatives of the German General Staff, Schliffen and Moltke, who were spokesmen for the aggressive aspirations of German imperialism.

Both sides considered that the war would be short and expected that their plans would be fulfilled by an offensive and as the result of a general battle; defense was considered almost a disgrace. Through all this appeared the inability of the general staffs of the belligerent nations to foresee the nature, scope, and methods of conducting war.

The main events of World War I developed on continental Europe -- on the Western and Eastern Fronts. Even the first few months of the war showed the errors of prewar opinions relative to methods of waging war.

By the end of 1914 it was evident that the war would not be a short one, as the general staffs had thought. The war became drawn-out and exhausting. Continuous fronts developed, first in the West, then in the East. When maneuvers had ceased and the war became stabilized in the West, Germany directed her main efforts against the Eastern Front. The Russian Army was forced to go on the defensive. First the Germans succeeded in breaking through the Russian front and achieved some successes, but by the end of 1915 the front was also constrained by stabilized warfare from the Baltic Sea to Rumania.

Thus, the positional form of combat, first employed in the Russo-Japanese war, predominated in World War I.

The machine gun and the magazine-loading rifle made the defense stronger than the offense. The battlefield became empty, the infantry dug in. Troops covered the entire front and created a multizone, multi-position defense consisting of trenches and communications trenches, surrounded by barbed wire. A frontal breakthrough became the only way to overcome such defense.

Both sides sought the most diverse methods and means for breaking through, if only on an operational scale. But this problem was not solved during World War I due to the imperfections of the weapons of suppression and destruction.

First belligerents attempted to solve the breakthrough problem by artillery and mortars, a recent innovation. Before the breakthrough the enemy was softened up with artillery fire, sometimes for seven days. But the result was a breakthrough in only one or two positions, since the defenders could regroup their forces in a new position and the offensive

came to naught.

The German imperialists, despite international convention, attempted to escape from the cul-de-sac of stabilized combat by chemical means. The British and French attempted to solve the breakthrough problem by means of a new weapon, tanks. However, neither of these means had yet become a strategic weapon and had no significant effect on the problem of breakthrough of the positional front.

True, the Russian army achieved some results in penetrating static positions in the summer of 1916 on the Southwestern Front. However, operational successes were not translated into strategic successes because the Czar's stavka did not consider the Southwestern sector to be the main sector and the front was not supplied with ammunition. Gradually, the armed conflict on this sector took on a static form.

Thus, World War I remained positional, in essence, to the end.

Military operations in naval theaters in World War I were of secondary importance. The belligerents entered the war considering that the basic means of naval combat were large surface ships -- battleships and cruisers. During the war a number of so-called cruiser operations were conducted, the fate of which was determined by the firepower from groups of surface vessels.

But even at the very beginning of the war a new means of naval combat, submarines, demonstrated their high combat efficiency. At the beginning of 1915 Germany unleashed a merciless submarine war against her enemies. In 1917 the operations of German submarines placed Britain in a precarious position. World War I showed the vast potential of submarines for combat in naval theaters of operations.

During World War I both sides also used aviation to a great extent. It was used, in addition to the artillery, as infantry support and also for aerial reconnaissance. Germany even tried to deliver air raids to the rear areas of Britain and France, first with dirigibles and then with planes. However the British air defenses and, to a certain extent, those of France, were more effective than Germany's air strikes, and therefore Britain and France did not have too much to fear from German aviation. On the whole, aircraft had no noticeable influence on the means of waging war, since aircraft were far from perfect. At the same time, World War I showed the enormous prospects for the development of aviation and the possibility of using it to strike deep in the enemy's interior. This war also saw the start of air defense weapons.

Thus, World War I introduced many new features into combat methods. General battle as a means of attaining basic military objectives became a thing of the past. War became prolonged and mass multimillion-man armed forces and vast amounts of military equipment were used. Many campaigns, consisting of land and naval operations, were necessary to attain the mili-

tary objectives. The main objective of the military operations was the armed forces in the theater of operations. The war bore the nature of mutual annihilation of troops on the battlefield or naval forces at sea. In this war attempts were made to destroy the economy and the system of governmental control by means of submarine activity for sea communications and air strikes. The basic forms of strategic operations were offense and defense in the land theaters of operations, and the firepower of surface vessels at sea. Strategic offense was conducted mainly during a brief period of maneuvers. Then defense took over and the belligerents went on the strategic defensive.

In World War I, the forms of armed combat received their furthest development. Along with army operations, which became considerably more complex, front operations (army group operations in the West) as well as fleet operations appeared. Front operations were distinguished by their large scale, large amount of participating forces and equipment, and the accomplishment of large-scale missions in armed combat. Each front operation consisted of army operations, and the latter, of a number of battles by formations and units.

During World War I the Great October Socialist Revolution occurred in Russia.

Experience in the preparation for, and conducting of, armed uprising during the days of the October Revolution had a serious effect on the development of the means for conducting armed combat. [Editor's Note #2]

Immediately after the victory of the October Revolution, international imperialism, together with Russian counter-revolutionaries, prepared for a military assault on Soviet Russia. In 1918 the imperialists, without declaring war, began military intervention, starting the Civil War which lasted three years and which cost our people dearly.

The Civil War was an extremely just war, the highest form of class struggle, a continuation of the policy of the proletariat in a socialist revolution -- the policy of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the landowners. [Editor's Note #3]

The armed conflict covered a vast territory. The armed forces of the interventionists and the White Guardists occupied a peripheral position throughout the war, allowing them to communicate with the outside world, to obtain arms and equipment, and to make concentric strikes at our country. The Soviet Republic occupied the central position; it was blocked on all sides, but its army could maneuver in internal operational directions.

There was no solid front, and operational units and groups operated within broad zones. However, forces and weapons were concentrated in the main directions and in the most important regions.

In the Civil War, large formations of infantry and cavalry clashed.

Fighting took place primarily for cities, railroad centers, and important regions and objectives. The attack was often mounted along the railroad lines. The military operations were distinguished by their high mobility, and extensive use was made of turning movements, envelopments, gains into the enemy rear and flanks, brief battles, and pursuit of the enemy.

An important role in the Civil War and in the destruction of the interventionists was played by the cavalry which, in the hands of the front command, was a mobile means for carrying out deep strikes in the main directions. The breakthrough of the enemy's organized defenses was most often made by infantry units and groups, but often this task was given to the cavalry. After breakthrough the cavalry proceeded to the enemy rear and conducted military maneuvers with full scope. However, breakthrough of the enemy defense was not always used. The lack of a solid front made it possible for large groups of offensive troops, particularly the cavalry, to maneuver to the enemy flank and rear. Armored trains, river and lake flotillas played an important role in these maneuvers.

During the Civil War partisan combat received unprecedented scope. Partisan warfare was of the most diverse forms -- from surprise attacks by small detachments and diversionary operations, to large-scale operations with partisan armies.

The Civil War gave birth to strategic operations which were conducted by one or two fronts and were concluded with the accomplishment of the war's strategic missions. The operations of the Civil War differed to a considerable degree from operations of World War I: the scale of operations was increased -- width of zone, depth, and tempo; maneuverability of troops increased sharply, and the results of combat operations were increased. As a whole, the Civil War made an essential contribution to the development of the means and forms of armed conflict.

Soviet military art, born during the Civil War, was the most advanced military art of its time. The Soviet Republic had vast superiority over the interventionists and White Guardists in the methods of waging war and in military art.

World War II gave great impetus to the development of combat methods.

World War II, prepared by world imperialism and unleashed by its most warmongering misanthropic cliques -- fascist Germany in the West and militaristic Japan in the East -- involved 61 countries, almost twice as many as in World War I. Military operations were conducted over a territory which was more than five times as large as that of World War I. The armed forces of the belligerent countries included over 100 million men. Practically the entire economy of the belligerents was devoted to fulfilling military requirements.

World War II continued for six years. The armed conflict, particularly on the Soviet-German front, was of an unparalleled fierce and bloody nature.

The basic strategy of fascist Germany utilized the ideas of Schlieffen and Seekt on massed attack; Ludendorff's theory of total war which envisaged not only the defeat of the armed forces of the enemy but also the annihilation of the population, industry, transport, and cities; Douhet's theory of war in the air; and the mechanization and tank theories of Fuller and Guderian. All these ideas were concentrated in Hitler's theory of the "blitzkrieg," the lightning war.

The ringleaders of the Hitler bloc devoted special attention to surprise attack in order to stun the enemy, to paralyze his will to resist, and to use to the utmost the advantages of an attacking side.

The level of development of the combat means on the eve of World War II, and the fact that the Axis powers had at their disposal large air forces and armored troops, made possible their considerable successes in the first part of the war as a result of surprise attack against unprepared enemies. The countries of the fascist bloc managed to forestall their enemies in converting their economies to military production and assured a higher level of technological equipping of their armed forces with the required materials.

The forestalling of the deployment of the armed forces was particularly significant in this war. Fascist Germany deployed her armies beforehand and in secret. At the moment of attack her troops were completely combat-ready and in the respective strategic and operational organization; the main forces were grouped along the main offensive lines. The same was true of Japan. This gave the aggressive countries great military advantages at the start of the war.

In counterbalance to this, the western allies set up a timid defensive plan of war, very approximate, and not supported with the necessary forces and weapons. The bet that the fascist bloc would first attack the USSR turned out to be groundless.

The imminent threat of the Second World War forced the Soviet Union to take measures to prepare the country to repel aggression.

In the prewar years the reorganization of the Red Army had taken place, increasing its number, really strengthening the military technical power, beginning the rearmament and creation of formations of tanks and motorized units. However, the Soviet Union did not succeed in accumulating sufficient material and technical reserves for waging a large war with the imperialist aggressors.

War was unleashed against the USSR by fascist Germany with a surprise massive air raid on our airfields, means of air defense, towns and villages, railroad stations, river crossings, troop regions, and control points, to a depth of 300-400 kilometers. This combined surprise attack of unusual strength caused enormous losses to our aviation and our Ground Troops, overwhelmed our weak air defense, and disorganized movement along railroads and highways in the border zone.

The enemy at the beginning of the war was able to take the strategic initiative and achieve air superiority. The rapid penetration of German troops deep within our territory extremely hindered the mobilization and deployment of units and formations, particularly in the border regions of Lithuania, Belorussia and the Ukraine, and also disrupted our economy in these regions.

The Great Patriotic War from the very beginning posed extremely crucial and complex problems for the Soviet Armed Forces: to stop the enemy, to bleed white the fascist shock groups, to take the strategic initiative away from the enemy, and to protect the vital centers and regions of the country. It was necessary to deploy the Armed Forces, mount an attack, evacuate industrial materials and materiel from the threatened regions, expand military production in order to defeat Hitler's planned "blitzkrieg," and create conditions for a basic turning point in the course of the war.

The accomplishment of these tasks required a long bloody struggle. The enemy was stopped in the battle of Moscow, his plans for a blitzkrieg were frustrated, and conditions were created for the Red Army to counter-attack only by the end of 1941.

The successful counteroffensive at Moscow and the defeat of Hitler's troops in the main western strategic direction indicated that the fascist German plan had miscarried, that the myth of the invincibility of the German Army had been exploded, and that the strategic initiative had been taken by the Red Army.

However, the outcome of the initial phase of the war, as a whole, was not in our favor. The main cause of our defeats at the start of the Great Patriotic War was the fact that fascist Germany had a number of temporary advantages over the USSR. Germany had a more powerful material-technical foundation and forestalled the USSR in converting its economy to a war footing; the armed forces of the enemy were better equipped and had the necessary military experience; Germany selected a favorable time for attacking the USSR, when almost all of Europe was under the heel of fascism; Hitler could freely employ his main forces against the USSR at a time when the Soviet Union was all alone; Germany used the advantages of surprise attack.

||| Titanic efforts on the labor and fighting fronts were needed by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces and, most of all, much time, to surpass the enemy in military, technical, and economic power. |||

Japan, like Germany, unleashed war in the Pacific with a surprise attack. At a time convenient for herself, Japan attacked the U.S. Naval Base at Pearl Harbor without warning and with one blow seriously weakened U.S. forces in the Pacific. At the same time and in the same manner Japan attacked the Philippines and Hong Kong, invaded the territory of Thailand and the Malacca Peninsula, and captured a number of U.S. bases in the Pacific.

|| The Anglo-American bloc suffered serious losses in the Pacific. This || was the result of the surprise Japanese attack, the unpreparedness of the

Anglo-American bloc for war, and the passive defense strategy of this bloc at the beginning of the war with Japan.

Despite the great results attained at the start of World War II, Japan could not achieve victory. She could not destroy the Anglo-American bases and force the United States to capitulate. The war became protracted. [Editor's Note # 4]

Despite the fact that the war involved most of the countries of the world and the military operations were conducted over a vast territory, the main and decisive front of World War II was the Soviet-German front. Here was decided and predetermined the outcome of all of World War II. The situation on the Soviet-German front was radically different from the military situation on all other fronts of World War II. From the moment that fascist Germany attacked the USSR, and right up to her capitulation, there was no letup in the tense bloody armed conflict on the Soviet-German front, while on other fronts the military operations were of a limited and passive nature. The turning point in the war for the anti-fascist coalition occurred after the Red Army had defeated the fascist troops at Stalingrad and Kursk. The main and most combat proficient forces of German ground troops and aviation were destroyed on the Soviet-German front, which determined the victorious end of World War II in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. At the final stage in the war the Red Army defeated the Kwantung Army, the nucleus of the Japanese armed forces; this was a decisive factor in hastening the end of World War II.

For a long time Britain and the United States conducted a defensive war, concentrating their forces in secondary directions where they often remained inactive, and stubbornly refused to open a second front in Europe. Only when it became quite clear to the entire world that the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces could themselves take care of fascist Germany were U.S. and British imperialists forced to open a second front in Europe.

The true purpose of opening the second front under these conditions was not to hasten the capitulation in Germany but to grab more territory in Europe and to not allow popular rule to become established in European countries.

The second front had only a secondary influence on the war. This is obvious if just from the fact that on the Soviet-German front at this time there were 191 German divisions (not counting the divisions of the satellite countries), while the Anglo-American troops in Western Europe were faced by only 60 German divisions; these divisions were of low military quality and were only 70-75 percent of total strength.

In the main theaters of World War II the belligerents deployed their armed forces, consisting primarily of ground troops and aviation, along borders or along the front. The zone thus created, saturated with troops, in the final analysis was intended to cover economic regions and the political centers of countries and to assure their vital activity, without which, waging war was impossible. In order to capture vital centers and

regions of the enemy, the loss of which would prevent his further resistance, it was necessary to defeat groups of enemy ground troops and aviation. Therefore armed conflict throughout the entire war was of the nature of mutual annihilation of the armed forces of the countries in land theaters of military operations and encompassed a relatively shallow depth, some hundreds of kilometers.

The military operations of the armed forces reduced basically to two types: strategic offense and strategic defense. The decisive role in strategic offense and defense was played by the ground troops; the efforts of the other services of the armed forces, including the air force and navy, were used to support the ground troops.

The basic type of military operation was strategic offense, by means of which the enemy front was broken through, his main forces were defeated, and his borders, regions, and administrative centers were captured. In order to accomplish a breakthrough, great masses of artillery, aircraft, tanks and ground troops were concentrated in narrow sectors. The offensive by the troops was preceded by powerful artillery and aviation preparation, although this lasted a much shorter time than it did in World War I (1-2 hours). Then came the attack by infantry divisions together with tanks, with continual artillery support by the method of successive concentration of fire or the barrage method with low-flying aerial assaults. After the tactical defense had been breached, powerful groups of tank forces were committed to battle to develop an offensive in depth. Large-scale assault operations were widely used, with the purpose of splitting, encircling, and annihilating enemy operational and strategic groups. Soviet strategic offense in the past war attained a high level of development and was capable of overwhelming the German strategic defense.

Strategic defense also played an important role in the past war. Its purpose was to hold the main perimeters, not to allow enemy armed forces to reach the vital centers and regions of the country, to bleed the enemy forces white and create conditions favorable for transition to strategic offense. The defense was more active than in World War I. The Red Army made wide use of artillery and aerial counterpreparation, counterattacks, and counterthrusts which often developed into a counteroffensive and then into a general offensive.

During the first phase of the Great Patriotic War the Red Army conducted primarily strategic defense. During this time the Soviet defense was weaker than the German offense. However, beginning at the end of 1942, the Soviet defense became superior to the German offense. In 1943, in the Kursk Bulge, our strategic defense withstood a powerful thrust by the fascist army. From this moment on, to the end of the war, the Germans were never able to overcome our defense either strategically or operationally.

Consequently, the experience of strategic offense and defense by the Soviet Armed Forces considerably enriched military art as a whole aiding in its development.

Thus we can consider that in World War II offense was more important than defense unlike World War I, in which penetration of defense was essentially unsuccessful. The decisive role in this case was played by the use of masses of tanks and aircraft. The tanks and planes breached the defense and caused the war to be mobile.

The use of aviation in World War II became a factor of strategic significance. On the decisive fronts of the last war the basic aviation forces concentrated on air battles and on supporting the operations of the ground troops. For this purpose the belligerents had large forces of short-range bombers, assault planes, and fighters. The battle for air superiority acquired great significance.

In addition to aviation intended for operation with ground troops and the navy, World War II saw the appearance of long-range and strategic aviation used according to the plans of the strategic command. The United States and Britain had particularly strong strategic aviation. Its use left the framework of military actions in ground theaters of operation. The objectives of strategic aviation operations were the enemy interior regions, his economy, transportation, population, and governmental control system. The purpose of these aviation operations was to undermine the military-economic strength of the enemy, disorganize his rear areas, and demoralize the population.

However, it was impossible to count on decisive results from such operations, since at that time there were no powerful striking weapons which would assure complete disorganization of the enemy rear. The initial phase of World War II demonstrated convincingly that strategical military problems could not be solved through the use of strategic aviation alone. In this regard, in the war between Germany and the USSR, such operations were of limited scope, and long-range aviation was not significantly developed in the USSR.

The United States and Britain treated the matter somewhat differently. These two countries used the theory of aerial warfare advocated by the Italian General Douhet. For a long time all active operations of the United States and Britain against Germany consisted of the bombing of cities and industrial objects. Germany also delivered massive aerial attacks against Britain and other countries of Western Europe. All the large cities of Western Europe were bombed. Germany suffered quite severely from these bombings. [Editor's Note #5]

However, the operations of the strategic aviation of the United States and Britain had no decisive significance in the victory over Germany. The Americans themselves say this. General Taylor has written on this: "...strategic bombing in World War II did not exert any decisive influence on destroying the war production of Nazi Germany. It was a contributing but not the decisive factor in achieving the ultimate victory" [2].

Professor Brodie is more specific on this point: "...the urban-area bombing of World War II must be set down unequivocally as a failure" [3].

The German economy, despite the fact that it was greatly damaged, assured the prolonged stubborn battle by fascist troops in the theaters of military operations. The American Crowley-Clayton Commission has established that the entire machine-production industry of Germany at the end of the war had greater output than at the start of the war. For every 100 war plants, 10-15 were put out of commission; the blast furnaces and coke ovens were undamaged. According to American data, the aviation industry suffered the most. However, the production of military aircraft in Germany increased steadily right up to 1945. For example, in November 1943, 953 combat aircraft were manufactured, in April 1944 -- 1224 planes, and in July -- 1855 planes.

Another aim of the American-British air strikes was not accomplished, viz., the demoralization of the German people. True, the German people suffered relatively high losses from air attacks, but their ability to resist was broken not by these attacks but by the operations of Soviet troops in German territory.

During World War II a number of countries worked intensively on the creation of an atomic bomb. It is quite understandable that if atomic bombs had been available, the results of the air attacks would have been quite different. The United States did not have an atomic bomb until 1945, when Germany had already been defeated and World War II was drawing to a close. All the same, the ruling circles of the United States decided on an atomic strike against Japan, pursuing not strategic but mainly political purposes. [Editor's Note #6]

The development of strategic aviation during World War II and the creation of the atomic bomb and the first long-range missiles made clear the prospects for direct action by combat means against the economy, the government control system, and the population in the interior areas of the enemy. This served as the prerequisite for the appearance of a new method of waging world war, a new sort of military action, in addition to offense and defense in theaters of war.

In connection with air flights over objectives in the interior, in World War II it became particularly important to protect the population, the economy, and the communications of a country. This was the task imposed on PVO [air defense], which also became a factor of strategic significance. The forces and weapons of PVO such as antiaircraft artillery, fighter aviation, and radar equipment, as well as methods of air defense, were widely developed during the last war. Britain was forced to develop not only antiaircraft but also antimissile defense; this was effective against the V-1 winged rocket but was helpless against the V-2 ballistic rockets.

Thus, even in World War II military operations by forces and weapons of PVO were necessary to protect the rear from enemy aircraft and rocket attacks.

In addition to military operations in land theaters and air strikes

in the interior of the belligerents, naval operations were conducted during the war. In the war between Germany and the USSR, naval operations were conducted on a relatively small scale, mainly in the interests of the operations of the ground troops. In the Atlantic and the Pacific, military naval operations were conducted on larger scales; in the Atlantic armed combat was necessary to keep communication lines open, while in the Pacific battles occurred mainly between U.S. and Japanese ships and planes, and relatively little support was rendered to the ground troops.

During the first phase of the Second World War the sides attempted to use a large surface fleet (battleships, cruisers) to conduct armed combat in the naval theaters by the method of close-range fire, as had been done in past wars. However, the use of aviation and submarines showed that cruisers and battleships had lost their former advantages. They were replaced by aircraft carriers which played a specific role, although they were highly vulnerable to air and submarine attacks. Naval battles became conflicts between carrier-based planes. The task of the airplanes was to annihilate the submarine and surface fleet and the aircraft of the enemy. Submarines were widely used against military and transport surface ships. The use of submarine packs was particularly significant; these were controlled by radio from shore and were directed against enemy ships and convoys. The close-range artillery battle of large surface vessels had seen its day, although there were a few such battles in World War II. Naval mine warfare and large-scale landing operations were widespread.

Naval operations had no decisive impact on the outcome of World War II. For a long time the United States concentrated its main forces in the secondary theater, the Pacific. Here there was a fruitless and prolonged war for aviation and naval bases on islands, and for the capture of numerous small islands.

The Anglo-American bloc acquired great experience in large-scale landing operations. But they were rendered worthless by the fact that they were conducted when the United States and Britain had complete superiority over Germany and Japan and met with weak resistance. Each landing operation took many months to prepare (the landing in Sicily took 6 months to prepare, that in northern France -- 15 months) and was carefully equipped.

In addition to these types of military operations, World War II saw the widespread use of partisan warfare in the enemy rear and the use of underground forces which played an important role in achieving victory over fascism. A great influence on the course of the war was exerted by partisan combat in enemy-occupied regions of the Soviet Union. Partisan warfare was conducted mainly in the form of diversionary and reconnaissance operations, attacks by small units on enemy garrisons and important objectives, armed clashes between entire partisan groups and enemy reserves and, finally, in the form of raids by large partisan groups in the enemy interior. The partisans disorganized the enemy rear and diverted considerable enemy forces to themselves. In essence, partisan warfare and underground activities were a basic and important type of military operation.

Thus, the main types of military operations during World War II were

strategic offense and strategic defense; in these operations the ground troops, with air support, played the main role. Strategic air operations against the enemy rear areas, protection of the rear from air strikes, and naval operations had no decisive significance on the outcome of World War II, although they were conducted on a large scale.

The attainment of the final political and military-strategic aims of the last war required the solution of a number of intermediate political and military-strategic problems. The solution of each of these took quite some time and comprised a specific phase of the war.

Definite military operations characterized each period. The period of war, in turn, was divided into campaigns, which were determined by the goals of the armed conflict, time, forces, and equipment. However, in the course of World War II, the campaign did not become an organizing form of armed conflict at any of its stages. During the War, the operation became such an organizing form. A new type of strategic operations definitely shaped up in the course of World War II -- operations of groups of fronts, as a result of whose conduct important strategic missions were accomplished. Several fronts, long range aviation, and often navy and national air defense forces and weapons participated in such operations. Front group operations were prepared and conducted under the direct leadership of the Supreme High Command. The conduct of front group operations during the years of the Great Patriotic War is an important achievement of Soviet military art.

During World War II, front and army operations were further developed. New types of operations appeared for the first time in history -- strategic (long range) air operations directed at destruction or annihilation of enemy rear objectives and also combat activities of National PVO troops which, to a certain degree, acquired the form of air defense operations aimed at frustrating enemy air operations and defending the rear. Naval operations aimed at destroying enemy naval forces, disrupting and protecting sea communications, making sea-borne assaults, and defending against assault operations were extensively developed.

Thus, the Second World War promoted the further development of the methods of waging war. [Editor's Note # 7]

A great jump in the development of methods for waging war occurred in the post-war period. This period is characterized by the rapid development of the means for armed conflict, the creation of new weapons and new military equipment, as well as a radical modernization of existing armament and combat equipment. This brought about radical changes in the methods of waging war up to and including a complete revolution in all areas of military art.

In the development of the means for armed conflict and in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces a qualitative jump took place. This radically altered the character of the Armed Forces, their structure, the technical equipment and training, which naturally caused a complete

revolution in the military art and in the methods for conducting armed conflict.

The character and methods of waging a war have also changed: instead of a basically land war, where the principal tasks in armed conflict were resolved by the clash of armed forces in theaters of military operations, nuclear rocket war arrived, in which the basic tasks in armed conflict are solved by strategic nuclear rocket strikes against the economy, national administrative system, military bases and armed forces simultaneously throughout the depth of an enemy's territory. The protection of the country's rear areas and of the Armed Forces from the enemy's nuclear strikes by PVO and PRO forces has acquired great significance. For the Ground Forces, in coordinated action with the Air Force, it has become paramount to effectively utilize the results of a nuclear strike to complete the destruction of surviving enemy groupings through the conduct of mobile combat operations, unrelenting attacks at great speed and in great depth. The combat activities of the fleets are carried out on the broad expanse of oceans; their basic mission consists of nuclear strikes against objectives on the continents, the maneuvering of missile and torpedo submarines, missile-carrying aircraft and surface ships in the active search for enemy naval forces, their destruction, using missile and torpedo strikes. Fundamental changes are taking place in the forms of armed conflict on all scales -- strategic, operational and tactical.

The war may turn out to be short and swift-moving. The initial phase, during which the sides may employ the nuclear rocket weapons stock-piled during peacetime, may be of decisive significance for the outcome. In this connection the Armed Forces must be deployed and constantly ready for immediate retaliatory actions. The character of the deployment of the Armed Forces has changed; now they must be stationed not only on the national frontiers, but actually throughout the entire territory of the state. And the main combat means -- the strategic nuclear rocket forces -- will be dispersed deep inside the territory.

Having analyzed the development of the methods for waging a war in the first half of the 20th century and in the post-war period, the following conclusions can be drawn.

Each war in principle has been waged using new methods and forms inherent to it alone. The new methods for waging war have assimilated all accumulated historical experience. This experience has been improved and changed in relationship to the development of the means for armed conflict and by the concrete political conditions of the origin and conduct of war.

The development of the means for waging a war has constantly accelerated, especially in the post-war period, due to the introduction into the armaments of essentially new means for armed conflict. In this period, a radical deterioration of the old methods of waging war has been taking place.

The results of the imperialist age have been the world wars, which drew into their orbit the majority of the nations in the world and enormous

masses of people.

During all the period analyzed, revolutions and civil wars directed against the sovereignty of capitalism and for the establishment of a new socialist order have often occurred. The wars of national liberation, in the colonial and dependent countries, aimed at liberation from the imperialist yoke, have also reached a large scale.

Experience from history teaches that the aggressive states, as a rule, prepared themselves carefully ahead of time for war, forestalled their opponents in deploying their armed forces, and unleashed a war with a surprise attack. The Kaiser and Hitler's Germany, and militant Japan acted in this manner. This gave them a decided advantage over the states against whom they unleashed wars. The aggressive states usually fought an offensive war at the outset and not uncommonly achieved serious results. The states undergoing aggression usually were not sufficiently prepared to repel the attack and were compelled initially to defend themselves and conduct a long struggle to take the initiative. Such was the position of England, France, the USA and the USSR at the beginning of World War II.

Wars are becoming ever broader in scope, universal in the true sense of the word, and are being waged with an ever greater intensity and ferocity.

In the wars during the first half of the 20th Century, the armed conflict occurred, primarily, in a theater of military operations between the armed forces of sides. Then the deep rear became more and more the objective in military operation. With the appearance of the nuclear rocket weapon the objective in an armed conflict became the economy, the state administrative system, and the strategic nuclear means together with the groupings of the armed forces in the theaters.

During peacetime, when there is an absence of combat experience, military science and theoretical foresight possess decisive significance in developing the methods to conduct an armed conflict. It is impossible to develop military art without serious theoretical work. Military theory must outstrip the development of the means for armed conflict, actively influence their development, and, at the proper time, determine the changes in the methods of conducting armed conflict.

METHODS OF CONDUCTING MODERN WAR

Nuclear rocket war, if it nevertheless arises, will be waged by fundamentally different methods in comparison with past wars. [Editor's Note #8] This is caused by the appearance of powerful new means of armed combat -- nuclear weapons and long-range strategic means for delivering them to the targets, radioelectronics, the development of conventional combat means and military equipment, and also the change in the political conditions for the occurrence of a new war. Therefore, all attempts to use, under modern conditions, without any changes, the methods of armed combat developed in World

War II are extremely dangerous, since these attempts may be detrimental to the readiness of the armed forces and the country as a whole to repel aggression.

When determining the methods of waging modern war, it must, above all, be understood what the chief objective of action of the armed forces in a war will be and where the main strength the means of combat are to be directed.

Classical military art was based on the principle that the chief objectives of the actions of a combat means were the armed forces, the ground forces groupings, the naval forces, and aviation, deployed in the theaters of war. Stationed on the most important directions or along the state frontiers, these groupings protected the vital centers of their country. It was necessary to destroy these groupings and break through the front in order to penetrate the enemy territory in depth to seize the vital centers and deprive the enemy of a material base for continuing the war. Thus, armed combat was reduced to a mutual destruction of the armed forces in the theater of military operations (on the land, sea, and in the air), which was the only means of achieving victory. Such was the manner in which wars have been conducted throughout eons of history.

Under modern conditions, the situation has radically changed. For rockets with nuclear charges, a front line saturated with troops is no longer an obstacle, and distance plays no role. The presence of nuclear charges of unprecedented destructive and striking power, and rockets as the means of delivering these charges to the targets, makes it possible almost instantly, in a matter of minutes and hours, to destroy any objective in enemy territory. A simultaneous nuclear rocket strike against the vital centers and means of armed combat of an enemy country is the quickest and most reliable way of achieving victory in modern war. The former way -- battling troop groupings in a military theater of operations -- is a lengthy way to victory, although, evidently these actions will still be conducted on a large scale.

This principle has now become indisputable. It is accepted as the basis of official military doctrine by the most aggressive imperialistic states.

The military chiefs and theoreticians of the imperialistic states are trying in every way to conceal the essence and the actual character of nuclear rocket war, to minimize the magnitude of its possible consequences, to fool world public opinion and their own people and to free their hands for an armaments race and preparations for aggression.

The aggressive imperialist forces, and first of all the American militarists, do not intend to employ their nuclear weapons against military objectives alone. They plan to employ these weapons first of all against deep rear-area objectives, against cities, against the peaceful population, against the economy, and also, of course, against the means of combat and the armed forces.

In 1961, a West German military periodical published an article, "Thoughts on Total Atomic War," by a former officer of Hitler's army, retired Colonel Doctor I. Krumpelt, in which he wrote: "Thermonuclear weapons make unnecessary the destruction of the enemy's armed forces which, until recently, was considered the basic goal for the conduct of war. They create the possibility for the immediate destruction of people and of the economic potential of the opposing side. This weapon, so to say, leaps over fronts and continents, destroying the enemy in places most vulnerable to it." [4].

Krumpelt expressed the very innermost nature of the strategy of modern aggressive imperialism. All practical measures of the aggressive imperialist states in preparing to unleash a world nuclear war are based on this strategic concept. [Editor's Note # 9 and 10]

After the second World War, the USA and, partly, England, concentrated their main attention on the development of long-range strategic means and the increase of the nuclear stockpile. The military circles of the USA openly admit that the basic principle of the American strategy is the achievement of victory in a war by means of destroying the industrial potential and undermining the morale of the civilian population of the enemy. McNamara and other responsible people at the Pentagon speak out quite openly on the question of using the US strategic nuclear forces when it is necessary to obtain budget allocations for the armed forces from the committees of the House of Representatives or Congress. The aim of the US strategic nuclear forces is said to be the assurance of the "guaranteed destruction" of the enemy. It is also flatly stated how many millions of the population of the socialist countries can be annihilated, as well as what percentage of the industrial potential will be destroyed.

The military plans of the imperialists and their practical measures for the preparation of a new war are based entirely on the fact that the atomic and hydrogen charges and the rocket weapons are weapons of absolute annihilation and destruction and that it is advantageous to use them against large stationary objects deep in enemy territory behind the frontline. Consequently, the center of gravity of an armed struggle is now moving toward the rear although there will also be fierce armed combat on a large scale in the military theaters near the frontline or frontier.

Right after World War II, even before the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, the basic principles for conducting nuclear warfare had already been determined in the West.

The atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki instilled a belief in the American generals of the decisive significance of strategic bombing using nuclear bombs. That is why massive nuclear strikes with the aid of strategic missiles and bombers, missile submarines, and operational tactical means are now recognized in the USA and other imperialist countries as the basic means of conducting a nuclear war. With these strikes they intend to destroy the population, economic base of the socialist countries, disorganize the vital activity of states, destroy the nuclear means, crush the

combat capability of the armed forces, and thus achieve their aggressive predatory aims.

The NATO countries are also holding in readiness large ground forces, tactical aviation, and naval forces armed with nuclear weapons. However, the imperialists do not intend to conduct a large war with ground forces. They are counting on nuclear weapons, mainly strategic. The ground forces and other conventional means are needed by the imperialists to wage local wars in various areas, including Europe, to maintain a tense situation in the world, and in case of a large war -- to attract the nuclear means of the enemy from strikes against more important objectives and above all, against objectives in the USA and also for invading the borders of the socialist countries after the nuclear strikes.

The method developed by the military imperialists for waging a nuclear war as a war of total destruction and ruin is now being presented as a "doctrine of containment," "doctrine of balance," a "strategy of deterrence," etc. This is a trap, a screen, under which the imperialists intend to continue the armaments race, supercharge the world situation, and prepare for a nuclear war.

The nuclear rocket war, if unleashed, will unfold on an unheard of spatial scale as compared with previous wars. This is due to the practically unlimited range of combat means, the tremendous destructive properties of the weapons, the dispersion of nuclear forces, groupings of armed forces over a wide area, and the involvement of the majority of countries in war blocs. The American military have been trying for a long time to demonstrate the possibility of waging a limited war with only tactical nuclear weapons, hoping in this way to protect US territory from a shattering nuclear blow. However, few believe in the possibility of localizing a nuclear war. Active military operations will probably take place in all main areas of the globe, primarily in North America, Europe, Asia, the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. All countries that are in the opposing coalitions where the important political and military objectives, military bases and groupings of armed forces are located would inevitably be subject to nuclear blows. As for the actions of the army and naval groupings, they can occur simultaneously in all the main theaters of military operations first in the main and then in the other theaters.

A complex problem is the determination of the duration of a modern war. In the past, the aggressive states usually prepared for a quick victory over the enemy. But this was rarely achieved; the wars usually took on a lengthy and protracted character. The imperialist states are also now preparing for a short nuclear war. It must be taken into account that the situation has now radically changed. The nuclear rocket weapon permits the solution of the strategic questions of the war in hours or days. Apparently, in a nuclear war a victory can be counted upon only if the basic power is used in the shortest possible period. Many foreign military theoreticians, for example, believe that the most powerful nuclear blows of the opposing sides can last only 48 hours, and the whole nuclear war, according to Herman Kahn, can last from five hours to two months at a maximum.

At the same time, the possibility of a relatively protracted war cannot be excluded. This can be related to a war in which the nuclear weapon will not be used. The war may start from a local conflict. In these cases, the war may acquire an exhausting and protracted character.

No less complicated is the problem of phasing and creation of a nuclear war scheme. The study of this problem is of considerable significance in constructing a model of such a war with the aim of estimating and defining its probable outcome. It is not surprising, therefore, that the problem of creating schemes and models of nuclear war is given serious attention in the USA and in other imperialist countries.

In the West, a so-called classical system, or phasing, of nuclear war has been developed: -- first phase (initial phase) -- massive nuclear strikes or aerospace operations lasting from several hours to two-three days (according to individual statements, up to two weeks); -- second phase -- elimination of the consequences of nuclear strikes lasting from one week up to one month; -- third phase -- final operations primarily by ground forces and aviation (the conduct of strategic-attack operations within the principal theater of military operations).

In this scheme, decisive significance is attached to the first phase -- a period of intense nuclear exchange. It is supposed that after expending their accumulated nuclear rocket means, the opponents will be incapable of conducting any type of military operations for an extended period of time, excepting isolated areas. The second phase will be used by the opponents to clarify the situation, bring about order among their armed forces, render aid to the population, organize the restoration of the vitality of the countries, determine the consequent relationship between their forces, and to arrange negotiations for a peaceful settlement. If the negotiations lead to naught and forces remain to continue the war, the third phase commences.

Other schemes are also being advanced, one massive nuclear strike lasting several days and negotiations over a peaceful settlement, if that appears possible; a limited war, regulated (controlled) nuclear strikes, military operations in the theaters using nuclear weapons and simultaneous negotiations, etc.

There are many such schemes. Most often they reflect the opinion of the individual military theoreticians and practitioners. However, in these opinions, there is probably also some reflection of official doctrine. Recently, publicity has been intensified for a so-called cautious-type conduct of war, i.e., that the ruling circles of the imperialistic countries supposedly are willing to push for limited aims and try not to allow circumstances to develop to a dangerous point. At the same time, much attention is paid to a "fog of war," i.e., dissemination of false information and camouflaging actual plans and measures in preparing for a nuclear war.

It is quite obvious that a new world war cannot be reduced to some single scheme inasmuch as the concrete circumstances may produce the most

varied and sometimes unexpected situations. Apparently, from the multitude of concrete situations, it is necessary to choose the most probable and construct schemes for solving its theoretical and practical problems.

In a nuclear world war, the initial phase will be of particular significance. The nuclear-missile weapons and other new means of combat sharply increase the possibilities of a surprise attack when compared with the last war. It is not ruled out that the aggressive imperialist countries will use this circumstance as has often been in the past. They can start an adventure and after a short direct preparation, make a surprise nuclear strike against the socialist countries.

However, possibilities of averting a surprise attack are constantly growing. Present means of reconnaissance, detection and surveillance can opportunely disclose a significant portion of the measures of direct preparation of a nuclear attack by the enemy and in the very first minutes locate the mass launch of missiles and the take-off of aircraft belonging to the aggressor and, at the right time, warn the political leadership of the country about the impending danger. Thus, possibilities exist not to allow a surprise attack by an aggressor, to deliver nuclear strikes on him at the right time.

From the lessons of numerous studies and from the statements in the foreign press, it can be concluded that the military leaders of the major imperialist countries understand the term initial (first) phase of a nuclear war to mean the short period of the delivery of massive strikes of the conduct of aerospace operations with the aim of inflicting a decisive defeat on the socialist countries. Those plans must be countered by such actions on the part of the armed forces of the socialist countries, above all, the strategic nuclear forces and strategic defense forces, which would assure the frustration of the aggressive intentions of the enemy and his complete destruction by subsequent operations.

In connection with changes in the role and content of the initial phase of a modern war, of particular value is the maintenance of high, constant combat readiness of troops, forces, and equipment. The imperialists are nursing the idea of a preventive war, of a first strike, and base their calculations on the advantages they can receive from a surprise attack. Under these conditions, the socialist countries are forced to undertake measures so that the combat readiness of their armed forces will be constantly at the required level.

The theory of military art must give an answer to such important questions as: what types of strategic actions will be used in a nuclear war, and what form military operations must take. In other words, the theory of the military art must determine the forms and categories, which would assure precise organization of military operations and the coordinated use of all forces and means to solve the specific problems of armed conflict.

The types of strategic operations (or military operations) and the specific forms of their manifestation in the course of the war (operations, strikes, battles), the combination of these forms, and their interaction

are the essence of the methods for conducting war. Without exaggeration we can state that the development of effective methods for conducting modern war depends decisively on the correct solution to the question of the types of strategic operations and the specific nature of their manifestation.

||| Around these questions there are polemics. But in essence, the argument is about the basic method of conducting future war: will it be a land war with the use of the nuclear weapon as a means of supporting the operations of the ground troops, or a war that is essentially new, where the main means of solving strategic tasks will be the nuclear rocket weapon. |||

In the past war all armed combat reduced mainly to two types of strategic operations: strategic offense and strategic defense, in which ground troops played the main role, while all other services of the armed forces, including the air force, navy, and, in part, air defense forces, were used to support the ground forces. The main objectives of armed combat was the groups of the armed forces in the theater of military operation. True, the rudiments of new types of strategic operations appeared during the last war -- strikes by strategic aircraft against objectives deep within enemy territory, against cities and the economy, and also protection against such strikes. These operations were beyond the scope of strategic offense and strategic defense conducted in the theaters of military operations. But they had no decisive significance in the outcome of the war. Strategic offense and strategic defense remained in the basic types of strategic operations right up to the end of the war; they determined the basic method for conducting the war. This was due to the level of development of armed combat equipment at that time.

Have things changed much? Can we consider that modern war also reduces to two types of strategic operations -- strategic offense and strategic defense in the theaters of military operations?

Certain authors consider that there have been no essential changes in this position, that the basic types of strategic operations, as before, should be considered strategic offense and strategic defense. In this case, by strategic offense we mean those military operations on land, on sea, and in the air, operations of all services of the armed forces. The aim of such offense is a breakthrough of enemy defenses, the breaching of his lines, sometimes even the "gnawing through" of the defense, and the development of strikes deep within enemy territory. The main role in strategic offense is usually played by the offensive operations of fronts, by the ground forces. [Editor's Note # 11]

This is an incorrect concept of the method for conducting a modern war. This is the result of a reappraisal of the experience of the past war and of the mechanical conversion of this experience to modern conditions.

||| The error of such a point of view is that it minimizes the role of strategic nuclear rocket weapon, underestimates its tremendous combat |||

possibilities and, therefore, is oriented toward the ground forces and the usual methods of conducting war. The imperialists by no means intend to conduct a war against the socialist countries with ground forces. They are counting on nuclear, primarily strategic, weapons. Professor Bernard Brodie, in his book Strategy in the Missile Age, asserts: "Speaking of the decisive nature of strategic bombing, we have in mind that if it is conducted on such a grandiose scale as existing forces permit, then other means of combat operations, in all probability, will be inconceivable and unnecessary." [5]

In the postwar period gigantic forward jumps were made in the development of means for armed combat. Nuclear weapons with colossal destructive and striking power, and strategic rockets with unlimited range as the basic means for delivering nuclear charges to a target appeared; a new service, the Strategic Rocket Troops, appeared in our Armed Forces; these troops will solve the main problems of modern warfare if an aggressor dares to disturb the peaceful building of communism in our country. The scope of warfare is expanding; it encompasses the entire territory of the countries in the opposing coalitions and not just the theaters of military operations as in the past.

The objects of actions in a modern war will be the strategic means of an enemy nuclear attack, his economy, his system of government and military control, and also the groups of forces and his fleet in the theaters of military operations. In this case the main objectives will be beyond theater limits, deep within enemy territory. The destruction of strategic means, the disorganization of the enemy rear, and also the defeat of main groups of forces in land theaters of military operations will be accomplished by powerful strategic means: Strategic Rocket Troops, long-range aviation, and rocket-carrying submarines. They will fulfill their tasks by carrying out nuclear rocket strikes according to the plans of the Supreme High Command to attain victory over the enemy for the benefit of the entire armed conflict and for the benefit of a rapid defeat of enemy countries as a whole. [Editor's Note #12]

The frontline ground troops in conjunction with frontal aviation and with the fleet in coastal regions, using the results of strikes by Strategic Rocket Troops, long-range aviation and rocket-carrying submarines against objectives and enemy groups in the theaters of military operations, will destroy the remaining groups of enemy troops, occupy enemy territory, and protect their own territory.

The fulfillment of these tasks requires strategic operations of the Ground Troops; however the nature of these operations has changed compared with the last war. Now it is not a case of the Strategic Rocket Troops -- the basic means for conducting a modern war -- timing their operations with those of the Ground Troops, but just the opposite, i.e., the Ground Troops should utilize to the fullest extent the results attained by the Rocket Troops for a rapid fulfillment of their tasks.

We must also bear in mind that the probable enemy will direct his strategic nuclear weapons mainly against large cities, important economic

regions and objectives, against missile bases, long-range aviation bases, and naval bases, the strategic reserves throughout the territories of the socialist countries, and also against groups of forces in the theaters of military operations.

The operations of the National PVO Troops also must not be subjugated to the interests of the Ground Troops, since the task of the PVO Troops is to protect the territory of the entire country against which the main strikes of the enemy's nuclear devices are directed.

The Navy's operations also must not be tied to ground theaters since in modern conditions it is called on basically to conduct the struggle on the oceans, often far from ground theaters of military operations.

In land theaters the mission of armed combat will be accomplished primarily by offense. But this will be done by the Ground Troops, by fronts, including front line aviation, without the direct support of other services of the Armed Forces. Naturally, the Ground Troops will utilize the results of strikes by Strategic Rocket Troops and long-range aviation on the main enemy groups. In this case the main task of the Ground Troops will hardly be the breakthrough of the enemy defense, much less its "gnawing through." Breaking through the defense is not such an acute problem as in past wars, particularly during the initial phase of the war. The surviving groups of enemy troops in the land theaters during the attack will be defeated mainly by annihilation of the nuclear devices of the enemy and his divisions by nuclear rocket strikes and operations of tank forces and paratroop landings deep within his territory.

By strategic defense we sometimes mean the defensive operations in the Ground Troops throughout the strategic front or in the most important strategic directions. The aim is to frustrate the enemy offensive. Often even the Strategic Rocket Troops are used as a means of defense, while the National PVO Troops have the task of covering the defending troops, i.e., the defensive operations are extended to the basic services of the Armed Forces.

Recognition of strategic defense as one of the basic types of strategic operations of the armed forces in a modern war means recognition of defensive strategy as a whole -- essentially an extension of the situation at the start of the Great Patriotic War to modern conditions.

The imperialists are preparing an offensive war against our country, a war or general destruction and mass annihilation of the population using nuclear weapons. Therefore they must be countered with decisive active operations of our Armed Forces, primarily with crushing nuclear blows by strategic weapons. Only in this way can we curb the imperialistic aggressors, frustrate their criminal plans, and rapidly defeat them. Strategic defense, and then a counteroffensive, under present-day conditions cannot assure the attainment of these decisive war aims.

This does not mean that defense as a forced, temporary type of troop combat operation will not have a place in a future war. Our troops should

study and master defense in order to master all forms of military operations. But here we are speaking of operational and tactical defense. Strategic defense and defensive strategy should be decisively rejected as being extremely dangerous to the country.

Consequently, the question of strategic operations in modern conditions must be decided anew and new methods of conducting war must correspondingly be sought which will assure the rapid and decisive defeat of the aggressor.

Development of long-range means of armed combat, particularly the appearance of the Strategic Rocket Troops, has created a principally new type of strategic operation -- nuclear rocket strikes against targets throughout the enemy territory. If the imperialists unleash a war, such targets will include the enemy's strategic means for nuclear attack, their military-economic potential and the governmental and military control system, and their troop groupings. This type of strategic operation is no longer within the framework of former strategic offense or defense where the main role was played by the Ground Troops. Now the main role will be played by Strategic Rocket Troops, long-range aviation and rocket-carrying submarines using nuclear weapons, if we should be forced to this. It is difficult for the strikes by the Rocket Troops to qualify as offensive or defensive in nature, regardless of whether troops are on the offensive or the defensive on the ground front.

Nuclear rocket attacks against objectives within enemy territory, mainly against their nuclear devices, will create conditions favorable for the operations of other services of the Armed Forces. At the same time the Strategic Rocket Troops, long-range aviation, and rocket-carrying submarines will strike strategic objectives in the theaters of military operations as well, destroying simultaneously both enemy troop units, including reserves, and the bases of operational-tactical nuclear devices, communications, the military control system, etc.

Another type of strategic operation in modern war is the military operation in land theaters aimed at final destruction of enemy troop units, the capture and occupation of enemy territory, and the prevention of an invasion of the socialist countries. This type of strategic operation, as before, will be highly significant in the attainment of the military-political aims of the modern war.

The socialist countries have at their disposal ground troops equipped with nuclear rocket weapons, tanks, frontal aviation, and other new fighting equipment and arms. These troops have the necessary combat qualities for the decisive conduct of armed warfare in land theaters against a strong enemy. Their main task will be to utilize the results of nuclear attacks by rocket troops and aviation for the final defeat of enemy units in theaters of military operation, the rapid capture (occupation) of enemy territory, and the victorious end of war on the continent.

|| In the ground theaters of military operations, front offensive operations will be initiated, in the course of which strategic missions will be ||

accomplished. This will be an offensive in a theater immediately after nuclear strikes by strategic weapons, to which also belongs the decisive role in the smashing of the enemy.

An extremely important type of strategic operations is the protection of territory of the country from nuclear attacks by the enemy, using PVO (antiair), PRO (antimissile), and PKO (antispaces defense). Without the effective conduct of these operations, successful conduct of a modern war and assurance of the normal vital activities of the country are impossible. These operations are intended to repel enemy air and rocket attacks and to annihilate his aircraft and rockets in flight, to prevent them from reaching the most important administrative-political centers, economic regions and objectives, groups of rocket troops, aviation, the navy, regions of reserve mobilization, and other objectives.

The protection of the territory of the country from enemy nuclear attacks can be successful only as a result of active military operations of National PVO Troops. These operations go beyond the framework of the strategic defense during World War II since they are conducted throughout the country and are directed against an air enemy, while strategic defense was conducted in theaters of operations restricted to the enemy's offensive front.

Finally, military operations in naval theaters directed against groups of enemy naval forces to destroy his naval communications and to protect our naval communications and coast from nuclear attack from the sea must be considered an independent type of strategic operation. This type of military operation undoubtedly will acquire a much greater scope than was the case during the Great Patriotic War. The equipping of the Soviet Navy with nuclear weapons, rocket-carrying nuclear submarines, and long-range rocket aviation opens vast possibilities for successful conduct of armed combat over vast sea and ocean expanses against an enemy with a powerful navy.

Thus, the theory of military strategy determines the following types of strategic operations by the armed forces during a future nuclear war: nuclear rocket strikes to destroy and annihilate objects which comprise the military-economic potential of the enemy, to disrupt the system of governmental and military control, and to eliminate strategic nuclear devices and the main troop units; military operations in land theaters in order to destroy the enemy forces; protection of the rear areas of the socialist countries and troop groupings from enemy nuclear strikes; and military operations in naval theaters in order to destroy enemy naval groups. [Editor's Note #13]

To determine the methods of waging nuclear war, as well as any war, it is insufficient to establish the types of military operations. The type of strategic or military operation does not determine the start and finish of operations, forces and means, specific missions, scales of operations, etc. Nuclear missile strikes, offense and defense operations in ground theaters, operations of naval forces on the seas and oceans, operations of air defense forces and means -- these are general military operations without

specific forms or frameworks. They are necessary in theory and practice to establish certain concepts and to bring our opinions to the main, specific forms in which military operations of the armed forces are organized and carried out. Military affairs have an extremely specific nature.

The specific forms of strategic, operational, and tactical use of armed forces, and the forms for conducting war as a whole do not stand still; they develop and improve, they cause old forms to become obsolete; new ones are born which replace them. Those forms which were used in the last war are no longer suitable for a future nuclear war. Means of combat have changed, armed forces have become different, and war is becoming very complex and is acquiring a different character. Inevitably, the specific forms of strategic, operational, and tactical use of armed forces must change.

In the course of a war, each type of strategic operation acquires a specific form -- a form of nuclear missile strikes, operations, and engagements limited by the goal, means, space and time. A nuclear rocket strike consists of several simultaneous launchings of missiles with nuclear warheads by all combat-ready launching pads. By operations we mean organized combat operations by the operational units of various branches of the Armed Forces conducted according to a unified plan and aimed at solving specific operational and strategic missions.

The first type of strategic operation is manifested in nuclear rocket attacks and also in the operations of long-range aviation. Military operations in land theaters will be conducted, as in past wars, in the form of offensive and defensive operations by the Ground Troops and frontal aviation. Protection of the country from enemy nuclear attacks is the task of operations by the National PVO Troops (air defense and antimissile operations). Armed combat in sea and ocean theaters of military operations will be conducted by the Navy in the form of naval operations.

The operations as a specific form of armed combat was born during World War I. Soviet military science, even before the start of the Great Patriotic War, had developed a well-ordered theory of operations that played an important role in the successful conduct of the war. In the Great Patriotic War a great many operations of diverse nature, scale, and result, were prepared and conducted. However, the main types of operations in the past war were offense and defense conducted by operational commands of the Ground Troops with the support and in interaction with formations and large units of other services of the Armed Forces. In the past war relatively independent air and naval operations were also conducted.

The postwar period saw the rapid development of long-range aviation, strategic missiles and operational-tactical missiles, antiaircraft missiles, and submarines. A new branch of the Armed Forces appeared, the Strategic Rocket Troops, and the role and significance of the National PVO Troops sharply increased. The nature and methods of conducting a modern war have changed. New types of strategic operations have appeared. All these caused changes in the theory and practice of strategy, operational art and tactics.

The nuclear rocket strike and each operation is conducted by specific

forces, specific equipment is used, and it takes place within a specific space and time. Strikes and operations are planned and thoroughly supplied in the interest of fulfilling the set missions and activating the developed plan of operations.

Military theory has made use of many decades of experience in developing operations as a completely distinct category having an organized basis. An operation is carried out by one operational formation or group of operational formations such as armies (combined arms, tank, air armies, armies of PVO), fronts, PVO districts, fleets.

Each type of strategic operation, strike or operation of any service of the Armed Forces, is conducted jointly. Independent operations, strictly speaking, by operational units or services of the Armed Forces as a whole do not exist. A future war can be conducted successfully only when all strategic operations are strictly correlated on the basis of a single strategic plan with unified centralized command and if they are purposefully aimed at solving the general problems of armed combat.

Such coordination of operations by the services of Armed Forces in a future nuclear rocket war will be accomplished in the form of strategic operations. The strategic operation is a specific form of strategy.

In the Great Patriotic War, as already noted, a strategic operation was conducted in the form of an operation by a group of fronts, with the participation of formations and large units of other services of the Armed Forces. In each operation of a group of fronts the main forces of the Armed Forces participated; these operations were conducted on the main sector for a given time, and they formed a specific part of the war. At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, operations of several groups of fronts were conducted simultaneously, but they were all coordinated and, in essence, comprised one over-all strategic operation or an operation of several groups of fronts. The conduct of operations of groups of fronts in the last war played an important role in the defeat of the German fascist troops. However, under modern conditions, the forms of strategic operations have become significantly more complex. The means of combat have changed, war has acquired a different nature, and it will be waged with other means in comparison with the last war.

Strategic operations of a future nuclear war will consist of coordinated operations of the services of Armed Forces and will be conducted according to a common concept and plan and under a single strategic direction. The main force of such an operation will be the strategic nuclear weapon and first of all Strategic Rocket Troops and their nuclear strikes. Simultaneously with these strikes or, more probably, immediately after them, front offensive operations, airborne operations, and, in some sectors, naval operations and operations by large pre-frontal formations of National PVO Troops will be initiated for the final destruction of surviving formations of enemy troops in a theater of military operations. Such activities take the form of strategic operations in a theater. In this strategic nuclear strike over the aggressor's entire territory, operations by the National PVO Troops to protect the country from the enemy's nuclear strikes and fleet operations on the oceans are not stopped. All these operations will be directed toward

the accomplishment of the war's regular missions. Events may unfold over vast territories, and they may simultaneously encompass all the main continents and the waters of the world's oceans. At the same time, strategic operations will be fluid and brief. It is difficult to imagine now the results of their conduct.

May one consider that in a future war any one form of strategic operation will be used?

Of course not. War always was an extremely complex and varied phenomenon. This is even more true of a future nuclear war. In working out the forms and methods for conducting a future war, an entire number of questions should be considered: how will the war be unleashed, what character will it assume, who will be the main enemy, will nuclear weapons be employed at the very start of the war or in the course of the war, which nuclear weapons -- strategic or only operational-tactical -- where, in what area or in what theater will the main events unfold, etc. One can solve the problem of the forms and methods of waging war with the consideration of these factors. Some forms of strategic operations may take place in a nuclear war on a world-wide scale which arose as a result of a surprise enemy attack; other forms of operations may take place in a world nuclear war which arose as the result of the expansion of a local war into a world war, and a completely different form of operations will take place in a local war.

Let us examine in more detail these types of strategic operations and the means for conducting the basic military operations of each service of the Armed Forces individually, considering, however, that isolated military operations and solitary operations cannot take place in a modern war.

Nuclear rocket attacks by strategic weapons will have decisive primary significance on the outcome of a modern war. Mass nuclear attacks on the strategic nuclear weapons of the enemy, on his economy and government control system, with simultaneous defeat of the armed forces in theaters of military operations will make it possible to attain the political aims of a war in a considerably shorter period of time than in past wars.

This type of strategic operation has been forced on our Armed Forces in the event of war. The aggressive imperialist bloc is preparing a war for the total destruction of cities, industrial regions and objectives, communications networks, and mass annihilation of the civilian population throughout the socialist countries by means of nuclear attacks. The main purpose will be to destroy the economy and means for armed combat, to disrupt the governmental control system, demoralize the population, and undermine the will and ability to resist.

Using destructive means of armed combat -- nuclear weapons and other devices for mass destruction -- the imperialists will attempt to liquidate the social structure in the countries of socialism, including total annihilation of entire states of the socialist community. They do not hide their plans. For example, Henry Kissinger in his book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, writes: "The idea that victory in a war will be assured by

annihilation of the industrial potential of the enemy and by undermining the morale of the civilian population is the basic principle of British as well as American strategic planning." [6] [Editor's Note #14]

The United States for a long time has had a special office under the Department of Defense for planning the targets for strategic nuclear attacks. This office records all important objectives in the socialist countries intended for annihilation by nuclear attacks. Strategic intelligence by the United States and other imperialist countries attempts to organize continuous observation of these objectives and to detect new ones. All exposed objectives are distributed between the crews of strategic, tactical, and carrier-based attack planes, missile-launching sites and rocket-carrying nuclear submarines. Planes armed with nuclear devices are constantly on alert on the ground and in the air, as are the missile-launching pads and submarines, and a system of signals, alert etc., has been worked out. The American periodical Flying Review for June 1961, reported that the United States Department of Defense had approved a list of 400 objectives on the territories of the USSR and the peoples' democracies which were to be destroyed in the initial period of the war. For this, it is planned to use 1500-2000 nuclear weapons, i.e., four to five on each objective.

This is why the Soviet Armed Forces and the armed forces of the other socialist countries must be prepared to deliver massive retaliatory nuclear strikes by strategic means against the military-economic foundation, the system of government and military control, strategic nuclear devices, and groups of armed forces of the imperialist bloc.

Such strikes can destroy the basic regions of the territory of enemy countries where the economic foundations for war of the imperialist coalition are situated; where the strategic means for nuclear attack -- strategic aviation, ICBM's, IRBM's, tactical bomber aviation, naval forces -- are based; where the basic stockpiles of nuclear ammunition and materiel for conducting a war are located; regions where troop units and large units are formed and the main groups of armed forces and strategic reserves are located; and the main centers of governmental and military control.

The basic aim of this type of military operation is to undermine the military power of the enemy by eliminating the nuclear means of fighting and formations of armed forces, and eliminating the military-economic potential by destroying the economic foundation for war, and by disrupting governmental and military control. The basic means for attaining these ends are the Strategic Rocket Troops equipped with ICBM's and IRBM's with powerful thermonuclear and atomic warheads, and also long-range aviation and rocket-carrying submarines armed with rockets with nuclear warheads, hydrogen and atomic bombs.

These ends can be achieved by attacks on selected objectives by nuclear rocket and nuclear aviation strikes. The most powerful attack may be the first massed nuclear rocket strike with which our Armed Forces will retaliate against the actions of the imperialist aggressors who unleash a nuclear war.

In making nuclear rocket and nuclear aviation strikes, military bases (air, missile, and naval); industrial objects, primarily atomic, aircraft, missile, power and machine-construction plants, communications centers, ports, control points, etc., can be destroyed.

The prime objectives of the strikes will be strategic air bases. The bases of strategic aviation are very vulnerable since the airdromes occupy a great area and are actually all well known.

To deprive strategic aircraft of their bases is equivalent to rendering them unfit for action.

In the foreign press much has been said about the nuclear submarines armed with Polaris missiles. It has been stated that this is the most stable means for the use of missiles. Actually these weapons are vulnerable. Effective weapons against rocket-carrying nuclear submarines are anti-submarine submarines with self-homing missiles and torpedoes and also surface ships.

Rocket-carrying aviation might also carry out the fight with them using some of the weaknesses of these submarines, in particular, the long preparation of the rockets for launch and the great vulnerability to underwater nuclear explosions. In addition, the bases of the submarines might be destroyed with strikes by the Rocket Troops.

Naturally, the task of eliminating the means for an enemy nuclear attack must be successfully carried out. Of particular significance is timely and reliable intelligence regarding air bases, missile-launching sites, submarine bases and positions, the storage sites for nuclear ammunition, and the location of fuel components and control points.

A most important task is the destruction of the military-economic potential of the enemy. Since the imperialists are preparing destructive nuclear strikes against the economic base of the socialist countries, the latter will be forced to retaliate in the same manner.

The military-economic base of the imperialist bloc is highly susceptible to nuclear rocket attacks. Imperialism's main economic base for war is located in the United States. Here are concentrated the basic production facilities of the imperialist camp; these manufacture nuclear weapons, missiles, planes, tanks, ships, guns, and other means for combat and for the material support of military operations. The second most important economic foundation is in West Germany, which has a considerable production capacity. England [Editor's Note #15] is highly industrialized. Large manpower resources of the imperialist bloc are concentrated in European countries.

The vulnerable features of the economy of the imperialist bloc include its high concentration in limited regions, its dependence on imports, and the vulnerability of communications. The United States depends on the import of atomic raw materials and non-ferrous and rare metals, while England depends on the import of iron ore, petroleum, atomic war materials, food-stuffs, non-ferrous and rare metals, etc.

The economy of the socialist countries is in a more favorable position, it is more dispersed, there is not the dense industrial concentration as in many imperialist countries, and, finally, it is less dependent on imports.

Thus, an unlimited nuclear war, a war for general destruction and annihilation, prepared by the imperialists will surely go against them. For this there must be retaliatory means in constant readiness: Strategic Rocket Troops, long-range aviation, and nuclear devices; it is necessary to have an effective means for delivering immediate crushing nuclear blows against the enemy if he forces the socialist countries to this.

Military operations in land theaters in a future world war will be of broad scope, despite the use of long-range nuclear weapons. Final defeat of enemy troops, capture of his territory, the establishment of proper order and peaceful control over all problems after the war can be attained only as a result of operations of the ground troops.

The imperialist bloc is preparing vast land forces, tactical aviation and operational-tactical rockets to attain their aggressive aims in theaters of military operations. These forces can be deployed along the borders of the socialist countries in a zone up to a thousand kilometers deep, in corresponding units, mainly offensive.

The main purpose of military operations in land theaters is the decisive defeat of enemy units, the capture of vitally important regions and objectives and the occupation of his territory, and also the prevention of an invasion by land armies into the socialist countries.

The basic means for armed combat in land theaters in a future world war will be the nuclear weapon used primarily with operational-tactical missiles, and also frontal aviation (bombers, fighter bombers, and fighters). In addition, the Strategic Rocket Troops and long-range aviation will deliver nuclear strikes against important objectives in the zone of the offensive fronts. Airborne landings will be widely used. As before, tank units and formations will be used in mass concentration on the battlefield. The motorized infantry will be just as important, although it will not be the "queen of the battlefield" as in past wars. On the battlefields the decisive role will be played by fire of nuclear weapons; the other means of armed combat will utilize the results of nuclear attacks for the final defeat of the enemy.

The primary objectives of armed combat in the theaters will be the nuclear weapons of the enemy. Without eliminating or neutralizing these nuclear weapons it is impossible to count on successful conduct of any military operations, offensive or defensive, in the theaters. The destruction of enemy divisions -- tanks, airborne, and motorized -- is just as important a task.

A characteristic feature of military operations in land theaters in a future war will be the absence of linear troop actions, the absence of solid fronts. Military operations simultaneously will be extended for great distances along the front and to the rear; they will be, to a certain extent, of a focal nature.

The second important feature of armed combat in theaters is the high mobility of the military operations, the widespread use of trucks, helicopters, and aircraft for troop maneuvers. Maneuver of fire and nuclear strikes will acquire particular significance.

Finally, armed conflict in theaters of military operations will be characterized by great violence the mass destruction of troops, colossal destruction, and the formation of broad zones with a high level of radioactive contamination.

The belligerents in the land theaters will attempt to achieve their aims mainly by offense. While in the last war the defense was incapable of resisting attack, in a future war the offense will be still more superior to the defense. However, defense as a method of armed combat to resist offense will not disappear entirely, although the distinction between offense and defense will not be as clearly expressed as in past wars.

Offensive operations in a future war will be the basic means for solving the problems of armed conflict in land theaters of military operations. They will be conducted by fronts and by combined arms, tank, and air armies. The main role in solving the combat problems of an offensive operation will be played by operational-tactical rocket troops and frontal aviation using nuclear ammunition and also by tank, motorized infantry, and airborne troops.

During the Great Patriotic War, offense, as a rule, was conducted for the preliminary defense of a positional nature, of which the most powerful was the tactical zone saturated by the infantry with its fire-power, antitank weapons, artillery, and mortars. The main task was to break through the front defenses, for which in narrow sectors were concentrated large masses of troops, artillery, tanks, infantry, and aviation strikes. Mobile groups, mainly tank troops, were sent into the breakthrough area.

In a future world war, particularly at the start, in the land theaters the belligerents will attempt to achieve their aims mainly by offense. Considering the modern nuclear means of destruction and the high maneuverability of tank, motorized infantry, and airborne troops, we can foresee that offensive operations will be complexes of isolated battles, sometimes of the nature of meeting engagements and encounters unfolding simultaneously at great depth. It is also possible that the future defense will be used to counter an offensive. However, the basis for such a defense will be fire-power (atomic artillery, missiles, and tactical aviation using nuclear ammunition), anti-tank weapons -- guided anti-tank missiles, and PVO weapons -- surface-to-air missiles. The infantry and tank divisions will, for the most part, be located to the rear; only cover will be extended to the forward positions. Under these conditions, breakthrough of the defense front is not such a complex problem as in the past war; the most complex matter will be development of an offensive in depth, where the offensive troops will be met with strong enemy counteroffensives and be subjected to nuclear

strikes. The main task of the attacking troops will be the annihilation of atomic artillery, missiles, and tactical aviation throughout the enemy territory. The bases for these weapons are within the range of optional-tactical missiles and frontal aviation, and they can be rapidly eliminated by nuclear attacks provided they have been accurately spotted in time. Immediately after the nuclear strikes the airborne troops will be landed, and an attack will be begun by tank troops whose task will be to move into regions subjected to attacks by Strategic Rocket Troops in order to achieve the final aim of the operation. Enemy infantry and tank divisions will be neutralized and destroyed by nuclear strikes and by the swift actions of tank and motorized troops. But we must say that an offensive against a defender must be even more carefully prepared for than in the past war because of the great complexity in destroying the main means of defense -- nuclear weapons -- dispersed over great areas deep within the defense area.

Such problems as preparing the troops for the offensive, directing the strikes, and determining the offensive zone, the depth of the operation, and the rates of advance will be solved in a different manner.

Striking groups will be created to the rear at a considerable distance from the front lines (the country's border). The basic operational structure of the troops will be groups of rocket troops, and tank and combined arms armies. Tank armies will operate in the first echelon in the main directions. The main task of the tank armies is rapid continuous movement to a great depth with the support of frontal aviation, right up to the final goal of the operation. The combined arms armies will also develop an offensive to destroy groups of enemy troops.

The offensive should be simultaneously conducted in a number of directions in order to cut off the enemy groups from one another and annihilate them piecemeal. However, the main efforts of the advancing troops should be concentrated in basic decisive directions. The direction of the main efforts under modern conditions will be determined by the regions against which the main nuclear rocket strikes are concentrated and also by the lines of advance of the main groups of troops.

The offense zones for units and formations are expanding. For example, the American command considers that an infantry division can attack along a 10-20 kilometer sector (the most effective is a 12 kilometer sector) and a field army can attack in a 100-160 kilometer sector. The offensive will be conducted along the lines with great gaps. Enemy groups will be destroyed by nuclear attacks from the rocket forces and aviation and, in a number of cases, by the concentrated fire of conventional weapons. A characteristic feature of the battlefield is the considerable dispersion of troops, the relative sparseness and the possibility of wide maneuvering.

Offensive operations of a future war will be distinguished by high tempos.

An offensive should be mounted primarily on tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters. Dismounted attack will be a rare phenomenon.

The fire and maneuvers of troops in vehicles will now reign on the battlefield. Gaps and breaks in the enemy troop formations must be sought; strikes must be carried out on the flanks and the rear of the enemy troops, cut them off, surround them and rapidly annihilate them or take them prisoner. If pockets of enemy resistance cannot be overcome, nuclear strikes should be used and fire from rocket or rifled artillery can be concentrated against him.

During the operation, wide use will be made of tactical and operational airborne landings. These will have the task of solving problems of the most effective use of the results attained by massed nuclear strikes -- capture of the regions where nuclear weapons are located, important objectives, river crossings, bridgeheads, mountain passes, defiles, and the annihilation of strategic objectives which cannot be put out of commission in any other way. Helicopters will be used as the main means of dropping tactical airborne troops. Transport planes can be used for operational landings. To assure the landing of a large air-drop at a great depth the enemy air-defense must be neutralized by ECM, air operations, and rocket strikes.

A very complex problem in a modern war is the overcoming of zones with a high level of radioactive contamination. The probable enemy is prepared to create special barriers with surface nuclear explosions in the directions of the attacking troops. The radioactive contamination of the terrain is inevitable. Therefore, an advance will be hindered in a number of sectors because of high radiation levels and destruction. Zones with a high radiation level must be crossed by troops. When it is impossible to by-pass these zones they must be crossed in tanks and closed vehicles with the necessary shielding measures or overcome using helicopters and airplanes. It is not impossible that certain regions can be crossed by troops only after a drop in the radiation level with the appropriate antinuclear and antichemical measures being taken.

During the operations the troops must suffer losses from nuclear attacks by the enemy. It is possible that entire sub-divisions, units, and even groups will be put out of action. However, this should not have any bearing on the speed of the operation.

The high combat qualities of our Ground Troops, their arms and combat equipment, particularly the missile armament and tanks, and the maneuverability of tank and motorized infantry units are all a reliable basis for the successful conduct of offensive operations in a future war with decisive aims.

Defensive operations are also possible in a future war. We must not imagine that only offensive operations will be conducted throughout the entire war. During certain phases of the war, in individual directions and, possibly, in theaters, the situation may require that we go on the defensive. Therefore our Armed Forces should be perfectly trained in the conduct of such operations. Denial, in Soviet military strategy, of the justifiability of defense on a strategic scale and defensive war as a whole cannot be applied to operational, much less tactical, defense. Such defense has evidently not lost its former significance; it will inevitably appear during the war as one of the means of frustrating the offensive

of an enemy having superior forces. Modern operational defense has a number of important aspects, such as the possibility for more effective use of firepower, suitable features of the terrain, engineering obstacles, etc. At the same time we should consider that the buildup of defense and the methods of conducting it are undergoing strong changes.

In a modern war, defense in land theaters may be used to win time, to economize forces, to reinforce an attained objective, and, in a number of cases, to repel an attack by superior enemy forces. But nonetheless this is a forced type of military operation. It is to be resorted to only when it is impossible to change the situation to our favor by means of an offensive or when nuclear weapons are all used up.

During the Great Patriotic War defenses were set up along a continuous front, including a number of positions parallel to the front line. The main forces of the defending troops were located within a tactical zone, and in the main directions, a high density of troops, artillery, and antitank weapons, and also antitank and antipersonnel obstacles were created. The basis for the engineer equipment of the positions and zones were trenches and connecting trenches.

In a future war such a defense cannot be so stable; it will not be able to withstand an offensive. The attacking troops can, with nuclear weapons, easily create large gaps in such a defense.

Defense, under modern conditions, is based on the use of nuclear weapons and the maneuvers of groups of ground troops. There is no need for creating solid positions and defense bands with dense troop and equipment concentration. The troops will occupy individual, most important (key) regions and positions along the main directions, dispersed along the front and particularly to the rear. The gaps between such regions are covered by rocket troops' fire, aviation actions, and obstacles. In this case the main forces of the defending groups are located to the rear of the defense and not near the front lines as has previously been the case.

Defense should be mainly antiatomic, i.e., it should protect to the highest degree the troops and fighting equipment from destruction by nuclear attacks. Therefore in the regions of troop and combat equipment concentration, places of concealment using the protective properties of the terrain must be prepared (foxholes, trenches, more permanent works) and equipped for antiatomic defense.

Defense must also be antimissile and antiaircraft. For this, groups of defending troops, the firing positions of the rocket troops, air fields, control points, and rear-area objectives should be reliably covered by air and antimissile defense weapons.

Finally, the most important requirement of defense under present conditions is its ability to resist massed tank assaults, i.e., it must be antitank defense. For this we must use antitank weapons, principally guided antitank rockets, to destroy enemy tanks. The high efficiency of the latest antitank weapons shows the vast possibilities for frustrating

an enemy tank attack.

Successful conduct of a defensive operation can be assured by decisive operations to frustrate, or weaken as much as possible, the offensive prepared by the enemy. For this there must be nuclear strikes and also attacks by aircraft armed with conventional armament to destroy the enemy when he is deploying his forces for the attack. It is expedient to launch a nuclear rocket and aerial attack against his basic forces and weapons: on tactical air fields, rocket-launching sites and atomic-artillery firing positions, against tank and infantry divisions, and against control points. Modern means of destruction make it possible to attain decisive results from counterpreparation, including total disruption of the prepared offensive.

An attack by enemy troops can be repelled by destroying the fire-power of defending troops and also by decisive counterattacks with units, sub-divisions and groups. The enemy groups driving a wedge into the defenses, and also his airborne units, should be destroyed by firing strikes, counterattacks, and counterstrikes by troops located in the rear. In this aspect, the methods of waging a defensive battle approach those of an offensive. [Editor's Note #16]

During the war in individual sectors a situation may arise in which forces can be saved from inevitable defeat only at the cost of giving up conquered territory by means of a temporary withdrawal. Troops may be forced to withdraw as a result of an unsuccessful defensive battle or an unprovided for offensive by individual groups. Sometimes the withdrawal will be premeditated so that the troops can gain a more advantageous position for subsequent active operations.

Withdrawal has always been neglected in all armies. However, history has taught that armed forces which have not mastered the organized withdrawal cannot be considered as battle-ready, since such troops are most often defeated. The Russian army in the past has suffered most of its losses during withdrawal. Lenin taught that: "...one who knows how to advance and has not learned how in certain difficult circumstances to adapt to it, to withdraw, will lose the war. Wars which have begun and ended with a victorious offensive are not evident from world history or, if they have occurred, are exceptions."[7]

In all cases the withdrawal should be conducted only on orders from the senior member of the unit; it should be organized and without panic. The crucial moment in a withdrawal is the sudden removal of the main forces from the battle under cover of strong rear guards. In many cases there must be counterattacks carried out over a broad front.

Withdrawal can be accomplished by the organization of resistance on intermediate lines or by uninterrupted withdrawal to the final perimeter. During the withdrawal, measures must be taken to rapidly defeat enemy landings and groups of his troops breaking through along routes parallel to those of the withdrawing troops and also to annihilate nuclear means.

Protection of the rear area of the country and groups of Armed Forces from enemy nuclear attacks has the aim of preserving the vital functions of the government, of assuring the uninterrupted functioning of the national economy and transportation, and preserving the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. These aims are achieved mainly by annihilation of the enemy's means of nuclear attack in the regions in which they are based. However, there is no guarantee that considerable aircraft and rocket forces can be annihilated at their bases, particularly at the start of the war with a surprise enemy attack. Therefore it is necessary to have the necessary forces and means for destroying great masses of enemy aircraft and rockets in the air in order that there be no nuclear attacks against important objectives within the whole territory of the country. This can be done by military operations for protecting the country from attack by enemy aircraft and missiles.

Reliable defense must be afforded to main administrative-political centers, the most important industrial targets and regions, strategic stores of materials, road and communications junctions, governmental and military control points, strategic missile launching sites, long-range and transport airfields, naval bases, regions where reserves are formed and trained, institutions where military cadres are trained, etc. The protection of all these objects against enemy nuclear attacks also has another, more important aspect -- to prevent mass losses among the civilian population.

The basic means for protecting the interior of the country and groups of Armed Forces from enemy nuclear attacks are the National PVO and PRO Troops, and also civil defense forces. They have the task of creating an invincible system for the defense of the entire country [Editor's Note #17], and also preparing measures for rapid removal of the results of enemy nuclear attacks. Such a system should be prepared beforehand, in peacetime, and should be in a constant state of high combat readiness. The air and antimissile defense of the frontal zone will be in the hands of forces and weapons of PVO of the fronts in conjunction with the National PVO Troops.

Modern air defense is built to be antiaircraft, antimissile, and antispace united in a single system.

National PVO, as an antiaircraft system, is created for the timely interception and annihilation of enemy aircraft, winged rockets, and "air-to-ground" rockets in flight. The system includes: radio-electronic devices to detect aerial targets and direct PVO means to them; surface-to-air missiles and fighter planes to intercept and annihilate aerial targets on the approaches to state borders or on the far approaches to covered regions and objectives; and surface-to-air missiles and fighter-interceptors which annihilate intruding aerial targets on their direct approaches to covered regions and objectives.

PVO forces and weapons should be concentrated in the main directions to provide cover for the most important regions and objectives. Uniform cover of the entire country cannot assure reliable protection from nuclear strikes; it would only result in dispersion of the PVO forces and weapons, which would allow the enemy to penetrate our PVO system.

We must consider that the enemy will use the most diverse methods of air attacks against the socialist countries: a converging attack from many directions; breakthrough of the air defenses on a narrow or broad front in a number of directions; the flight of aircraft at maximum and minimum altitudes; active and passive measures for electronic countermeasures and also feints. Air defense will become invincible against any of these measures only if it is active and maneuverable. Modern air-defense weapons -- surface-to-air missiles, fighter aviation, and radar devices -- assure complete frustration of the strikes by enemy aircraft and winged rockets and annihilation of the main body of the aircraft and winged rockets on their approaches to covered regions and objects. The success of the defense depends on the skillful use of these forces and weapons and on their combat capabilities.

Experience during World War II showed that combat against aircraft and winged rockets can be successful only as a result of the utilization of all air-defense forces and weapons. In England, for example, the organization of air defenses against the German V-1 included a system of radar and visual detection, an outer defense line where fighter aircraft operated, a second line of defense covered by antiaircraft artillery, and a third line on which barrage balloons were used. Since that time air-defense equipment has made great strides. Modern surface-to-air missiles, fighter-interceptors, and new types of radar have become powerful weapons against aircraft and winged rockets.

The destruction of ballistic rockets in flight is a more complex problem. During World War II England was unsuccessful in solving the problem of destroying the German V-2 ballistic missiles. Attempts to create an antimissile missile ("Project Tamper") were unsuccessful since the level of technology did not make it possible to solve this complex problem at that time. In our country the problem of eliminating rockets in flight has been successfully solved by Soviet science and technology. || Thus the task of warding off strikes of enemy missiles has become quite possible. ||
[Editor's Note #18]

It is interesting to note that the problem of antimissile defense is far from being solved in the West. The United States has developed the "Nike-Zeus" and "Wizard" systems with nuclear warheads for the direct encounter between a missile and an antimissile missile. The foreign press has mentioned the possibility of throwing up a screen of fine metal fragments created by the fragmentation of conventional charges into the flight path of a ballistic missile. Work is being conducted on the use of space means (antirocket "screening" systems). It is intended to launch a large number of satellites (missile-carriers), aboard which are placed interceptor rockets with a guidance system which operates in the infrared or ultraviolet portion of the frequency band. [Editor's Note #19]

The interior of the country and the Armed Forces groups will be protected from enemy nuclear strikes by air defense (antimissile) operations conducted by the National PVO Troops. Of particular significance in the successful conduct of the war will be the air-defense operations at the start of the war aimed at decisively frustrating surprise enemy air strikes.

It is to be supposed that our retaliatory nuclear strike will weaken considerably the enemy's means of nuclear attack. But it cannot be excluded that a certain number of enemy aircraft and missiles will nevertheless be launched for strikes against our objectives. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure early warning and detection, and great activity and effectiveness of operation of the air defense forces and weapons. [Editor's Note #20]

Of decisive significance in the successful conduct of air-defense operations will be the activity of all forces and weapons of air and anti-missile defense, their maneuverability, and their rapid concentration against main groups of attacking aircraft and rockets.

Exceptionally great demands are being made on modern air defense. While, in the last war, it was sufficient to destroy 15-20 percent of the attacking aircraft to break up an air operation, now it is necessary to assure, essentially, 100 percent destruction of all attacking enemy airplanes and missiles. Even one airplane or missile with a nuclear warhead, which has broken through the air defense system, can cause tremendous destruction and damage. The high effectiveness of modern means of air defense permits the successful accomplishment of a complex and important mission -- the complete destruction of all attacking enemy airplanes and missiles, keeping them from objectives intended for destruction. It is all in the ability to use the greater possibilities of modern means of air and antimissile defense.

The combat operations of the National PVO Troops will be distinguished by great activity, fluidity, and continuity. It is necessary to assure the continuous effect of air defense means against attacking enemy airplanes and missiles until their complete destruction at any time of day or night and in any meteorological conditions. Great significance for the successful repulse of enemy air strikes will be had by the accurate and continuous coordination of all air defense forces and weapons, radio-technical equipment, fighter aviation, and antiaircraft missiles. Great destruction and high levels of radioactive radiation are inevitable in the areas of combat operations of the National PVO Troops. Under these conditions, great importance will be had by the high level of training of the PVO Troops for operations under difficult conditions, rapid maneuver of forces and means, and the timely reestablishment of a damaged air defense system at some other area.

However, we should consider that no matter how effective the system of air and antimissile defense, we must have ready civil defense forces and weapons for rapid removal of the results of nuclear attacks, evacuation of the population from regions subjected to nuclear attack, the organization of emergency medical aid, the extinguishing of fires, the establishment of order, and other similar measures. Special civil defense formations should be prepared to fulfill these tasks. In addition, there must be corresponding preparation of the population for operating under conditions of an enemy nuclear attack.

Military operations in naval theaters in a future world war will acquire vast scope, although these operations can hardly have a decisive effect on the outcome of the war.

During the Great Patriotic War our Navy conducted limited military operations mainly in inland seas: the Black and Baltic Seas. Operations in northern and far-eastern seas were on a very small scale. The naval operations were aimed mainly for support of the Ground Troops during operations in the coastal regions for the destruction of enemy naval forces on closed sea and for the protection of naval communications, mainly in the North.

In a future world war the fleet may have more responsibilities. The world oceans will be the theaters of military operations for the navy.

The main aim of military operations for naval forces on the oceans and in naval theaters is the defeat of the enemy fleet and disruption of his naval and sea communications lines. In addition there may be the task of delivering nuclear rocket strikes against coastal objectives, support of the ground troops, the carrying out of naval shipping, and protection of our own naval communications lines. The presence of a fleet of rocket-carrying nuclear submarines and naval rocket-carrying aircraft will make it possible to conduct naval operations decisively against a strong naval enemy.

The most important task of our fleet from the very outset of the war will be to destroy enemy striking carrier-based units. The enemy will attempt to deploy these units in the most important theaters near the socialist countries and to deliver surprise nuclear attacks against important coastal objectives (naval bases, airfields, missile installations) and, possibly, against objectives quite far from the coast. For example, in the NATO exercise "Autumn-60", a carrier-based striking unit from the Norwegian Sea made 200 simulated nuclear attacks against coastal objectives of our country and against targets deep within our territory. Most of the nuclear attacks were made within 21 hours. Such an attack will present a great danger if the fleet cannot cut it off and destroy the carrier-based striking units. This task can be fulfilled only with a high degree of combat readiness on the part of the fleet, their timely deployment, and skillful operations, taking into account the weak aspects of the enemy's assault carrier units.

Assault carrier formations are to be deployed to deliver strikes in a limited region where most of the surface forces are concentrated. In the center will be assault carriers, the basic and most vulnerable target for nuclear-rocket or nuclear-torpedo attack. The assault carriers are protected by surface antisubmarine ships and antisubmarine aircraft. Radar picket forces will be located on the perimeter of the area. But these forces and weapons can no longer reliably protect the attack carriers and other elements of the force from missile strikes from submarines and naval aircraft.

The presence in our fleet of missile-carrying submarines and missile-carrying aircraft permit approaching the aircraft carrier to the distance

of missile launch without entering the zone of antisubmarine and air defense of the attack carrier force. It is essential to attempt to destroy the attack carriers before they can launch their planes; we must destroy the security forces and the supply sections, and we must destroy the regions where the carrier units are based. It must be taken into account that these units are highly vulnerable during ocean crossings, during refueling, at the moment they are preparing to launch their planes, and also when the planes are landing again on the carriers.

Attack carrier forces can break up into smaller groups. Such groups can include one attack carrier and covering forces. The American press expresses the idea that attack carriers, especially with atomic power plants, can operate without any protection. All this must be considered in organizing the fight against aircraft carriers. The attack carrier is an extremely vulnerable target for a nuclear strike.

An effective means of combating assault carriers and other surface forces is the use of rocket-carrying nuclear submarines. The old-style submarines destroyed ships by means of direct hits with torpedoes below the waterline; the submarines are close to the target and close to the surface which makes them easy targets. Nuclear submarines carrying guided missiles have become a great threat to surface vessels. They are highly autonomous, have great underwater traveling speed, and can strike with their rockets from great distances, even from under the water. Therefore, the nuclear submarine is less vulnerable, highly maneuverable, and can successfully conduct battles against aircraft carriers and other surface ships.

New methods of submarine operations have come to replace the former methods of torpedo attack from short distances -- missile strikes from great distances and from a submerged position. Previously, it was necessary to concentrate several submarines for a mass torpedo strike to destroy a large surface ship. Now, any surface ship can be destroyed with one missile or torpedo having a nuclear warhead.

Assault carrier formations can be successfully combated with naval and long-range aviation. Armed with "air-to-ship" rockets with nuclear warheads, these planes can strike without coming in range of the air defense weapons of the carrier unit.

The strikes of rocket-carrying airplanes using rockets with nuclear warheads against an attack carrier force or group create the necessary condition for the subsequent operations of airplanes with the aim of final destruction of the enemy. The use of nuclear weapons does not require the assignment of a large number of airplanes to accomplish this mission.

In addition, coastal missile installations can be used to destroy the enemy fleet.

Concentration of all these forces and weapons in the main theaters against large groups of enemy assault carrier formations and their decisive

operations can safeguard the countries of the socialist camp against nuclear strikes from the sea.

An important task of the fleet is combat against enemy submarines, particularly rocket-carrying nuclear submarines.

In the aggressive plans of the Anglo-American bloc, great significance is attached to the use of nuclear submarines||armed with "Polaris" missiles||for nuclear attacks deep in the territory of the socialist countries. By the start of the war, rocket-carrying nuclear submarines can be deployed so as to launch rockets up to 1800 kilometers from the coast, mainly in the Arctic Ocean and the northern seas, in the northeast part of the Atlantic, and in the Mediterranean Sea, and in the Western Pacific. The remaining nuclear submarines are to be used to combat our naval forces and to disrupt communication lines.

Submarines have become the main striking force at sea, not only in our navy but in the navy of the Anglo-American bloc. The nuclear submarine is a formidable underwater vessel. Therefore, in the future, armed conflict in naval theaters may acquire the nature of underwater operations.

Submarines can be successfully combatted by antisubmarine submarines with rockets and torpedoes, by planes, by antisubmarine surface vessels with hydrofoils and armed with nuclear weapons, and also by destroyers, fast torpedo boats, and helicopters. Nuclear submarines with "Polaris" missiles can be destroyed in bases by strikes of the Strategic Rocket Forces and long-range aviation, and while crossing the seas and in position areas, by the operations of antisubmarine submarines, long-range aviation, and other antisubmarine forces and means. Combat with missile-carrying submarines has now been shifted to great distances from the coast -- to the open seas and oceans. The former coastal system of antisubmarine defense will now be ineffective against missile-carrying submarines. For successfully combating them, a reliable system of reconnaissance is necessary which will ensure the timely detection of enemy submarines, particularly those carrying missiles, the exact determination of the coordinates of their location, and the guidance of active weapons against them. There must also be precise coordination of the operation of all antisubmarine forces and weapons. Under such conditions we can count on frustrating the enemy rocket strikes using submarines, on safeguarding the fleet and communication lines from submarine attacks.

Among the main tasks of the fleet in a future war will be cutting off enemy ocean and sea shipping and the disruption of communications lines. We must consider that up to three-fourths of all the materiel and personnel of the probable enemy are located across the ocean. According to the calculations of certain military theoreticians, in the event of war 80-100 large transports should arrive daily at European ports, and 1500-2000 ships, not counting security vessels, will be en route simultaneously. To safeguard his communication lines the enemy will adopt the most diverse measures: the creation of "giant convoys" requiring smaller security forces, wide use of the method of "patrol zones" where transports will move without security

vessels, the one-time use (without security) of fast ocean liners, the use of tankers and trawler ships and underwater transport, etc.

Operations against enemy communications lines should be developed on a large scale at the very beginning of the war. This task might be achieved by strikes of the Strategic Rocket Troops, long-range aviation and rocket-carrying nuclear submarines against sea bases and ports, channels and narrow inlets, the shipbuilding and ship-repair industry; it can be carried out by destroying convoys and transports at sea by means of submarines and aircraft. Of important significance in the disruption of naval communications of the enemy will be the maneuverable use of nuclear submarines, allowing maximum concentration of efforts against enemy communications within a limited time. Diesel-electric submarines, which will still be used to combat naval communications, can use, as in the past war, the method of mobile screens, systematic operations, or free search.

Although support of the Ground Troops will not be one of the main tasks of the fleet, considerable effort must be expended in this direction. In conjunction with the Ground Troops the fleet can foil enemy landings at the landings points or during the ocean crossing or repel the landing attempt. In turn, the fleet will have the task of conducting landings on enemy coastal territory, assuring the crossing of straits and large water obstacles by the Ground Troops. The fleet will combat forces of the enemy fleet, particularly his carrier and rocket-carrying fleet, thus safeguarding groups of Ground Troops from attacks from the sea. It is also possible that naval forces can be diverted to strike enemy troop units and his nuclear weapons in coastal directions. This task can be successfully accomplished by rocket-carrying submarines, aircraft, and coastal rocket installations.

The enemy may attempt to land large sea-borne assaults in which connection readiness to break up assault operations remains an important requirement of our Navy, Ground Troops, and the other services of the Armed Forces.

In a modern war, as in past wars, mine warfare may be widespread. Mines will be used to defend the coast; to blockade enemy bases, ports, and straits; to disrupt naval communications; and for other purposes.

Conditions for military operations of our fleet in a modern war will differ radically from those during the Great Patriotic War. Our fleets must sail in the world oceans. They will be opposed by a strong enemy, one well-versed in naval operations. The Anglo-American command has devoted great attention to preparing for war against our fleet, particularly against submarines. They intend to strike our naval bases and have prepared a large antisubmarine force. The U.S. Navy has seven antisubmarine groups using heavy antisubmarine aircraft carriers; four groups will operate in the Pacific, and three in the Atlantic. This must be taken into consideration when preparing to repel possible aggression.

These are the basic forms of strategic operations and operations of various scales and for various purposes which might be used in a future

world war, and their specific expression in the field of strategy, operational art, and tactics.

Victorious conduct of a modern war is possible through the coordinated use of all types of strategic operations, through the purposeful conduct of the operations, battles, and engagements by a carefully centralized, specific, and flexible leadership of the armed forces. For victory over a strong and crafty enemy, which the aggressive bloc of imperialist countries is, there must be active decisive conduct of the military operations. Only through such operations can the enemy be totally destroyed. [Editor's Note # 21]

Footnotes to Chapter VI.

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2. М. Тейлор. Ненадежная стратегия. Москва, Воениздат, 1961, стр. 42.
3. Б. Броди. Стратегия в век ракетного оружия. Москва, Воениздат, 1961, стр. 149.
4. J. Krumpelt. Gedanken über den totalen Atomkrieg, "Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau", August, 1961, S. 434-451.
5. Б. Броди. Стратегия в век ракетного оружия. Москва, Воениздат, 1961, стр. 120.
6. Г. Киссинджер. Ядерное оружие и внешняя политика. Москва, Изд-во иностранной литературы, 1959, стр. 373.
7. В. И. Ленин. Сочинения, т. 33, стр. 74.

EDITOR'S NOTE ON CHAPTER VII

This chapter, "Preparing a country to repel aggression," remains unique even in the third edition. It was the only chapter attributed to a definite author, General Colonel A.I. Gastilovich, Doctor of Military Sciences and Professor, also former Deputy Commandant of the General Staff Academy. It has been argued that the chapter was attributed to him because it did not entirely agree with the tone of the rest of the book. On the other hand, apart from Marshal Sokolovskiy, Gastilovich is the best qualified contributor and also has held the most responsible positions. Events since 1963, since the two other editions were published, have given us another reason for singling Gastilovich out. As previously noted, Leonid I. Brezhnev was the political officer in the 18th Army, commanded by General Gastilovich, during World War II. The adjacent army, the First Guards, was commanded by A.A. Grechko, later a Marshal of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Defense Minister, appointed after the death of Marshal Malinovskiy in March 1967. Also nearby was the army commanded by General Moskalenko, later a Marshal of the Soviet Union. Moskalenko was former Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops. General A.A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration, the military arm of the Communist Party, was the political officer of the army Moskalenko commanded. Have the friendships, which were formed over twenty years ago on the Fourth Ukrainian Front, anything to do with today's politics?

Almost six years have passed since Gastilovich expressed his ideas on "Preparing a country to repel aggression." One idea was that if the term of military training were shortened, more men could be trained to be held in the reserves. However, the number of 19-year-olds available for military service in 1962 was very low. This state of affairs continued for several years. But, beginning with January of 1968, the term of service in the Soviet Armed Forces was reduced from three years to two years. Special inducements were given to servicemen to settle in isolated areas of the Soviet Union after their service terms are finished.

The chapter stresses the importance of studying the views of the probable enemy on war. Therefore one of the books of the 'Officer's Library' series is *The Organization and Armaments of the Armies and Navies of Capitalist Countries*, published in 1965 with a second edition in 1968. This book deals extensively with the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany. As could be expected, France was dropped from the second edition after her withdrawal from NATO. A large section of this present work, *Military Strategy*, is also devoted to United States' views on armaments.

Another section speaks of the need for pipelines to follow the troops as they advance. "10,000 five-ton trucks would be required to deliver the daily needs of fuel and lubricants of a modern army." This apparently was advice well heeded, for in 1967, exercise 'Dnelper' stressed the fact that pipelines were laid in the wake of the advancing troops. The new five-year plan showed the influence of Gastilovich's ideas on highway and railway networks. The Air Show at Domodedovo Airport in the summer of 1967 demonstrated the serious attention given to the development of vertical take-off and landing aircraft, which can operate without vulnerable landing strips.

The last section of this chapter concerns civil defense, which remains unchanged from the previous editions. However, the foreword to the second edition noted that civil defense is a proper subject for study within the scope of the theory of military strategy.

CHAPTER VII

PREPARING A COUNTRY FOR THE REPULSION OF AGGRESSION

As can be seen from the contents of the preceding chapters concerning the nature of modern warfare and the methods of waging it, victory in a war is entirely unthinkable without thorough and timely preparation of the nation and the armed forces for it.

In preparing the nation and the armed forces for war, each country relies on its economy, science, technology, and culture, and also takes into account the forces and capabilities of the probable enemy, the data concerning which are constantly being supplemented.

Planned preparation of a country for war should assure: the possibility of repelling the aggressor at any moment and of inflicting upon him a shattering retaliatory nuclear strike for the purpose of seizing the strategic initiative; the attaining of victory in the shortest possible time; the possibility, if need be, of waging war for a protracted period of time; the ability to "hold out" against the massive nuclear strikes of the enemy with the fewest possible losses; and maintaining a high moral-political state of the population and bolstering its determination to achieve victory.

The preparation of a country for war is accomplished along three main lines -- the preparation of the armed forces, the preparation of the national economy, and the preparation of the population. [Editor's Note #1]

Preparation of the Armed Forces

The preparation of the armed forces in peacetime under present-day conditions acquires decisive importance. The nature of their preparation, conditioned by the political and economic situation, scientific-technical and industrial progress, and new methods and means of waging the armed struggle, has changed greatly even in comparison with the recent past -- the period of World War II and the Great Patriotic War.

Present-day preparation of the armed forces consists in determining their composition and organization for peacetime and for waging war; the preparation for the mobilization of the armed forces; ensuring their high combat readiness; the continuous development of the services of the armed forces in accordance with their role and assignments; ensuring that they are materially and technically equipped to conduct military operations; the preparation of the territory of the country and theaters of military operations; the organization and carrying out of strategic reconnaissance.

Mobilization and combat preparation of the armed forces. The numerical strength and composition of the armed forces in peacetime are determined by the respective governments. Taking into account the threat of a

surprise attack by an enemy using present-day means of massive destruction and the resulting difficulties in mobilization, it would seem advisable to have peacetime armed forces set up such that the main aims of the initial phase of the war can be attained without additional mobilization.

However, to keep the armed forces in such a state is economically impossible for even the strongest country. Therefore, in peacetime even in the strongest countries such forces are kept as are able to deliver a well-timed nuclear strike, to repel a surprise air attack, and actively wage operations on land and sea, where the power of the first blows can be increased rapidly by throwing into action mobilized units and commands. At the present time, it is assumed that peacetime armed forces must be capable from the very first hours of the war of seizing the strategic initiative and of ensuring the attainment of the most immediate strategic goals.

Such a quantity of peacetime armed forces are ensured by keeping in a state of constant readiness strategic forces and weapons in the amount required for the attainment of the war aims, the national PVO system and certain units of other types of armed forces: ground troops, naval forces, air forces, and rescue-restoration formations of civil-defense. The composition of these most numerous services of the armed forces is, as a rule, increased at the outset of a war by mobilization. Moreover, part of the forces and commands of the ground troops intended to carry out the first operations and deployed in the border regions (part of the submarines in the naval forces) are kept in peacetime at a strength which will ensure the carrying out of the main tasks in the beginning of the war. Another part of them have short mobilization periods, thus enabling the forces to participate in the first operations, and, finally, a certain group is kept at reduced strength in peacetime.

In contrast to cover forces in previous wars the combat-ready units of ground troops under present-day conditions must be much stronger in their structure in order to be able to fulfill their active assignments.

Consequently, peacetime armed forces under present-day conditions differ considerably with respect to purpose and composition from the armed forces existing before previous world wars. Now they not only play the role of a "shield" covering the deployment of the main forces of the nation, but they themselves, in essence, comprise a portion of the main forces which are increased at the outset of the war.

The determination of the composition of the armed forces during war-time is a very important problem of the political and military leadership of the country, since all the mobilization measures taken in the country depend upon it.

As is known, by mobilization or mobilization deployment of the armed forces, we mean their conversion from a peacetime footing to a war footing in accordance with the war plan.

In practice, mobilization either takes the form of supplementing existing military organizations with war-trained men and combat equipment

until a war footing is reached or else new units and commands are formed. The cadres commanding the new formations are usually chosen from existing troop units.

It is very difficult to foresee in peacetime the exact dimensions of the armed forces which may be needed to wage a war throughout the entire period of its duration, since at the very outset of the war mutual massive use of nuclear weapons may fundamentally alter the situation.

Therefore, in accordance with the situation already prevailing during the period of mobilization carried out according to plans developed in peacetime, new formations may be created for the subsequent deployment of the armed forces. However, a considerable part of these formations can be realized administratively by taking into account existing personnel and material resources.

With respect to methods and ways of realization, present-day mobilization of armed forces can be total or special, open or concealed.

Total mobilization is declared by governmental decree and is accomplished openly. In previous wars, up to and including World War I, it usually began during the period of aggravation of the international political situation, only before the beginning of military operations.

During World War II mobilization in several belligerent countries, including the USSR, was mainly accomplished not before, but during the war. [Editor's Note #2]

Special mobilization in the past included simultaneously or consecutively only the territories of certain military districts in the immediate vicinity of the probable theater of military operations. The concealed method was sometimes used for special mobilizations which consisted of mobilizing only certain units under the guise of different types of checks, training groups, maneuvers, etc.

Concealed mobilization is possible even under present-day conditions, but it will be realized somewhat differently than previously. As the relations between the belligerents become increasingly strained, a part of the armed forces intended for the solution of the problems of the initial phase of the war gradually will be brought into a state of complete combat readiness. However, it must be borne in mind that with present-day means of strategic reconnaissance, widespread mobilization measures, even though concealed, cannot go unnoticed. Therefore, all the leading countries of coalitions strive to keep their armed forces in a maximum state of readiness.

An important factor determining the degree of preparation of the armed forces is the system of recruitment in peacetime and during mobilization. The most suitable system is assumed to be a system of territorial recruitment of armies during mobilization, which under conditions of nuclear rocket war considerably accelerates the process of converting the armies to a wartime organization. As for a peacetime army, its main purpose --

the immediate repulsion of an aggressor and the preparation of trained manpower reserves for war -- can be fulfilled only by using cadre formations staffed on an extraterritorial basis. |||

The manpower resources for bringing the armed forces up to strength during mobilization are usually kept in reserve on the military register. The register contains all individuals of the appropriate ages liable to military service, both those with military training, as well as the untrained. Some of those liable to military service are "reserved" by factories and institutions of the national economy and, during mobilization, are not called.

Taking into account the number of men eligible for military service, especially those with training, is one of the principles of mobilization.

The main source of replenishment of the reserve of men with military training is persons discharged each year from the cadres of the peacetime army. However, no peacetime army, as a rule, in any country ever fully absorbs all the eligible men of a given age, and therefore there is always a certain percentage of men in the reserve who have not undergone training in the cadre forces.

In the military training of these individuals, a network of civilian institutions of learning is used preparing different types of specialists needed by the armed forces: mechanics, radio operators, telegraph operators, chauffeurs, etc. The reserve includes trained individuals who have not performed military service and who have a civilian speciality which can be used in military service. Moreover, individuals not called to the army are partially trained at specially organized classes at the military-training centers.

It is well known that the shorter the period of service in the army, the greater the number of men with military training discharged every year into the reserve. [Editor's Note #3]

At the same time, it should be noted that under present-day conditions there are possibilities for more rapid training and instruction of enlisted and noncommissioned personnel since many of the mechanisms existing in the Armed Forces are similar to mechanisms and devices used in the national economy. Indeed, such specialists as operators and mechanics of diesel, gasoline, and electric engines, specialists in radio engineering, radio electronics, optics, and others are fundamentally identical in the military and in civilian production.

The presence of a sufficient number of officers of all specialties plays an important role in the creation of the militarily trained reserve.

The number of officers discharged each year from the cadres of the Armed Forces and retained on the military register is usually very small in comparison with the mobilization requirements. Therefore, a reserve of younger officers is created in peacetime mainly from sergeants discharged each year into the reserve, especially from those with higher and secondary

education. The reserve of younger officers with technical specialties is also replenished by individuals who have completed special civilian institutions of higher learning but have not performed any actual service in the cadres.

During mobilization, the network of intermediate military institutions of learning is usually expanded with an accelerated program, mainly training junior officers. Promotion to higher officer ranks is done by advancement according to seniority, since military and official experience is usually more valuable than accelerated training in advanced-training courses.

The mobilization of units existing in peacetime, and especially the formation of new units, has special features in each service of the Armed Forces. [Editor's Note #4]

The Air Forces can operate from the outset of the war in the same composition in which they existed during peacetime |||but the formation |||of combat and particularly transport units and rear-area airfield units |||might be needed. |||

The Navy |||usually |||accomplishes mobilization by equipping the existing ships with sufficient supplies, removing from them excess equipment and personnel with practical experience, putting into service ships of the reserve that are being kept in mothballs, converting of certain ships of the civilian fleet into warships and auxiliary ships, and the formation of means of ensuring the basing of the fleet, for which purpose the equipment of civilian ports and shipyards is used.

The most extensive mobilization occurs in the Ground Troops and the troops of civil-defense.

The formation of new units and commands in the other services of the Armed Forces, in addition to being governed by the presence of trained manpower reserves, is also governed by the length of time it takes weapons and military equipment to come from industry during the course of the war, weapons and equipment which it would be inadvisable to accumulate in peacetime due to their rapid obsolescence.

It should be noted that the formation during mobilization of certain special units (repair, automobile transport, hydrometeorological, hospitals, etc.) can be accomplished directly by civilian ministries and departments.

The great losses which may be caused by the nuclear assaults of the enemy, as well as unavoidable extensive disruptions of the operation of the entire transport and communication system, require that present-day mobilization be simplified and dispersed and that it be accomplished as fast as possible. Only under these conditions can the mobilized troops take part |||in the initial operations of the war. |||

Simplification of mobilization can be achieved by accomplishing it

according to territorial methods, i.e., by avoiding the transport of mobilized men, weapons, and equipment to the points of mobilization or formation of troops (so-called mobilization transports), and by simplifying the system assigning eligible men to units.

By dispersion of mobilization we mean an organization where one unit is formed at each mobilization point and the fullest possible autonomy of the mobilization centers (military registration and enlistment offices) is achieved, thus enabling them to form units and groups independently.

The unavoidable extensive disruptions of the operation of the entire system of transport and communication will not enable us under present-day conditions to use the method of rigid centralization of mobilization, as was done in previous wars. Therefore, each military organization should be completely mobilized on the spot.

During the course of the war it will be impossible, naturally, to avoid certain transfers of specialists from one region to another. But these transfers under present-day conditions should be reduced to a minimum. Complex storehouses with all necessary equipment should be created at the mobilization centers. During the last war the equipment for manning the units frequently had to be brought in from dozens of storehouses located hundreds and even thousands of kilometers from the mobilization points. In a future war such a situation will be intolerable, since it does not correspond to present-day mobilization time limits.

The simplification of the system of assigning trained eligible men to military units by more widespread substitution of one specialty for another (related) specialty, and also the use, for recruiting military units, of a large percentage of so-called untrained personnel enables us to avoid having to bring in specialists from far away, thereby increasing autonomy of the mobilization centers.

Among the new formations realized during mobilization a very important place is occupied by units and groups intended for the replenishment of units suffering casualties.

The importance and the scope of replenishment of troops during a war may be illustrated by the case of the German fascist army during World War II. In 1942 it was receiving an average of 250,000-300,000 men per month for replacements. As a result of inaccurate estimates of the capabilities of the country for a systematic replenishment of the armed forces with personnel, already in 1943 the replenishment in the German army was reduced to 150,000 men per month. At the same time, because of strict and centralized planning in the USSR the replenishments coming into the army were not reduced during the course of the entire war.

In a modern war the problem of making up manpower losses will become particularly acute from the very first hours of the war. According to the experience of previous wars, manpower losses were restored mainly by forming, during mobilization, reserve and training units and groups, which

underwent the abridged military training of reserve contingents sent to the front in the form of draft companies, batteries, or battalions. Another method used to bring forces up to full strength was the "placer" method, i.e., sending into the armed forces a certain number of more or less trained men.

Because of the probability of great losses resulting from the means of massive destruction and the possible liquidation of entire units, and even formations, under present-day conditions of waging war it would hardly be feasible to limit ourselves to the creation of only reserve and training units and formations, sending to the front drafted subdivisions. Apparently, the primary form of restoration of losses will now be the formation of new completely trained and assembled commands or individual units, ready to step into battle immediately after their arrival at the front.

However, no matter what the method of achieving organization may be, it must, as previously, be planned in detail even in peacetime.

The disruption of mobilization plans and calculations mapped out in peacetime following a nuclear attack will obviously give rise to the necessity of controlling the mobilization administratively to make it possible to introduce changes and corrections into the plans depending on the prevailing situation. Therefore, mobilization plans developed in peacetime should be flexible and adapted to the carrying out of mobilization by different methods: open and concealed, total and special. All these requirements can be satisfied if each mobilization center possesses maximum autonomy in completing the formations assigned to it.

The expedient distribution of manpower resources for mobilization formations and for the replacement of casualties is one of the most important problems of mobilization planning. The planning agencies should take into strict account the possible manpower requirements for the entire war and not permit the calling up of eligible men of all young ages during the initial mobilization. A portion of them must be saved for replenishing the army during the war.

The General Staff determines the time required to develop a comprehensive mobilization plan and gives dispatching data for planning to the military districts, troops, and military registration and enlistment office only after the government has made its decision concerning the scope of the mobilized Armed Forces and the rates of involvement of national resources.

The abundance and diversity of the data with which both the General Staff and the on-the-spot registration-mobilization agencies must operate impose upon the agencies the need|||to make wide use of various computing machines, including electronic computers. [Editor's Note #5] |||The electronic computers ensure the required rapidity and accuracy of mobilization planning. In particular, with their aid it is easier to determine the most expedient sites of new formations according to the system of territorial recruiting, depending on the quantity and quality (specialties) of the available manpower reserves.

Under conditions where nuclear rocket weapons are used, both belligerents will be subjected to attacks in the very first hours of the war and will apparently be in approximately the same conditions from the point of view of the equipment of achieving mobilization and transporting troops to the theater of military operations. Therefore, that side which manages during the first days of the war to penetrate more deeply into enemy territory naturally acquires the capability for more effectively using the results of its nuclear attacks and disrupting the mobilization of the enemy. This is especially important with respect to European theaters of operations with their relatively small operative depth.

The most important field of training of the Armed Forces is direct training of troops in methods of conducting combat operations, which includes operational, combat, and political training. In addition to maintaining the high level of combat readiness of the armies, the basic aims of these types of training are: the mastery of the means of armed fighting; teaching methods of fighting a battle, an operation, and armed combat as a whole; the development and verification of new methods of waging combat operations; the verification of the workability of the plans and calculations for wartime; and the political and military training of the personnel. It should be noted that in the system of training armies under present-day conditions there has been a great increase in the importance of technical training and, in particular, of the interchangeability of the crews and teams servicing machines, instruments, and assemblies.

The training of troops should be organized and carried out in such a way that during the entire time the theory and practice of military science are developed reciprocally and the methods and means of armed combat are perfected. From this point of view a generalization of the experience of operational, combat, and political training which furthers the development of the theory of military art, is of great importance. In order to prevent the conclusions from this experience from being one-sided, it is necessary in a system of operational and combat training to carefully study the enemy and to follow the changes in his views concerning the conduct of military operations.

The theory of military art and the practice of training troops serve as the basis for the development of every kind of official manual, regulation, instruction, and guidance. The timely development of these documents, revising them in accordance with developments of means of armed combat, and their thorough study by the troops constitute one of the most important aspects of the preparation of the Armed Forces.

The development of the Armed Forces in peacetime is planned for certain periods related to the over-all plans of the national economy, new scientific achievements in the field of weaponry and combat equipment, and the nature of the international situation. The long-range plans of development of the Armed Forces made by the government determine the quantitative and qualitative development of means of armed combat; the organizational structure of the armed forces; the methods of using them in war; the creation of reserves of armament, combat equipment, and other material means; the preparation of war-trained manpower reserves and command cadres.

Depending on actual conditions, the long-range plans may also include other additional subdivisions.

The preparation for material and technical support of the Armed Forces. No matter how perfect the armament, the organization, the training, and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces may be, they will not be able to carry out the assignments entrusted to them if their material and technical support for conducting combat operations is not organized and thoroughly prepared in peacetime.

The nature of the initial phase of a modern war requires that the material means required for conducting the first operations not only be prepared in peacetime, but dispersed, taking into account the requirements of antiatomic defense. Moreover, in the interior of the country at the points of troop mobilization, the required reserves of material means should be created and also reserves for casualty replacements.

In accordance with their designation the reserves of material means for the Armed Forces are divided into emergency and mobilization reserves, strategic and government.

Emergency reserves are kept directly in the units and commands existing in peacetime in quantities ensuring their mobilization deployment (if provided for) and, most important, the conduct of military operations for a specific period of time.

The mobilization reserves are designated for the replenishment of expended or loss of material means in operations during the initial phase of the war. The quantity and distribution of mobilization reserves depend on the probable requirements of the troops when solving the problems in these operations.

By strategic reserves of material means is meant that part of the government reserves which is placed at the disposal of the high command. All other reserves constitute state reserves.

The quantity of strategic and state reserves is determined on the basis of the need for continuous supplying of the Armed Forces until the mobilized industry expands production according to the war program. According to the experience of the Great Patriotic War this required about 3 months, while in the case of industries evacuated to the interior of the country, 6-9 months were required.

The experience of both previous world wars showed the enormous material expenditures for the needs of the armed forces. It suffices to recall that the Russian army during World War I expended approximately one million tons of various types of ammunition. During the Great Patriotic War the expenditure of ammunition in the Soviet Armed Forces amounted to approximately 8 million tons. The expenditure of fuels and lubricants increased even more sharply. While during World War I the Russian Army expended only several tens of thousands of tons of fuels and lubricants, during the Great Patriotic War their expenditure amounted to more than 13 million tons. Thus, in previous world wars in addition to an over-all sharp increase in the expenditures for material resources, a tendency to

more rapid increase in the fuel and lubricant requirements is clearly noted.

Under present-day conditions, due to the complete motorization and mechanization of the Armed Forces and the continuous increase in their technical equipment, the importance of fuels and lubricants in supporting the combat operations of troops has increased even more. The quantity of these materials required to carry out one frontal offensive operation can give us an idea of the need for these materials in the Armed Forces. An approximate calculation shows that in the case of such an operation about 300 thousand tons of fuels and lubricants are required. One of the large fleets alone can consume up to 150,000 tons of fuel during an operation. It is necessary, moreover, to note the ever-increasing requirements for special types of rocket fuel. On the whole, fuels and lubricants may constitute more than 50% of the total volume of material means required by the Armed Forces.

The requirement of technical equipment of all types for the Armed Forces has also sharply increased. According to rough calculations it increased by a factor of 2-2.5 in comparison with the period of the Great Patriotic War. [Editor's Note #6]

The Armed Forces' requirements of material means can be determined more or less accurately only for the first operations of the initial phase of the war and for the support of troops, deployed or newly formed according to the mobilization plan. All other calculations are very tentative; however, they are also used as a basis for the development of the plan for the material and technical support of the Armed Forces, according to which the extent of peacetime military production of industry is determined, and as a plan for its mobilization at the outset of the war. All calculations of requirements are made with an allowance for probable heavy losses of material means even before the troops get them. The extent of such losses will undoubtedly be much greater than in the last war.

In the material and technical support of the Armed Forces, timely delivery to the troops of all the equipment required from the peacetime stockpiles plays a very important role. In previous wars the main means of delivery, both from the interior of the country as well as at the theater of military operations, was railway transport. Under present-day conditions even in the case of destruction of railway focal points the restoration of trackage on the basis of industrial work methods and with timely accumulation of roadbed and bridge components is possible only at a rate not exceeding 40-50 kilometers per day, while the restoration of bridges cannot proceed at a rate exceeding 120-150 meters per day.

In theaters of operation, railways can no longer fully ensure the delivery of material means to the troops, and therefore, motor transport will play a decisive role. In addition to motor transport, pipelines are acquiring ever-increasing importance. One present-day front alone during the course of an offensive operation requires the delivery from the warehouses to the troops of up to 25,000 tons of fuels and lubricants per day. In order to deliver such a quantity of fuel over a distance of 300 kilometers

more than 10,000 5-ton tank trucks would be required, which is not only uneconomical but also unreliable. In order to deliver fuels and lubricants throughout a present-day frontal operation, the number of trucks required would be many times greater. The problem of supplying offensive troops with the fuels and lubricants from underground pipelines or storehouses located in the theater of operations can be solved only by using field pipelines laid as the troops advance, as well as pipelines to air fields and naval bases.

In the future, air transport, using planes not requiring a landing field, may become a very effective and mobile means of delivery. For the time being, the role of aircraft in delivery of supplies is limited, since they have inadequate carrying capacity and require complicated airfield equipment and coverage during flight. Military transport aircraft will apparently be used primarily for airborne parachuting (landing) of troops and the delivery of rockets and fuel to rocket troops.

On river systems without a large number of locks (they may be destroyed by the enemy) water transport will play a large role in the delivery of supplies to the troops.

Under present-day conditions it is absolutely necessary to use all forms of transport in combination. This will make it possible, if need be, to switch the flow of freight from one type of transport to another.

An important type of materials and technical support of the Armed Forces under conditions of a nuclear-rocket war will be their medical support. The number of people requiring medical aid will be immeasurably greater than in previous wars, so that a different approach to the organization of medical aid in the Armed Forces will be required. According to the experience of previous wars, medical aid to the victims consisted mainly in the evacuation of the majority of sick and wounded to the relatively peaceful rear of the army, or front, or even into the interior of the country. This evacuation required a large quantity of specially equipped transport devices of all types. For the treatment of the sick and wounded, dozens of hospitals with all necessary equipment were created in the armies and army groups (fleets).

In a present-day war there will obviously be no "peaceful" places for treatment. Therefore, it will hardly be possible or feasible to deal extensively with problems involved in evacuating victims of nuclear explosions to the interior of the country. Of primary importance will be the problem of evacuating the victims from the zones of radioactive contamination and of organizing on-the-spot medical aid behind the boundaries of the combat formations of the troops. Consequently, the organization of medical aid must be directed to a large extent, toward the creation of mobile detachments of medical personnel (doctors, nurses, and administrators) equipped with supplies of medicines, instruments, and in part, soft goods. These detachments must be capable of organizing a "hospital" at any spot with the aid of every-day equipment (furniture, bedding, etc.) given by the local population or confiscated from it. As a result, medical detachments can, to a considerable extent, be relieved of their cumbersome equipment.

The organization of the so-called technical support of the troops should be based on the same principle. Military equipment put out of commission should no longer be evacuated, but should be collected, this task being trusted not to troops, but to the repair agencies of the front, which move out for this purpose into necessary regions.

The repair agencies of the front must, to a considerable extent, use local means of repair (industries, workshops). The repair of combat equipment by the troops themselves must be limited to just the replacement of parts or entire assemblies. The supplies of parts and assemblies for this purpose are prepared in peacetime.

The preparation of the rear occupies an important position in the system of preparation of the Armed Forces.

The rear of the Armed Forces includes many units, industries, warehouses, and institutions devoted to the complete material and technical support of the troops while they are conducting military operations. In peacetime only the rear of military commands and units intended to carry out the first operations of the initial phase of the war, as well as all kinds of storehouses with supplies, are kept at full strength. As for rear units and establishments of the armies, fronts, and fleets, most of them are deployed or formed during mobilization.

We should particularly note the ever increasing need to utilize the local resources within enemy territory, something for which our rear units must be prepared.

The preparation of the territory of the country as a theater of military operations for the purpose of creating the optimum conditions for the use of all services of the Armed Forces is also one of the aspects of preparing the nation and the Armed Forces for war. It should be noted that before previous world wars such preparation was done mainly in the border regions of the countries and was directed mainly towards the construction of fortifications to protect the troops and the development of a railway network. Before World War II there was also the construction of airfields in the border zone.

Under present-day conditions the whole territory of the country, not just the border regions, will be covered by rocket-troop positions, airfields and positions of National PVO Troops, airfields for long-range and other types of aircraft, airborne troops, as well as troops and other means intended for the liquidation of the results of nuclear strikes by the enemy. Now, the entire territory of the country will be liable to nuclear attack by the enemy and in this sense will constitute a theater of military operations. Therefore, there arises a need for appropriate preparation of the entire country, not just its border zones.

At the same time, the concept is retained of land and sea (oceans) theaters of operations as the regions in which battles of land, sea, and air forces are prepared and carried out. These theaters include both the territories (the bodies of water) of foreign countries, as well as part of

the territory (bodies of water) of our own country. The preparation of the theaters of operations retains the same importance it had previously, since, first, the enormous scope of a future war will require skillful organization of warfare under the most diverse military-geographical conditions; and second, the preparation of each theater of operations has its own special features deriving from the operations planned to take place on it during the initial phase of the war (preparation of communication system, pipelines, storehouses, etc.)

The preparation both of the entire territory of the country and of the theaters of direct military operations includes an extensive range of measures carried out partly by the Armed Forces themselves and partly by civilian ministries and departments within the framework of the over-all state plans.

The measures carried out by the Armed Forces are directed towards ensuring the operations of all the services of the Armed Forces as a whole or any one of the services of the Armed Forces.

Engineering-fortification preparation of the theaters of military operations in the interest of the Ground Troops, which in the past occupied one of the main positions in the over-all system of preparation, has now lost its previous significance.

The peacetime development of a railway network in the theaters of operations has also lost its former significance, since railways can no longer serve as the main form of transport in operations of Ground Troops.

A network of airfields is prepared in advance for the use of the Air Forces. Bearing in mind that airfields will constitute the objectives for the very first nuclear strikes, the number of them must considerably exceed the requirements of the Air Forces to be used for operations in a given theater of operations.

In the preparation of naval theaters of operations, the equipping of dispersed bases of the Navy (navigational devices, radar equipment for the launching sites of coastal rocket installations, the mining of certain zones, etc.) is an important factor.

Strategic intelligence* organized by the Armed Forces in peacetime is also one of the most important parts of preparing for war not only the Armed Forces themselves but also the country as a whole. Strategic intelligence enables us to prepare more rationally for war by taking into account the intentions and capabilities of the probable enemy, allows us to gain a certain amount of time for preparatory measures before the enemy's attack, and also enables us to make well-founded decisions in carrying out operations from the start of combat.

It is also impossible to completely conceal the preparation of a surprise attack from present-day strategic intelligence with its high level

*RAZVEDKA can mean both intelligence and reconnaissance. (See Short Anglo-Russian and Russian-English Military Dictionary 1963 , p. 462.)

of technical equipment, since certain signs exist, the study and comparison of which enable us to determine the likelihood of an attack. Thus, well-organized strategic intelligence is in a position to assure a government and the high command that it will be able to carry out certain precautionary measures both of a political and military nature.

Strategic intelligence, both in peacetime and wartime, systematically procures political, military, economic, scientific, and technical data concerning possible enemies and studies their military possibilities.

Soviet intelligence differs fundamentally from that of capitalist countries both with respect to its class nature, as well as with respect to the content of the assignments and the methods of carrying them out.

Intelligence in imperialist countries is not confined merely to the collection of the data mentioned above. It is also entrusted with the task of organizing political pressure on domestic and foreign policy, especially in small countries. For this purpose the intelligence agencies of capitalist countries use or organize internal-political and national enmity, conspiracies, and political assassinations; they blackmail and bribe government officials, party leaders, well-known scientists, and newspaper publishers and editors. In so doing, they rely on the most reactionary bourgeois-nationalist and other antidemocratic elements and groups. Such assignments and methods are alien to Soviet intelligence.

Current strategic intelligence operations of capitalist countries include the following forms: political, carried out by the ministries of foreign affairs; economic, carried out by the agencies in charge of foreign-trade relations; military, organized and carried out by the armed forces. There exists a close relationship and coordination between all the types of intelligence. Sometimes they are actually combined organizationally into one agency under the command of the Chief of State (e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States).

Military strategic intelligence, which occupies an important place in the over-all system of strategic intelligence, is a part of the entire intelligence service of the state. It studies not merely military, but also military-political and military-economic questions and is thus inter-related to political and economic intelligence.

The main assignments of military strategic intelligence are: the procurement of data concerning the military-political plans and mobilization measures of countries; the determination of their military, political, and economic potentials; the ascertainment and thorough study of the composition and groupings of the armed forces in the theaters of operations; the study of the military art of the potential enemy; the disclosure of the planned nature of the military operations of the enemy during the initial period of the war; the procurement of data concerning work in the field of the development and improvement of military equipment and weapons; the procurement of information and the study of data concerning the theaters of operations and their equipment; and study of the level of morale of the army and the population.

The above-mentioned assignments, naturally, do not completely exhaust the entire range of their diversity but give only a general picture of the main trends in intelligence activity.

The main forces and means of capitalist military strategic intelligence are undercover intelligence, the legal foreign intelligence network, radio and radar intelligence, air and naval intelligence and, finally, the information service which studies and processes the open information concerning foreign countries.

Undercover intelligence is the main means of military strategic intelligence, since it makes it possible to discover the innermost secrets concerning the plans and intentions of the probable enemy. Undercover intelligence operates continuously both in peacetime and in wartime, both in the interior, as well as in the border zones.

The legal foreign apparatus sanctioned by international law consists of military, naval, and air attaches and chiefs of military missions with their official machinery. The main methods of operation of the military attaches of capitalist countries are: personal observation, official visits to military units and institutions, exercises and maneuvers, parades and military celebrations, trips through the country, and also study of the press. It should be noted that military attaches of a number of capitalist countries also usually engage in illegal organization of undercover intelligence, the organization of sabotage and terrorist acts.

Radio and radar intelligence is one of the most important means of obtaining intelligence data. It operates continuously, secretly, and almost independently of the time of year, the time of day, and the weather.

The widespread use of radio-electronic devices in the armed forces makes it possible for radio and radar intelligence to determine the location of land, air, and naval forces and the radio-communication devices being used by them, and to obtain the most diverse data which are transmitted in open or coded form with the aid of radio-electronic devices.

Strategic air reconnaissance is of great significance for obtaining information mainly in wartime, since in peacetime, flights of aircraft over the territories of foreign states are, as a rule, limited to existing international lines. The imperialist countries, violating every international right and law, frequently use aircraft for reconnaissance purposes in peacetime. However, these attempts have been definitively and successfully stopped, a clear proof of which is the ignominious end of the American adventure with the U-2 in May 1960.

Naval intelligence procures information concerning naval forces and also of sea and ocean theaters of military operations. For the execution of its assignments it uses the same methods and means as military strategic intelligence as a whole, i.e., undercover intelligence, the legal

foreign apparatus, radio intelligence, air reconnaissance, and in addition, facilities of the Navy, especially underwater forces.

The information service uses all legal sources, such as, for example, the press and periodicals, radio and television broadcasts and motion picture films concerning the country being studied, etc.

The painstaking and systematic study of all legal information, its methodical processing, and its comparison with data from illegal sources can supply intelligence with very important and detailed information concerning all questions of preparation for war in peacetime. This branch of intelligence activity is just as important as the others.

The intelligence of imperialist countries, primarily of the United States and Britain, strives by every means to uncover our state and military secrets, sparing no forces or means for this purpose. Therefore, our counter-intelligence agencies are carrying on a continuous struggle with capitalist intelligence, relying on the extensive support of the entire people, maintaining a high level of vigilance, and using all the latest achievements of technology in addition to their own methods of operation.

The Preparation of the National Economy

The preparation of industry for operation under war conditions is the most important part of the entire preparation of the national economy. As has already been mentioned, at the start of military operations the volume of military production increases sharply. To illustrate this concept, we may well recall that during World War II the United States produced 296,000 airplanes, 86,000 tanks, and 363,000 guns and mortars during the years 1939-1945; the USSR produced about 150,000 airplanes, about 110,000 tanks, and about 900,000 guns and mortars during the years 1941-1945.

An increase in the production of armaments and military equipment naturally requires appropriate provision of industry with power and strategic raw materials. New military equipment (missiles, supersonic planes, etc.) require refractory alloys of special strength; for war production many nonferrous and rare metals, as well as a fully developed machine-tool construction and instrument making industry are required.

For example, according to rough calculations, the production of 40,000 airplanes (fighter types) with an average weight of 10 tons each requires approximately 250,000 tons of aluminum. In order to obtain such a quantity of aluminum, it is necessary to mine and process approximately 800,000 tons of bauxite, thereby expending 4 billion kilowatt-hours of electrical energy.

It must be borne in mind that the requirements of the troops during World War II cannot serve as initial data in calculating the material requirements for a future war. Although the number of weapons units operating simultaneously in theaters of operation may be somewhat less than in

the last war, the magnitude of the losses will nonetheless increase immeasurably. According to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the average monthly irrevocable losses of airplanes amounted to about 21% of those at the front, while the tank and artillery losses amounted to 19% and 9%, respectively. Under present conditions, according to certain calculations made by NATO specialists relative to their own armies, the losses of aircraft in the first two weeks of the war might amount to 60-85%, while the ground troops may suffer 30-40% losses. Thus, it is highly likely that the losses of weapons and military equipment may be approximately 6-8 times greater than in the last war.

It is not impossible that a situation might arise in a future war where nothing else will be required apart from previously created stockpiles of weapons and military equipment. However, it would be dangerous to count on such a possibility alone, and therefore industry must prepare during peacetime to meet possible heavy losses in the armed forces and to provide new units.

The most important duty of the strategic leadership charged with preparing the national economy and, in particular, its industry for war is the development of thoroughly well-founded calculations of the material requirements of the Armed Forces during the initial phase of the war.

On the basis of a calculation of the possible losses of military equipment in theaters of operations, appropriate requisitions are usually made, which enables industry, after government approval is received, to create in peacetime the productive capacities required to satisfy these requisitions.

Under present-day conditions it is difficult to count on any considerable expansion of new war industries after the start of the war, as was the case in the past. Therefore, the reserves required for at least the initial phase of the war are already created in peacetime, and appropriate productive capacities and power sources are prepared, so that at the outset of the war they can be rapidly switched over to the wartime production program. In this connection certain specifically military industries have created a "mothball" reserve of production capacities. For example, in the United States, this reserve amounts to approximately 50 percent of the industries currently operating.

Measures are taken in peacetime to accelerate the mobilization of all industry. From this point of view a standardization of structures or the unification of military and civilian equipment is of great importance, since an industry adapted to the mass production of a given product can be switched over to the production of another product only after considerable lapse of time.

One of the important conditions of the rapid mobilization of industry is the standardization of the supplies of the armed forces, the replacement of many models by one or several most appropriate for rapid mass production.

Under present-day conditions extensive cooperation may be observed

between industrial enterprises when one production depends on many others. Certain factories serve as suppliers of parts or half-finished products, others are suppliers of tools and assemblies, while still others are engaged in prefabrication, etc. Automation and mechanization of production, and mass and serial production are now based on division by parts and on specialization of labor.

In a planned economy, cooperation of production is organized by economic regions, thereby cutting down the transport of individual parts, assemblies, half-finished products, and fuel, and thus accelerating the production process, the mobilization of industry, and ensuring the steady flow of supplies to the Armed Forces in the event of war.

Ensuring the viability of industry, especially heavy and military industry, is a most important aspect of the preparation of industry for war. In previous wars this problem was solved comparatively simply by an appropriate geographical arrangement of important industrial objectives in the interior of the country, beyond the reach of enemy aircraft and ground troops in the event of a successful offense. Under present-day conditions no geographical arrangement of industrial objectives will protect them from nuclear-rocket strikes, and therefore their viability must be ensured by compulsory dispersion, duplication of production, and by antinuclear defense measures.

Special attention should be given under present-day conditions to the need for dispersing the industrial power sources.

When we speak of dispersion of industry, we must bear in mind that many industrial objects were established at a time when no one had ever dreamed of nuclear attack. Therefore, we should now speak mainly of the appropriate location of newly built objects and the partial and gradual dispersion of existing objects.

From the point of view of antinuclear defense the most important industrial enterprises should preferably be located underground in premises prepared beforehand for this purpose. During the last war the Germans planned to construct approximately 9 million square meters of underground premises for the concealment of industry. However, by the end of the war they had succeeded in constructing only 1.5 million square meters. Naturally, under present-day conditions, the preparation of underground premises must be developed on a particularly large scale. The United States, for example, as far back as 1956, set aside for these purposes approximately 400 million square feet of underground premises, mainly mines, suitable for the location of military objects.

In the case of new above-ground construction for industrial enterprises the need for increasing their viability is taken into account. The most valuable equipment is located in especially solidly constructed premises beneath concrete shelters; the materials and equipment for rapid restoration of destroyed areas are prepared in advance. Naturally, to conceal underground a considerable portion of the industrial objectives is

economically beyond the means of any country, even the most powerful. Therefore, such concealments are used only for the most important objects, while in the case of the other objectives only stable underground control points are created.

Special attention must be given to the problem of evacuating industrial enterprises into the interior of the country at the beginning of the war or during a threatened period. This measure played an important role in previous wars, particularly in the Great Patriotic War. In a nuclear rocket war the significance of evacuation will radically change.

If a real threat of war should arise, obviously only a very small but very important part of the industrial enterprises can be evacuated, mainly from those regions and points where the first enemy nuclear strikes are most likely and where extensive destruction is unavoidable.

As for other centers located both in the interior of the country, as well as in the border regions, any preliminary evacuation of industrial enterprises from them would give rise to additional difficulties, disorganization of production, and complications of the mobilization measures. Moreover, at the new sites the evacuated industries, from the point of view of the possibility of enemy attack, would be in the same situation as at the old sites.

The evacuation of industries is usually provided for in the plans for mobilizing the national economy and is closely related to the mobilization plan of the Armed Forces.

Summarizing all that has been said concerning the preparation of industry for war, it is necessary to emphasize once again that in addition to equipping the Armed Forces, industry must, in case of war, satisfy the needs of the entire population of the country. Therefore, industries not converted to war production must be prepared for expansion, and sometimes changes, in their production profile during mobilization of industry.

The rates of mobilization of an entire industry depend to a considerable extent on the degree to which the technology of production achieved by the industrial enterprises in peacetime can be converted to a war program; this is tested by filling experimental orders, on the supply of the industrial enterprises with raw materials and half-finished products, workers, and technical personnel.

The preparation of agriculture which provides the entire country with food and raw materials is also one of the important problems involved in preparing the economy of a war. Usually at the start of a war the conditions of agricultural productions change appreciably, since a considerable number of the workers and machines engaged in agriculture are drawn into the Armed Forces.

Under present-day conditions the part of agricultural production which formerly went to supplying the army can be replaced by appropriate synthetic industrial products (e.g., leather, wool, all kinds of fiber, etc.).

However, this in no way diminishes the importance of agriculture as the supplier of the main types of production, since the production of synthetic materials may at the outset of the war suffer from nuclear attack to a much greater extent than agriculture.

The preparation of agriculture is done in peacetime according to the following main requirements. First, the level of its development must ensure the creation of considerable reserves of food and raw materials in case of war. Second, its structure must facilitate the carrying out of the mobilization of the Armed Forces. And finally, agriculture must at the very outset of the war maintain a level of production to supply the current needs of the population and the Armed Forces for food and the needs of industry for raw materials.

The socialist system of agriculture, in which the great bulk of agriculture products is concentrated in the hands of the state, ensures the creation of the necessary reserves in case of war. The advantages of the socialist system in this respect stood out fairly clearly during the Great Patriotic War when our collectivized agriculture was able to withstand extremely great stress.

Now, the possibilities of creating the required reserves have increased immeasurably. The assimilation within a short period of time (1954-1956) of 36 million hectares of virgin land in the eastern part of the country (all the tilled acreage of England, France, and West Germany together amounts to 32-33 million hectares), the eightfold increase in the acreage devoted to corn during the period from 1954-1960, and the increase in the electrical capabilities in agriculture from 28 to 125 million horsepower are all important factors which the socialist state has at its disposal for the development of agriculture.

Agriculture in the USSR is developing along the line of a systematic increase in the yields of grain and industrial crops and in the productivity of livestock raising. This is achieved by expanding the tilled acreage through assimilation of virgin and fallow land, as well as by extensive irrigation and improvements; by ever-increasing mechanization and electrification of agriculture; by improvements in tilling the soil; by the development of plant breeding; by increasing the quantity of chemical fertilizers; by the creation of a sufficient fodder supply; and by introducing scientifically proven methods of keeping animals and caring for them.

The development of agriculture is closely related to the state of the machine-construction, chemical, and food industries. The preparation of these branches of industry is organized in peacetime in such a way that from the outset of the war they can compensate for the decrease in the number of agricultural machines and workers caused by mobilization.

The creation of reserves of agricultural production, as a rule, implies the construction of a sufficient number of storehouses, both state and local, located closer to the consumers and the processing centers in order to reduce the volume of freightage at the beginning of the war.

It should be noted that the conditions of waging a modern war necessitate avoiding the storage of food in large cities.

The industrial packaging of food in small units is of great significance in protecting food supplies from contamination. In this case the packaging materials must be impermeable and must enable the food to be stored outside of hermetically-sealed storehouses. From this point of view the development of high-nutrition concentrates and preserves is of special importance from the outset of the war, especially for supplying the Armed Forces.

The mobilization of the Armed Forces may be accelerated by introducing into agriculture standard machines and mechanisms used in the armies, such as automobiles, tractors, prime movers, tank trucks, automobile-repair detachments, road material, containers, etc. Because of the above, the newly formed units will be able to receive this material and equipment at the sites of formation.

The preparation of transport for operation in wartime, accomplished in peacetime, plays an exceptionally important role. In addition to the fact that transport must, as in peacetime, ensure the operation of industry and the functioning of the entire national economy, it is entrusted with the tasks of delivering from the interior of the country to the frontal regions mobilized troops and all types of supplies for the Armed Forces. The troops become very great consumers of materials as a result of which the direction of freight traffic changes considerably.

The development of transport in peacetime is characterized on the whole by new construction and equipping of railways and highways, waterways, pipelines, and airlines, by the improvement of the technical and economic indices of all forms of operations, and by taking measures to increase its viability during enemy nuclear strikes and to ensure rapid restoration after destruction.

In the interest of preparing for war, transport facilities create, in peacetime, reserves of rolling stock and fuel for railways, waterways, and airfields, reserves of materials for the restoration of highways, bridges, lines of communication, wharves, airfields, supplies of equipment for railway care, ships, and planes for military transportation, and they prepare cadres of specialists for reconstruction work.

Railway transport occupies the most important position in the national economy. However, its share in peacetime transportation is systematically declining as a result of the growth of other forms of transport, especially automobile transport and pipelines. Thus, in 1940 the percentage of the separate forms of transport in the economy of our country amounted to: railway, 85.1 percent; sea and river, 12.3 percent; pipeline, 0.79 percent; automobile, 1.8 percent; and air, 0.01 percent. In 1965, the share of transport had changed: railway, 71.5 percent; sea and river, 15.6 percent; pipeline, 6.8 percent; automobile, 6.2 percent; air, 0.07 percent.

Railway transport will, in the future, also be the main form of transport in the national economy. As has already been mentioned, in theaters of operations under present-day conditions the dominant role will be played by automobile transport, pipelines, and aircraft. However, in the interior of the country it will obviously be necessary to use all forms of transport in combination, since no one of them by itself can satisfy all the requirements of the national economy and the Armed Forces.

The over-all effectiveness of the utilization of railways in the USSR is greater than the capitalist countries. For example, although the railway mileage in the USSR is less than half that of the United States, Soviet railways transport 25 percent more freight than American railways, owing to the high degree of effectiveness of the utilization of rolling stock and the better traffic organization. By 1965 the freight turnover on our railways was twice that of the United States, although on the whole the share of railway transport in the national economy decreased.

The role of railways in supplying the Armed Forces continues to remain very great even with the increase in the role of automotive transport, since the delivery of freight from the interior of the country to the theaters of operations will have to be accomplished mainly by rail transport. For example, during the Great Patriotic War an average of almost 10 percent of the nation's operating stock of railway cars was required daily for the transporting of military freight, and in certain periods as much as 23 percent was required. There is no reason to assume that the requirements of the Armed Forces for railway transportation will decrease under present-day military conditions. The increase in the role of automotive transport for carrying freight to theaters of military operations is not due merely to its efficiency and economy but to the fact that railways are more vulnerable to nuclear attack and the more difficult to reconstruct.

In preparing railway transport for war it should be borne in mind that a denser railway network is always more viable, since it allows the use of all kinds of bypasses of the destroyed areas. Moreover, greater viability is achieved by creating reserves of railway carrying capacity and by taking measures to ensure the rapid reconstruction of railway lines.

Reserves of railway carrying capacity are created not only by increasing the stock of cars and locomotives (steam engines, diesel engines, electric engines), but also by the realization of other measures. Thus, for example, very great importance is attached to the acceleration of loading and unloading procedures through widespread mechanization, the introduction of containers, standardization of packages, etc., thereby reducing the idle time of railway cars and increasing their turnover. One of the means of increasing the efficiency of rail transport is to increase the weight of the trains and to increase their speed.

In order to increase viability of railways in the main directions, especially those leading to the theaters of operations, extensive bypasses of railway junctions are usually made and tunnels are constructed.

Railways under conditions where nuclear weapons are used will obviously be subjected to destruction mainly in the regions of bridges, tunnels, and other engineering work which are more difficult to reconstruct. The removal of the results of destruction will require cadres of specialists, appropriate structures for the restoration of the engineering works, and special types of cranes. Provision must also be made for the use of railways of different gauges, the preparation of extensive bypasses in contiguous territory, the equipment of transshipment regions, and the creation of a rolling stock reserve in these regions.

It is very important to prepare water transport for war, since the transporting of troops and freight and even the transferring of naval forces along internal waterways is possible not only within the country, but also in allied and enemy countries.

Water transport is prepared by the construction of new ships, which have high speed and small draught (in particular, on hydrofoils), the development of wharves and river ports, the development of cranes and construction of approach ways to them, and also the improvement of all the technical-economical indices of operation of this type of transport.

Great importance will be attached to the adaptation of river floating conveyances, especially barges, for laying temporary floating railway and automobile bridges and for ferrying.

The development of automotive transport is of great importance not only for the Armed Forces in theaters of operations, but also for ensuring the needs of the national economy in case of disruptions in railway traffic in the interior of the country. Automotive transport is less vulnerable than railway transport and, moreover, is not characterized by the seasonal nature of navigation, which frequently limits the possibilities of water transport.

The growth of motor transport involves the development of a network of highways and the equipping of them for servicing automobiles during mass movement by the construction of refueling and repair centers, technical-aid centers, etc. From this point of view it is very important to develop inter-city motor transport in peacetime.

The improvement of the automobiles themselves in peacetime also plays an important role. Even now all new automobiles have a greater cruising range, greater road performance, are better technically, and are more economical than automobile of the period of the Great Patriotic War. They are being further developed by increasing the carrying capacity and road performance and also by creating devices for self-loading and unloading.

Pipelines as a means of transporting liquid fuel are acquiring, under present-day conditions, ever-increasing importance in view of their great economy and low vulnerability to nuclear explosions. While in 1955 about 14 billion ton-kilometers of liquid fuel were pumped through pipelines in our country, in 1965 it was planned to pump about 200 billion ton-kilometers.

In case of war, pipelines can play a large role in delivery of petroleum and petroleum products to probable theaters of operations and to the main industrial regions.

The importance of air transport will increase as more large cargo helicopters, which do not require well-equipped airfields, are produced.

In the preparation, during peacetime, of all forms of transport for war the widespread development of different types of equipment to ensure rapid transshipment from one type of transport to another is exceptionally important.

The preparation of communications consists of ensuring not only the control of the Armed Forces when war occurs, but also the control of the country as a whole, particularly its economy.

For this purpose it is necessary to create in peacetime reliable control points capable of ensuring normal conditions of operation during an attack by an enemy using weapons of mass destruction and reliable communication between these control points.

The problem of creating reliable control points involves appropriately locating and equipping them, preparing duplication points, and supplying them with modern communications equipment.

Reliable communications ensuring the control of the country as a whole during the war cannot be considered as something new in comparison with a peacetime communications system. Peacetime and wartime communications must be constructed on the principle of strict continuity.

The main means of communication, prepared for the contingency of a nuclear attack by the enemy, should be multichannel radio, radio-relay, and underground cable lines. Above-ground communication wires passing through densely populated points and centers of communication should have at these points circular underground cable lines and reserve communication centers.

Important communication centers should be set up in underground quarters protected from nuclear explosions. The location of the centers should form a communications network allowing us to obtain bypass communication directions in case any of the centers is put out of commission. Of great importance is the creation of a reserve of mobile radio centers for reinforcing essential regions.

The Preparation of the Population

We can point out three main directions in which the preparation of the population for war takes place in peacetime. These are: first, the moral-political preparation of the population; second, preparation for defense against weapons of mass destruction and for the removal of the

result of this attack, usually called civil-defense preparation; and third, the military preparation of the population. All these types of preparation are interrelated and supplement each other.

The moral-political preparation of the population is of decisive importance under present-day conditions, since the use of weapons of mass destruction in war imposes exceptionally high, previously unheard-of demands on the political morale of the population.

The political-moral preparation of the Soviet people for war consists mainly in educating them in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, love of country and the Communist Party, and teaching them to be ready to suffer any hardships of war for the purpose of achieving victory.

The Soviet people are brought up on the ideas of defending their country and the achievements of the socialist revolution, the conviction of the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system, and confidence in the structure of the communist society.

In struggling for the peaceful coexistence of two opposite systems -- socialist and capitalist -- the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is waging an unrelenting struggle against bourgeois ideology and morality, against opportunist tendencies in the workers' and communist movement, and against revisionism and dogmatism threatening the unity of the workers' movement. To desist from or to weaken our ideological struggle would be to capitulate to bourgeois ideology and morality. [Editor's Note # 7]

Therefore, one of the tasks involved in educating the populace is to decisively unmask the reactionary nature of American politics and propaganda, which strive to present "the American way of life" in a rosy light, to show present-day capitalism as "democratic," peaceful, and humane, to conceal the aggressive nature of its politics, and to present preparations for unleashing war as defensive measures.

It is very important to convince the people of the justice of those goals which the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp will pursue in a war. The people must be deeply convinced of the indestructible unity of the countries of the socialist camp, of the wise leadership of the Communist and Workers' parties, of the economic might of the Soviet Union.

It is necessary to instill in the people a belief in the might of our Armed Forces and love for them, as well as a belief in the strength of the fighting union of the armed forces of the socialist countries.

Socialist internationalism and respect for the peoples of capitalist countries should not weaken the burning hatred of the imperialists, whose goal it is to destroy by war the achievements of socialism and to enslave the peoples of the socialist countries. Hatred of the enemy should give rise to a striving to destroy the armed forces and the military industrial potential of the aggressor and to achieve complete victory in a just war.

The moral-political preparation of the people for war is accomplished under the direction of the Communist Party and Soviet government, by every governmental and public organization in the country, by the entire system of education and training. For this purpose all means of propaganda and agitation, the press, science, literature, motion picture films, the theater, etc., are used.

As a result of socialist transformations and extensive educational work carried out by the Communist party and the Soviet government, there has been formed and is now developing in our country a new Soviet man, an active builder of communism, a fervent patriot of his country, ardent champion of a new life, ready to undergo any sacrifices in the name of freedom and independence of his country, capable of overcoming any difficulties on the path to victory. This new man, who possesses a high level of morale and technical culture, will, in the event of war, be a decisive factor in our victory.

Preparation for the defense of the population against weapons of mass destruction consists mainly of the timely warning of the population of an impending danger, its partial evacuation, the creation of shelters, ensuring individual means of protection, water and food, appropriate instruction of the population and the creation of a service to maintain order whose purpose is to prevent panic.

It is extremely important to warn the people of an imminent attack in time, since this makes it possible to take measures to decrease losses during an enemy attack. The warning device should be centralized, circular, and based on the widespread use of radio, especially radio broadcasting stations.

Since the PVO military command has the most complete picture of the air situation and, consequently, of the threat of attack against a given large objective, it should warn the appropriate civil-defense agencies and they should warn the population.

In warning the people it is very important not merely to warn them of a threat of air attack, but in special cases to advise them of enemy nuclear attacks already occurring. It is necessary to take into account that the explosion of a bomb or missile in a given region may, depending upon the direction of the wind, cause radioactive contamination of a large area. Therefore, for timely warning of a danger of radioactive contamination, it is necessary to have a special system of air and ground reconnaissance, as well as to create centers for forecasting the radioactive situation, which could use meteorological data of all types.

As a result of the contamination of food and water, which unavoidably would occur during a nuclear or bacteriological attack by the enemy, their preservation is a very important measure for protecting the population.

It should be mentioned that the water mains in cities are not usually invulnerable to attack and are not always adapted to the purification of water contaminated by radioactive materials and disease-spreading bacteria.

Therefore, with the threat of a nuclear attack there arises the problem of reconstruction and decontamination of water mains that have been destroyed. This will require a large quantity of deactivization material.

It is very important to teach the population the rules of behavior during an air attack by the enemy, especially simple examples of mutual medical aid and self help.

The effectiveness of aid to a stricken population will depend to a great extent on the degree to which the necessary order is maintained and panic among the population is avoided, since uncontrolled flows of refugees can disrupt the deployment and mobilization of the Armed Forces. The maintenance of order should be entrusted to militia units and to the troops if necessary. They should organize and control the traffic of all types of transport.

All sections of the services to maintain order and the traffic control should understand thoroughly even in peacetime what they have to do in the event of enemy attack and should proceed to execute their duties without waiting for additional orders or commands. As an aid to the militia and the troops, order-maintaining brigades can be created at industrial plants and institutions.

The establishment of an operational regime for all industrial plants, institutions, and transport is of great importance for the maintenance of order.

The military preparation of the population under present-day conditions acquires great importance not only from the point of view of replenishment of the Armed Forces during the war. A militarily trained population can be enlisted in the organized struggle against saboteurs and spies, as well as against small air and naval landings of the enemy carried out for purposes of sabotage. In probable theaters of operations the population must, moreover, be ready for decisive partisan operations against individual enemy groupings invading our territory.

Therefore, insofar as possible the population should understand modern shooting weapons, antitank weapons, and certain other types of military equipment. The people should have a certain amount of information concerning the possible methods of operation of the enemy so that none of these operations will be unexpected or cause confusion.

Regardless of what organizations carry out the war preparation of the population, one of their important functions naturally will be to teach individual protection against weapons of mass destruction and the rendering of aid to the injured.

Civil Defense

The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction in present-day war not only against armies on battlefields, but also against the interior, has given rise to the appearance of a new type of strategic safeguard of the vital functioning of countries, known as civil defense. Therefore, the

preparation and organization of civil defense has been given great attention in all countries in recent years. In the United States and Britain, for example, a special civil-defense administration headed by government officials has been created. Under the direct control of these administrations many practice atomic alerts are carried out, an extensive network of atomic bomb and fallout shelters has been prepared, and military training of the population is carried out.

The strategic importance of civil defense has increased tremendously as a result of the fact that, to a considerable extent, upon its effective organization and functioning depend not only the defense of the interior, but also the mobilization of the armed forces during the initial phase of the war.

The principal tasks of civil defense are to ensure the required conditions for normal activity of all governmental control agencies during the course of the war and the effective functioning of the national economy. This is achieved by maximum defense of the population against weapons of mass destruction, widespread and all-round aid to victims, and the rapid removal of the remains of an enemy nuclear attack.

The tasks enumerated above are closely related, and the execution of each of them to a considerable extent furthers the solution of all the others. At the same time, the methods of solving the problems confronting civil defense may vary. Certain civil-defense measures are realized by government decree on a nationwide scale, for example, the partial evacuation of the population, measures to ensure the communications and control the country, the creation of special civil-defense troops, etc. Other measures are carried out by decree of specialized ministries and departments, but again on a government-wide scale. And, finally, the third group of measures is realized in a decentralized manner within cities, industrial plants, and institutions.

Thus, civil defense is the sum total of extremely diverse measures, the carrying out of which, to one extent or another, is the duty of all party, council, and economic agencies. All the civil-defense measures are so intertwined that they cannot be separated from the over-all problems of the organization or the control of the nation and its economy.

The civil-defense system in the USSR is based on the principle of strict centralization of control. It is under the control of the all-union headquarters of civil defense of the country. There are, moreover, republic, regional, and municipal headquarters consisting of representatives of different departments. They have under their control the following services: medical, food supply, transport, warning and communication, and others. The headquarters form their own command points.

Such civil-defense organization, however, does not relieve the ministries, departments, services, and organizations of the responsibility of ensuring the planned operation of industrial plants and institutions, and also of providing the needs of the population and comprehensive facilities in case of war.

Taking into account the enormous extent of the probable destruction and losses resulting from thermonuclear strikes by the enemy, it is necessary to create a large number of special civil-defense formations for the removal of the results of an enemy attack on the home front. These may be rescue and reconstruction attachments, medical aid attachments, automobile columns, etc. These detachments should be equipped in such a way that it would be possible to transfer them over considerable distances by their own power, i.e., with their own motor transport.

In order for the civil-defense troops to carry out their missions, it is necessary to place them at an appropriate distance from large cities and industrial objectives.

If the enemy succeeds in carrying out a nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological attack, the activity of all civil-defense forces and means will be directed toward rendering medical aid to the population, extinguishing fires, organizing rescue work and clearing away obstructions, removing the injured from the zone of destruction and evacuating the healthy population from the zone of radioactive contamination, as well as maintaining order.

In organizing the above-mentioned types of aid to the population, especially medical aid, it is necessary to take into account the extraordinarily great scale of this aid. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that in the majority of cases aid must be rendered from outside, i.e., by forces and means from points that have escaped nuclear attack, since the civil-defense means and agencies of the stricken points will suffer great losses.

In order to render timely medical aid, it is important that all doctors, regardless of speciality, receive in peacetime training in the pathology of diseases produced by nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological means. Obviously, nurses should also receive such training.

In order to render aid in the case of a bacteriological attack by the enemy, it is very important to develop, in peacetime, a procedure for the rapid diagnosis of contagious diseases, and also to determine the work regime of industrial plants and transport, the system of isolation of the infected, and to determine the quarantine regime.

Summing up everything that has been said, it should be emphasized once again that in organizing civil defense both centralized, as well as decentralized, creative preparation of all measures is very important. It should also be noted that the number of civil-defense measures to be carried out should be increased continuously.

EDITOR'S NOTE ON CHAPTER VIII

This chapter, "Leadership of the Armed Forces," is almost without change from the two earlier editions. Two significant paragraphs are added on the importance of "one-man command." These are as follows:

"The one-man commander is successfully fulfilling this task not only because of the power given him by the party, the government and the Soviet people to train and educate the personnel, but also because of the honored authority he enjoys from his subordinates for his high culture, education and the qualified solution of all questions of daily combat activity.

"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in its activities systematically carries out work in strengthening the one-man command, viewing it as the most important condition of high military discipline of the personnel and of combat readiness of the Armed Forces."

Another change of interest is the deletion of a part of a paragraph from the 1962 and 1963 editions:

"All leadership of the country and the Armed Forces during wartime will be accomplished by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with the possible organization of a higher agency of leadership of the country and the Armed Forces. This higher agency of leadership may be given the same powers as the State Committee of Defense during the Great Patriotic War, and will be headed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the head of the government to whom the functions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces may also be entrusted."

(The underlined portion of the paragraph above is omitted from the 1968 edition.)

It is obvious that the reference underlined above was to Khrushchev, who was both First Secretary and Premier. *Military Strategy* now does not state which of the two men, Brezhnev, the General Secretary, or Kosygin, the Premier, might be Supreme Commander-in-Chief in a future conflict.

CHAPTER VIII

LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMED FORCES

STRUCTURE OF HIGHER AGENCIES AND THE METHODS
OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMED FORCES
IN THE MOST IMPORTANT CAPITALIST COUNTRIES,
BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF WORLD WAR II, AND
AT PRESENT TIME.

The leadership of the armed forces encompasses the activity of the agencies of strategic command in the area of preparation and waging of war. The main problems which must be solved in this area are: the determination of the military-strategic aims of the entire war and individual stages of it in conformity with the political aims and the nature of the war, the leadership of the armed forces during the process of preparation, mobilization, strategic deployment, organization of military operations, and their all-around support.

As the experience of the last war shows, the proper leadership of the armed forces in a modern war is possible only on the basis of a thorough consideration of the political, economic, and military conditions under which war is prepared and carried out, a realistic evaluation of the potentialities and activities of the enemy, the mobilization of all forces of the country and the armed forces in order to achieve victory over the enemy. Consequently, the agencies directing the armed forces should not only be able to take into account the situation and the potentialities, but should also be able to make them change to their own benefit, to foresee scientifically and soundly the development of events over a considerable period of time, to make timely decisions and to carry them out unswervingly.

The structure of the agencies and methods of leadership of the armed forces are different in various governments. However, common to all governments was the effort to attain the most complete conformity between the forms and methods of leadership and the character of the war and to provide unity of leadership in a political, economic, and military respect.

During World War II in fascist Germany the entire leadership of the country and the armed forces was usurped by Hitler. All civilian ministries and the higher agencies of military leadership were directly subordinated to him as the Supreme Commander and Chancellor of the Reich and, from December 1941, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. The higher agencies of military leadership included the supreme command or the main staff of the Armed Forces (OKW) and the staff of the operational leadership of the

armed forces, which formally belonged to the main staff but were actually subordinated directly to Hitler. The General Staff of the Ground Forces (OKH), as well as the Commanders-in-Chief of the Air Force and the Navy with their staffs, were also subordinated to him. The group commanders of the armies at the front were subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and to the main staff.

As a whole, the system of the higher military leadership, based on duplication and mutual control, caused serious friction and was able to provide control only while the military actions were carried out under conditions favorable for fascist Germany. When its armed forces encountered stubborn resistance, and later the mounting blows of the Red Army, the Hitler machine of leadership was incapable of effectively controlling the country and the Armed Forces.

The problems of coalition leadership of the fascist bloc were not solved. During the course of the war the leadership amounted to the direct military and political dictatorship of fascist Germany over its partners. The numerous negotiations of Hitler with Mussolini, Horthy, and other leaders of the Axis countries were carried out unsystematically. All decisions were usually made personally by Hitler. The daily contact between the partners of the Axis countries through the ambassadors and military attaches was also weak. Each of Hitler's allies pursued certain purposes in the war and did not wish to let the others in on their plans. The contradictions inherent in the bloc of capitalist countries showed up at this point.

In Britain the highest organ of leadership of the country and the armed forces was the War Cabinet, which included the Prime Minister -- he was the Minister of Defense -- a lord who was chairman of the Council, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Labor and National Conscription, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Industry, and other ministers.

However, the actual leadership at the highest level was performed by the Prime Minister through committees of the War Cabinet. Three groups of committees were created in conformity with the scope of the problems to be solved during the course of the war: military; civilian, which had jurisdiction over problems of civil defense of the home country and general economic problems; and also committees responsible for production.

The group of military committees included the Committee of Defense (operational group and supply group), the Committee of the Chief of Staff, the Committees of the Chiefs of the Rear Areas, the Committee of Military Production, the Committee for the Planning of Materiel and Technical Provisions, the Planning Committee, and the Intelligence Committee.

The main role in this group was played by the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, the members of which were the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Chairman), the Chief of the Naval Staff, Chief of the Air Force Staff, Chief of Staff under the Ministry of Defense, and the Chief of Staff of Joint Operations.

This committee was, in essence, the main higher agency of leadership over a broad scope of military problems which were solved at its conferences with the enlistment of interested persons from other committees, while the War Cabinet only legally retained a value of the highest instance and was actually responsible only for carrying out foreign policy and for the economic condition of the country. The work of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff was provided by the Intelligence Committee, which included the chiefs of the intelligence commands of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, the Planning Committee, which consisted of the chiefs of the operational commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and also other committees.

The Prime Minister, who, as was already mentioned, fulfilled the functions of Minister of Defense, directed the armed forces by various methods. For instance, he personally met with the Chiefs of Staff or gave them written instructions; in other cases, he maintained direct contact with the Planning Committee and other committees, and sometimes engaged in direct correspondence with commanders in various theaters of operations.

In the United States of America the President stands at the head of the armed forces; he is the Commander-in-Chief. The President accomplishes leadership of the armed forces through his own personal staff which is created during war-time, through the Chiefs of Staff, and through the War Department and Department of the Navy.

The President's personal staff helped him as Commander-in-Chief to lead all the armed forces during war.

The tasks of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff were: to secure the interaction of the army and naval forces, to coordinate the general problems of the development and utilization of the armed forces, to discuss and present to the President for approval strategic plans for conducting the war and to work out directives to the commanders in the theaters of operation. In addition to this, the committee was responsible for over-all planning of all types of military orders to industry and for the utilization of strategic raw materials in conformity with the over-all strategic policy agreed upon.

The Committee of the Chiefs of Staff included the Chief of Staff under the President (Chairman), the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, and the Commander of the Army Air Force.

The President directed the work of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff through the chief of his own personal staff, who, presiding over the conferences of the committee, informed it concerning the President's directives. Sometimes the President personally intervened in the decisions of the committee.

The President, as Chief Executive of the United States and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, was also the chief of all agencies regulating the war economy. To solve these problems, a department was created in 1940 for measures to be taken at times of emergency; this department was part of the executive office of the President and was directly subordinate to him. This department consisted of various bureaus and civilian agencies through which the War Department distributed military orders. The

Secretary of War, his deputy, and other representatives of the Army participated in directing the department. The relationship with military economic agencies and the agencies of the Department of the Navy was accomplished in a similar manner.

Therefore, the President of the U.S., like the Prime Minister of Britain, depended on a rather complex system of various agencies, allocating appropriate powers to them for solving all problems concerned with war as a whole.

The coalition leadership of the armed forces of the U.S. and Britain during the Second World War was accomplished in the following manner. A Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the American and British armed forces, headquartered in Washington, was created in the spring of 1942 to coordinate the efforts of the armed forces of these countries.

The Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was subordinate to the President of the U.S. and the Prime Minister of England.

The tasks of the Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were to develop and carry out under the direction of the heads of government of the U.S. and Britain strategic plans, the determination of military requirements in conformity with these plans, the distribution of military supplies, and the determination of the requirements for sea shipping.

In order to fulfill the responsibilities entrusted to it, the Joint Committee had to systematically hold conferences at which the British Chiefs of Staff could not always be present. They were replaced by the chiefs of the missions of each type of armed forces, which together comprised the mission of the British committee of the Chiefs of Staff. The chief of the British mission was a full and equal member of the Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and participated at all its meetings, even when the Chiefs of Staff of all the services of the armed forces of Britain were present at them.

The Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff met, on the average, once a week during the war to solve urgent problems of strategic planning.

The long-range strategic plans of the war were agreed upon at a conference of the governmental heads of the U.S. and Britain with the participation of the members of the Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and political advisors.

The Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was given the right of strategic leadership of all theaters of military operation where British and American forces were located. It was directly responsible for developing and carrying out operational plans on the European continent and in the Mediterranean area.

The British Chiefs of Staff directed the fulfillment of the plans of the allies in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East. The Atlantic Ocean was divided into a British and an American zone of military operations with the commander of the naval forces of the respective power being responsible for the operations in his zone. Leadership of the operations in the Pacific

Ocean was completely entrusted to the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the American Armed Forces.

In theaters of military operations where all three types of armed forces of the allies were active, leadership over them was accomplished by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief or the Commanders-in-Chief, who bore the responsibility for using the combined forces in the interest of achieving the over-all goals of the allies and were subordinated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Actually, in most cases they adhered to the political and strategic orientation of their own government, which led to friction and differences of opinion. In order to smooth them out somewhat, the post of deputy was created. If the Supreme Commander-in-Chief or Commanders-in-Chief were American, then the deputy was an Englishman, and vice versa.

Such was the structure of the strategic leadership on a coalition scale, and such was the procedure for solving problems regarding the organization of the higher joint-command agencies, the development of coalition strategy, and the coordination of the efforts of the allied armies, and also problems of the leadership of joint forces in theaters of military activity.

However, these agencies could not always successfully solve the problems they faced due to contradictions in the foreign policies of the allies. The contradictions were such that the strategic decisions worked out by one ally were not accepted by the other, since they did not correspond to his interests. For example, the American plan proposed in August 1942 for military action against the Axis in Western Europe in 1943, which called for invasion of Europe, was categorically rejected by the British, who insisted upon a landing of Anglo-American troops in North Africa at the end of 1942. At their insistence the main efforts of the allies in 1943 were thus directed against secondary theaters of operation. As is known, the question of opening the second front in Europe was postponed repeatedly. All this permitted the Axis countries, first and foremost fascist Germany, to concentrate their main forces in the principal theater of operations, which was the Soviet-German front.

There was no complete agreement even within the allied agencies of the Commander-in-Chief in the theaters of operation. The work of these organs of strategic leadership was seriously hampered by the contradictions caused by the different political and military aims of the allied countries in one theater or another and also the endeavor of each of them to seize the controlling position in order to more easily achieve their particular goals. In this respect the Supreme Command in Europe is indicative.

For example, in spite of the fact that at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 it was decided to appoint a British general as the Supreme Commander of the allied forces in Europe, this post was occupied by an American general. The British government compromised in solving this problem only after the Americans agreed to open the second front not in 1943, as was planned earlier, but only in 1944. However, the British government recognized the Supreme Commander only for his functions as organizer of coordination and over-all leadership, which did not affect

problems of operational control.

The Supreme Commander of the allied forces in Europe was directly subordinate to the Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and maintained relations with the American and the British committees of the Chiefs of Staff. The staff of the Supreme Commander was occupied with extremely diverse problems, ranging from the leadership of troops to diplomacy and policy. Its composition was very complex and cumbersome, since, along with the military specialists, there were various political and economic advisors, each of whom had his own opinion on international and political questions. All this extremely complicated the activity of the Supreme Commander, and he had to spend considerable time coordinating plans, getting compromise decisions accepted, and smoothing over all kinds of differences of opinion.

As is known, the Soviet Union also participated in the anti-Hitler coalition during World War II. However, the ruling circles in the U.S. and Britain, pursuing their own mercenary motives in the war, strove to weaken the Soviet Union as much as possible. During the war they hampered in every possible way the fulfillment of their interallied pledges, intentionally prolonging the war and concentrating their efforts on solving problems which were by no means the main ones.

At the same time our former allies, while carrying out the war against the common enemy, were forced to agree on a political and military policy with the Soviet Union. Agreements were reached at periodic conferences of the heads of state of the USSR, the U.S., and Britain with participation of representatives of the armed forces (the Moscow, Teheran, and Yalta Conferences), and also by systematic correspondence of the heads of state, sending responsible representatives to the allied countries, and through diplomatic channels.

As was already mentioned, soon after the end of World War II the American-British imperialists proceeded to create various aggressive military blocs directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and to create agencies for directing these blocs. What the agencies of the higher military leadership of the imperialist coalition are can be seen in the example of the military and political system of leadership of the North Atlantic bloc. Its highest directing political organ is the NATO council, which includes the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and finance; if necessary, the heads of state of the countries participating in the bloc may participate in the work of the council.

Sessions of the NATO council gather two or three times a year to discuss the general problems, to work out a unified political course and strategy, to determine the total military budget of NATO and for each country separately, to direct the creation of armed forces, and other problems.

A permanent council directs the activity of NATO between sessions. It consists of permanent representatives of the countries participating in the bloc, who have the rank of ambassador and are given appropriate

powers to solve current problems.

The military committee is the highest military agency which can solve problems of military strategic planning, organization, training of the armed forces, and other problems. It is staffed by representatives of the committees of the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. and Britain and by chiefs of the general staffs of other countries participating in the bloc. Until June 1966, the working agency of the NATO military committee was its standing group, composed of representatives of the committees of the chiefs of staff of the USA, Britain and of the general staff of the national defense of France. In connection with the withdrawal of France from the NATO military organization, by the decision of the NATO Council, this group was abolished and its functions given to the standing military committee. In September 1966, the decision of the French government was announced on recalling its representative from the NATO military committee and of his replacement by a liaison mission.

Military leadership of the combined forces of NATO is directly accomplished by the Supreme Commands in Europe and on the Atlantic, the English Channel zone committee, and the regional strategic USA-Canada group.

The chief command is the European Supreme Command, to which are subordinated the basic troop contingents, units of the Navy and the Air Force detached by the countries participating in NATO.

The Supreme Commander of the combined armed forces of NATO in Europe is an American general; his deputies are representatives of the armed forces of Britain and France. The staff of the Commander-in-Chief consists of representatives of the NATO countries. A military representative of the U.S. also heads the staff.

The territory encompassed by the European command is divided into North-European, Central-European, South-European, and Mediterranean theaters of operation. The Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces at these theaters are directly subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the combined armed forces of NATO. At the disposal of these Commanders-in-Chief are specific armed forces combined into army groups, field armies, tactical aviation commands, air armies, and naval forces. By a decision of the NATO Council adopted in Ottawa in May of 1963, nuclear forces may be included in the joint armed forces which are at the disposal of the Supreme Commander in Europe.

The next in importance is the supreme command of the Atlantic. [Editor's Note #1] The Supreme Commander of the combined armed forces of NATO in this theater is also an American admiral. Only one command in the English Channel, which includes air and naval forces placed at the disposal of NATO by a number of governments, is headed by a military representative of Britain. [Editor's Note #2]

As is apparent from the entire organization of the military and political leadership of NATO, the ruling circles of the U.S. even during peacetime secured for themselves complete supremacy in this main military

grouping, having converted it into an obedient weapon. However, the withdrawal of France from the NATO military organization is testimony to the fact that among the countries who are members of this bloc, the idea of release from the dangerous dictates of the USA has begun to break through. At the same time, the tendency for closer military cooperation between the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany is becoming stronger. It [Ed. Note #3] is making every effort to have access to nuclear weapons and is showing particular insistence in seizing the leading posts in NATO. In the struggle for the leading position in NATO there appear the same irreconcilable internal contradictions which were inherent in imperialist governments in past coalitions.

Such is the structure of the political and military agencies of the leadership of the most important coalition of the imperialist countries -- NATO.

As to the structure and functions of the agencies of the higher political and military leadership of the armed forces of the most important capitalist countries -- the U.S., Britain, France, and West Germany -- at the present time, they are as follows.

In the United States of America the political and highest military power belongs to the President, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The President is given considerable power in solving military problems. During war his power is further expanded, while the influence of Congress is reduced. The highest agency for preparing and waging war which is subordinated to the President is the National Security Council. This council includes: the President (chairman), the Vice President, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury, the chief of the National Mobilization Administration and the chief of the budget bureau.

The committee of the Chiefs of Staff and its working agency, the joint staff, is formally a consultation and working agency of the President for developing and accomplishing strategic plans, but actually it is the highest agency of strategic leadership of the armed forces during war.

The leadership of all the services of the armed forces during peacetime is done by the Secretary of Defense, who is directly subordinated to the President and also by the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for mobilization and strategic planning, the construction and the utilization of all the services of the armed forces, and for the direction of research projects.

The joint staff is responsible for developing mobilization and strategic plans, their execution, and operational leadership of the combined commands of the U.S. Armed Forces in Alaska, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Caribbean Sea, in the European zone, the air defense of the continental U.S., and also of special strategic air force commands and the command of the U.S. naval forces in the Eastern part of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

In Britain the leadership for preparing the country for war and leadership of the country and the armed forces during war are entrusted to the cabinet of ministers under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.

Under the cabinet of ministers is the defense committee which determines the over-all direction of the development of the armed forces of Britain, directly leads them, and also takes measures to prepare the country for war. It should also coordinate the activity of all ministries and departments with respect to the problems of the creation of the armed forces and preparation for war. The committee includes: the Prime Minister (Chairman), Minister of Defense, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, War Minister, Minister of the Air Force, First Lord of the Admiralty, Minister of Finance, and other ministers.

Under the Defense Committee is the Ministry of Defense, which is concerned with problems of the structure of all the services of the armed forces as a whole, and of each service in particular, military research projects, and military production.

The committee of the Chiefs of Staff is the agency for the operational and strategic leadership of the armed forces of Britain. During peacetime this committee works out strategic plans which are presented for consideration and approval by the defense committee; during wartime it is called upon to issue specific orders in the name of the defense committee to the Commanders-in-Chief in the various theaters of operation.

In France all military power is concentrated in the hands of the President who is the supreme commander of the armed forces and also Chairman of the Supreme Council and the Committee of National Defense. The General Staff of National Defense and the Ministry of the Armed Forces are subordinated to the President and the Premier.

The Supreme Council of National Defense, as an advisory agency, expresses its opinion on problems which are presented to the President, the Premier, and other members of the cabinet for consideration. It consists of the Premier, the ministers, the Chief of the General Staff of National Defense, the Chiefs of Staff of the services of the armed forces, inspectors, and representatives of other agencies of the armed forces.

The Committee of National Defense in a narrower scope solves all problems pertaining to preparation of the country for war and creation of the armed forces. The committee includes the Premier, the Chief of the General Staff of National Defense, the Minister of the Armed Forces, and representatives of the services of the armed forces.

The General Staff of National Defense works out plans for war and deploys the armed forces within the framework of the over-all strategy, determines the prospects for further development of the armed forces, watches over the military and political situation, and informs the President, the Premier, and interested ministers concerning it, sees that the measures to be taken by various ministries for mobilization of the economy and other resources for military needs are carried out.

The Ministry of the Armed Forces is responsible for the practical realization of measures in the area of creating the armed forces, bringing them into fighting shape, and preparing and carrying out mobilization.

The Hitler system of higher military control is virtually being restored in West Germany. The Federal Chancellor is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of West Germany during wartime. The Defense Council is the advisory agency under him. The council includes the Federal Chancellor (Chairman), the Vice-Chancellor and the Minister on Atomic Matters (Deputy Chairman), and the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance and Economics.

The Defense Council is called upon to develop and make fundamental decisions on all important problems of the creation of the armed forces in the country, presents to the Cabinet of Ministers suggestions for the coordination of the activities of the higher civilian and military authorities in the area of military build-up and mobilization measures.

The Ministry of Defense is the highest agency controlling the armed forces. It consists of three main administrations (for military questions, armaments and combat equipment, and military administration) and two lesser administrations (personnel and budget and finance). The basic agency of operational control of the armed forces is the main administration for military questions headed by a general inspector of the Bundeswehr. The administration of the armed forces which carries out the leadership by means of the staffs of the services of the armed forces is also subordinate to him. A military council has been set up under the general inspector. On the council are: the general inspector (chairman), the inspectors of the services of the armed forces, the inspector of the territorial troops and the chief of the main administration of armaments and combat equipment. [Editor's Note #4]

It is apparent from what has been said that all of the most important imperialist countries are characterized by considerable centralization of governmental and military leadership during wartime, the concentration of all power in the hands of the President or Prime Minister, who is given unlimited authority. Under him is created a system of governmental agencies having primarily consultative and advisory functions. Such a system of higher governmental and military leadership can easily be used by the most militant imperialist circles for unleashing war without consulting their parliaments, thus ignoring public opinion.

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE HIGHER AGENCIES OF LEADERSHIP
OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES DURING THE YEARS OF THE CIVIL WAR,
DURING THE PERIOD OF PEACE, AND DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Origin and organization of the agencies of military leadership during the years of the Civil War. The agencies directing the Armed Forces of the

Soviet Union originated together with the creation of a new army, an army of workers and peasants, under severe conditions of economic ruin and incredible fatigue of the masses from the imperialist war, and under conditions of counter-revolutionary rebellions and military intervention, as well as demobilization of the old army. Demobilization of the Army and Navy was accompanied by break-up of the old and creation of a new apparatus of military control.

These radical changes began with the first days of the socialist revolution. On October 26 (November 8), 1917, the decree of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets created a Committee for Military and Naval Affairs. It was entrusted with control of the Military and Naval ministries. Simultaneously with the creation of this committee by a special decree of the Congress of Soviets to all armies it was proposed to create provisional revolutionary committees, which were entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining revolutionary order and solidarity of the front.

In December of the same year the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs was changed to the Collegium of People's Commissars for Military Affairs. The apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs gradually began to build around the collegium. Many administrations and departments of the former war ministry were abolished, as demobilization of the old army proceeded, and those administrations and departments which were used for forming the Red Army were radically changed.

By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars dated January 15 (28), 1918, concerning the creation of the Workers and Peasants Red Army, the supreme directing agency of the Army was declared to be the Council of People's Commissars headed by V. I. Lenin.

Direct leadership and control of the Army were concentrated in the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs in the All-Russian Collegium for the Formation of the Red Army created under it.

The All-Russian Collegium was responsible for coordination of the activity of local organizations for the formation of the Army, for taking into account the newly formed units, leadership of the formation and training, arming and supplying the Army, development of new regulations, and also the drawing up of military plans, the solution of various operational problems and problems of troop disposition.

However, the All-Russian Collegium could not rapidly develop a sufficiently strong apparatus which would ensure organization of the work for the creation of the Red Army for all of Russia. Therefore, the enormous work of creating the Red Army fell mainly on the Councils of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies.

In conformity with the instructions worked out by the All-Russian Collegium, the creation of the Red Army and its control was subordinated to local district, provincial, and regional councils and to army and corps committees in the Army.

All detachments of the Red Army in the provinces were created by decree of the regional councils in coordination with the local councils and were under their complete direction and depended upon them for provisions. Under each of the councils, ranging from those of the small rural districts to the provincial councils, military departments were created, and under the army and corps committee military staffs were created for the purpose of organizing the Red Army. The military departments of the councils included representatives of the councils and military staffs. The military staffs consisted of the representatives of the army and corps committees.

Such a structure of the leadership of the Army from the very beginning of its creation on voluntary principles most completely corresponded to the conditions of that time, when it was extremely important not only to do away with the old army and its apparatus, but to keep the front from complete collapse, to bring the masses of workers, including the soldiers of the old army, closer to the Communist Party, and to rouse them to the defense of the October conquests. Therefore, such extensive power in creating the Red Army was given to the councils as the most massive organization of the working classes.

This structure of the leadership of the Army was due to the fact that the young Soviet Republic began its construction with the almost complete absence of experienced military leaders. The command staff in the Army was elected. The mutual relations between the military services were regulated by general meetings of soldiers and elective organizations. Of course, as a result of all this, the principles of successive centralization in the leadership and control of the Army could not be completely observed. Certain local councils reserved the detachments of the Red Army for the needs of their districts or provinces, and only after repeated demands placed them at the disposal of the higher agencies.

The leadership of the Navy was originally accomplished by the Naval Collegium elected from delegates of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Then, in November 1917, the Supreme Naval Collegium was formed and headed the work of the Navy Department. In February 1918, the People's Commissariat for Naval Affairs was established. The Supreme Naval Collegium was renamed the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Naval Affairs.

The original leadership of the Air Fleet was accomplished by the Bureau of Commissars created in October 1917. In December of the same year the All-Russian Aviation Collegium was established and was responsible for the problems of the formation of the aviation and balloon units, their control, assembly and maintenance of aviation equipment, and also the selection of cadres.

At the beginning of March 1918, the Supreme Military Council consisting of three persons, a military director and two political commissars, and was created by decree of the Council of People's Commissars to supervise all military operations of the Red Army.

At first, the most important function of the Supreme Military Council was the organization of operational formations, so-called screening detachments along the line of demarcation established by the Treaty of Brest which

separated the Soviet Republic from the regions occupied by the German bandits. Later the staff and tasks of the Supreme Military Council were considerably expanded.

From April 1918, the staff of the Supreme Military Council included the People's Commissars on Military and Naval Affairs, a member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, and also specialists of military and naval affairs. The People's Commissar on Military Affairs was chairman of the council. The Supreme Military Council fulfilled the functions of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and was directly subordinated to the Council of People's Commissars.

In May 1918, the All-Russian Collegium for the Formation of the Red Army and certain other agencies were replaced by the All-Russian Supreme Staff, which included the Administration for the Organization of the Army, the Operational Administration, the Administration of Military communications, and the Administration for the Commanding Personnel of the Army. During the same month the All-Russian Air Force Collegium was replaced by the Main Administration of the Workers and Peasants Red Fleet. The supply agencies were also reorganized.

The activities of the All-Russian Supreme Staff and the Central Supply Administration were combined into the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. At the head of the All-Russian Supreme Staff and each of the administrations of the war department were Councils composed of a director and two military commissars.

The method of filling command offices was also set in order. The elections of officers were abolished by the decree of the VTsIK* of April 22, 1918. The command personnel, starting from commanders of individual units and higher, were appointed by the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs with the consent of the Supreme Military Council.

Organization of the troops and the administrative agencies was also improved in order to repulse the counterrevolution and the foreign interventionists who in the spring and summer of 1918 unfolded active military operations in the North, on the Eastern front, in the region of Tsaritsyn, and in the North Caucasus.

In June 1918, all Soviet troops operating against the interventionists and White Guardists in the region of the Volga, the Urals, and in Siberia as individual detachments were subordinated to a single command of the Eastern Front headed by the Revolutionary Military Council of the front. All detachments were brought together into regular military units. For example, five armies were created on this front. The agencies controlling the troops which were defending Tsaritsyn and were active in the North Caucasus were also radically reorganized. The military council of the North Caucasus military district was created in the second half of June. The Southern screening force was created in August to defend the line of

*All-Union Central Executive Committee

demarcation from violation by the Germans occupying the Ukraine and to combat the counterrevolutionary formations of General Krasnov, while the Northeastern screening force was created to combat the interventionists and White Guardists in the North. These screening forces were also headed by revolutionary military councils.

However, in August 1918, it became evident that leadership of the fronts and the screening forces was not unified. For example, the Supreme Military Council, being occupied with the screening forces, lost sight of the other fronts and mainly the Eastern front. Leadership of operations against the Czechoslovakians in the East and against the White Guardists in the Southeast was accomplished by the operational department of the Moscow District Military Commissariat. The operational administration of the All-Russian Supreme Staff also attempted to perform operational leadership. The interrelationships between these agencies were not determined. All this introduced confusion into the leadership of the troops and weakened the defense of the republic. Urgent measures were needed to liquidate the shortcomings and to create a unified center of leadership of the military action of the Red Army.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR) was established as the highest command agency of the Red Army on September 2, 1918, by a special decree of the VTsIK, which declared the country to be an armed camp. Due to the centralization of the command of the Army in the hands of the RVSR, the Supreme Military Council was abolished. The Revolutionary Military Council was also entrusted with the functions and rights of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, whose members became part of the staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. The chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs.

Established together with the creation of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was the post of Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces, who headed all ground and naval forces making up the Field Forces. The post of commander of Naval Forces was established for operational leadership of the fleets and flotillas and was made subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. The Naval Staff was formed at the same time.

For leadership of military operations of the Field Forces, the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was established, while a Field Aviation and Aeronautical Administration was created under the Field Staff of the RVSR to control the actions of the air force.

Along with the Field Staff, the All-Russian Supreme Staff was retained and was entrusted with the execution of all orders of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic concerning the defense of the country, recruitment, distribution of troops, combat training of the Army, the creation of new formations, and equipment for living for servicemen.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, as well as all other departments and establishments, worked on the basis of the orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In a special decree of the

Central Committee of the party published in December 1918, "Concerning the Policy of the War Department," it was indicated that "the policy of the war department, as well as all other departments and establishments, is to be carried out on the precise basis of general directives issued by the Party in the person of its Central Committee and under its direct control" [1].

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was a collegial agency of leadership and complete military power belonged only to it. The Commander-in-Chief was given free rein in solving operational and strategic problems only within the limits of the directives of the higher agencies of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. However, the Commander-in-Chief was accountable to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of which he was a member. All orders of the Commander-in-Chief had to be countersigned by one of the members of the Revolutionary Military Council, without which they were not valid.

The same principle of collective leadership underlay the command of the troops on the front, the organization of which continued.

A commander -- a military specialist -- and two military commissars participated in the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Northern, Southern, and Caspian-Caucasian fronts, which were created in the fall and winter of 1918. The revolutionary military councils of the armies were the same. All orders of the commanders of the front troops and of the armies had to be countersigned by one of the members of the Revolutionary Military Council.

The development of armed intervention by international imperialism against the Soviet Republic demanded the most efficient unification of the activity of all agencies of the Soviet government under the leadership of a single agency and the subordination of its activity to the problems of defending the country. For this purpose the decree of the VTsIK of November 1918 established the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense under the chairmanship of V. I. Lenin. The creation of this higher organ of leadership of the country and the Armed Forces achieved a more complete and purposeful mobilization of all resources and efforts of the country for the successful crushing of internal and external counterrevolutions, and also a unification of the political, economic, and military leaderships.

The Council of Defense was the highest organ directing the defense of the country. It had complete power in directing the armed struggle on the fronts and the entire activity of the people's commissariats and departments for the mobilization of all industrial and transportation resources in the rear. The most important fields of activity of the Council of Defense were food provisioning, mobilization of transport, of industry, of fuel resources, and the organization of military supplies. The Council of Defense directed the entire military economy of the republic. The activity of the Revolutionary Military Council and other military agencies was placed under its control.

The Council of Defense carried out all its work through its members, who, being directors of the most important departments in the country, bore

the responsibility for fulfilling the resolutions of the Council of Defense each with respect to his own department. The Council of Defense did not have its own apparatus, and in all its activities it depended on the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars and appropriate departments. To realize the most important problems associated with defense of the republic, special commissions were created, while authorized agents of the Council of Defense were sent out to solve urgent problems on the local level.

Therefore, by the end of 1918 a harmonious structure of the centralized leadership of the Armed Forces was built from top to bottom based on the principle of collective leadership, in conjunction with personal responsibility of each of the leaders.

The most important feature of this structure was the undivided authority and leading position of the Communist Party in all agencies and units of leadership of the Armed Forces. The highest expression of the undivided authority and guiding role of the Communist Party was that all of the most important problems of military policy, the creation of the Armed Forces, and their strategic utilization were solved only by decree of the Central Committee of the Party. The direct authority and leadership of the Communist Party in the entire complex organization of the Army from the bottom up was carried out through military commissars and political agencies, which depended in their work on party cells.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government constantly analyzed the military situation, determined which of the fronts was the main one during each stage of the war, and developed strategic plans for crushing the enemy, being concerned at the same time with the organization of work in the rear areas, in order to supply the front.

The system of leadership of the Armed Forces, which was set by the fall of 1918, existed during the entire Civil War with only minor changes.

The most important of these changes was that of transforming the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense into the Council of Labor and Defense. This transformation was caused by the fact that after the defeat of the second campaign of the Entente a pause ensued during the Civil War. Certain armies were made into labor armies, in order to restore the national economy. The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense expanded its economic functions and by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars dated April 16, 1920, was transformed into a Special Commission under the Council of People's Commissars and received the name Council of Labor and Defense (STO).

The tasks of the Council of Labor and Defense included the correlation and intensification of the activity of all the people's commissariats and departments in the area of construction and defense of the country.

Agencies of military leadership during the period of peaceful construction after the Civil War. After the end of the Civil War the agencies of military leadership during the entire period of peaceful construction

underwent certain changes in conformity with the changes occurring in the economic, political, and cultural development of the country, in the structure of the Armed Forces, and in the opinions concerning the nature of a future war.

By special decree of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR published in November 1923, the tasks and functions of the military department were generalized, and the structure of the central agencies of the military administration was refined.

According to this decree, the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was responsible for developing and realizing plans and measures for the ground and naval defense of the USSR; the organization of groups and naval Armed Forces, including territorial troops and their leadership; the maintenance of the Armed Forces in constant preparedness; leadership of the agencies of local military and naval administrations; formation, recruitment, and training of units of the RKKA*; political education of the servicemen; provision of the Army and Navy with all types of allowances and materiel equipment; registration and drafting into military service of the population; training of the cadres of command and high-command personnel, and the solution of many other problems.

Orders of the People's Commissar or his deputy common to the entire People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs were issued as orders of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, which was the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs.

In addition to the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, who was the chairman, the Revolutionary Military Council included the deputy of the People's Commissar, who was the deputy chairman, the Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces, and members appointed by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was the chief of all ground and naval forces. He had independent authority in all problems of an operational and strategic nature within the limits of the directives of the higher agencies of power, which were received through the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs or through the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR.

The staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was occupied with solving problems concerning the defense of the country, organization of recruitment and distribution of troops, their combat training, equipment and daily life, mobilization of the Armed Forces and military registration of the population, as well as many other problems.

The concept of central controlling agencies legally reinforced that organization and those functions which had taken form by the closing period of the Civil War. However, certain of them under peacetime conditions lost their significance, and certain ones had to change their functions and

*Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

methods of work.

For example, the need for the post of Supreme Commander was past, since his functions during peacetime were very indefinite and duplicated the work of other agencies. It was also necessary to reorganize the staff of the RKKA, which did not provide a sufficiently successful solution of the problems entrusted to it, since, together with the problem of the defense of the state as a whole, it was also occupied with the problems of the organization of military training of the Army in the daily life of the troops.

All this demanded the reorganization of administrative agencies, which was accomplished on the initiative and under the direction of the Communist Party while carrying out the military reform of 1924-1925.

The post of Supreme Commander was eliminated as a result of the reorganization of the control agencies, and the structure of the staff of the Red Army was put into order.

The main functions of preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for war were concentrated in the staff of the RKKA. It dealt with general problems of training all services of the Armed Forces -- the Army, Navy, and Air Force. All agencies which fulfilled to some extent these functions in other administrations, such as the Administration of Naval Forces and the Administration of the Air Forces, were transferred to the staff of the RKKA, and those of them which were not directly associated with performing these functions were excluded from the make-up of the staff.

Leadership of combat training and inspection, recruitment of the army personnel, equipment and servicing of the troops, and also the daily life of the Army was concentrated in the Main Administration of the RKKA. The Supply Administration of the RKKA was given the job of supplying all types of provisions, except special ones, to the Armed Forces. The administrations of the Naval and the Air Forces were left only with the organization of a special service to be performed by the personnel of these branches of the Armed Forces, their special and combat training, and special supplies. Thus, the structure of the central agencies was considerably simplified, their functions were more clearly defined, and the apparatus was reduced both with respect to the number of administrations and departments and with respect to the number of personnel.

The continued strengthening of the power of the Armed Forces; the growth of their technical equipment on the basis of the industrialization of the country; and the development of aviation, the Navy, and armored troops made it necessary to further improve the agencies of military leadership.

In accordance with the decisions of the 17th Party Congress on establishing strict one-man command, on strengthening the personal responsibility of leaders, and on the abolition of collegiality in the military commissariats, in June 1934, by decree of the Central Executive Committee USSR, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was abolished. By the same decree, the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs

was renamed the People's Commissariat of Defense USSR. The Commissariat of Defense was entrusted with the functions of the leadership of all services of the Armed Forces, branches, and special troops, and also of local agencies of military control (military commissariats).

New administrations of national air defense and of armor were created under the Commissariat of Defense.

Under the People's Commissariat of Defense, in the capacity of a consultative organ, there was created a Military Council, the regulations on which were approved in November 1934. Simultaneously with this, the military councils of the districts, fleets, and armies were abolished.

In connection with the enhancement of the role of the staff of the RKKA as the main agency of the People's Commissariat of Defense it was renamed the General Staff by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in September 1935.

The General Staff was entrusted with developing plans for the operational and strategic utilization of all services of the Armed Forces for defense of the country, their thorough provisioning, the preparation of the theaters of operation, mobilization deployment, and also the drafting of industrial orders, the creation of mobilization reserves, and the fulfillment of many other measures concerned with increasing the defense capabilities of the country as a whole.

In order to further strengthen the seacoasts of the Soviet Union, the TsIK and the SNK* of the USSR on December 30, 1937, adopted a resolution to create the People's Commissariat of the Navy, which was to develop plans for the construction, armament, and recruitment of Naval Forces, to direct their combat and political training, to organize air defense in the naval theaters of the country, to prepare cadres and to prepare naval regulations.

The intensification of international tension plus the increased threat of war brought about a number of new measures aimed at strengthening the nation's defensive capability and the organs of administration of the Armed Forces.

By decree of the TsIK and the SNK USSR on May 10, 1937, military councils composed of a commander and two members of the Military Council were introduced in the military districts, fleets, and armies. The Military Council was the highest organ of administration. It had complete responsibility for the morale-political condition of the troops, as well as for their constant combat and mobilization preparedness.

In 1938, in keeping with a decree of the government and of the Central Committee of the Party on the creation of collegiums under the people's commissariats, the Main Military Council of the Red Army and the Main Military Council of the Navy were created. In connection with the setting up

* The Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People's Commissars.

of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, the role of the Military Council which was set up under the People's Commissariat of Defense in 1934 was gradually decreased, and it was abolished.

The main military councils examined the basic problems of the structure of the Army and Navy and directed all of their activity into the thorough preparation of the Army and Navy for the impending war.

Thus, for example, at the expanded conference of the Main Military Council of the Red Army held by decree of the Central Committee VKP (b) in April 1940, the lessons of the war with Finland were discussed. As a result of their discussion, the decree "Concerning Measures to be Taken for Military Training, Organization, and Equipment of the Troops of the Red Army on the Basis of the Experience of the War in Finland and Military Experience of Recent Years" was issued. This decree introduced serious changes into the nature and methods of training, administration, and organization of troops. Many administrations of the People's Commissariat for Defense were reorganized; certain of them, including the Administration of National Air Defense were changed to Main Administrations. The formation of the Administration of Airborne Troops began on the eve of the war.

The Main Military Council also made recommendations for the elimination of obsolete models of military equipment and for measures to be taken for developing new types of weapons, especially for improving aircraft and armored equipment, as well as communication facilities. The resolutions of the Main Military Council were carried out by the People's Commissariat for Defense and other people's commissariats.

However, by the beginning of the Great patriotic War there were still some things that had yet to be accomplished. For example, the High Command had still not been created. There were serious gaps in solving the problems of the organization of communications between the General Staff and the front. It was considered disadvantageous to have the communications units of the RVGK* provide communication with the front. It was proposed that this communication be accomplished during war by means of lines and communication centers of the People's Commissariat of Communications. All these and other shortcomings made it necessary to carry out additional measures for the further improvement of the agencies of military leadership, measures which had to be carried out during the course of the war.

Agencies of Military Control During the Years of the Great Patriotic War. From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government took a number of measures to convert the country into a unified armed camp. Military problems from then on took precedence over all other problems. The activity of all agencies of the government was put on a war footing, in order to render all-out aid to the front. The entire rear area of the country stood at the service of defense. All activity of the Communist Party and of all agencies of the government was permeated with the spirit of iron discipline and the strictest centralization.

* The Revolutionary Military High Command.

A state of war was declared in the European part of the country by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR on June 22, 1941. On the following day by decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, Stavka of the High Command under the chairmanship of the People's Commissar of Defense was created to direct the military operations of the Red Army and Navy.

In order to mobilize rapidly all forces of the country to repulse the enemy, a joint decree of the Central Committee of the Party, the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 30, 1941, created the State Committee of Defense under the chairmanship of I. V. Stalin, in whose hands all state power was concentrated and by whom the military, political, and economic leadership of the country was united.

The State Committee of Defense was organized after the example of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense of the Civil War period. As in the case of this council, the State Committee of Defense was the highest agency of leadership of the country and the Armed Forces. The Peasants' Defense was fully utilized by the State Committee of Defense. In order to direct the reorganization of the national economy on a war footing, representatives of the State Committee of Defense, People's Commissars, their deputies, and the directors of central boards were sent into the deep rear areas of the country. They did enormous work on the mobilization of all forces of the Soviet people, in order to repulse the enemy and ensure his defeat.

The creation of the State Committee of Defense made it possible to coordinate more efficiently the activity of the Council of People's Commissars, all union and union-republic people's commissariats, as well as all local agencies of Soviet power, in conformity with the general directions of the Central Committee of the Party. The economic, moral and political, and military potentialities of the country were systematically and thoroughly utilized in order to achieve victory. Duplication in the work of certain agencies dealing with problems of defense before the war was also eliminated.

Having complete state and military power at its disposal, the State Committee of Defense rapidly and decisively mobilized all forces of the nation for the creation of a well-coordinated and rapidly growing military economy. During the first days of the war an energetic reorganization of the work of industry, transportation, and agriculture was begun, in order to adapt them to wartime conditions; the organization of war production was also begun. New people's commissariats, administrations, committees and councils, all-union people's commissariats of the tank industry, munitions, armaments, and mortar arms were created; main administrations of military industrial construction and materiel reserves; a committee for the registration and distribution of the working force; evacuation council, and other agencies.

A considerable place in the work of the State Committee of Defense was occupied by solution of the problems concerning the redistribution of the population in the national economy, training of a qualified working force, securing cadres for the most important branches of industry, and, what was especially important during the entire war, the apportionment of the necessary contingents for the Armed Forces.

Particular attention in the work of the State Committee of Defense was devoted to the inculcation into the consciousness of the Soviet people of the enormous danger hanging over our homeland, the need to rid themselves of peaceful sentiments and to direct full attention to the solution of military problems, to the maintenance of high patriotic spirit in the Soviet people, to increasing the productivity of labor in all branches of the national economy, and to instilling a burning hatred of the enemy.

While fulfilling the tasks presented by the State Committee of Defense, the Soviet people in a short time achieved outstanding successes in the mass production of such types of armament as airplanes, tanks, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and heavy artillery, and also in the production of munitions, clothing, foodstuffs, and in their timely delivery to the front.

The State Committee of Defense attached exceptional importance to the problems of the development of war materiel.

In this activity the State Committee of Defense started from the dialectical concept that the means of armed combat continuously develop, thus introducing important changes into the methods of its conduct. Therefore, the State Committee of Defense and the High Command, by studying the potentials of the enemy, were indefatigably concerned with the organization, production, and introduction into the Armed Forces of the latest models of weapons, the search for the latest methods of waging war and the organizational structure of each corresponding service of the Armed Forces and branch.

During the war the organization of the agencies of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces was improved, and the most suitable forms and methods of ensuring this leadership were sought.

As was already noted, the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces from the beginning of the war was accomplished by the Stavka of the High Command. However, the experience of the first weeks of the war showed that with a rapidly changing strategic situation and a frequent disruption of communications between the General Staff and the fighting fronts and armies, the Stavka could not cope with problems of the direct leadership of troops. Therefore, by decree of the State Committee of Defense of July 10, 1941, the main commands coordinated the operations of several fronts solving the over-all strategic task for a given area.

By this same decree of the State Committee of Defense, the Stavka of the High Command was changed to the Stavka of the Supreme Command under the leadership of the Chairman of the State Committee of Defense, who was appointed by the People's Commissar of Defense, and in August by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Then, the Stavka of the Supreme Command was renamed the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. Certain members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, the Chief of the General Staff, and individuals of the higher-command personnel made up the Stavka.

During the entire Great Patriotic War, Stavka was the highest agency of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces. It was a collective agency.

All of the most important decisions were made after discussion by the Stavka with participation of the front commands, the commanders-in-chief of the services of the Armed Forces, and commanders of branches, as well as other interested persons.

The main commands of sectors, created in July 1941, lost their importance upon stabilization of the front of the armed conflict and improvement of the operation of the front staffs, and after a certain time were done away with. The Stavka was again entrusted with the direct leadership of all active fronts and individual armies.

However, it is necessary to point out that at the closing stage of the war a High Command of the Troops in the Far East was created to lead the Armed Forces in the war against Japan; the fronts, Navy, and Air Force were subordinated to it. This was explained by the remoteness of the theater of operations and by the fact that it had a completely independent strategic importance. The Stavka of the Supreme High Command had direct liaison with the Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern troops and the commanders of the fronts and the Navy and controlled the course of operations. The High Command was given complete authority and had the needed forces, reserves and all means at its disposal for the successful fulfillment of the missions assigned it.

Therefore, the basic system of leadership, which proved itself during the war years, was the Stavka of the Supreme High Command-Front, that is, the direct leadership of the fronts by the Stavka. The Stavka laid down the tasks for the fronts, was concerned with their thorough provisioning, and monitored the fulfillment of the tasks. This made it possible for the Stavka to follow operationally and continuously the development of military actions, to reinforce the front units with its reserves at an opportune time, and to restore their cooperation in case of disruption, and also to spearhead the main forces of the fronts or front and to lay down additional or new tasks.

Along with the creation of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command there was a reorganization of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, as a result of which the functions of each of its agencies were defined, which improved the effectiveness of the leadership of the armed forces and improved its supply system.

The General Staff, which was the most important agency of the People's Commissariat of Defense and had become the main working agency of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, was reorganized. The General Staff was entrusted with developing plans for strategic operations, their thorough provisioning and control over their fulfillment, the solutions of the problems concerning the organization of the Armed Forces, control over the formation and restoration of units, the organization of operational and strategic transport, and many other problems concerning the direct control and coordination of the military activity of all services of the Armed Forces on numerous fronts. The General Staff also had to study and generalize the experience of war.

The main Administration of Newly Activated Units (Upraform) was created during the reorganization of the People's Commissariat of Defense. It was responsible for the leadership of and control over newly activated reserve units (except the air force, artillery, and armored), training of draft reinforcements, leadership of the supply and instruction units. Formation of units of the air force, artillery, and armored troops was done by the appropriate administrations in the apparatus of the commanders-in-chief of the services of the Armed Forces and the commanders of branches.

When creating the Upraform, the positive experience of the All-Russian Supreme Staff, which was occupied with problems associated with new formations during the years of the Civil War, was taken into account. With the organization of the Upraform which produced trained formations for the disposal of the Stavka for their use on the front during the Great Patriotic War, the General Staff was relieved of the extremely complex functions of activating new units and instructing reserves, leadership of internal military districts, etc., so that all its attention could be concentrated on directing the front forces.

To coordinate the operation of the rear areas of the Armed Forces, the post of Chief of the Rear of the Red Army was established and was directly subordinated to the Stavka. A Central Staff of the Partisan Movement was also created under the Stavka.

The fronts, organized at the beginning of the war from border military districts, were operational and strategic units of the Armed Forces. As during the Civil War, military councils headed the fronts. They, too, were collective agencies controlling all troops subordinated to them. Following the example of the times of the Civil War, they were entrusted with all functions of agencies of state power in the area of defense, social order, and state security in localities, as directed in the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The staffs of the fronts were agencies which accomplished the development, planning, preparation, and provisioning of the operations.

Thus, the experience of the Civil War was to a considerable extent used in the creation of the agencies of military leadership and in their activity during the Great Patriotic War, although this was not a simple repetition of the past.

For example, the magnificent conquests which were achieved by the Soviet people in the building of socialism fostered the successful activity of the State Committee of Defense. The Soviet Union was transformed from a weakly developed agrarian country into a powerful industrial state with a strong rear area and a monolithic character of the entire multinational Soviet nation. In all its activity the State Committee of Defense depended on the advantages of the socialist economic system, which made it possible to concentrate rapidly all material and moral forces of the Soviet Union for the victorious conduct and completion of the war.

The Stavka of the Supreme High Command was a collective agency of military leadership. It differed fundamentally from the Revolutionary Military Council with respect to its organization. As was already indicated,

the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council was the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, while the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. Their decisions were controlled by the Revolutionary Military Council.

The Stavka of the Supreme High Command was organized completely differently during the Great Patriotic War. The combination of the post of leader of the Party and head of the government, chairman of the State Committee of Defense, chairman of the Stavka, of the People's Commissar of Defense and of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief provided unity of leadership of the Armed Forces to the highest degree in a political, economic, and military respect.

Such an organization of the Stavka meant a further centralization of leadership and a merger of the over-all leadership of the country with the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces. In this new centralization of political, economic, and military leadership, the unity of policy and strategy, as well as the incredibly increased effect of the economy on strategy, found its even more perfected expression.

Methods of strategic leadership based on the experience of the Great Patriotic War. As was already pointed out, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command was a collegial agency of the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces, and the most important strategic decisions were made by it after discussion.

The decision made by the Stavka reached the commanders of the front groups, fleets and flotillas in the form of directives of the Supreme High Command. The directives usually indicated the purpose of the operation, the forces enlisted to carry it out, the direction of concentration of the main forces (main attack), as well as the time for presenting a plan of operations to the Stavka and the time for preparing the operation or the order in which directions concerning its start are to be given. In developing the directives of the Stavka, the staff of the front obtained special instructions from the General Staff, branch commanders, and service chiefs.

The most important instructions were given by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief personally to commanders of field forces by summoning them to the Stavka or by sending out representatives of the Stavka to the fronts. Particular missions were set up by short orders sent in the name of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief by the Chief of the General Staff.

The same practice was used when the Stavka required reports on the fulfillment of operations from the Military Councils of the fronts. Frequently the front commands presented such reports on their own initiative. Taking these suggestions into account, the Stavka correlated the operations of the fronts and the services of the Armed Forces and then sent directives to the fronts. Consequently, the right to make final decisions even in such cases was left up to the Stavka. Operational plans worked out by the military councils of the front in execution of the directives of the Stavka were also subject to obligatory approval by the Stavka.

Such a system of setting up tasks for the fronts, together with securing a rigid centralization of the strategic leadership on the part of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, made it possible for the commanders of the front troops to manifest broad initiative.

The same practice was also used when the Stavka of the Supreme High Command issued orders directly to armies, bypassing the fronts. At the same time this was not a system, but was used only in exceptional cases when the situation required rapid action and did not permit delay. In this way the Stavka without delay informed the commander of the front troops about the order it had issued.

As advances began on the entire Soviet-German front, when the achievement of large scale operational and strategic goals based on the plans of the Supreme High Command was accomplished by the interrelated simultaneous efforts of several fronts, it became necessary to bring the strategic leadership closer to the troops, in order to aid the fronts in preparing operations and coordinating their activities and to monitor the fulfillment of the assigned missions.

For this purpose representatives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command were sent to the fronts. As a working apparatus they had operational groups consisting of representatives of the General Staff, commanders of branches, the chief of the rear, and other central agencies of military control.

The representatives of the Stavka helped the command of the fronts carry out the plans of the Supreme High Command, helped the front troop commanders make decisions depending on the role and place of the front in a given operation, and also solved problems on the spot concerning operational and strategic interaction. However, there were substantial shortcomings in the activity of the representatives of the Stavka. This refers mainly to cases where the representatives of the Stavka substituted for the front troop commanders, where they constrained the initiative of the latter, and also to the preferential replenishment of troops and provisioning of materials of one front at the expense of other fronts upon the insistence of a representative of the Stavka.

The necessity for different methods of leadership of the fronts on the part of the Stavka was due mainly to the complexity of the armed struggle which had spread over a vast area and to the importance of taking into account the situation developing in any particular direction. Moreover, the Stavka was forced to help the commanders of the fronts in directing the troops.

Consequently, during the Great Patriotic War the methods of leadership of the Armed Forces were not constant and were changed depending on the conditions of the armed struggle and also as experience was accumulated along with growth in the art of leadership of the front troop commanders.

As is known, operational units and operational and tactical units of our allies, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, fought on the Soviet-German front together with Soviet troops, while troops

of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army participated in crushing the Japanese troops in Manchuria. These units and formations, by agreement with the governments of the countries which had allocated them, were incorporated into the corresponding front units of Soviet troops and, being in operational subordination to the commanders of the front troops, fulfilled the missions assigned to them. In order to achieve unity of action when fulfilling operational and strategic tasks, which were solved by joint efforts, the Soviet command and the command of the allied troops mutually assigned their representatives to corresponding staffs.

Such a method of leadership of the troops of countries allied with us in the Great Patriotic War proved its value.

Summarizing what has been stated, it is necessary to emphasize in particular that the rigid centralization of the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces on the part of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command and the flexibility of the methods of leadership which corresponded to changes in the situation ensured the successful conduct of a victorious war and the full achievement of its goals.

POSSIBLE AGENCIES OF LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS

The positive experience of the leadership of the country and the Armed Forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War can be used under modern conditions. However, it is necessary to take into account the radical changes which have occurred in the nature of warfare and in the methods of unleashing and waging it, which are due to the development of completely new means of armed combat and also other factors.

It is completely evident that the principles which have been developed in our country and verified by practice concerning the unity of leadership in conducting an armed struggle in a political, economic, and military sense and the centralization of the leadership of the Armed Forces with a rational combination of collective leadership and personal responsibility of the leaders are completely applicable under modern conditions.

All leadership of the country and the Armed Forces during wartime will be accomplished by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with the possible organization of a higher agency of leadership of the country and the Armed Forces. This higher agency of leadership may be given the same powers as the State Committee of Defense during the Great Patriotic War. [Editor's Note #5]

Concentration of the leadership of the country and its Armed Forces in the hands of the highest political agency of government control, as during the years of the last war, is a decisive condition for the victorious waging of a war, in case one should be unleashed by imperialist aggressors. Only an organic relation between the leadership of the country and

the Armed Forces can provide the most efficient utilization of the economy and all the scientific and technological achievements of the country, the complete mobilization of the material and moral and political forces of the state, and the proper utilization of the Armed Forces in order to achieve victory.

The direct leadership of the Armed Forces during a war will obviously be accomplished, as before, by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. The Stavka will be a collegial agency of leadership under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Just as during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the General Staff will be the main agency of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command.

In contrast to the conditions of the last war, under which the structure of the General Staff was constructed to provide leadership of military actions mainly of the Ground Troops, under modern conditions the General Staff must ensure leadership of all services of the Armed Forces, especially the Rocket Troops and National PVO Troops.

Control of the materiel, equipment, and medical supplies of the Armed Forces will be accomplished by the Chief of the Rear and the rear staff and the central rear administration and establishments subordinated to him.

The troops of the operational units, as in the last war, will be controlled by military councils responsible to the TsK* CPSU and the Supreme High Command for the state and combat readiness of the troops, their political orientation, and effective utilization during the war.

Such, in general features, are the agencies of military and political leadership of the country and Armed Forces in a modern war.

However, division of the world into two opposite socio-economic systems defines a future war as a coalition war. Consequently, there arises the problem of leadership on a coalition scale.

It is fully evident that for the successful repulsion of an attack and the complete disruption of the aggressive policies of the imperialists, we must have a unification of the political, economic, and military forces of all the countries of the socialist camp, mutual support, mobilization of all their economic, human, and military resources, the establishment of a single military-political and strategic policy for the entire war and for its individual stages, and complete unity in the leadership of the combined armed forces.

The highest political agency for coordinating all efforts of the countries in the socialist camp during wartime can be the Political Advisory

* Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Committee (PKK) created in conformity with the Warsaw Pact.

The highest military leadership can be accomplished by coordinating the activity of the higher military agencies of the allied countries with respect to the leadership of the armed forces in any theater of military operations.

Operational commands, which include formations and units of the armed forces of different socialist countries in them, can be created to conduct joint activities in a theater of military operations. The leadership of these commands can be entrusted to the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces, under which will be representatives of the supreme high commands of the allied countries. In certain theaters of operations the operational commands of the allied countries will be subordinated to their own supreme high command. In such cases the leadership of these commands can be accomplished according to the principle of coordination of policies and plans of operations and a close correlation of troop actions during the operations through representatives of these countries.

THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMED FORCES

Marxism-Leninism, which has revealed the role of the people as the maker of history and the role of the political organization in the leadership of the masses, decisively refutes the attempt of bourgeois ideologists to explain all events of a war by the actions of individual personalities.

By idealization of separate individuals, the ideologists of imperialism attempt to instill submissiveness in the masses and dependence of their fate on the actions of these individuals, to undermine the faith of the masses in their own strength, to divert them from the solution of urgent problems of the class struggle, and to prepare submissive executors of their will for war. When dealing with various military events, they pervert their real essence and strain every effort to disorient the broad masses or hide from them the true causes of the occurrence of war, military defeats, and failures.

This is especially evident in the bankrupt command of the former fascist German Army. While military success was accompanying the fascist Army, especially in wars against economically and militarily weak countries, all the bourgeois theoreticians extolled Hitler in every possible way, especially emphasizing his qualities as an outstanding political and military leader. However, after the shattering of the Hitler war machine by the Soviet Army, and especially now when the Bonn revanchists have again set out on a path of unleashing a third world war, the military theoreticians of the West, especially of West Germany, attribute all the defeats in the war to the personal qualities of Hitler, his incompetence in military affairs, his reluctance to follow the advice of the leaders of the armies, etc.

Such assertions are nonscientific, since they represent the role of

the individual out of contact with the development of social life, politics, the nature of war and the conditions under which it is waged, and without taking into account the factors affecting the course and outcome of the war.

A criticism of subjectivist-idealistic opinions from a scientific position does not, however, reduce the real role of leaders, including that of generals. A Marxist-Leninist evaluation of the role of the people as the makers of history not only does not deny the importance of the individual, but gives a scientific basis for the proper understanding of the activity of a leader. In any social organization where the activity of a collective is evident, authority and subordination are a requisite. Naked denial of authority in general, and in military affairs in particular, signifies disorganization, dispersion of power, and a blow to discipline.

In the history of human society there are no examples where any class could have achieved supremacy without leaders capable of organizing and directing the movement. Also, there are no examples where any army not having a definite organization and led by an inexperienced military leader successfully waged war with an army headed by an experienced military leader. However, the will of the general and his activities are not absolute. The role of a general is revealed not in being out of touch with the masses, not in the contraposition of his authority to the personnel of the armed forces, but in their inseparable unity.

Contrary to the assertions of bourgeois ideologists, the history of past wars convincingly shows that a general can lead an army successfully, only if the purpose of the war, the actions and opinions of the general are understandable to the populations. Thus, for example, Napoleon as an outstanding general could appear only in the specific setting of the French Revolution. The victories of his armies were due mainly to the new class nature of the goals which they were pursuing. The armies of Napoleon differed radically from feudal armies, since they were armies of the emancipated bourgeoisie and peasantry. Their new strategy, tactics, and organization, as interpreted by Engels, were "a military expression of this emancipation."

The generals of the Soviet Armed Forces are representatives of the Communist Party and Soviet government who are carrying out the party policy, which expresses the basic interest of the entire Soviet people. This determines the inseparable connection between the command cadres of our army and the people and the enormous confidence in them and respect shown them by the people, who distinguish Soviet generals from the military leaders of the armies of capitalist countries. A general of the Soviet Armed Forces enjoys the confidence and support of his subordinates not only because he is the chief, but mainly because he is a representative of his people, whom the people trust to educate, train and lead into battle Soviet soldiers and to protect the Motherland with weapon in hand from any encroachment by imperialist aggressors.

The generals of the Soviet Armed Forces, in conformity with the tasks set by the Communist Party for strengthening the defensive power of the socialist state, directly lead the organization of the Armed Forces, including

their equipment with modern military equipment and arms and, first and foremost, with nuclear weapons, and organize the education and training of the personnel of the Armed Forces.

The Soviet Armed Forces have achieved great successes in recent years in solving these tasks: the personnel have mastered to perfection modern combat equipment and can use it skillfully for solving various problems. The quality of the operational, combat, and political training has improved, and the level of combat readiness of the Army and Navy has sharply increased. A considerable role in achieving these successes belongs to our military commanders.

Modern war with its decisive goals, enlarged scope, and the dynamism of conducting combat action makes extremely high demands on generals. The military leader of today must have not only an excellent knowledge of the methods of conducting an armed conflict, but also a profound understanding of the laws of social development, of the objective laws of a modern war, the ability to lead troops in conformity with these laws with a thorough consideration and utilization of the economic potentialities of the country. In accomplishing these policies, a general under present-day conditions more than ever depends on the material potentialities for conducting a war which are produced by the economy of the country. The effectiveness of military plans and the proper selection of the methods and forms of waging a war and carrying out operations greatly depend on the ability of the general to take into account soberly and thoroughly the real potentialities for waging a war and to use these potentialities intelligently.

These requirements can be fulfilled properly only under conditions of a socialist structure, which ensures unlimited support of the Army by the population. A general of the Soviet Armed Forces has potentialities for leadership of troops such as no single military leader of the capitalist countries has ever had or has at present. These potentialities are explained by the advantages of our social structure, which is distinguished by a continuous and orderly development of all branches of the socialist economy, by the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, its solidarity in support of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

The generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces are not mechanical executors of the policies and will of senior chiefs. Understanding an order to be law, they fulfill it with deep consciousness. The initiative and creative leadership of the generals and officers of our army was one of the most important foundations of the successful fulfillment of the strategic and operational plans during the Great Patriotic War. This remarkable quality of our military leaders has been tirelessly nurtured by the Communist Party. The Communist Party and Soviet government have always highly valued and supported military commanders who were able to manifest bold and intelligent initiative.

However, it would be erroneous to assume that the generals and officers of the armies of the capitalist countries do not have the necessary qualities, that they are untalented people and that this to some extent preetermines the adventurism of their plans, the fallaciousness of the tactics, etc.

The armies of the capitalist countries have no shortage of capable officers and generals, but for the most part they are from the privileged class, intimately associated with the bourgeoisie, and are therefore true servants of the capitalist monopolies, active champions of their aggressive policies, and represent a military caste cut off from the population. This naturally determines their ideology and opinions, which are foreign to the masses of the people, and limits their potentialities as military leaders.

The strength and grandeur of our commanding cadres lie in the fact that, by carrying out the policy of the Communist Party, they subordinate their entire activity to the noble purpose of defending the conquests of the Great October Socialist Revolution and depend on the initiative of the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces and the support of the entire nation.

Their close ties with Army and Navy personnel, their deep understanding and knowledge of the life of the soldier, sailor, non-commissioned and petty officer, and their daily leadership of the combat, political, and operational training of the troops enable our commanders and political workers to make a profound study of and to generalize upon our experiences in the indoctrination and training of the armed forces and, on the basis of this, to improve and creatively develop Soviet military art.

The commanding and political cadres of the Soviet Armed Forces, who have been brought up by the Communist Party, proved during the years of the Great Patriotic War that they can successfully solve all complex and responsible problems. Our military leaders, who have been nourished on the idea of Marxism-Leninism and have thoroughly mastered the most advanced Soviet military art, have imparted to the Soviet troops the necessary qualities, have skillfully combined courage and bravery with the art of leading troops in the battlefields.

The successes of the Soviet Armed Forces [Editor's Note #6] during the years of the Great Patriotic War in solving bold and extensive strategic plans were the result of the creative efforts of numerous generals and officers, the heroism of Soviet soldiers on the battlefield and of toilers in the rear areas. The operational and strategic tasks, as the experience of the war showed, were planned and were not carried out by individuals, but were the result of collective creativity. Centralized leadership of troops does not exclude, but assumes, the use of collective creativity. Therefore, the successful fulfillment of operational and strategic plans during the Great Patriotic War was the result of the work not only of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, but also the commands of the fronts, armies, various formations, and their staffs.

The problems of the training and education of military cadres occupied and are now occupying a particular place in the activity of the Communist Party. During the years of the existence of the Soviet Armed Forces the Communist Party has promoted and educated many talented officers and generals.

The military leaders of the highest echelons, like all commanding and political personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces, have high moral and

fighting qualities. Utterly devoted to their people, to their socialist Motherland, to the Communist Party, they can lead the military actions of troops under the complex conditions of nuclear rocket war.

At the present stage great and responsible tasks stand before the commanding cadres of our armed forces. The increased power of the Army and Navy, based on the use of the nuclear rocket weapon, makes new demands on the training of both the commanding and all personnel. [Editor's Note # 7]

In contemporary conditions -- in the age of nuclear energy and cosmic speeds, radioelectronics and remote control, the ceaseless process of perfecting all types of combat equipment and weapons -- the volume and content of the task of the combat, political and operational training of the Army and Navy has grown many times. In order to resolve these tasks in a qualified manner and to organize their fulfillment by the personnel in an intelligent way, to guarantee their readiness, and to use all the power of the weapons for solving the combat task, the command and political cadres must have high general and military-technical development.

In this plan, the thorough training of the command and political cadres at the contemporary stage is one of the main tasks the fulfillment of which takes on decisive significance in the cause of assuring constant readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Recent years have been characterized by further increase of work in the realm of military-technical training of military cadres. It is being carried out not only in courses at schools but also during daily combat, political and operational training.

An indicator of the successful fulfillment of this mission is the growing art of the commanders and political workers in using complicated modern combat equipment and the skill of actions of units and formations in the course of exercises.

No less important a task which stands before the command cadres must be the further raising of operational efficiency in work, flexibility in guiding the troops, and creative solutions of tasks in conditions of rapidly and acutely changing conditions.

The successful solution of these problems is a guarantee of the further increase of the fighting capabilities of the Armed Forces and their preparedness to frustrate the aggressive designs of the imperialist countries.

AGENCIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE ARMED FORCES

AND THE PRINCIPLES OF PARTY AND POLITICAL WORK

Leadership of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party -- the Fundamental Basis of Military Organization.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Central Committee of the Party, headed by Lenin, began major efforts to create an army for the world's first state of workers and peasants.

The foreign military intervention which had just gotten under way and the emergence of internal counterrevolution made one of the most important functions of our socialist government that of the defense of the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution and of the young Soviet Republic. It was impossible to resolve this task by using the forces of the Red Guard detachments or of the old army. It was necessary to create a new army.

The Party Program adopted at the Eighth Party Congress in March of 1919 pointed out that "in an era of the decomposition of imperialism and of a spreading Civil War, it is impossible either to retain the old army or to create a new one on a so-called non-class or a national basis. The Red Army, as the weapon of the proletarian dictatorship, should by necessity bear an openly class nature, i.e., to be composed exclusively of the proletariat and the semiproletarian strata of the peasantry which are close to it. Only in the event of the destruction of the classes is it possible to convert this class army into a national socialist militia." [2]

Under such a situation, the Communist Party was forced to proceed along new and hitherto unknown paths.

"The question of the structure of the Red Army," Lenin said, "was a completely new one. It was not at all even a theoretical one." [3] The Communist Party and its leader, V. I. Lenin, worked out the theoretical principles on the designation of the armed forces of a socialist state, and set forth the principles on the structure of the Red Army: political, organizational, on the staffing, training, and indoctrination of its personnel.

These concepts are profoundly and thoroughly revealed and substantiated in the numerous addresses and work of V. I. Lenin, in the resolution of the Congresses, in the decrees of the Central Committee of our party, and also in the resolutions of the government pertaining to the defense of the Soviet state.

The leadership of the Communist Party [Editor's Note #8], which was able to raise, mobilize, and organize the working class and enormous masses of the working peasantry for the struggle against the enemies of the Revolution, was the decisive condition for the victories of the Red Army during the Civil War. The Central Committee, headed by V. I. Lenin, led the entire struggle for repulsing the armed attack on the Soviet Republic. All problems of waging war, distributing forces, ensuring supplies and arms, and operational and strategic planning were solved by the Central Committee of the Party. Communists entered the Army in response to the call of the Central Committee of the Party. The ranks of the Red Army during the Civil War included 300,000 Communists, or 65 % of the entire party membership, which indicates the exceptionally important role of the Party in the leadership of the Army. Everywhere in the rear, on the front and in the

underground, in the territory occupied by the enemy, the Bolshevik party, together with the people and at the head of the people, directed a gigantic struggle, which was climaxed by the victory of the Red Army in the Civil War.

After the end of the Civil War the Central Committee of the Party concentrated its attention on the conversion of the Red Army into an advanced, highly equipped and trained army corresponding to the needs of defense of the socialist state and the requirements for conducting war. The main directions in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces were defined in the decree of the Central Committee of the Party, dated July 15, 1929, "Concerning the State of Defense of the USSR." The main task of the Communist Party at that period was to ensure a technical rearmament of the Army and to create the necessary military-technical base for the defense of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, the Central Committee of the Party advanced the tasks of creating a sufficiently strong Air Force and Navy and further expanding the technical troops. This decree of the Central Committee defined the course of the technical supplying of the Soviet Armed Forces, which the Communist Party carried out during all the years that followed.

Owing to the energetic activity of the Central Committee of the Party, which mobilized the working class and engineering and scientific workers for the fulfillment of the plans for developing and producing combat equipment, the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the prewar five-year plans received a variety of arms and combat equipment.

The Central Committee of the Party during the entire history of the Armed Forces showed particular concern for the training of the command and political cadres. In the decrees of the Central Committee of the Party of the Soviet government the main attention was devoted to reinforcing the ideological and political education of the commanding cadres and improvement of their military-technical training, a strengthening of one-man rule, unity and solidarity of the command and political staffs, instruction and proper utilization of trained cadres, the build-up of reserves of the command staff, etc. One of the most important measures of the Party directed toward preparing command and political cadres was the creation of a network of military schools. By decree of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government in 1932 six military academies were opened (mechanization and motorization, artillery, engineer, chemical, electrical engineering, and transport). The number of students was considerably increased, and the network of military schools was expanded, especially for engineering curricula.

Because of the increased demand for military cadres the Central Committee of the Party during the second five-year plan again expanded the network of military schools -- the Military Management Academy and the Academy of the General Staff were created. The Academy of the General Staff was called upon to train higher commanding cadres for the Armed Forces. Together with the creation of military academies, the network of military schools was increased.

The efforts of the Central Committee of the Party, directed toward training troops, yielded remarkable results. The Armed Forces were yearly reinforced by highly qualified commanding and political cadres.

Thanks to all this work of the Communist Party and the efforts of the Soviet people in the successful fulfillment of the plans for socialist construction, the Soviet Armed Forces were converted into modern and highly trained armed forces with well-educated commanding cadres.

Emphasizing the important role played by command and political personnel in strengthening the Armed Forces, the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, in their appeal to our Soviet troops on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, pointed out that "... the most important of our riches are our remarkable military cadres, cadres unstintingly devoted to the Motherland, to the Communist Party, and to the Soviet government, bold and manly cadres who are familiar with modern combat equipment and who have full mastery of its use even under the most complex conditions of modern warfare." [4].

The most important principle in the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces is that of single command. This principle was not immediately established in our Armed Forces, although in the very first years of its being formed Lenin raised the question of the transition to single command as soon as the proper conditions were created for it.

The principle of single command arose and developed logically, as an expression of objective necessity, as the most expedient method for directing troops and for facilitating unity of will and action, strict centralization, organization and discipline, without which the high combat capability of the Army is unthinkable. Successful fulfillment of these requirements, Lenin pointed out, is possible only through subordination of the wills of thousands to the will of one man, only through the implicit obedience of the masses to the single will of their leader. It is with complete clarity that the experience of the Red Army points up the need for a single command as the best method of leadership. "We must think over this experience," Lenin said. "It arose, developed in accordance with natural law from haphazard, scattered collegiality of action to the collegiality which was introduced into the system of organization and which penetrated down into all institutions of the Army, and now, as a general tendency, has become single command, as the sole correct way of doing things." [5]

The Communist Party has always handled the question of one-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces in a creative manner, taking into consideration the social side of command personnel, its political maturity, its level of military preparedness, as well as the readiness and the capability of the masses to accept one or another form of leadership.

One-man command as a form of leadership of the Armed Forces exists only so long as the army exists. But there is a basic difference between the one-man command in our army and that which exists in the armies of capitalist states. In the armies of capitalist states, one-man command rests upon the class subordination of the overwhelming masses of the personnel of these armies to their officers, who are representatives of the ruling, exploiting class.

In the Soviet Armed Forces, one-man command has a completely different

social essence. The Soviet commander is a representative of the Party and the people. He fulfills their will and carries out the policies of the Party among the troops. Our troops justly see in the order of the single commander the order of their Motherland, and they fulfill it not only because it has the force of law but also because of their inner convictions.

In doing everything possible to strengthen this single command, to raise the authority of the commanders, and in supporting their exactingness, our Party is proceeding on the basis that our one-man command should be based on Party, Leninist principles. The Soviet commander cannot be a narrow military specialist: He is the organizer and an expert on the training and indoctrination of the men who are subordinate to him. All of his actions should be imbued with state interests and should be more successful the closer the commander is to his soldiers and sailors, the better he relies upon the efforts of Party and Komsomol organizations and on the efforts of the public, while skillfully directing these efforts toward the resolution of the daily tasks connected with combat, political, and operational training. The just strictness of the Soviet single commander is organically combined with a heartfelt attitude toward his subordinates, with concern over satisfying their requests and needs, and with an ability to influence the minds and hearts of his troops.

The single commander is successfully fulfilling this task not only because of the power given him by the Party, the government and the Soviet people to train and educate the personnel, but also because of the honored authority he enjoys from his subordinates for his high culture, education and the qualified solution of all questions of daily combat activity.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in its activities systematically carries out work in strengthening the one-man command, viewing it as the most important condition of high military discipline of the personnel and of combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

That is why the question about one-man command and on its strengthening should always be the center of attention of commanders, political organs, and party organizations.

The surprise attack of fascist Germany confronted the USSR with very grave tasks. Especially severe were the first months of the war, when the Red Army under the blows of the superior forces of the enemy was forced to retreat deep into the country.

The Communist Party came forward as the inspirer and organizer of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces against the fascist German bandits. It directed all efforts toward the organization of the armed defense of the socialist homeland, and toward the decisive repulse of the fascist aggressors and their defeat.

The Central Committee of the Party headed the entire work of organizing the defense of the socialist state, just as in the Civil War. The Central Committee of the Party overcame enormous difficulties, mobilized the forces of the Party and people and all the resources of the Soviet state, in order to achieve victory over the aggressor.

The directing activity of the Communist Party was demonstrated in the most diverse fields of the economic and military life of the country, in the Armed Forces -- most of all in the work of the political organs of the party and Komsomol organizations and also by personal example of the Communists. The Communists enlisted in the Army were sent to the most difficult and severe sections of the front, where bold and courageous organizers of the masses, who were able by their personal example to inspire the soldiers to the fulfillment of any tasks, were needed.

By decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU about 48,000 leading party, council, trade union, and Komsomol workers were sent just in the first months of the war to reinforce the Armed Forces. Almost a third of the members and candidates for membership in the Central Committee of the Party were on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Prominent figures of the Party and Soviet government were assigned to the Armed Forces as directors.

Hundreds of thousands of Communists upon mobilization voluntarily went to the front. Party organizations of the near-front region almost entirely entered the ranks of the Army. At the end of 1941 the Red Army had about 1,300,000 Communists. In 1942 the Armed Forces had more than 2,000,000 Communists or 54.3% and by the end of the war about 3.4 million or up to 60% of the entire Party. The Lenin Komsomol came forward as the combat assistant of the Party. During the first days of the war 900,000 Komsomols entered the ranks of the Army.

The Communist Party raised and carried behind it the entire Soviet nation in the struggle against the fascist German bandits, deployed and strengthened the power of the Soviet Armed Forces, and organized the work of the rear areas of the country to supply the front with all that was necessary. The most important prerequisites for achieving victory over fascist Germany and its satellites were thus created.

The Central Committee of the Party during the first days of the war carried out enormous organizational work, in order to put the economy of the country on a war footing. This was complex and difficult work. The complexity of the work was aggravated by the fact that it was carried out under conditions of great military setbacks and withdrawal of our troops deep into the territory, evacuation of industrial enterprises from the western regions of the country to the east and a serious shortage of cadre workers. It was necessary to establish enterprises and get the production of military goods going at new, then completely uninhabited regions, in the shortest period of time.

Thanks to the measures carried out by the Party, the work of converting the economy of the country to a war footing and of organizing the output of military products by enterprises evacuated to the east, was fulfilled successfully.

The Central Committee of the Party was occupied daily with the problems of developing new models of weapons, equipment, and munitions. Certain new models of arms and equipment, created by Soviet designers and which

went into mass production, were superior to the arms of the fascist army with respect to their tactical and technological data.

As a result of the organizational work of the Central Committee of the Party the Armed Forces were continuously reinforced with fresh forces and combat equipment. Our army was converted to a regular army, acquired the needed combat experience, and learned to beat the enemy according to all rules of military art.

During the postwar period the Communist party and its Central Committee directly led the Armed Forces and were constantly concerned with their further development. All important problems of the creation and combat and political training of the Armed Forces were discussed at the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The Communist Party, taking into account that, as long as imperialism still exists, the danger of the unleashing of aggressive wars will remain, considers the protection of the socialist Fatherland, the strengthening of the defense of the USSR and the power of the Soviet Armed Forces as the sacred duty of the Party and of the entire Soviet people and as the most important function of the socialist state.

The Party is doing everything in its power to see to it that the Soviet Armed Forces is a precise and smoothly-operating organism which has a high degree of organization and discipline, and which fulfills in exemplary fashion the tasks placed before it by the Party, government, and people, and that it is in constant readiness at any moment to give a crushing repulse to the imperialist aggressors and to destroy completely any enemy who dares encroach upon the state interests of the Soviet Union.
[Editor's Note # 9]

Party and political agencies in the Armed Forces and the principles of their work. Party-political work is called upon to strengthen the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces and the discipline of its personnel, and to inculcate in the personnel a spirit of devotion to the Motherland, to the Communist Party, and to the Soviet government, to train them in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, the friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism, high revolutionary discipline, and hatred for the enemies of our government.

The leading agencies of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces in the field of party and political work are the political agencies, which in all their activities are guided by the Program and Regulations of the CPSU, decrees of the party congresses, its Central Committee, and the Soviet government.

The political agencies in the Armed Forces were established during the first days of the creation of a large scale regular army. During the entire existence of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Communist Party has shown and is showing untiring concern for the improvement and strengthening of political agencies and army party organizations, considering party and political work as one of the most important fields in the activity of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the party and political agencies as an inseparable component of the organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The party and political apparatus in the Army and in the Navy has been established and perfected together with the creation and strengthening of the Armed Forces. The political agencies and party organizations were called upon to instill high moral and political qualities in soldiers and commanders.

The leadership of the Party and political work in the Army and Navy was first accomplished by the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars and then by the Political Department created in place of the All-Russian Bureau under the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic in conformity with the resolutions of the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919. In May of the same year the Political Department was changed to the Political Administration of the Revolutionary Military Council (PUR). The PUR was headed by a member of the Central Committee of the Party who had the rights of a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. This emphasized the strict party character, the high purpose, and the responsibility of the higher political agency of the Red Army and subordinated all of its activity directly to the Central Committee of the Party.

The creation of the Political Administration had a vast significance in the leadership of military construction, the activity of the political agencies and party organizations of the Red Army and in elevating the level of party and political work among the troops.

Being agencies of the Communist Party in the Army, direct conductors of its policies, the political organs played an important role in the victorious outcome of the Civil War.

Evaluating the role of the political agencies of the Army during the years of the Civil War, M. V. Frunze noted: "The Russian Communist Party is the undisputed organizer of our victories. This task was possible, thanks to the creation of a network of political agencies, which encompassed the Army from top to bottom and which welded it into a single whole, united by a unity of attitudes and feelings. Therefore, the honor for the organization of victory belongs to our political agencies." [6]

In addition to the creation of political agencies, the Party took measures to strengthen further the army party organizations, to improve the leadership of them, to enhance their role and influence on the masses of Red Army soldiers, to work out solid principles for the interrelation of the political agencies and party organizations with the commanders. These problems were solved simultaneously with the problems of training commanding cadres from among the best militarily prepared and devoted workers, peasants, intelligentsia and the strengthening of one-man rule in the Army.

As a result of the enormous and fruitful work carried out by the Communist Party with respect to the organizational strengthening and technical provisioning of the Army and Navy, the education and training of command cadres devoted to the Communist party, and also as a result of socialist transformations in our country and the upbringing of the Soviet people, the Central Committee of the Party took a course for the establishment of one-man rule in the Armed Forces. This was one of the most important problems

of military organization.

The commanders were completely responsible for all aspects of the military and political life of the troops. This decision fostered a still greater amplification of all party and political work. Thousands of commanders began to participate in the direct organization of party and political work, which became more intimately correlated with the daily assignments of the troops.

The one-man-rule commanders skillfully direct the work of the party organizations, rely on them daily, and successfully solve the problems of further increasing the combat preparedness of the troops and improving the education of the personnel. [Editor's Note #10]

The Central Committee of the Party directs party and political work in the Armed Forces through the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, which works as a department of the Central Committee CPSU. Attached to the Main Political Administration is the party commission, whose staff is approved by the Central Committee CPSU.

The party and political work in military districts and in troop groups and fleets is directed by the appropriate political administrations and by political departments in the armies, flotillas, corps, divisions, and brigades. Attached to all political agencies there are party commissions, which are elected at appropriate party conferences.

All political agencies, up to the political department of formations inclusively, are not elected, by virtue of the characteristics of the organization of the Armed Forces, but are created by the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Administration, in conformity with the structure established by the Central Committee CPSU.

Party committees elected at party conferences direct the party and political work in central administrations of the Ministry of Defense, in military educational establishments and scientific research institutions, as well as in the staffs of military districts, troop groups, PVO districts, military schools and certain other institutions.

The creation of party committees increased the activity of Communists in solving vitally important problems, expanded the relation between the party committees and all Communists, increased the responsibility of party organizations as a whole, and promoted a further improvement of the entire system of party and political work in administrations, institutions, and establishments.

During the years of their existence the political agencies of the Soviet Armed Forces traversed a glorious path. In spite of the fact that they had to undergo isolated organizational changes, their purposes and tasks remained unchanged. They played an enormous role in the achievement of the historical victories of our Armed Forces over numerous imperialist aggressors and are successfully solving their problems with respect to strengthening

the Armed Forces at the present time.

The most important principles of the work of the political agencies and party organizations of the Armed Forces are the daily and steadfast assurance of the undivided authority of the Communist Party in all aspects of life and the activity of the Armed Forces; the assurance of unity in troop training and political education, its continuity and purposefulness; the combination of collective leadership and high personal responsibility of leaders to the Party for the entrusted sector of work; the intimate relation between party and political agencies and the broad masses of Communists and nonparty members.

The influence of the Communist Party on all aspects of life and activity of the Armed Forces is the fundamental principle of the work of the political agencies and party organizations. This principle follows from the very essence of party and political work, from the Leninist concept that military construction in our country cannot be considered isolated and out of contact with the construction of Communist society.

This concept is brilliantly reflected in the new Program of the Communist Party. Here it is pointed out that the fundamental basis of military construction is the leadership by the Communist Party of the Armed Forces, the intensification of the role and the influence of party organizations in the Army and in the Navy.

Therefore, the party and political work being carried out by the Party in the Armed Forces is an inseparable part of the over-all activity of the Communist Party. The practical tasks of party and political work issue from the over-all struggle of the Party for the triumph of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, for strengthening the security of our socialist Motherland and the entire socialist camp, for the victory of the forces of peace over the forces of aggression. Party and political work serves as the main means for the formation of the political consciousness and the high moral qualities of the Soviet soldier -- the selfless devotion to the Party and government, courage and bravery, initiative, steadfastness, a high degree of discipline and performance, and the ability to overcome the difficulties of army life. [Editor's Note #11]

By all their work the command, political agencies, and party organizations must rally the personnel of the Armed Forces around the Communist Party, its Leninist Central Committee, and the Soviet government and must instill the troops with a spirit of high personal responsibility to the Party and state with respect to ensuring the freedom and independence of the Soviet people and the national interests of our Motherland. The entire system of party and political work must be directed toward the solid and consistent realization of the policies of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces.

Accordingly, party and political work in the Armed Forces is organized on the basis of the resolutions of the Central Committee CPSU and the Soviet government and the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy.

In their practical activity the commanders and chiefs of political agencies and party organizations are guided by the "Decree Concerning the Political Agencies of the Soviet Army and Navy" and by instructions approved by the Central Committee CPSU. The content of the party and political work in each specific case is determined by the tasks assigned to the troops.

Being the organizer, leader, and educator of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Party deals strictly with any violations of this principle and decisively condemns belittling of the importance and role of party and political work. Evidence of this is the decree of the October Plenum of Central Committee CPSU of 1957 "Concerning the Improvement of Party and Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy."

The [1957] October Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party occupies a special place in the life of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Plenum decisively put an end to a policy aimed at curtailing the work of party organizations, political organs, and military councils aimed at abolishing the Party's leadership and control over the Army and Navy. The significance of the resolutions of this Plenum is that they reestablished the Leninist principles of leadership in the Armed Forces, decisively normalized the situation in the Army and Navy, promoted solidarity of forces, strengthened unity in the work of the command and political cadres, and created conditions for the improvement of party and political work.

The Plenum resolutions fostered unification in the efforts of commanders, political agencies, and party organizations in their work to strengthen the unity and organic relationship between military training and political education.

On the basis of the resolutions of that Plenum of the Central Committee, new regulations on military councils and political organs were introduced, as were new instructions to party and Komsomol organizations; party committees were created in regiments and aboard ships, in military educational institutions and scientific research institutes, in staffs of military districts, and in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. Party organizations in battalions and divisions were granted the rights of primary party organizations.

As a result of the measures taken by the Central Committee of the CPSU, army and navy party organizations were strengthened ideologically and organizationally and their activity and aggressiveness in solving all important problems were noticeably increased. The flow of our best military men into the ranks of the Communist Party increased.

The Leninist principles of party leadership of the Armed Forces were fully incorporated and even further developed in the Program and regulations of the CPSU adopted at the XXII Party Congress.

The continuity, unity, and purposefulness of military education and political training are the most important principle of party and political work. Observation of this principle is the most important obligation of one-man-rule commanders, political agencies, and party organizations, to

the greatest extent ensures a further increase in the combat capability of the Armed Forces and their constant readiness to frustrate the aggressive designs of the imperialists. [Editor's Note #12]

The collective solution of problems of party and political work is also of considerable significance.

It permits a more thorough and complete solution of vitally important questions, it permits us to overcome red tape in the resolution of problems of party and political work, in the leadership of the lower political agencies and party organizations, and does not permit errors resulting from red tape. This assumes close contact between the leader of the political agency and the workers of its apparatus and between the secretary of the party committee and the members of the party committee, collective determination of ways and means of solving urgent problems of political and party work, discussion of plans and the results of work, etc.

However, the collective solution of problems of party and political work in no way means a lessening of personal responsibility of the leaders of political agencies and party organizations for the state of work in all areas of the life and activity of troops. Each leader bears personal responsibility to the person commanding (commander) higher political and party organizations for the political and moral state and military discipline of the troop personnel, for military training, and the state of party and political work as a whole.

The combination of collective decisions and personal responsibility ensures a high sense of ideals and principles in the work of political agencies and party organizations, that is a Bolshevik irreconcilability to the least deviations from Marxism-Leninism, to any perversions whatsoever of the policies and decrees of the Party, and to any other shortcomings. The high sense of ideals and principles in the work of the political agencies is, first and foremost, an orientation of their work such that the interests of the Party and the state are foremost in the solution of all problems.

Such an orientation in the work of the political agencies is unthinkable without fundamental criticism and self-criticism.

The Communist Party has always looked upon criticism and self-criticism as a powerful means of strengthening its ranks and was never afraid to openly acknowledge its mistakes. Lenin stated: "The party of the revolutionary proletariat is sufficiently strong to openly criticize itself, to call an error an error and weakness weakness, without beating about the bush." [7] He also noted that "by analyzing the errors of yesterday we will thus learn to avoid errors today and tomorrow" [8].

Lenin demanded the extensive development of criticism and self-criticism in all areas of our life and activity, including the Army. He emphasized the everyday aspect of "intrafactory, intravillage, intra-regimental life, where everything is being built anew, where ever-increasing attention, publicity, social criticism, and badgering of the unfit, and

slogans to learn from the best are needed" [9]

The new Program of the CPSU again emphasizes the importance of criticism and self-criticism as the unchanging condition for the ideological and organizational strengthening of the Party itself, the unity and solidarity of the party ranks, the all-round development of intraparty democracy, and the activation on this basis of all party forces, the strengthening of relations with the masses. The Party during the period of expanded construction of communism has set the task of all-out development of criticism and self-criticism as a tested method of work, as a way of detecting and correcting errors and faults, and for the proper education of cadres.

By virtue of the specific character of the organization of the Soviet Armed Forces, only the orders of commanders and chiefs are not subject to criticism. All other aspects of the life and activity of the troops should be subjected to healthy party criticism and self-criticism. Fundamental criticism and self-criticism make it possible to reveal to the greatest extent the deficiencies in the education and training of troops, in military discipline, and in the activity of political agencies and help the one-man-rule commanders to take timely measures to eliminate these faults.

The new Program and regulations of the CPSU open up broad possibilities for the further strengthening of party work in the Armed Forces, for expanding intraparty democracy, for the development of criticism and self-criticism as a powerful means for the elimination of shortcomings, and for the confirmation of everything new and progressive. Political agencies and party organizations must do a lot more to strengthen their ties with the mass of military personnel, to consult more with party and non-party members, to improve the flow of information and reports on their work, and to rely more heavily upon the party, Komsomol, and non-party activists.

Political agencies and party organizations, in reorganizing their work in the spirit of the demands made upon them by the XXII and XXIII Party Congresses and the Plenums of the Central Committee CPSU, should concentrate all their efforts in party-political work toward the successful fulfillment of our main task -- a further improvement in the constant combat preparedness and combat capability of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

The close relation of political agencies and party organizations to the masses makes it possible to penetrate into all aspects of the combat and political preparation of troops, to reveal and eliminate shortcomings and, what is most important, to disclose the causes producing them.

Without close communication with the people and without their education, training work and purposeful leadership are, on the whole, unthinkable. Ignorance of the real state of affairs, disorganization and drifting, blind acting with belated taking of necessary measures for the elimination of shortcomings, and also other blunders and failures are inevitable.

The everyday intimate relation between political agencies and the

masses is accomplished in various ways: by holding conferences, meetings of the most active members and general meetings, periodic reports of party organizations to Communists, personal contact of the leaders with rank-and-file Communists, through periodicals, radio, television, etc. This relationship is favored by party and Komsomol organizations, party and non-party activists, and army and navy communities.

Komsomol organizations are faithful assistants to party organizations in their work with young troops. They work under the direction of political agencies and party organizations and are called upon to educate Komsomol members and unaffiliated youth in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and in the spirit of devotion to the Communist Party and to the Soviet government, in the spirit of fidelity and selfless service to the Motherland. An important place in the work of Komsomol organizations is the inculcation in young troops of a Communist conscientiousness, a feeling of friendship and comradeship, of honesty and veracity, of worthy behavior in society and in daily life.

The varied political and organizational activity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the extensive development of party and political work in the Army and Navy were among the most decisive factors of the historical victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War and assure their high combat readiness under modern conditions. By their painstaking daily work in the very midst of the ranks of the Army, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations cement the Armed Forces which are now the most powerful armed forces in the entire world.

The political agencies and party organizations should actively scrutinize all aspects of the life and activity of the troops, continuously carry out political and organizational work among the personnel, struggle for exemplariness of the Communists and Komsomolets in the fulfillment of their military duties. They are obliged to strengthen one-man rule, to increase the authority and role of the commanders as the organizers of battles and operations, to develop and perfect their commanding qualities -- will, exactingness, initiative, and performance--to educate the personnel in the spirit of conscientious obedience to the commanders and esteem for them, to endeavor to manifest creative initiative in fulfilling combat tasks, thus ensuring further growth of the power of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and their preparedness to repulse any intrigues of the imperialists.

The positions developed by the XXII Congress CPSU on the further strengthening of the nation's defense is equipping our party, the Soviet people, and the personnel of the Army and Navy with a clear understanding of the conditions under which the building of communism will be faithfully protected against anything unexpected and the adventuristic plans of the aggressive forces of imperialism. The positions of the party Program and of the resolutions of the Congress will mobilize Armed Forces personnel to the successful fulfillment of the tasks facing them.

Footnotes to Chapter VIII

1. КПСС о Вооруженных Силах Советского Союза. Москва, Госполитиздат, 1958, стр. 47.
2. КПСС в решениях и резолюциях, ч. 1, изд. 7-е. Москва, Госполитиздат, 1953, стр. 417.
3. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч., т. 38, стр. 137.
4. КПСС о вооруженных Силах Советского Союза. Москва, Госполитиздат, 1958, стр. 402.
5. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 40, стр. 77.
6. М. В. Фрунзе. Избранные произведения, т. 11. Москва, Воениздат, 1957, стр. 121-122.
7. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 26, стр. 172.
8. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 34, стр. 257.
9. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч. т. 37, стр. 91.

EDITOR'S NOTE ON THE CONCLUSIONS:

Except for the deletion of less than two whole sentences, the "Conclusions" to the 1968 edition of *Military Strategy* are identical with those found in the 1962 and 1963 editions. As shown below, the omitted portion probably is due to the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the military use of outer space:

"The methods of waging war as a whole are expressed by the totality of the types of military actions: nuclear rocket strikes...; protection of a country and its armed forces against nuclear rocket strikes; actions in land theaters, and actions in naval theaters and probable types of military actions in space. Because in recent years the imperialist aggressors have devoted great attention to a study of the possibilities of carrying out military actions in space, and through space, Soviet military strategy cannot ignore this fact and must study the possibilities opening up in this sphere of military action."

(The portion of the paragraph above that is underlined is now deleted.)

The very lack of change in the "Conclusions" makes their reading worthwhile. Many people in the United States hope for changes in the Soviet Union that will permit "peaceful coexistence" -- as the term is considered in the West -- to become a reality. Since the first edition of *Military Strategy* appeared in 1962, before the Cuban Missile Crisis and before the open polemics between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists, it is reasonable to assume that the "conclusions" to the book in 1968 would reflect these events. This is not the case. From the official Soviet point of view, war still "is the inevitable outcome of imperialism and ... wars will finally disappear only with the destruction of imperialism."

On the other hand, there are changes from the first and second editions which may be very significant. In Chapter II, the Soviets may be attributing to the United States certain policies and concepts which, in reality, they themselves are considering.

CONCLUSIONS

Any genuinely scientific theory reflects objective laws inherent in any particular manifestation of social life. The theory of Soviet military art, being just such a theory, reflects the laws of war as an armed struggle carried out in the name of the interests of the foremost social class, the proletariat. Therefore, an investigation of the various aspects of war in the present work could not be objective. Although war as a two-sided process of struggle has a series of objective features, the authors as representatives of the Soviet Armed Forces could not, of course, consider these features from the position of an outside observer, but each time proceeded from a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the essence, causes, and conditions of the origin of wars in the modern era.

From the point of view of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic, an objective evaluation of the various events of social development rests on the fact that the investigator cannot be neutral, but always remains the representative and champion of the ideology of his class.

Lenin stated, "... For the first time in the history of universes' struggle the army contains elements which do not carry bureaucratic banners but which are directed by the ideas of struggle for the liberation of the exploited" [1]. Only a firm conviction of the triumph of these ideas enables us to properly evaluate such complex events of social life as war and to determine most truly the content and tasks of military strategy.

To study any branch of military knowledge, including military strategy, the subject of the investigation is of greatest importance. War, military activities on a strategic scale, and armed forces as the main instrument of war were always the object of the investigation of military strategy. When these are investigated in military strategy, not only is the experience of past wars studied and general principles and rules formulated on this basis, but the character of an armed struggle in the future is predicted. This is the essence of military strategy.

Therefore, in this work, along with consideration of the general theoretical problems of military strategy concerning its content and place in the over-all system of military knowledge, laws of armed struggle, determination of the basic strategic categories, etc., a considerable place is devoted to the nature of, and methods of unleashing and waging, modern war. All these problems were considered in most cases in comparison with the opinions of our probable enemies in a future war.

The military and historical experience of the past was used in writing this work. However, the authors did not attempt to give a comprehensive picture of all past wars and the development of military strategy during different eras, since history for the sake of history loses all value. The experience of past wars was used only to prove a particular concept and also to confirm new laws and phenomena of armed struggle, the germ of which can be traced in past wars.

What conclusions can be drawn from the work as a whole?

As was shown, the basis for the development of military strategy is the experience of wars and military actions of a strategic scale, the experience of directing a war and the armed forces during the process of preparation and waging of the armed struggle. This experience was in its time a source of knowledge of the phenomena of war and the formation of strategic points of view which gradually built up into a definite system.

Each newly created socio-economic formation contributed to the development of military strategy and determined its features. Moreover, the main factor determining the character of military strategy was always the material conditions of the life of the society and the economy of one state or another.

The dependence of military strategy on the economy was especially marked with the appearance and development of the capitalist system of production; when a jump in the development of productive forces occurred, the militaristic designs of the capitalist countries increased, and mankind entered an era of imperialist wars.

All this caused aggressiveness in the policies of the ruling classes of the capitalist countries who kept military strategy in complete subjection to these policies. The aggressive tendencies of world capitalism were especially clearly manifested after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and the appearance of the world's first socialist state. These tendencies in the modern era, when the aggressors have at their disposal new powerful means of violence, have become an enormous danger to peace. In the policies of the modern imperialist states force has become the chief weapon and means of obtaining basic goals. Thus, in spite of the statements by bourgeois ideologists, the Leninist concept that war is a continuation of the policy of classes and states by violent means has not only lost its significance under present conditions, but has found an even clearer corroboration.

The class essence of bourgeois military strategy lies in the fact that it serves reactionary purposes for preparation of war in the name of the annihilation of the most progressive social structure -- socialism -- and the hindering of the regular development of mankind along the pathway to communism.

The superiority of Soviet strategy over the military strategy of imperialist countries is that it serves the most advanced social structure and the cause of the defense of the conquests of the world's workers.

The class essence of Soviet military strategy is defined by state policy. The policy of a socialist state considers war as the inevitable outcome of imperialism and considers that wars will finally disappear only with the destruction of imperialism. At the same time the Communist party makes a conclusion about the absence of the fatal inevitability of war in the modern era, when political and economic potentialities are being created to prevent a world war, even though imperialism still remains on a portion

of the earth. These potentialities are determined, first and foremost, by the great military power of the socialist camp, which is now an insuperable obstacle in the pathway to the unleashing of a new world war by imperialist madmen.

The imperialist countries are preparing for a new world war, using for this purpose the best achievements of science and technology and all the means which can be produced by modern capitalist industry.

Soviet military strategy in its theory also rests on the achievements of socialist industry and on Soviet science and technology, which has attained the world's highest level of development.

But, while from the technological point of view the armaments of the capitalist and socialist armies, as well as bourgeois and Soviet military strategy, have many features in common, the class political goals of capitalist and socialist armies differ radically from each other.

The military strategy of the imperialist countries, serving the interests of the bourgeoisie, is directed toward preparation of war as a means of solving international problems. Soviet military strategy serves the purpose of preparing for war, in order to defend the conquests of the workers and to crush the aggressor.

Soviet military strategy originates from the nature of a future war, from the most probable methods of unleashing and waging it.

The nature of war in the modern era is determined by factors of an economic, political, geographic, and purely military order. All these factors have undergone such enormous changes in comparison with the period of the last world war that a future war cannot begin to be compared with World War II.

Together with the most major political changes which have occurred in the world during this time and with the fantastic jump in the development of productive forces, the modern era is characterized by the appearance and development of unprecedented means of armed struggle, primarily the nuclear rocket weapon.

Therefore, a future world war will, first and foremost, be a nuclear rocket war. The enormous destructive and damaging power of the new means of armed conflict, the unlimited spatial extent of the war, and the inevitable involvement of the majority of the earth's population testifies to the fact that a new world war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, will inflict on mankind incalculable disaster and suffering. The magnitude of the destruction and the human losses in such a war are difficult to even imagine.

Of decisive significance in a future war will be its initial period, during the course of which both sides will endeavor to achieve maximum results, exerting every effort for this purpose. Therefore, of primary importance in determining the duration of a war will be not the length of time

during which the war is waged, but the coefficient of effectiveness of the efforts put forth at its very beginning. Thus, the duration and intensity of a war must be measured in two ways: by the duration of the entire war, and by the efficiency with which the forces and means are used during a specific period of time.

The more effectively a country uses the forces and means accumulated before the war, the greater the results it can achieve at the very beginning of the war, and the more rapidly victory is achieved. At the same time any government must obviously take into account the possibility of a protracted war, for which it will be necessary to have potential forces in readiness.

In complete conformity with this is such a feature as the massiveness of the armed forces participating in a modern war. Accordingly, an intense creation and development of the armed forces is going on in all highly developed countries of the world. This development is determined mainly by the economic potentialities of the countries, their ability to produce nuclear weapons and highly efficient and complex military equipment.

The probable nature and methods of conducting a future war strongly influence the development of the armed forces. Therefore, the directions of their development, the organizational structure, and equipment are selected in complete conformity with the requirements of a modern war.

The moral and political training of the armed forces is of considerable importance under the conditions of waging a modern war. The socio-political nature and class essence of the armed forces of the socialist and capitalist countries determine the different directions in the education and training of personnel, as well as the principles of formation and recruitment of armies.

Capitalist armies are obedient tools in the hands of the monopolistic bourgeoisie and serve reactionary and inhuman purposes. Predatory and grasping purposes are foreign to the Soviet Armed Forces. Their entire training is founded on the principles of preserving peace, the assertion of equal rights, and esteem for the independence and sovereignty of all countries and peoples.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that the technical equipment of the capitalist and socialist armies has much in common, since the means for war and the development of equipment are governed by objective laws which apply to all countries.

In citing the principles of waging war the authors depended on the historical trends in the development of the means of waging war and their dependence on particular factors of a political, economic and geographic nature. The wars of the era of imperialism served as the basis for this study.

The forms and methods of waging a modern war are to a great extent determined by the most probable ways in which a future war can be unleashed by the imperialists and by what their military plans and preparations are.

The methods of waging war as a whole are expressed by the totality of the types of military actions: nuclear rocket strikes for the purpose of simultaneously smashing the military and economic potential of the enemy, annihilation of strategic means of nuclear attack and groups of armed forces, and disorganization of military and government control; military actions for protection of a country and of its armed forces against nuclear rocket strikes; military actions in land theaters; and military actions in naval theaters. [Editor's Note # 1]

Determination of the nature of a war, the directions in the creation and development of armed forces, and the methods of waging a future nuclear rocket war enable us to reveal the main trends in the preparation for war. Preparation of a country for war consists of preparing the economy, the armed forces, and the population. Under present-day conditions the problems of the timely organization of civil defense are of great importance and for this reason were considered in a special section of Chapter VII, although they comprise one of the elements of preparation of the population.

The leadership of the country and the armed forces in war is a function of the highest military and political leadership, which in various countries, depending on their governmental and social structure and the century-old traditions which have developed, are dissimilar. However, there is much in common in the functions of these organs. The system of organization of the leadership of a country and the armed forces continuously changes under the influence and action of external and internal conditions occurring in the country. Now it is still difficult to say how this system will actually be formed in a future war. Therefore, the authors relied mainly on the experience of the leadership of the armed forces in past wars.

Taking into account that military affairs do not mark time, but continuously develop under the action of various conditions, the authors have attempted as much as possible to anticipate and depict certain prospects in the development of various branches of military strategy.

At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that the theories expressed in this work were cited in each individual case by relying on an evaluation of the political and economic conditions of today. Therefore, it is impossible to consider them as final and unchanging data. Only a creative approach from the position of Marxist-Leninist dialectics will enable Soviet commanding cadres to understand properly and use the various conclusions and recommendations of this work.

Footnotes to Conclusions

1. В. И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч., т. 35, стр. 270.

EDITOR'S NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

#1. The following was omitted: "The XXII Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, which has become a new historical milestone in the development of Marxism-Leninism and of the whole international communist movement, has outlined a program..."

#2. Omitted: "At the same time it must be noted that in the open Soviet military literature there is a lack of publications dealing with general concepts of military strategy and the vast variety of the problems concerned. Actually, since the publication of Strategy by A. Svechin in 1962, which was far from correct in regard to Marxist interpretation of the substance and content of military strategy and contained many shortcomings of a methodological nature, there have been no other publications in the Soviet Union devoted to the problems of military strategy as a whole.

"We must also take into account that many basic positions expressed in our press of Soviet military strategy, especially those stated during the post-war period, have been influenced strongly by the cult of personality of I. V. Stalin, who, in order to justify miscalculations and errors committed by him in the course of the Great Patriotic War [World War II (Translator's note)], intentionally distorted the concepts of a whole series of questions of military strategy. The following became axiomatic: the rationality of low military preparedness of nonaggressive countries, the theory of active defense which ex post facto justified the deep withdrawal of our army into the heart of the country, surrendering to the enemy extensive territory, counterattack as an allegedly inevitable form of strategic operations in wartime, as well as a number of other positions."

EDITOR'S NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

#1. Omitted: "...and Rumanian..."

#2. This read "...to organize material and political security..."

#3. This read "...of military strategy."

#4. This read "...even with hundreds of thousands of troops and vast amounts of..."

#5. Omitted: "...Great Britain and especially France..."

#6. Omitted: "...France..."

EDITOR'S NOTES TO CHAPTER II

#1. Omitted: "The desire of the aggressive imperialist circles of the United States of America for world domination was often proclaimed by the leaders of the USA. Thus, in 1945, soon after the conclusion of World War II, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George C. Marshall, in his report to the Secretary of War wrote that the United States possesses the necessary 'Power to secure its leading role in the future developments of mankind.' The notorious ex-President Truman in his message to Congress in December, 1945, even more frankly expressed this idea. He asserted that victory in World War II allegedly '...has placed upon the American people the constant and immediate necessity for world leadership.' Finally, the new president, John F. Kennedy, in his 'Special Message on the Urgent Needs of the Country' to Congress on May 25, 1961, remarked that 'the government must examine additional long-range measures..., to enable us to justify our position as a world leader.'"

#2. Omitted: "It follows that American imperialists expect to achieve their main political aim -- winning world domination -- by starting aggressive wars."

#3. Omitted: "...which led to sharp disagreements between the ground troops command on one hand, and the Air Force and, in part, Naval command on the other. Undoubtedly, this development of the armed forces could not help but produce serious dissatisfaction among the representatives of the ground troops and those monopolistic groups who supply these forces with arms and materiel. The victory of the advocates of the strategy of 'massive retaliation' was a victory not only of the representatives of the Air Force and Navy, but also of the monopolistic groups interested in the manufacture of armaments for the Air Force and the Navy."

#4. This read: "...retaliation..."

#5. Omitted: "...such as The RAND Corporation*; the Johns Hopkins Washington Center for the study of foreign policy; the Rockefeller and the Gaiter Commissions; Harvard, Princeton, the Universities of Pennsylvania and Chicago, and other American universities.

*The RAND Corporation (RAND: from Research and Development) was formed by the USAF Command in 1948, and employs more than 800 prominent scientists. Its task is to determine what types of weapons are needed to meet the requirements of modern strategy. Among similar organizations are the Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office (ORO) dealing with the same work for the US Ground Forces, the Navy Operations Evaluation Group attached to MIT, and the Institute of Defense Analysis, which receives assignments from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense of the United States."

#6. Omitted: "The most timely, from the point of view of clarification of the present military strategy of the West, is the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the books of General Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, and of Professor Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice. *

"*In 1961, Taylor and Kissinger were appointed special military and political advisers to President Kennedy, and almost all the proposals contained in their books have found or are finding practical realization; previously, Kissinger was consultant to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff."

#7. Omitted: "In referring to the vast influence of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic on the course of world social development, he says bitterly that 'the successes of Moscow and Peking will offer the same magnetic attraction as the accomplishments of Europe in the 19th Century. No economic aid can counteract the belief that the West is doomed.'"

#8. Omitted: "...imaginary..."

#9. Omitted: "Thus, the European countries raised the question of forming their own independent strategic nuclear forces."

#10. Omitted: "...and the new President became its fervent advocate."

#11. Omitted: "The United States military program outlined by President Kennedy in his messages and television address, provides the general outlines for building and preparation of the armed forces required for a general nuclear war as well as for limited wars."

#12. Omitted: "At first glance, this position may seem strange. On one hand, the political and military leadership of the USA and NATO believes that a general nuclear warfare is problematic, in short, without a future, since it leads to mutual annihilation; for this reason, the previous strategy was rejected. On the other hand, the newly adopted strategy, which is more flexible, again primarily envisages assuring the capability and preparedness for waging a general nuclear war. But this is only an apparent contradiction."

"The recognition of the possibility of a general nuclear war, despite its problematic nature, is an indication that the American imperialists are ready to embark upon any monstrous crime against humanity that would prevent their imminent destruction. Such a war would be an extreme measure, and could be started by aggressors when all other measures have failed to produce tan-

gible results in a struggle against the socialist camp."

#13. Omitted: "According to its estimate such satellites, located in space, are capable of photographing objects with a size of two meters and, in the period between 1965-1970, possibly, will be able to photograph at night objects 60 centimeters in height from an altitude of about 500 kilometers."

"However, according to American press reports, in 1962 the successes of the imperialists in the field of reconnaissance of Soviet strategic rocket bases were more than modest."

#14. Omitted: "Considering... the vastness of Soviet territory, our information of Soviet launch sites unavoidably has a fragmentary character."

#15. Omitted: "In the opinion of the military command of the United States, the design of the 'Minuteman' missile permits reducing its launch time by about 7-15 times and, because of a reduction in its dimensions, its concealment is facilitated and its mobility is increased. Such missiles will be in a state of constant readiness and can be launched in one to two minutes. The optimum time for launching intercontinental ballistic missiles which operate on liquid fuel is 15 minutes from the moment the command is given."

#16. This read: "...from which we hope to refrain."

#17. Omitted: "The military command of the United States is striving to solve the problem of organizing a reliable notification (warning) and communication system by means of launching a large number of adequate satellites which should provide a warning concerning the launching of enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles 30 minutes before they reach their targets on the territory of North America, as well as by the creation of a global, invulnerable communications and navigation system with the use of satellites. Air (on airplanes) and sea (on ships) command posts have been created and are continuing to be created for the reliable control of the armed forces of the United States and NATO."

#18. Omitted: "Thus, the realizability and effectiveness of the 'counterforce' strategy is placed under great doubt. The most objective and critically-disposed representatives of the West consider that even in the case where during the 1960's the percentage of the strategic strength of the Soviet Union which the United States can destroy will remain constant (which is quite an optimistic assumption), the absolute amount of forces which will remain will grow. Therefore, 'capability of the Soviet Union to inflict a devastating blow will inevitably grow.'"

"Similar admissions are also characteristic from the point of view that they unwittingly expose the aggressive nature of the strategy of 'counterforce.'"

#19. Omitted: "A strategy which contemplates attaining victory through the destruction of the armed forces cannot stem from the idea of 'retaliatory blow;' it stems from preventive actions."

#20. Omitted: "The element of surprise includes taking the initiative, rapidly destroying the armed forces of the enemy, mainly his strategic forces and weapons, disrupting the control of troops and the country as a whole, and undermining the economy and morale of the people."

#21. Omitted: "...when the Americans had a monopoly on the nuclear weapon..."

#22. Omitted: "...appearance of such weapons in the Soviet Union..."

#23. Omitted: "Brodie is an employee of The RAND Corporation. Therefore his pronouncements reflect not only his personal point of view, but also that of the Air Force leaders and of the other military agencies of the U.S. served by The RAND Corporation. The conclusions and recommendations of the employees of this corporation are not 'voices in the wilderness,' they are heard and accepted, since otherwise the activity of the corporation would make no sense.

"However, U.S. officials, e.g., representatives of the government and of the military command, who agree with the conclusions and proposals of their scientific experts and who implement them, prefer to use other words, attempting to convince the nations of the world of their 'peaceful intentions.' Even Brodie is forced to admit this; he states that government-employed adherents of preventive war consider the public expression of their views to be 'impolitic.' Therefore, ..."

#24. Omitted: "The American imperialists believe that the present military potential of the United States is more nearly adequate to the task of knocking out the Soviet Union quickly by preventive war than it will be at any point in the future."

[*Translator's note: This is nearly a direct quote from Brodie, but (curiously enough) the Russians have changed the last phrase "than it was when we enjoyed a monopoly of atomic weapons" to "than it will be at any point in the future," thus changing the emphasis from the past to the future. (Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton [1959], p. 230.)]

"Therefore, it is not by chance that the Soviet government, expressing the hopes and aspirations of all peace-loving mankind, recommended in 1962 inclusion in the agenda of the 17th Session of the UN General Assembly an important and urgent point: 'Condemnation of Propaganda for a Preventive Nuclear War.'"

#25. Omitted: "However, the military specialists of the United States consider that in the future, the possibility of achieving strategic surprise will decrease more and more. As a matter of fact, modern means of detection and warning permit intersecting the launch of ballistic missiles, primarily strategic missiles, and transmitting signals concerning such launchings to the corresponding command posts.

"The savings of time which these warning devices can provide is not great, but during this time the air defense (PVO) and rocket defense (PRO) and strategic weapons can be brought to complete combat readiness, the major part of military aircraft can take off into the air, and even...a counter salvo of rockets can be launched in answer to the imperialists' aggression.

"In preparing for aggression, the United States simultaneously devotes a great deal of attention to defense. The American leaders attach decisive importance to two factors: (1) the time element and (2) assurance of the invulnerability primarily of the strategic forces and weapons.

"It is well known that the time factor is of tremendous importance for early warning of attack: withdrawal of the armed forces to a safe area, particularly the withdrawal of strategic weapons; the organization of the retaliatory blow; warning of the population through the Civil Defense machinery; etc.

"In September, 1960, Kennedy, still a presidential candidate, formed a temporary committee presided over by Senator Symington (former Secretary of the Air Force) to study the existing structure of leadership of the U.S. Armed Forces and its relation to the existing military-political and strategic situation. Early in December, 1960, the committee presented to Kennedy a report 'A Broad Survey of the Defense Organization of the United States,' which stressed that in any evaluation of the U.S. military position 'there is one factor which has greater significance than the others.' At that stage of technical development this was the time factor, whose significance, according to the conclusions of the committee, consisted of the following:

"1) The unique strategic value of time from the point of view of assuring the possibility and capability of an immediate response in the modern space and nuclear age. According to the evaluation of the committee, the United States had at least 18 months to prepare for each previous World War; however, in the case of a general nuclear war, there would be less than 18 minutes to respond.

"2) The decisive significance of the time factor in the armaments race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Here the stress is on the need for assuring a reasonably timely choice from among the various weapons systems available and for assuring a minimum time lag between the

designing of the weapons and their operational use.

"3) The influence of the time factor on the military budget. No matter what funds are expended by the United States for military purposes, 'time cannot be bought.' It is therefore recommended that one keep in mind the economic consequences of creating weapons which may become obsolete before completion, due to time lag.

"Today, when rockets 'have fantastically reduced the time necessary for the delivery of nuclear warheads from one continent to another,' the response time is literally measured in minutes. For example, the flight of a rocket from the American to the Eurasian Continent, or vice versa, requires only 30 minutes, and possibly even less in the future.

"On this basis, the political and military leaders of the United States examine all possible ways and means of gaining additional time. As indicated above it visualizes the solution of this problem in the launching of special artificial earth satellites which are to pinpoint the launchings of ICBM's and relay this information back to earth. In addition, the Americans are building radar stations to observe the launchings of ballistic missiles.

"Another equally important problem is to assure the relative invulnerability of the armed forces, primarily of the strategic forces and weapons. The political and military leaders of the USA and of NATO believe that this problem can be solved by the creation not of a single, but rather of a large variety of different types of strategic weapons: solid-fuel ICBMs and IRBMs, rocket-carrying nuclear submarines, medium and heavy bombers armed with long-range 'air-to-ground' missiles with a great radius of action, and, in the near future, special space devices.

"One of these measures is to construct subterranean and mobile launching pads for solid-fuel ICBMs and IRBMs to make their detection and destruction more difficult. In addition, provisions are made to maintain all combat-ready ICBMs and IRBMs and a significant part of SAC and TAC on a 15-minute alert and to increase the number of airborne heavy bombers carrying nuclear bombs, as well as to create a reliable system of communications, control, and information.

"It should be noted that the maintenance of a significant part of the strategic and operational formations on a 15-minute alert as well as the increase of the number of heavy bombers in the air, fulfills a double aim: 1) constant readiness for delivering a surprise attack; and 2) quick removal of them from danger and the delivery of a retaliatory (counter) blow. However, a retaliatory blow, if it is possible, can only be delivered on a timely basis by the surviving rocket forces, including the rocket-carrying nuclear submarines, carrier-based aircraft, and the patrolling heavy bombers in the air and aircraft units which are on 15-minute readiness alert. The remaining strategic and tactical aircraft, having succeeded in leaving the danger zone, would be forced to land at remaining airfields to refuel and take on nuclear weapons. Only then can they carry out their task.

"The United States military command is seriously concerned over the vulnerability of its strategic air force. For this reason, it is taking the necessary measures for its dispersion and for increasing further the forces on alert on airfields and in the air. Moreover, in order to reduce the time for inflicting a strike, the Americans are studying the possibility of increasing the number of aircraft loaded with nuclear bombs on ground alert.

"The rocket-carrying nuclear submarines, subterranean and mobile launching installations for ICBMs and IRBMs, carrier-based aircraft and subsequently space devices are considered to be most invulnerable."

#26. Omitted: "...with or without the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Limited war is defined as an armed conflict in which the warring sides intentionally limit the political aims of the war, the forces and means employed, the dimensions of the area of military operations, the number of participants in the war, etc.

"In the opinion of the bourgeois theoreticians, in a limited war there should be no use of strategic nuclear weapons for striking at objectives located on the territory of the United States and the USSR. Such a war would not require the maximum strain on the efforts of the warring sides, but only a part of their human and material resources. In contrast to general war, limited war should not reach the extreme limits, and the warring sides must reach an agreement before the military operations exceed the specified limits.

"The concept of limited war has many contradictory propositions which even the representatives of bourgeois military science who support such war are forced to admit. The contradictory nature of these propositions can be followed through the characteristics of some of the factors, the intentional limitation of which, in the opinion of the representatives of the West, gives war a limited character.

"It is believed that in limited war none of the sides should set for itself political goals which so threaten a change in the existing situations as to justify a significant increase in the scale of military operations or the risk of unleashing a general war. These goals should be 'modest and morally justifiable' so as not to entail a radical change in the status quo.

"Such 'modest' goals for the United States, in the opinion of the military theoreticians, are: consolidating their political and strategic domination in certain parts of the world or weakening in some region the positions of the 'Communist countries'; the restoration of the capitalist system in any country which has set forth on the road to socialism; the suppression of democratic movements in capitalist countries and the national liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries.

"Expressing the aggressive aspirations of American imperialism, the western military theoreticians at the same time point out that in a limited war the United States and her allies will not absolutely limit their military

goals to specific borders and political conditions which existed before the start of the war.

"Thus, the arguments of the bourgeois ideologists of 'modest' tasks become pointless because they do not refer to limitation of the political and military goals of imperialism. These arguments clearly contradict the true nature of imperialism which is striving for world domination.

"American military theoreticians admit, and in this they are probably right, that the most acute problem of limited war is the use in it of tactical nuclear weapons. The complexity of this problem, in their opinion, is explained by the following.

"First of all, the role and the effect of tactical nuclear weapons are still insufficiently studied and are based primarily on assumptions. It does not appear possible to foresee the political, military, and psychological consequences of the use of this weapon. The opposite side, in retaliation for the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, may launch the same number or considerably more retaliatory nuclear strikes. The possibility of an error is not excluded, the result of which will be the unleashing of a general nuclear war with its catastrophic consequences.

"The possibility for both warring sides to accept the classification of nuclear weapons in accordance with their power (tactical and strategic) is doubted.

"It is also difficult to imagine which delivery means of tactical nuclear weapons can be used in a limited conflict, and whether these can be used from areas located outside the zone of limited war.

"Thus, the illusiveness of limitations in the use of nuclear weapons does not need proof. The ideologists of limited war, fighting for the wide use of tactical nuclear weapons, at the same time do not show any desire to abandon strategic nuclear weapons of attack which should be, as they point out, in readiness as weapons of deterrence.

"With respect to territorial limitations, they supposedly are most effective in the case where, with the flaring up of a limited conflict, they are more easily implemented, observed, and mutually controlled by the warring sides. This pertains in particular to economically under-developed regions and countries which are located on islands and peninsulas.

"At the same time, the adherents of limited war are obliged also to admit that the creation, down to the present time, of military and political blocs of states in which, as is known, the American imperialist circles have dragged in the majority of the countries of the capitalist world, to a considerable degree complicates the possibility for limiting armed conflict to a specific territory.

"The concept of limited war also is based on the necessity to limit the inflicting of strikes with conventional as well as tactical nuclear weapons on specifically determined military targets (objectives) without

subjecting large populated places and strategic objectives to destruction in so doing. The illusiveness of such assertions requires no explanation.

"As a matter of fact, both theoretically and practically, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between tactical and strategic objectives without even speaking of whether such a differentiation (assuming that it may be achieved) is recognized as proper by both warring sides.

"Politically, the concept of limited war represents an adventuristic reckoning by the American imperialists to wage war on foreign territory.

"Such is the essence of the strategy of 'flexible response' which has been adopted in the United States and shared in principle by all the NATO countries. However, it is being subjected to a broad and critical discussion and analysis on the part of the European countries, members of the bloc. Its discussion is causing sharp clashes, primarily with respect to such cardinal questions as the creation of a nuclear force within NATO, control over the use of nuclear weapons, especially in limited war, an increase in conventional armed forces."

#27. Omitted: "The military strategy of the main imperialist countries was formed under the influence of the essentially unified predatory and aggressive policy of the monopolistic circles. Because of this the strategies of the different imperialist countries have much in common.

"Until recently, the United States had the monopoly of strategic forces and were against their establishment by the European countries within national frameworks. The political meaning of such a position is the continued, unlimited domination over the bloc, and the political and military pressure on its allies. Some European countries, above all France, the Federal Republic of Germany and England have come out against this position. During 1961-1962, no progress was made on this matter. The talks between Kennedy and McMillan, which took place in December, 1962, in the Bahamas, lead to the conclusion of the so-called Nassau Pact, which envisaged the creation of nuclear force of the bloc. According to the announcement made by President Kennedy at a press conference on December 31, 1962, this is one of the important problems facing NATO in 1963, the solution of which will determine 'whether the alliance will begin to fall apart' or whether it will provide 'a higher degree of combat readiness.'

"The decision to create NATO nuclear forces was adopted at the session of the Council held in Ottawa in May, 1963. The meaning of this is that with the help of the United States, the European members of NATO should create their 'pyramid' of nuclear forces, the summit of which will be the NATO military command in Europe. The United States, apart from this, retains leadership of a second 'pyramid' of strategic offensive forces which are subordinate only to the American military command. These two military commands should cooperate with each other within the framework of NATO, coordinating plans and targets for the launching of nuclear strikes. On the basis of the Ottawa decisions, the NATO nuclear forces should include: 3 American submarines armed with Polaris missiles and located on combat

patrol in the Mediterranean, all-British medium strategic bombers (about 180), as well as a portion of the tactical air force, armed with nuclear weapons, belonging to Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

"These nuclear forces will be called 'multinational' or 'interallied' and will be headed by a specially designated deputy supreme commander of the combined-arms forces of NATO in Europe. In addition, a special committee has been created consisting of nine representatives of the European countries mentioned above to deal with the coordination of operational planning and distribution of targets between the strategic aviation commands of the United States and the nuclear forces of NATO.

"Subsequently, it is anticipated to include within the composition of these forces four British atomic submarines with Polaris missiles, to be built by 1967 and three more American atomic missile-carrying ships.

"In addition to the 'multinational forces,' the creation of a so-called 'multilateral' NATO nuclear force consisting of surface ships armed with Polaris missiles is intended as a second stage. Altogether the construction of 25 pirate warships carrying eight Polaris missiles each is contemplated. These ships will be camouflaged as merchant vessels. They will have mixed crews, i.e., they will be staffed by servicemen of several nationalities."

#28. Omitted: "Bourgeois military strategy changed and developed in accord with the changes in foreign policy of the ruling circles of each country, the distribution of forces in the world arena, economic possibilities the appearance of new combat weapons, and other factors.

"In this chapter we give a brief analysis of the development of military strategy in Britain, the United States, France, Germany, and Japan, during World Wars I and II, and of the military strategy of the modern imperialist coalition headed by the USA.

"In World War I, Britain, the United States, France and Germany pursued the same predatory aims, attaining them, however, by different methods. For instance, Britain adhered to its traditional policy of having others carry out the dirty work. The essence of British military strategy was very openly stated by former Prime Minister Lloyd George; he wrote: 'We conceived of our participation in war in accordance with Britain's traditional role in continental wars. Our Navy was to control the seas in the interests of the Allies. Our wealth was to finance their foreign expenditures. Our Army was to play a secondary role in this war.'

"However, in the very beginning of the war, the British government was forced to revise these concepts. It was clear that the outcome of the war would not be decided on the high seas, as previously conceived, but on the continent with a mass application of ground forces. As a result of the revision, during the war, of the concept of the role and aims of the armed forces in a continental war, the British government deployed a large, well-equipped land army. By the beginning of 1918, the ground forces of the

British empire comprised ninety divisions, most of which were deployed on the continent, although the initial plans provided for only seven divisions of the expeditionary corps on the continent.

"U.S. military strategy prior to World War I differed little from its British counterpart. It was based on the policy of American imperialists aimed at the expansion of its sphere of influence. By the beginning of the 20th Century, the United States was first in world industrial output and began to aim at world dominance. War was to be instrumental in achieving this end.

"In taking into account its geographic position, i.e., the absence of common borders with major powers, as well as the possibility of prolonged war, the ruling circles of the USA planned to gradually deploy a large army and to enter into the war at a favorable moment. Accordingly, the United States devoted its main prewar efforts to the development of the navy and its least effort to the development of ground forces.

"The French military strategy on the eve of World War I reflected both cowardice and the desire of the French bourgeoisie for territorial expansion. The desire to regain the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine forced the French General Staff to plan active operations in this very area. However, because the French feared the might of the German army, their war plan was to wait passively for an opportunity. The main blow was to be delivered only after the first encounters with the enemy, depending on conditions.

"The French counted on the possibility of a German invasion into France through Belgium, but considered this unlikely since they felt that the Germans had insufficient forces to undertake this operation.

"Germany, occupying a central position on the European continent, was most afraid of a war on two fronts -- against Russia, and against the Western powers. In order to win such a war with an inferior economic and military potential, Germany had to act quickly and decisively, destroying its opponents one at a time without granting them time for mobilization and deployment of their vast resources. Therefore, the war plan developed by the German General Staff was based on the idea of a 'blitzkrieg,' first against France and then against Russia. In planning the first blow against France, the German General Staff started with the idea that Russia was unable to initiate active operations until its mobilization and concentration of forces had been completed. The Germans believed that this would require at least forty days -- enough time to conclude the war with France.

"The strategic aims of German imperialism determined the decisive, offensive nature of the operations of the armed forces. In the initial stage of the war, such strategy and tactics produced notable results. Later, however, the adventuristic nature of the policy and strategy of German imperialism led Germany to catastrophe.

"The experience of World War I showed that bourgeois military strategy was not capable of understanding and evaluating the conditions of modern warfare characteristic of the machine age.

"By the beginning of the war, in most capitalist countries it was believed that the war would be over in a few months. This idea was most graphically expressed by von Schlieffen, who believed that the war would be over 'before the leaves start to fall.' In this connection the German General Staff planned only the initial operations, which were to destroy the armed forces of the opponents and bring the war to conclusion. No provision was made for the deployment and preparation of the reserves or for the mobilization of industry for war production, since it was thought that the arms and ammunition accumulated in peacetime were sufficient to wage war and bring it to a victorious conclusion.

"However, the war changed all these plans. For well-known reasons, it became a prolonged war involving deployment of armies of many millions, their continuous replacement, a change-over of industry to the production of vast amounts of arms and ammunition, equipment, clothing, and other war materiel.

"In the course of the war, new means of warfare appeared with the armies involved, sharply changing the organization of troops and the nature of military operations. The war became a war of destruction and attrition.

"World War I culminated in total military defeat of Germany and her allies. However, it brought no solution to the disagreements existing between the large capitalist countries but, conversely, made them more acute. The system inherent in the Treaty of Versailles, which was a result of World War I, proved to be so unstable as to provide the nucleus for a new world war.

"As a result of World War I the entire capitalist system suffered a major defeat. The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia took one of the largest countries of the world out of the chain of world capitalism. The world was split into two opposing social systems -- that of capitalism and that of socialism.

"The appearance in the world arena of the first socialist state of workers and peasants was a serious obstacle to the aims of world domination of the imperialist countries. Thus, during the period between the two world wars the imperialists of Britain, France, and the United States set themselves two tasks: first, to destroy, or in any case, to weaken substantially the Soviet Union; and second, to eliminate old competitors (Germany and Japan) from the struggle for world domination. To do so, Britain, France, and the United States pursued an extended policy aimed at setting Germany and Japan against the USSR, i.e., letting them do the dirty work, and then to eliminate Germany and Japan, ravaged by war, from the world market. To realize these plans, extensive credits were put at German disposal to assure the rebirth and renewal of its heavy military industries and to further Hitler's aggressive policy in all possible ways.

"However, contrary to the plans of international reaction, the contradictions between the largest imperialist countries of this period proved to be stronger than the contradictions between the USSR and the imperialist countries. It was this fact that led, on the eve of World War II, to the

formation of two imperialist factions. One was composed of the United States, Britain, and France, striving to secure their dominant positions in the world. The second group consisted of Germany, Italy, and Japan, who sought to remake the world.

"The countries of the fascist bloc by 1939 had strengthened their economic and military potential to such a degree as to visualize a real possibility of crushing their competitors before starting a war against the Soviet Union. Thus, the military machine of fascist Germany, created with the direct and active support of the United States, Britain, and France fell upon its own creators in 1939-1940.

"During the period between the two wars, bourgeois military leaders feverishly sought the best methods of warfare. With this aim, all countries thoroughly studied the experience gathered in World War I, and sought new forms of strategy.

"Certain bourgeois military ideologists (Seeckt in Germany, Fuller and Liddell Hart in Britain, de Gaulle in France, and others) advanced the theory of small, highly mechanized professional armies, suggesting that modern military technology obviates the need for massive armed forces.

"The theory of professional armies arose because the bourgeoisie feared the armed working masses. The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the decline of armies and the growth of the revolutionary movement in countries which participated in World War I, showed the bourgeoisie the danger inherent in conducting wars with large armed forces.

"There existed other similar theories, particularly the theory of the Italian General Douhet, who insisted that the only form of war is the 'war in the air.' Douhet considered that massive bomber attacks on important industrial and political centers of the enemy can secure victory within a short time without using large armies or navies.

"By the beginning of World War II, the imperialist countries had developed various strategic concepts. The French bourgeoisie, frightened by the huge human losses sustained in the course of World War I (over a million-and-a-half killed), believed that in future wars it could avoid large losses and win the war with smaller forces by merely defensive operations involving the large fortifications on the eastern border.

"The French General Staff seriously believed that a war against Germany could be won defensively on the Maginot Line. A gradual attrition of the enemy by a naval blockade was considered a substantial complement to the Maginot Line. Therefore, the French army and its generals were preparing for a trench war, similar in form to the war of 1914-1918. The passive-defensive strategy of France was reflected in the building of its armed forces, in the training of the army personnel, and later in the strategic deployment and in the methods of warfare. Therefore, it was not surprising that the armed forces of France, exceeding three million people, were destroyed in a month-and-a-half of war.

"It should be stressed that the French imperialists were hoping until the very last moment that fascist Germany would attack the USSR without initiating any decisive actions in the west.

"The ruling classes of the United States and Britain, who by force of circumstances found themselves in the same coalition with the Soviet Union, continued to pursue their imperialist aims throughout the war, although in a masked form.

"The aim of the ruling circles of the United States and Britain was to undermine the power of Germany, Italy and Japan (their main competitors) and at the same time to preserve the existing regimes of these countries.

"With regard to the Soviet Union, the political aims of the United States and Britain were clearly reflected in the military problems of the imperialist circles of these countries: to conduct the war primarily at the expense of the USSR, to weaken the USSR by war, and to keep the Red Army out of the Balkans and central Europe. Following this front, plans matured for the expansion of Anglo-American operations not in France, which would hit Germany closest to home, but rather in Italy and in the Balkans.

"These strategic aims, directed at the prolongation of war by all possible means, determined also the methods of armed warfare employed by the British and American troops so as to create a slow, passive, and indecisive character of warfare.

"The political plans and the basic military strategic problems of fascist Germany were quite different. To destroy the enemies, who together possessed superior potential, the Nazi leadership and the German General Staff were counting primarily on the full use of the element of surprise and on the destruction of the countries of the opposing coalition by lightning blows, one at a time. In essence, this strategy differed very little from the German strategy before World War I; still it was safeguarded better by the creation of large mobile forces, tanks and mechanized divisions, and a rather large air force, which was not the case in the beginning of World War I.

"The essence of the 'blitzkrieg' theory was formulated by Ludendorff. According to this theory, the maximum forces and materiel were to be concentrated for the initial strike. The mobilization and concentration of the armed forces were to be camouflaged and carried out before they attack. To surprise the enemy suddenly, to lull him into carelessness, to invade and suddenly advance into the depth of his country, to assure success by merciless and terroristic treatment of the population, to utilize the previously organized 'fifth columns,' to paralyze the will of the enemy to resist, and to force his surrender: these were the foundations of the 'blitzkrieg.'

"However, as is well-known, this theory was of no avail in the war against the Soviet Union, since fascist Germany had neither the political, the economic, nor especially the military prerequisites to decide the outcome of the war within a short time in its favor.

"The aggressive program of Japanese imperialism before World War II was

most completely formulated by one of the most prominent representatives of Japanese militarism, General Tanaka. As early as July 25, 1927, he presented to the Emperor of Japan a memorandum setting forth a plan of conquest of China and of the world. The memorandum stated that in order to seize China, Japan must 'first seize Manchuria and Mongolia. To conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we can conquer China, all the countries of Asia Minor, as well as India and the countries of the South Seas, will fear us and surrender to us. The world will then understand that East Asia belongs to us and will not dare to question our rights... Having seized all the resources of China, we shall proceed to conquer India, the countries of the South Seas, then Asia Minor, Central Asia, and finally Europe.'

"Aggression against the USSR was an intrinsic part of General Tanaka's plan. The memorandum states: 'The program of our national development apparently requires crossing swords with Russia again.'

"The imperialist aims and tendencies directed at world domination determined the decisive aggressive character of Japanese military strategy.

"However, taking into account the relative weakness of their own economy, Japanese militarists always provided for a thorough and long preparation for any expansion. Its start was to be timed with international conditions favorable to Japan, when the major powers were either at war, or so full of internal conflict as to be unable to resist Japanese aggression.

"The same causes (weakness of the economy and insufficient military potential) gave rise to the second principle of Japanese military strategy: the sudden attack, an example of the most abominable treachery.

"With respect to organization, building and military utilization of the armed forces, the Japanese believed their ground forces to be their mainstay. At the same time the insular position of Japan required her to maintain a large navy and to attach special importance to naval landings.

"World War II did not resolve the imperialist contradictions but only served to make them more acute. It did not strengthen the foundations of the capitalist system, but rather impaired and weakened them.

"The hopes of world reactionaries, and especially those of the ring-leaders of Wall Street, that Hitler's military machine would deliver a mortal blow to the Soviet Union in the course of World War II proved to be futile. The USSR destroyed the German army, defeated Hitler's Germany, and emerged victorious from the war."

#29. Omitted: "In accordance with the strategy of 'flexible response' adopted by the United States and NATO and the views of the possible nature of modern war their armed forces were created and developed. The basis for this development is the so-called principle of 'mutual dependence' between the NATO countries in the political, economic and military realms that was advanced by the American ruling circles as early as 1950. Later, this principle was extended to countries participating in other military and political alliances.

"The basic purpose of the principle of 'mutual dependence' is to create,

within the framework of the aggressive military blocs, 'balanced' military forces and hence to define the responsibility of each participating country or group of countries for the development of such national armed forces as required by the United States.

"The task of creating, training, and utilizing primarily offensive strategic weapons, including nuclear weapons, was taken on by the United States and partly by Britain, since these countries have the greatest military, economic, and technical capabilities. The other countries in NATO and the other military blocs were committed mainly to the development of ground forces and small air forces and navies whose mission was to safeguard the operations of the ground forces and to perform auxiliary tasks.

"The American imperialists, having available all the strategic means for armed combat, exert political and military pressure on their allies, forcing them to do whatever suits the United States.

"Thus, if we may say so, 'mutual dependence' does not sit well with certain NATO countries, particularly France and West Germany, who would like to play a more important role than that assigned to them in the solution of the most important military and political problems. The ruling circles of France, particularly of West Germany, object to the dominant authority of the Americans, and (to a lesser degree) of the British in the military blocs, and insist upon a revision of the principle of 'mutual dependence.' They demand that nuclear weapons and the strategic means of using them be put in their hands."

#30. Omitted: "The American plans, presented in the messages of President Kennedy to Congress in 1961-1963, provide not only for a stepped-up rate of deployment of strategic rocket weapons in NATO countries and other alliances, but also for well-equipped and mobile conventional armed forces, especially ground troops. Thus, in his congressional address on May 25, 1961, Kennedy remarked that at the present time the American government is especially interested in seeing its NATO allies devote their main attention to the development of conventional armed forces, primarily ground troops adapted to conditions arising from the changing balance of power between the East and the West.

"However, it is necessary to stress that even though the United States had begun to devote greater attention to conventional armed forces, the main emphasis in its military buildup remains the same. It is concentrated on the creation and perfection of nuclear forces and other strategic weapons. This is evident from the above military program of the new American administration, as well as from the statements of prominent American military leaders. For instance, General Lemnitzer, the present Supreme Commander of the NATO Forces in Europe, declared on October 28, 1961: 'Recently, our measures concerning conventional armed forces have attracted much public attention. I want to state clearly that this in no way indicates any decrease in the importance of the strategic nuclear potential. We continue to apply our main efforts to the improvement of our strategic forces whose mission is the delivery of a retaliatory blow.' "

#31. Changed: "The accelerated development of nuclear offensive forces and strategic weapons, which continue to be the mainstay of the military strength of the NATO countries and of the other aggressive military blocs as

a whole, and the significant attention devoted to the beefing-up of conventional armed forces have naturally led to a sharp increase in military expenditures in a number of capitalist countries, and to a stepped-up armaments race.

"As a result of the measures taken in 1961-1963, individual countries of NATO, especially the United States, have increased the number and military strength of the national armed forces, and have increased the personnel in units and formations and the general combat readiness of the ground troops, air force and navy. The groups of armed forces of NATO in Europe has also been increased."

#32. Omitted: "Since the imperialist forces of the United States are preparing to unleash various types of wars, they believe that today the structure of the armed forces is determined more and more by their mission. The traditional breakdown by services -- Army, Navy, and Air Force -- no longer fully corresponds to the present-day situation. Therefore, it would appear to be more expedient in the future to develop the armed forces according to the strategic problems in a general nuclear war and the possible need for waging limited wars.

"It should be stressed, however, that while on the one hand it is almost impossible to use strategic weapons in a limited war, on the other hand, those forces intended for use in limited wars must be used in a general nuclear war. Therefore, it is believed that victory in such a war can be achieved only through the combined efforts of all the armed forces, but naturally strategic weapons will play the main role. Therefore, for limited wars a distinctive division of the armed forces is necessary, while for a nuclear war there must be a maximum unification of effort.

"According to the U. S. command, the expediency of developing the armed forces according to mission is dictated by strategic considerations and by the necessity for a more singleness of purpose in the use of finances.

"Historically, the following situation arose. The U. S. Air Force and Naval Commands, concerned about developing their respective services, independently created corresponding strategic weapons: the Air Force -- heavy and medium bombers, ICBMs and IRBMs, and special space devices; and the Navy -- rocket-carrying nuclear submarines. The same took place with operational and tactical weapons and for air-defense weapons."

#33. Revised: "By early 1962, the United States government and high command, using the conclusions and suggestions of the Symington Committee and the committee headed by General Partridge (ret.), had completed a study of the possibilities for improving the building of their armed forces, the structure of which is determined on the basis of the missions which they accomplish.* The new principles for developing the armed forces in accordance with special

*In addition to being studied by the Symington Committee, this problem was also studied by a temporary committee formed early in September, 1961, by order of the Secretary of Defense, and headed by General Partridge (ret.) (former commander of the North American Air Defense). In November, 1961, the committee presented to the Secretary of Defense a secret report on the reorganization of the leadership of the armed forces (The New York Times, November 19, 1961).

missions, specified in the budget messages from President Kennedy to the Congress of the United States for the 1963/63 and 1963/64 fiscal years, permit the creation of armed forces which answer the requirements of general nuclear war and limited wars with and without the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In this connection, the American armed forces are classified on the basis of their purpose (from the point of view of their structure) as follows:

"1. The strategic offensive forces consisting of units and formations of ICBM's, rocket-carrying nuclear submarines, heavy and medium bombers and tanker planes, and, in the near future, possibly special space devices. These forces are intended to conduct a general nuclear war.

"2. The antiaircraft and antimissile (antispace) forces for the defense of the American continent.

"3. General forces, including ground troops, tactical aviation and naval forces (excluding rocket-carrying nuclear submarines). These are designed for conducting, in conjunction with the strategic offensive forces, a general nuclear war, and for independent operation in limited wars with and without the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

"4. The forces and means for strategic troop transport by sea and by air, including all necessary means of air and sea transport for rapid transfer of troops and arms from the United States to other regions of the globe in the event of any armed conflict.

"5. Armed forces reserves."

#34. Revised: "The Offensive Strategic Forces. The political and military leaders of the United States and NATO believe that the offensive strategic forces cannot be restricted to any one weapons system. Within reasonable limits, these systems must be many-faceted to assure their flexible utilization, and especially their relative invulnerability and, consequently, their survival.

"At the present time, offensive strategic forces include ICBMs and IRBMs (in the European NATO member-countries), nuclear submarines equipped with 'Polaris' missiles, heavy and medium bombers, some equipped with 'air-to-ground' rockets, and, in the near future, special space devices.

"The ICBMs are located only in the United States. Units are armed with liquid-fuel 'Atlas' and 'Titan' ballistic missiles and in 1962 will begin to be equipped with solid-fuel 'Minuteman' ballistic missiles.

"By early 1962 the U.S. Air Force had 17 squadrons: 11 'Atlas' squadrons and 6 'Titan' squadrons.

"Thirteen 'Atlas' squadrons with 132 launching installations are planned by the end of 1962.

"According to the Table of Organization, the 6 'Titan' squadrons have 54 launching installations (nine per squadron). By the end of 1963, 12 'Titan'

squadrons are planned with 108 launching installations. All the bases for these rockets are intended to be of the underground type. [This paragraph was omitted in Second Edition].

"The 'Minuteman,' having greater invulnerability, is judged to have the best future. On the basis of test data, the U. S. Command directed its efforts in 1961-1962 toward increasing the reliability and aiming precision of the 'Minuteman,' increasing its range and perfecting the re-entry technique, and speeding up further tests to obtain more operational data. The 1961-62 budget calls for doubling the production of these rockets and creating the necessary reserve forces.

"At the beginning of 1962, the U. S. Command decided to create by the end of 1966 sixteen 'Minuteman' squadrons with a total of 800 launching sites.

"However, already by the end of 1962, this program was reexamined in line with its increase to 19 squadrons and 950 launching sites.

[Footnote: Message from President Kennedy to the Congress of the United States on January 18, 1963, on the budget for the 1963/64 fiscal year, and the speech by Defense Secretary McNamara of January 31, 1963, in Congress during a discussion of the budget.]

"By the end of 1962, one squadron of 'Minutemen' had been formed, armed with only 20 launching sites with missiles. It is planned, for the middle of 1964, to have 150 combat-ready launching sites for such missiles (3 squadrons).

"All the bases for these rockets are to be of the underground type. It is possible that in order to increase the chances of survival, part of the launching installations will be mobile (for instance, on special railroad flatcars); these will be the so-called mobile rocket bases. This is presently under investigation.

"The general state and future plans for the development of ICBMs are summarized in the table.

Squadrons (launchers)	On hand at start of 1963	Planned		Total by end of 1966
		By middle of 1964	By end of 1966	
'Atlas' missile	13(126)	-	-	13(132)
'Titan-1' missile	6(54)	-	-	6(54)
'Titan-2' missile	-	6(54)	-	6(54)
'Minuteman' missile	1(20)	3(150)	19(950)	19(950)
Total	20(200)	9(204)	19(950)	44(1190)

Note: The remaining 'Atlas' missiles will be placed in service by the middle of 1963. By 1968, the United States intends to have 1850 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

According to press reports, the yields of the warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles are: 'Atlas' E--3 megatons; 'Titan' -- 1-4 megatons; 'Minuteman' -- 600 kilotons.

"IRBMs though developed and produced in the United States, are to be transferred to the NATO member countries and possibly to other military blocs. By early 1962, there were two types of liquid-fuel rockets, 'Thor' and 'Jupiter,' located in Britain, Italy and Turkey.

"The 'Thor' squadrons are part of the RAF and under British command; the 'Jupiter' squadrons are under joint command: either Italian or Turkish command, and under the European NATO command.

"All missile launching sites located in England, Italy, and Turkey are maintained on 15-minute alert to launch missiles. However, these countries do not have missiles with nuclear warheads; such warheads are under the control of the American command.

"The NATO plans provide for approximately 500 launching installations for intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe by 1966, not counting the British 'Thor' missiles. These missiles are to be under the unified command of the European bloc. With this in mind, U.S. military leaders decided early in January of 1962 to develop a new intermediate-range missile (2800 kilometers) using solid fuel and intended for the NATO countries. Presumably it will be lighter, more mobile, and consequently less vulnerable.

"Nuclear warheads for the 'Thor' and 'Jupiter' missiles are under control of the American military leaders.

"The United States and NATO military commands believe that the 'Thor' and 'Jupiter' missiles are obsolete and should be replaced.

"The chief deficiencies of these missiles are that they are emplaced on open sites and therefore are very vulnerable and, in addition, require considerable time to bring them to readiness for launching. As a result of this, it is intended to remove the 'Thor' missiles from service and to dismantle them by October, 1963, and somewhat later the 'Jupiter' missiles will be removed from service and dismantled. The assumption has been expressed that they will be replaced by intermediate-range missiles on mobile launchers, primarily on nuclear submarines.

"The British press has noted that the NATO command intends to have under its control 500 launchers for intermediate-range missiles.

[Footnote: British newspaper Daily Express, December 14, 1961.]

"Rocket-carrying nuclear submarines. The solid-fuel 'Polaris' IRBM carried aboard nuclear submarines is second in importance only to the 'Minuteman' ICBM. The ability of these submarines to cruise submerged for a long time and to launch rockets while submerged guarantees their high mobility and good camouflage, making them virtually invulnerable to enemy ballistic missiles.

"By early 1962, the U. S. Navy had 6 nuclear submarines, each equipped with 16 'Polaris' missiles. Five nuclear submarines with 'Polaris' missiles, based at Holy Loch, Scotland, patrol the waters of the Northeast Atlantic. They are on constant combat alert.

"With the advent of the Kennedy administration in the United States, there was a review of the construction program for 'Polaris'-equipped nuclear submarines to shorten the time needed to build them. Previously, 45 such submarines were planned by 1970; the revised plan provides for the construction of 41 such submarines by 1966.

"By the beginning of 1963, the U. S. Navy had nine nuclear submarines, each equipped with sixteen 'Polaris' missiles. All of them, being at constant combat readiness, and based at Holy Loch, Scotland, and the Mediterranean Sea, patrol the waters of the northeastern Atlantic.

"It is expected that by the end of 1963 the number of missile-carrying nuclear submarines will increase to 18, in which respect, beginning with the middle of 1963, the annual rate of placement of submarines into service will be increased to 12 in contrast to the five submarines called for by the initial program adopted by the Eisenhower administration.

|| [Footnote: Kennedy message to Congress, March 28, 1961.] ||

"The rocket-carrying nuclear submarines are presently equipped with 'Polaris' A-2 missiles with a range of 2800 kilometers; by 1962-1963 they will have 'Polaris' A-3s with a range of up to 4000 kilometers. The development of the 'Polaris' A-3 has been accelerated in order to have them one year sooner, possibly by cutting back production of the 'Polaris' A-2.

"The arming of nuclear submarines with the 'Polaris' A-2 and A-3, which has increased range and is capable of deep penetration into the enemy rear areas, significantly increases the combat potential of these submarines and makes them less vulnerable to coastal antisubmarine weapons.

"Strategic aviation. At the present time, strategic aviation is still the main striking force of the United States and its allies in aggressive military blocs. It includes American heavy and medium and British medium strategic bombers.

"By early 1963, the United States had more than 630 B-52s, 800 B-47s and at least 100 supersonic B-58s. In addition, the United States has more than 1000 tanker planes capable of simultaneous refueling, in the air, of a large number of heavy and medium bombers.

"Most of the strategic aircraft (all the heavy bombers and more than 700 medium bombers) are located in United States territory. The remaining medium bombers are based in Europe, in the Pacific, and in Alaska."

#35. Revised: "If necessary the number of heavy bombers on patrol can be increased to 70-80, while under extraordinary conditions, all the equipped heavy bombers, and possibly also medium strategic bombers, can be in the air (on patrol).

"The American command believes that the increasing development of ICBMs does not obviate the need for manned strategic bombers. Therefore, it provides for the further expansion of strategic aviation by increasing somewhat the

number of heavy bombers and arming them with 'air-to-ground' missiles.

"Plans are being made to maintain up to 700 heavy bombers within the next few years, a considerable part of which will be armed with 'Hound Dog' guided missiles (air-to-ground) with four-megaton nuclear warheads and a range of 800 kilometers.

"The American command exerted great efforts to develop the solid-fuel 'Sky Bolt' missile (air-to-ground) for equipping heavy strategic bombers. It was believed that the successful development and production of this missile, which was to have a nuclear warhead and a range of up to 1800 kilometers, could extend the period of service of heavy bombers, assuring their effective use in the missile era. However, the missile did not provide the expected results and the Americans were forced to refrain from its further development; this caused great discontent among the British because they were promised delivery of the necessary number of such missiles for equipping their medium strategic bombers.

"A considerable reduction in the number of medium strategic bombers is planned. By the end of 1966, they plan to use B-58s exclusively and to retire the B-47s.

"The United States continues to develop a new strategic bomber, the B-70, with a range of about 13,000 kilometers, a maximum speed of mach 3, and a practical ceiling of 25,000-30,000 meters. The prototype is to be constructed in 1963. If adopted, the B-70 will become operational no sooner than 1966.

"The United States has spent almost 15 years and over a billion dollars in an attempt to develop an aircraft with atomic propulsion. However, the possibility of creating such a plane suitable for military application in the near future is, in the opinion of the American command, highly unlikely.

"At the beginning of 1963, Britain had about 180 'Vulcan,' 'Victor,' and 'Valiant' medium bombers (common designation -- V-type). Several squadrons were equipped with the modified 'Vulcan' V-2 bomber, and the 'Victor' V-2 bomber is also expected. Both these bombers are capable of carrying the 'Blue Steel' missile (air-to-ground) which was developed by the British and should be placed into service in the near future (the missile has a nuclear warhead and a range of 160 kilometers).

"It is intended to maintain the number of British strategic bombers at the existing level.

"France established a strategic air command in the Air Force which, by the beginning of 1963, included more than 40 'Voiture' light bombers capable of carrying atomic bombs. Expected in 1964-1965 are 50 'Mirage' IV bombers which will be supported by 12 KC-135 refueling aircraft purchased in the United States. The first seven 'Mirage' IV bombers should be placed into service in 1963."

#36. A great deal of the material in this section was found in pages 401-406 of Edition 2 and pages 357-361 of Edition 1. This was a section of

the Sixth Chapter: "The Problems of Using Cosmic Space for Military Aims."
See Notes of Chapter VI for text.

"Space means, including various devices, are by their very nature strategic weapons, or serve to assure the successful use of other strategic weapons in wartime.

"The U. S. Air Force controls the development, research and testing of almost all types of space systems designed for reconnaissance, warning radio navigation, communication, and defense against ballistic missiles and enemy satellites, as well as those to be used for nuclear strikes against enemy strategic ground targets.

"All activity dealing with the development, creation, and testing of space-systems prototypes, the arrangement of series production, and the transfer to the armed forces is coordinated (with few exceptions) by a special command for the development of weapons systems under the U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff. This command has 60,000 military and civilian workers, including many scientists, scientific workers, and engineers.

"It is planned to allocate to this command in 1960-1975 from 60 to 120 billion dollars for the development of new types of space, ballistic, and electronic systems, as well as new types of aerospace vehicles (airplanes and winged missiles).

"A number of military space satellites were in the stage of construction and testing and experimental launching by early 1963; these will presumably be integrated into the armed forces before 1965. The basic satellite systems are designed for reconnaissance of ground targets and for meteorological reconnaissance, and for very-long-range detection of ICBM launchings and warning of a nuclear-rocket attack, for radio navigation and for the organization of the direction of the armed forces using radio communication equipment on board the satellites.

"The development and use of space systems for the destruction of ballistic missiles in the boost phase, for the recognition and destruction of enemy military satellites, etc., is also planned.

"It should be noted that by early 1963 the United States had launched more than 100 different satellites, including at least 40 for purely military purposes (Table 2). It is planned to increase substantially the number of satellites in space, and by 1975 to have launched approximately 1000 different satellites, including approximately 600 military satellites.

"The Projected 15-Year Program for the Launching of Military
Space Weapons (Satellites) in the United States

Table 2

Systems	Purpose	Number of launchings during			Total for 15 years
		1960- 1964	1965- 1970	1970- 1975	
'SAMOS'	Reconnaissance of ground ob- jects with linear dimensions of 6-18 m (later 0.7-18 m); radio surveillance	49	38	30	117
'MIDAS'	30-minute warning of mis- sile attack	33	50	40	123
'Transit'	Radio navigation of sub- marines and rocket-carrying aircraft with an accuracy of 100-200m	26	48	40	114
'Advent'	Active Global network of radio communication				
'Rebound'	Passive (Army, Air Force, and Navy)	8	3	15	26
'Nimbus'	Global network of meteoro- logical reconnaissance	7	9	30	46
'Aeolos'		2	14	15	31
'Bambi'	Destruction of ballistic mis- siles in the boost phase	6	36	30	72
'Saint'	Recognition and destruction of military satellites	20	36	30	86
'Dyna-Soar'	Destruction of ground ob- jectives with nuclear weapons; reconnaissance	8	6	10	24
'ANNA'	For communication between geodetic networks	-	-	-	-
'Sekor'					
TOTAL					Approx. 1000

"Thus, the present state and the future development of all strategic weapons systems up to 1966 can be characterized briefly by the following data:

Types	In existence by early 1963	Table 3 Planned by the end of 1966
Launching installations for intercontinental ballistic missiles	200	1190
Ground Launching installations for intermediate-range ballistic missiles	105	
Missile-carrying nuclear submarines (missiles)	9(144)	41(656)
Heavy strategic bombers	630	900-1000*
Medium strategic bombers	1100	
Active space weapons (for destruction of ballistic missiles and enemy satellites, and the delivery of nuclear strikes)	-	34**
* A rough approximation.		
** By the end of 1964.		

"It follows from these data that by the end of 1966, the rocket troops will occupy the leading position among the armed forces of the USA and NATO. In his message to Congress on March 28, 1961, President Kennedy declared: 'By that time we expect to have a large number of ICBMs fully tested and on the launching pads, as well as a large fleet of manned bombers, armed primarily with 'air-to-ground' missiles. A significant position will be occupied by space weapons in the period 1965-1975.' "

#37. Omitted: "In the opinion of the U. S. and NATO Command, despite the accelerated development, by both sides, of strategic rockets requiring the organization of an effective antimissile defense organization, antiaircraft defense designed to repel the attacks of manned aircraft in the next few years will not lose its significance. In his message to Congress on March 28, 1961, President Kennedy wrote: 'In the course of the next few years, at least, we must assure defense against attacks by manned bombers.'

"Since up to now there have existed mixed strategic offensive forces in the world, consisting of ICBMs and strategic bombers, the U. S. Command proposes that antiaircraft and antimissile defense systems undergo parallel development; however, it is proposed that the main effort be concentrated on the creation of a reliable antimissile defense."

#38. Omitted: "The second line of detection runs approximately along the 55th parallel. It was built and is manned by the Royal Canadian Air Force and can give more exact information concerning the detected objects. The radar stations located along this line can notify the U. S. antiaircraft defense control units 40-50 minutes before the approach of enemy aircraft to the northern borders of the United States."

#39. Omitted: "In early 1962, this system included more than 125 military and civilian observation points equipped with modern electronic devices for detecting and tracking aerospace vehicles."

#40. Omitted: "The American military command is accelerating the development, test, and delivery of the 'Nike-Zeus' antimissile missile, which should become the primary means of combatting enemy ballistic missiles. However, tests of this missile showed that it, apparently, has not as yet justified the hopes that have been placed in it. Therefore, the start of development of a new, improved antimissile missile, the 'Nike X', is envisaged."

"Late in 1961, the United States created a division for antispace defense, including antimissile defense, directing the system for detection and warning of the launchings of ballistic missiles, artificial earth satellites, and aerospace vehicles."

"Initially, the division will receive, process, and report to the command data on the space situation and on the launchings of ballistic missiles. In the future, with the development of military prototypes of weapons to combat ballistic missiles, earth satellites, and aerospace vehicles, the division will also obtain active means for antispace defense."

#41. Omitted: "The main air defense for the European NATO countries is fighter aircraft. However, most of these planes are antiquated and are not armed with guided 'air-to-air' missiles. In addition to fighters, the air defense system of the European NATO countries uses American and British guided anti-aircraft missiles of different types; these protect the most important economical and political centers, as well as the main troop formations."

#41a. Omitted: "The European and Pacific air defense is, in essence, the front line of American defense. In the future it is expected that the air defense of all three important geographic regions will be unified into a single system with maximum centralization of control. In addition, the U. S. Command has taken and continues to take measures aimed at the creation of antimissile and antispace defense. All this is determined by the fact that according to the American leaders the side which first creates an antimissile (antispace) defense can threaten war or even unleash it without fearing strong reprisals."

#42. Revised: "General-Purpose Forces. Such forces include ground troops, tactical aviation, and naval forces (excluding rocket-carrying nuclear submarines)."

"The ground troops of the countries participating in aggressive military blocs (NATO, CENTO, and SEATO) as well as those of Japan, South Korea and of the Kuomintang clique on Taiwan (Japan, South Korea, and the Kuomintang clique are included, with the above three blocs, in the imperialist military alliance headed by the United States, since they have similar mutual defense agreements with the United States), by early 1963 consisted of some 5 million troops and

over 160 regular army divisions.

"All the ground troops are located primarily in those geographical regions occupied by the appropriate blocs. The composition of these troops is not uniform: their arms and military equipment vary considerably; the training of the personnel is not uniform nor is their combat readiness.

"The ground troops of the NATO countries are the most important, in size as well as with respect to quality. In early 1963, there were more than 90 cadre divisions and a large number of separate units and subdivisions, especially those with operational-tactical nuclear rocket weapons.

"The prime efforts in the development of NATO ground troops, primarily given and designated to be given to the unified ground troops, are directed toward increasing the firepower and striking power, increasing the mobility and autonomy of units and formations in performing combat tasks, and also toward the creation of divisions with identical organization.

"The firepower and striking power of the ground troops is increased by equipping them with the means for delivering operational-tactical nuclear weapons and by rearming them with the latest types of conventional weapons and combat equipment.

"In the very near future, it is proposed to increase the number of guided and unguided missiles of the existing types in the NATO forces.

"In addition to the existing weapons for nuclear attack, new weapons are being developed for the ground troops, in particular various guided and unguided missiles considerably smaller than the present ones, in order to assure their maneuverability, reliability, and rapid use on the battlefield in limited wars as well as in a general nuclear war.

"In addition, the U. S. and NATO Command is in the process of rearming the ground troops with more modern types of conventional weapons and combat equipment. In 1961-1962, the ground troops of the United States and Great Britain were armed with improved models of the M-60 and 'Centurian' medium tank with increased cruising range (up to 400 kilometers) and with more powerful armament (105 mm gun), designed to replace most of the old-style medium tanks. Ground troops are also equipped with 105 and 155 mm self-propelled guns that have greater range and accuracy, as well as greater cruising range (up to 1000 km). Almost all European countries have begun to arm their ground troops with automatic rifles and multi-purpose machine guns of standard NATO caliber (7.62 mm).

"The U. S. ground troops are being equipped with new mobile radio relay stations designed for the organization of a multi-channel operational-tactical communication between headquarters. These stations are designed for round-the-clock operation and can be rapidly deployed in the field.

"As before, attention is also devoted to the problems of further perfection in troop organization, which would satisfy the demands of a limited or a general nuclear war. At the present time, the main efforts in this

direction are concentrated on the creation, in all the NATO countries, of divisions having identical organizational, or brigade, structure. Britain, France, West Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands have already adopted the brigade structure of divisions. In 1963, the divisions of the U. S. ground troops and those of a number of other NATO countries will adopt this structure.

"The ground troops, especially the unified troops, of the European NATO countries train primarily according to a unified bloc-wide program, and annual large-scale exercises or maneuvers are held. These troops are the most combat-ready, since they possess sufficient modern weapons for armed warfare, a high level of personnel training, the necessary administrative agencies, etc., and can, in conjunction with tactical aviation and naval forces, perform active combat operations in limited wars, as well as in a general nuclear war.

"Together with the increased capabilities and combat preparedness of the regular ground troops, the NATO countries, especially the United States and Britain, devote much attention to the training of reserves. The United States constantly maintains 35 reserve divisions (National Guard and Army Reserves, which has 13 training divisions) and Britain maintains 10 divisions (Home Army). Several months from the beginning of mobilization are required to bring them up to strength and to arm them. These reserve divisions are organized according to the Table of Organization of the Cadre divisions. The American and British commands strive to have the combat readiness of the Reserves approximate that of the regular troops.

"Thus, President Kennedy, in his message to Congress on May 25, 1961, wrote that the U. S. Army Command is developing a plan to bring the reserve divisions into combat readiness within 3-8 weeks after the declaration of mobilization, depending on the speed of mobilization of the various divisions. Thus, it is assumed that under extreme conditions 10 divisions can be ready to conduct combat operations in less than two months, whereas previously this required almost nine months.

"In addition, a small number of reserve divisions and trained reserves are maintained in other NATO countries.

"The ground troops of the CENTO members (excluding Turkey) consist of 20 divisions (12 Iranian and 8 Pakistani); those of SEATO, Japan, South Korea, and the Kuomintang clique consist of more than 70 divisions. These troops are considerably inferior to NATO troops in the matter of equipment, training, and combat efficiency. However, the imperialist aggressors, primarily the United States, exert great efforts to increase their combat capabilities. In addition, there are three American divisions and one British division in the Far East.

"In a general nuclear war, if unleashed by the imperialists, the ground troops of SEATO, CENTO, Japan, South Korea, and Kuomintang, with the support of American and British tactical aviation and naval forces will solve primarily defensive problems and conduct limited wars.

"Tactical aviation. The air forces of NATO, CENTO, SEATO, Japan, South Korea, and the Kuomintang clique on Taiwan, excluding the U. S. and Royal Air Forces, consist of tactical and air defense aviation. The U. S. and Royal Air

Forces also include strategic aviation.

"Tactical aviation is designed to deliver, in conjunction with strategic weapons, nuclear strikes to a depth of 1000-1500 km to isolate zones of combat operations, to support the ground troops, and to perform other tasks in a general nuclear war, as well as to support the ground troops in limited wars, with and without the use of nuclear weapons.

"Approximately 75% of all tactical aircraft is contained in the air forces of the NATO countries. The main group is concentrated in Europe, where there are over 3000 fighting planes, a substantial part of which carry nuclear weapons. There are also 80 installations of tactical cruise rockets. This is the group which is the most combat capable.

"The grouping of tactical aviation in Europe is not constant. It changes depending on the international situation. For instance, in the second half of 1961 the American tactical aviation in Europe was strengthened considerably by transferring a number of flight squadrons from the U. S.

"Most of the tactical aviation units of the European NATO countries are equipped mainly with American planes. In recent years the NATO Command has taken measures to standardize all the planes, i.e., to use the better types of planes as a standard. The countries of the bloc, after accepting these planes, arrange for joint production. Thus, a number of European NATO countries have arranged to produce the American F-104G fighter, the French cargo plane 'Atlantique,' and the Italian G-91 light fighter.

"Beginning with 1961, the views of the U. S. and NATO Command changed somewhat with respect to tactical aviation. While previously there was a tendency to play down the role and, consequently, the position of tactical aviation in the Air Force because of the rise of the IRBMs and of the rocket weapons of the ground troops, once the possibility of limited wars was recognized the significance of tactical aviation increased.

"Since it is expected that a great many obsolete tactical fighters will be decommissioned by 1965, while the number of remaining planes decreases and they become more obsolete, a tactical fighter is being developed which is not designed to use nuclear weapons. The necessary funds have been allocated for this. Until a tactical fighter which satisfies the above requirements has been developed, President Kennedy has recommended the allocation of funds for the modification of the F-105 tactical fighter in order to raise its capability of using conventional armament and to adapt it for taking off and landing at airfields of all types.

"In connection with the need for increasing the strategic mobility of the armed forces, especially of the ground troops, the American command is taking measures to expand its transport aviation, i.e., to accelerate and expand the production of transport planes so as to assure the necessary volume of air transportation.

"The second most important grouping of tactical aviation, with American air units as the basis, is located in the Far East. The aircraft of the CENTO countries (excluding Turkey) and of SEATO, Japan, South Korea, and the

Kuomintang clique consist mainly of obsolete American planes and can operate only in limited wars.

"A large grouping of tactical aviation is located in the U. S.; it is designed to reinforce the air units and commands located in Europe and the Far East."

#43. Omitted: "Up to the middle of 1961 the available Navy transport ships could simultaneously carry approximately 1.5 divisions; under the new program they will be able to carry 2 divisions. The transport capability of the navy will increase as a result of construction of new transport landing craft."

#44. Revised: "By early 1963, the United States had launching facilities for 'Atlas' ICBMs at the following Air Force bases: Vandenberg, Offutt, Warren, Fairchild and others. By the end of 1963, according to the American press, the Americans propose to have 20 operational bases for the launching of 'Atlas,' 'Titan,' and 'Minuteman' ICBMs. By 1966, seven more bases for the launching of 'Minuteman' missiles will have been built. By 1966, all 27 operational missile bases are to have over 1200 launching sites."

#45. Changed: "... strategic IRBMs. By early 1963, 60 'Thor' launching installations in Britain and 30 'Jupiter' launching installations in Italy were in operational readiness. At the same time, 15 'Jupiter' launching installations were under construction in Turkey."

#46. Omitted: "Even before World War II, the military strategy of the main capitalist countries took into account the need for the timely creation of extensive military industry capable of producing great amounts of weapons and military equipment. The general staffs of the main capitalist countries developed detailed mobilization plans for industry and for the production of weapons."

"In Germany, long before the war, Hitler created a system of government agencies for control of the economy and the expansion of military production. Government control was established over all branches of the German economy. From 1934 to August 31, 1939, 59% of the entire German budget was allocated to the preparation for war."

"Counting on a short war, Germany, in developing plans for economic mobilization, did not provide sufficient reserves, especially those of strategic raw materials. As a result, the military portion of gross production of the German industry in 1940 comprised less than 15%; in 1941, 19%; in 1942, 26%; in 1943, 38%; and reached 50% only in 1944."

"Having prepared a powerful military industry, the Germans were not capable of utilizing it to the fullest extent. The main limiting factors were the acute lack of a number of important kinds of mineral raw materials and the

limited domestic labor resources.

"England began to prepare its economy for war after some delay, after the Munich agreement. From the beginning, greatest attention was devoted to the development of the aircraft and ship-building industries. The industrial production of armaments for the ground troops began to expand, for all intents and purposes only during the war. After the German defeat of the British Expeditionary Corps at Dunkirk in May, 1940, the ground troops remained essentially unarmed and it took approximately 3 years for British industry to produce sufficient arms for the ground troops.

"Having essentially the highest degree of mobilization of its economy, as compared with the other capitalist countries, Britain still could not satisfy all its armament requirements during the war, and to a significant extent depended on deliveries from America. The United States provided more than one-half of Britain's requirements of tanks, 18% of her military aircraft, 60% of the military cargo planes, 38% of the ships and landing craft, 21% of the small arms, and 6% of the artillery.

"France, in effect, had no time to expand its economy to supply the needs of the armed forces and its industrial mobilization plan remained on paper.

"The feeble preparations for war of the main enemies of fascist Germany in Western Europe gave Germany great advantages at the beginning of World War II.

"The United States also had plans for the preparation of industry for war. Their last plan, adopted in 1938, provided for the conversion to military production of 9500 industrial enterprises with a total planned output of armaments and equipment on the order of 6.7 billion dollars a year.

"It was characteristic of the American plan that it was based on the conversion of private industry, with only a small cadre military industry.

"The war changed these plans and forced the ruling circles of the United States, already in the war, to create a large specialized military industry. At the same time, the extent of conversion of private industry exceeded the prewar plans by a factor of approximately 2.5. Satisfaction of the war requirements in 1944 required approximately 45% of the gross national product.

"During World War II, the main capitalist countries created large war industries. The maximum yearly production of the main types of armaments in these countries is characterized by the following data (in thousands of units).

Omitted:

Armaments	USA	Britain	Germany
Bombers	35.0	7.9	6.5
Fighter planes	38.8	10.7	28.9
Tanks and self-propelled guns	38.6	8.6	18.9
Guns (75 mm and larger)	16.7	3.0	40.7
Mortars	39.2	25.1	30.8
War ships (thousands of tons of standard displacement)	1402	233.9	No information available

"The indicated extent of armament production was reached by all countries by early 1944, i.e., almost three years after the beginning of the war for the United States and four years for Germany and Britain."

#47. Omitted: "The military strategy of the western countries stems from the fact that the imperialist coalition consists of countries with different levels of economic development. This is characterized by the following data of the main capitalist countries with respect to world-wide capitalist production (in percent).

Omitted:

Country	1937	1948	1960	1961
USA	41.4	56.4	44.1	43.0
Britain	12.5	11.7	7.7	8.98
West Germany	9.0	4.3	8.7	8.89
France	6.0	4.1	4.9	4.98
Italy	3.0	2.1	3.8	4.03
Netherlands	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2
Belgium	1.8	1.8	0.9	.94
Japan	4.8	1.5	3.9	4.62

"More than four-fifths of the present-day capitalist production is concentrated in the NATO countries. The Americans contribute about one-half of this production, although this percentage is constantly decreasing. During the period 1950-1960, the industrial production of West Germany increased by a factor of almost 2.5; that of Italy, by 2.2; of France, by 1.9; while that of the United States and Britain increased by only 1.4. This reflects the law of uneven economic conditions in capitalist countries in the age of imperialism."

#48. Omitted: "The extent of production in the main branches of heavy industry of the NATO countries is characterized by the following data.

Omitted:

Production of	1937		1950		1955		1960	
	absolute production	% of world capitalist production	absolute production	% of world capitalist production	absolute production	% of world capitalist production	absolute production	% of world capitalist production
Coal (million tons)	948.9	88.8	962.9	87.1	932.3	84.4	831.5	77.3
Including U.S. output of :	(448.3)	41.9	505.3	57.0	442.4	40.0	392.7	36.5
Petroleum (million tons)	173.8	71.4	272.6	57.0	388.9	56.4	383.1	43.3
Including U.S. output of:	173.0	71.1	266.7	55.8	366.0	53.0	346.0	39.1
Electrical energy (billion kw-h)	292.5	76.6	648.2	79.7	1024.8	80.3	1282.8	70.3
Including U.S. output of:	164.5	38.3	388.7	47.8	629.0	49.3	840.4	46.0
Steel (million tons)	99.4	88.1	137.0	89.7	179.6	86.7	192.7	82.3
Including U.S. output of:	51.3	45.5	87.8	57.4	106.2	51.3	90.0	38.4

"During the period 1937-1960 the production of electrical energy, in the NATO countries increased by a factor of 4.4, that of petroleum by 2.2, that of steel by 1.9. Coal production was down 12%; this is explained by the continuous decrease in the part played by coal in the energy production of the above countries and by a corresponding increase in the importance of petroleum and gas."

#49. Omitted: "In 1959, West Germany, together with France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, created a union for the production of 'Hawk' anti-aircraft missiles. At the end of 1959 West Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey united to produce the air-to-air missile 'Sidewinder'. Within the framework of the European community, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy plan to produce American F-104 fighters."

#50. Revised: "These unified efforts are designed to assure the wide participation of West German capital in the production of modern weapons and to assure it a dominant position in this industry."

"The 'Common Market' embraces the six most developed capitalistic countries of Western Europe (West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg). It accounts for approximately 22% of the world capitalist industrial production. The leading position in the association is occupied by West Germany, whose share in 1961 was approximately half of the entire production in this association. Through the organization of the 'Common Market' and especially

through the Franco-West German military-political alliance which was established at the beginning of 1963, the monopolistic associations of West Germany are trying to gain access to the production of modern weapons, including thermonuclear weapons..."

"The first steps have already been taken in this direction. In 1959, West Germany, together with France, Italy, Belgium, and Holland, created a joint venture for the production of antiaircraft missiles. Joint ventures were also set up for the production of 'air-to-air' missiles and jet fighters. By 1962, the preparation for production of these types of weapons had already been completed..."

"...who are striving to create a union of imperialist states of Western Europe and the United States in the form of a 'single Atlantic community' with monopolistic associations of the United States retaining and further strengthening their leading role in the capitalist world.

"Under conditions where a decisive shift in the relations between the two systems is taking place in favor of socialism, the imperialist 'integration' broadens the economic and political bases for preparing war and intensifying the danger of its flare-up. Therefore, in the well-known article by N. S. Khrushchev, 'Urgent Problems in the Development of the World Socialist System,' it is stressed that '... There should be no overestimation of the possibilities of international imperialistic combinations. However, not overestimating the strength of the enemy does not mean ignoring it. It would be careless and short-sighted to ignore the ideas and actions of the bosses of European integration. The communists are struggling against attempts to use the "Common Market" and other similar types of associations for the purposes of preparing a new war and speeding up the arms race...' "

#51. Omitted: "During the period 1956-1962, main attention was devoted to increasing the basic means for strategic attack, nuclear weapons, strategic bombers, ICBMs and IRBMs, new warships, and air defense weapons for the continent and the troops."

#52. Omitted: "At the same time, the production of nuclear and rocket weapons increased.

"In 1962, the U. S. war industry employed over 4 million people, of which approximately 2 million people were directly engaged in military production.

"Particularly great attention was devoted in the United States to the expansion of the atomic industry, whose potential continues to increase even at present. By early 1962, the United States had five important centers for the production of fissionable materials (uranium-235, plutonium, and lithium deuteride), 14 plants for the production of strategic and operational-tactical nuclear weapons, and a significant number of other supporting enterprises. The plants of the atomic industry employ 122,000 people.

"The ruling circles of the United States attach tremendous importance to the development of their missile industry. More than 170 companies, employing over 700,000 people, are presently engaged in missile production. Main attention is devoted to the accelerated development and production of strategic missiles.

"More than 19 billion dollars have been earmarked for the development and production of missile weapons during the last three years. By the end of 1966, the United States is to produce a minimum of 135 'Atlas' missiles, 108 'Titan' missiles, 950 'Minuteman' missiles, and 656 'Polaris' missiles for missile-carrying submarines. However, the total volume of production of these missiles will evidently be somewhat higher. Thus, according to press reports, approximately 1000 Polaris missiles will be produced for the 41 rocket-carrying nuclear submarines to be constructed.

"The United States produces a great many operational-tactical rocket weapons. In fiscal 1960-61 3.5 billion dollars were spent on the development and production of these weapons. The industrial basis already in existence not only fulfills the requirements of its own armed forces but also makes it possible to supply large amounts of these weapons to other capitalist countries.

"The United States has a large aircraft industry, numbering over 200 active companies employing almost 600,000 people. The expenditures for the production of aircraft equipment in 1960-61 comprise approximately 6 billion dollars per year. However, the production of military aircraft is continually dropping. In 1961, 2000 military airplanes were produced, compared to 10,626 in 1953.

"The armored-weapons industry was expanded considerably during the postwar period, primarily due to the building and reconstruction of government war plants. The main nucleus of this industry are the 6 large tank-manufacturing plants with a production capacity of 30,000-35,000 tanks a year. In addition, there are three plants producing self-propelled guns and three plants producing armored troop carriers. In the event of war additional private companies can be converted to the production of armored equipment."

#53. Omitted: "At present, the ship-building industry is carrying out an extensive program of military ship-building. On January 1, 1963, 110 ships were under construction, including two attack carriers, 19 frigates with guided anti-aircraft missiles including two frigates with atomic power plants, ten fleet destroyers with guided anti-aircraft missiles, twenty-six missile-carrying submarines, twenty-three nuclear submarines armed with torpedoes, three helicopter-carrying assault ships, and 30 ships of other types."

#54. Revised: "The Naval Command is stepping up the construction of rocket-carrying submarines in particular. By the middle of 1963 the rate of submarine construction is expected to be twelve per year, so that by the end of 1966 there will be 41 'Polaris'-carrying nuclear submarines in service."

#55. Changed: "Britain's atomic industry is represented by nine companies, including four plants for the production of fissionable materials, two plants for nuclear weapons and three subsidiary companies ..."

"It includes 67 aircraft plants in operation. 41 of them engaged in the construction of airplanes and 26 in the construction of aircraft engines. The aircraft industry employs approximately 200,000 people. The plants in operation

make it possible to produce several thousand military airplanes per year. At the present time, the plants of the aircraft industry produce small amounts of class 'V' medium strategic bombers and carrier-based attack planes and fighters."

#56. Revised: "Ground-to-ground operational-tactical missiles are in the testing stage. The British have been engaged in the development of 'ground-to-ground' 'Blue Streak' medium-range ballistic missiles; however, this work has been stopped because of financial limitations. Therefore, the British intend to equip their forces with American-produced missiles of this class. Britain has already received 60 'Thor' missiles. In addition, it is receiving from the United States operational-tactical 'Corporal' rockets.

"The armored industry is represented by four plants, two in operation and two in reserve. All the plants can produce approximately up to 4,000 tanks per year. In the event of war, a number of private factories could be converted for the production of armored equipment. At the present time, small numbers of heavy 'Centurian' tanks are produced.

"The British ship-building industry consists of about 250 ship-building and ship repair enterprises at which up to 500,000 tons of standard displacement of military ships and more than one million registered tons of commercial ships can be built per year. In 1962, seven combat ships, including one fleet destroyer with guided antiaircraft missiles, four diesel-electric submarines, and two escort ships were built. Under construction on January 1, 1963, were 31 ships, including five fleet destroyers with guided antiaircraft missiles, three nuclear submarines armed with torpedoes, six diesel-electric submarines, fifteen escort ships, and two amphibious dock ships.

"The production of artillery pieces and small arms is somewhat less developed. Four government plants and several private companies are engaged in this production.

"The potentials of the specialized enterprises for the production of explosives and gunpowder are insufficient for fulfilling the requirements of the armed forces during a war. These requirements can be fulfilled only by construction of new plants. Six specialized plants can produce military chemical products."

#57. Omitted or changed: "Twelve billion new francs were allocated for this program, including 4.1 billion francs for the development and production of nuclear weapons, 1.1 billion for rockets, almost 4.5 billion for aircraft equipment, 0.8 billion for military ship-building and 1.5 billion for armored equipment.

"In addition to the above allocations, during the five-year period more than 19 billion francs from the annual budgets will be spent for the production of arms and combat equipment.

"The adopted program outlines an expansion of the atomic industry and the series production of nuclear weapons; production of some 500 planes of

various types, including 100 light bombers carrying nuclear weapons; the construction of six ships, including two aircraft carriers, three destroyers with guided antiaircraft missiles, and a rocket-carrying nuclear submarine. In addition, plans call for the construction of 650 vehicles equipped with anti-tank guided missiles and a large amount of other military equipment.

"France has one nuclear center for producing fissionable material which can supply up to 180-190 kilograms of plutonium per year. Construction is being conducted of a gas diffusion plant for the production of uranium-235 and of two atomic electric plants. According to an announcement made by the French Minister of Armed Forces, in 1963 the French nuclear industry will begin production of combat nuclear charges.

"The aircraft industry is one of the most developed branches of the French military industry. It numbers some 75 companies, employing 100,000 people. The production of military aircraft in the last few years has been 500-600 units per year."

#58. Changed: "In 1961 more than 75 billion marks were allocated for military preparation, including 25.2 billion marks for the domestic production of arms and purchase of arms abroad. Up to the present time, orders for more than 20 billion marks worth of arms and military equipment have been placed, with more than 60% going to foreign firms..."

"Thus, by early 1961, the U. S. had received orders for 460 F-104 fighter planes, 750 M-48 medium tanks, 24 'Matador' winged missiles, 300 'Nike' anti-aircraft missiles, and 312 unguided ' Honest John' rockets. Britain received orders from West Germany for 1000 armored troop carriers, 7 patrol ships; France received orders for 300 light tanks, approximately 2000 armored troop carriers, and 20,000 antitank missiles; Canada received orders for 225 fighter planes. Orders were also placed abroad for artillery pieces, ammunition, and other military equipment.

"By the middle of 1961, the aircraft plants had produced approximately 900 military airplanes, primarily trainers and transport planes. Having gained experience in the production of modern aircraft equipment, the West German factories by early 1961 had begun production of American F-104G and Italian 'Fiat' G.91 fighter planes. Of the 949 F-104G fighters planned for joint production by a number of NATO countries, West Germany's share will be 604. In addition, these plants will produce 235 Fiat G.91 fighters.

"The increase in military orders caused the expansion of the plants and an increase in the number of employees. By early 1961 West Germany had 12 main aircraft plants employing 25,000 people."

#59. Revised: "West Germany is also undertaking the development of rocket weapons. Until recently, these were purchased from the Americans. However, since 1960 the Germans have been producing antiaircraft missiles and 'air-to-air' missiles in their own plants in cooperation with other countries. They have already received an order for the assembly of 8,000 'Sidewinder' 'air-to-air' missiles. Eight West German companies are preparing for production of the American ' Hawk' antiaircraft missile. In 1959, West Germany began series

production of the '810' antitank missile designed by them.

"Armored equipment is produced in West Germany in twelve plants, of which 3 plants produce armored troop carriers, and the others produce military automobiles. Orders are being filled for 1600 'Hispano-Suiza' armored troop carriers and 600 'Hotchkiss' armored troop carriers.

"In 1960 the Germans completed the development of a domestic medium tank. Series production is planned for the immediate future. The Ministry of Defense has already ordered 105-mm guns from the British for this tank.

"West Germany produces light artillery systems and small arms. Heavy artillery systems are purchased by the Germans abroad.

"In carrying out its revanchist plans, and in striving to acquire its own atomic weapons, West Germany has already created the scientific research basis for its atomic industry. In 1958, a program of construction of experimental atomic power stations was adopted. Beginning in 1957, the United States agreed for the next ten years to supply the Federal Republic of Germany with 2500 tons of uranium; Canada agreed to supply 500 tons. Approximately 260 German companies are engaged in atomic-energy research.

"West Germany has a large ship-building industry, numbering 170 companies with a total of more than 100,000 employees. In 1961 the shipyards produced 227 commercial vessels with a total of 1.1 million register tons. According to data as of the middle of 1961, West German yards had orders for the construction of 131 military ships and 29 auxiliary vessels, including 4 destroyers, 15 submarines, 6 patrol snips, 40 torpedo boats, 18 coastal mine sweepers and 30 ocean minesweepers."

#60. Omitted: "The dependence of the main capitalist countries on the import of many types of strategic raw materials, fuel, and foodstuffs; the relative distance of many sources of strategic raw materials from metropolitan areas; and the increased vulnerability of naval communications have forced the economically strongest countries to stockpile large amounts of strategic material reserves.

"Immediately after the end of World War II, a number of laws were enacted in the United States dealing with the accumulation of large reserves of strategic raw materials and industrial equipment. Initially, the reserves of strategic raw materials were designed for a five-year war period. In 1957, this program was reviewed and it was decided to create reserves for a three-year war period. The reserves are now essentially complete. At the same time, the United States created a large reserve of industrial equipment of several tens of thousands of units. More than 500 war plants and their supporting branches were deactivated."

#61. Omitted: "In preparing their economy for war, the Americans, up to 1956, believed in the expediency of creating a so-called broad mobilizational base, assuring the production of arms and military equipment by a maximum

number of companies during the actual war. It was planned to develop the industry during the first two or three years of the war."

#62. Omitted: "They are also designed to minimize the consequences of a surprise attack and to preserve to the maximum the most important productive capabilities and to assure, especially during the first most important stage of war, uninterrupted production of nuclear weapons, strategic missiles, strategic bombers, and other important types of weapons."

#63. Omitted: "The postwar distribution of forces in the world arena led to radical changes in all areas of activity of the imperialist countries. The postwar unification of a substantial number of capitalist countries into a unified anticommunist political and military coalition under the aegis of the United States led to an almost complete loss by these countries of their national independence and, consequently, of their foreign policy and strategy; it led to economic, political, and military subordination to the United States. Prior to World War II the strategy of the main capitalist countries had its sharply pronounced nationalistic traits, while with the creation, during the postwar period, of aggressive military and political blocs and groupings, the military strategy of the imperialist countries has become progressively more unified; it is determined and coordinated by the United States throughout the entire capitalist coalition. Therefore, when speaking of the military strategy of the capitalist countries in the West, it would be more correct to call it the military strategy of the U. S. and NATO."

#64. Omitted: "In 1953, the United States, and later NATO, accepted the so-called strategy of 'massive retaliation,' calling for the preparation and conduct only of a general nuclear war against the countries of the socialist camp.

"However, because of the grandiose successes of the Soviet Union in the fields of rocketry and the mastery of space, U. S. and NATO military strategy, which was nothing more than a strategy of 'nuclear blackmail,' suffered complete defeat. For several years (1957-1960) it underwent a serious crisis. With a change in the balance of strategic offensive forces, the American aggressors were forced to review their previous attitude toward general nuclear war.

"In 1961, with the advent of the Kennedy administration, the strategy of 'massive retaliation' was replaced by the so-called strategy of 'flexible response,' which, in conformity with general nuclear war, received its further development in the form of the strategy of 'counterforce.' "

#65. Omitted: "Consequently, modern military strategy must have a firm economic basis. But it must also have an appropriate political basis. Under modern conditions, in the opinion of U. S. leaders, military policy and strategy, as never before, are organically connected with the foreign policy of the country. In his message to Congress on March 28, 1961, President Kennedy said: 'Diplomacy and defense are no longer two alternatives, one to be used when the other fails; they must supplement each other.' "

#66. This read: "... (especially with respect to space means)..."

EDITOR'S NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

#1. Omitted: "Lenin pointed out that in modern war '...victory belongs to him who has the best technology, organization, discipline, and the best machines... without machines and without discipline it is impossible to live in a modern society; we must have a high degree of technology or we will be overwhelmed.' "

#2. Omitted: "'Modern armies,' pointed M. V. Frunze, 'have tremendous vitality... Even a complete defeat of the enemy army accomplished at a given moment does not guarantee final victory, since the defeated forces have behind them an economically and morally strong rear area.' "

#3. Omitted: "In accordance with Lenin's statement that the methods of warfare against the enemy must be adaptable to changing situations, (prewar Soviet theory held that in the course of the war various methods of armed conflict -- offense, defense, and retreat -- could be used)..."

#4. Omitted: "'Only he shall win who will take it upon himself to attack...', wrote Frunze, and therefore, 'first and foremost...we need preparation and education of our army in the spirit of mobile operations on a large scale.' "

#5. Omitted in the second edition: "(The navy) was designed to cooperate with the ground forces in the coastal areas as well as to operate independently on the high seas. However, serious errors were made in evaluating the significance of the various forces within it. As a result of the preference given to the surface fleet, independent operations of surface vessels were considered to be the main type of warfare."

#6. Changed: "...achieving superiority over the fleets of our probable enemies, since our surface fleet at that time was qualitatively and quantitatively inferior to those of the capitalist countries."

#7. Omitted: "Thus, our theory with regard to strategic utilization of the navy was influenced by antiquated concepts of naval warfare and the predominant role of the surface fleet."

#8. The next paragraph read: "(Soviet military theoreticians)...guided by the dictum of Lenin that 'in a war, victory belongs to him who has the greatest reserves, the greatest sources of strength, and the greatest support of the popular masses...' "

#9. Omitted: "...our armed forces."

|| "The cult of Stalin had a very harmful influence on the development of ||

Soviet strategic thought in the prewar period. The intolerable arbitrariness and dictate in the resolution of theoretical questions which had set in acted as a brake upon the development of military thought and lowered the level and the scope of military scientific research. Creative investigation of problems of military theory was replaced by a dogmatic repetition of statements made by Stalin."

#10. Omitted: "...one of the most difficult and strenuous wars ever experienced by our nation. It was..."

#11. Omitted: "...based on Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army,..."

#12. (This paragraph was added in the 2nd edition and then omitted in the 3rd.) "The Stavka actually began the winter operations of 1945 without any reserves. This had a negative effect upon the organization and the conduct of operations aimed at routing the enemy in Eastern Pomerania, plus development of the offensive which was to follow in the Berlin direction in February of 1945."

#13. Omitted: "...made possible by a miscalculation of the time when fascist Germany would attack..."

#14. Omitted: "Long before the war the political and supreme military leaders of the Soviet Union had the necessary information on the aggression being planned by Germany against our country. They knew about the early concentration and deployment of German forces along our borders. This made it possible to conclude that a real and imminent danger of war existed and to take the necessary measures with regard to the combat readiness of the troops and the mobilizational readiness of the country, so as to prepare for enemy aggression and to prevent a surprise enemy attack."

"However, certain preconceived notions on the part of I. V. Stalin in his evaluation of the military-political situation on the eve of the war led to a number of serious errors in the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for the impending war.

"Our erroneous prewar theoretical views on the content and nature of the initial phase of the war also had a certain adverse effect. Our military theory did not take sufficient account of the fact that...as a result of the errors committed by our Supreme High Command, before the war there were no directives for bringing the forces situated near the frontier into combat readiness or for the advance and deployment of covering armies along lines of cover provided by a plan.

"Because of the lack of an over-all view of the existing situation, the

underestimation of the enemy potential, and the overestimation of our own potential, the Soviet Command, knowing full well that the enemy could forestall our strategic concentration and deployment, did not display the necessary flexibility in the leadership of the Armed Forces and did not create (taking into account the probable directions of the enemy thrusts) the appropriate defense groups capable of repelling the initial mass thrusts of the enemy and thereby assuring the mobilization, concentration, and deployment of our Armed Forces.

"The directive of the General Staff, on the night of June 22, concerning the combat readiness of the troops stationed along the frontier was extremely belated and could not change the unfavorable situation. In addition, many units and formations of the frontier military districts received this directive only after the German offensive was fully underway.

"The belated decision concerning the increased combat readiness of the western military districts and the occupation of the defense perimeters stipulated in the plan for covering the borders of the country was one of the serious miscalculations of the initial phase of the Great Patriotic War. Our troop movements under conditions of combat activity and German air superiority led to unjustifiably heavy losses.

"The difficult conditions in which our troops in the western frontier military districts found themselves were aggravated by major short-comings in the work of the operational and military rear areas. These agencies were not capable of supplying the troops under the difficult conditions of the initial phase of the war.

"All this predetermined to a considerable extent the unfavorable outcome of the armed combat for the Soviet Armed Forces during the initial phase.

"The country was faced with the need for mobilizing, concentrating and deploying its Armed Forces to repel the aggression of an enemy who had already begun to invade our country.

"Because of the incomplete deployment of troops in the frontier military districts, their grouping was extremely unfavorable in the beginning of the war.

"The perimeters on which the divisions of the assault echelon of the western military districts were to be deployed were extremely close to the border; they were thus exposed to enemy attack and their mobility was hampered to the utmost. The most powerful groupings of the troops of the Western and Kiev Military Districts were deployed in the Bielostok and Lvov salients, which were enveloped by the enemy and immediately subject to flanking thrusts. At the same time, the directions of the most probable enemy thrusts were protected by insufficient forces. Moreover, even these groups were far from complete by the beginning of the hostilities. Over 35% of the units of the strategic assault echelon were not able to occupy the assigned positions. On the whole, the group of forces in the western border military districts was greatly scattered along the front as well as in depth, which resulted in uncoordinated

operations.

"The enemy was first able to bring all his forces to bear on the weak Soviet troops located near the border, and then to engage the major forces of the covering armies. Then, having penetrated in depth, he was capable of attacking rear echelon forces of the border military districts.

"The attacks of German aviation and artillery and the offensive of powerful groups of enemy ground troops caused high losses to our troops, especially to aviation; resulted in serious destruction of border towns, communications, and control points; and from the very first moments disorganized the troop control.

"As a result of the disorganization of control, the commander of the army groups was not able to estimate the serious nature of the situation and take appropriate action. The higher military command, lacking the true picture of the events, attempted to put prewar plans into operation. These provided, in the event of German aggression against the Soviet Union, for a powerful retaliatory attack in the direction of Suvalki and Lublin, and for subsequent taking of the strategic initiative. With this in mind, at 0830-0900 hours on June 22, 1941, the Peoples' Commissar of Defense, in his Directive No.2, ordered the ground troops and the aviation of the border districts to destroy enemy forces violating our territory. By the evening of June 22, the troops received even more decisive orders: to surround and destroy the Suvalki and Lublin enemy groups and to occupy these areas by late on June 24. However, an attempt to execute these orders met with complete disaster. On the fourth day of the war there was a real threat of the penetration of the mobile forces of the enemy to the West Dvina River. It became evident that the covering armies could not liquidate the invading enemy troops who had penetrated in great depth. The offensive intentions of the Soviet Command, which it attempted to put into operation, were negated by the entire course of events. A radical review of strategic concepts was needed."

#15. Omitted: "The armies composing the group were still concentrating at the end of June. Thirty-nine out of fifty divisions arrived at the line Idritsa-Loyev; the others were on the way."

#16. Omitted: "The unfavorable outcome of the initial phase was strongly influenced by the fact that by the beginning of the war we had not reasoned out and developed the problems of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces, with the result that in the initial phase of the war there were great shortcomings in the leadership of armed combat."

#17. "Vast" changed to "tangible".

#18. Omitted: "...totaling some seven combined armies. At the same time, the enemy transferred to the Soviet-German front an additional twenty-four divisions. ... This resulted in the change of the balance of power in the enemy's favor. The failure of Soviet troops at Kharkov was due, to a considerable

degree, to the fact that the Supreme Command failed to organize any coordination between the Southwestern Front and neighboring fronts, plus a number of other mistakes committed by the Supreme Command: chiefly, its failure to determine correctly the direction of the enemy's main blow in the summer of 1942, its failure to provide the Southwestern Front with adequate forces with which to conduct large offensive operations with decisive aim, and, finally, to the fact that, following the enemy's penetration into the rear of the Southwestern Front in the region of Slavyansk, the Supreme Command turned down the timely proposal of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front on recalling the front's troops from the area south of Kharkov and on having those troops carry out a counterattack on the enemy group which had made the penetration."

#19. Omitted: "On the whole, this measure justified itself and played an important positive role, especially in the organization of the defenses of the sea approaches to Leningrad."

#20. Omitted: "The accomplishment of these measures played a positive part in the control of the PVO Troops, and made it possible to more flexibly and opportunely solve the problems of defense of the most important objectives and make the necessary maneuvers with air defense forces and weapon."

EDITOR'S NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

#1. This read "... with an aggressor."

#2. This read "The Marxist-Leninist Concept of ..."

#3. This read "... encouraged by the imperialist reactionary forces..."

#4. Omitted: "...attempting to prove that it has become obsolete and does not correspond to the modern specific historical conditions of social development."

#5. Omitted: "It is known that the statement 'war is simply a continuation of politics by other means' belongs to the German military theoretician Clausewitz. Lenin, however, introduced an important correction (the phrase 'namely, violent'), which radically changed the statement of the problem."

#6. This was added in the second edition: "That is why it would be wrong to include in the concept of war the various non-military forms of conflict: economic, ideological, diplomatic and others. These forms of conflict between states and classes, as distinguished from war, are always in operation; and their inclusion into the concept 'war' would inevitably lead to the absurd conclusion that war is a constant state of human society."

#7. Omitted: "...categories of wars..."

#8. Omitted: "At his appearance at the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959, N. S. Khrushchev, treating this problem in more detail, said ..."

#9. This read "... produce almost half of the world grain output. The industrial output of the socialist countries has already attained more than half the size of the output of the developed countries of the capitalist world. The per capita industrial production of the world socialist system, taken as a whole, has already caught up to the world capitalistic system."

#10. Omitted: "A new world war..."

#11. This read "... British and French ..."

#12. This read "... England and France and others ..."

#13. This read "...local..."

#14. 1962 "...elaboration..."
1963 "...creation..."

#15. Omitted: "In the first decade of this period there must be practically resolved the historic task of overtaking and surpassing the most advanced capitalist countries in per capita production. This is going to be the basis of the gradual transformation of socialist social relations into communist ones. One of the cardinal tasks of the period of the full-scale construction

of communism is the training of the new man. The key task of the next seven years is to achieve a maximum economic and moral gain in the peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism."

#16. This read "... and for gaining time ..." 1 and 2

#17. This read "... Britain and France ..."

#18. This read "... have in readiness many air and naval bases, and are building ever newer nuclear-rocket bases openly directed against the USSR and the other socialist countries."

#19. This read "... and on the economy of the states ..."

#20. Omitted: "Moreover, our Armed Forces have received nuclear warheads ranging from several tons to tens of megatons in power."

#21. Omitted: "... with a power of several tens of megatons ..."

#22. No mention of Communist China's bomb is made.

#23. Omitted: "Ballistic missiles employed en masse are still practically invulnerable to existing means of PVO and their employment is almost independent of weather conditions. Only as special instruments of PRO are developed will it be possible to combat the massive use of missiles in the air." Only in the 1962 edition.

#24. Omitted: "... especially the intercontinental and orbital ones."

#25. This read "... operational and tactical..."

#26. This read "... According to calculations presented to Congress by American specialists, the losses which should be expected in the United States after a 24-hour nuclear war would amount to 50-75 million people."

#27. This read "only 135 million out of 188 million Americans would survive i.e., the dead alone would amount to 53 million. Moreover, it is assumed that as a result of nuclear attack..."

#28. Omitted: "This is why the Soviet Union most resolutely supports the banning of nuclear weapons and conducts a consistent campaign for the prevention of a world nuclear war."

"Questions of war and peace simply cannot be resolved, says N. S. Khrushchev, without account being taken of the actual real-life situation. The consequences of modern war must be weighed with scientific precision. Foreign specialists have calculated that at the beginning of 1963 the U. S. possessed about 40,000 nuclear warheads. And the USSR also has more than enough of these weapons. Under these circumstances, the scientists have calculated that 700,000,000-800,000,000 persons would perish and all the big cities of many countries be destroyed simply as a result of the first blow alone."

"Such are the data in the possession of science."

#29. Omitted: "Khrushchev has said: 'Now we have only to press one button and entire cities ... will fly into the air, entire countries can be destroyed. Such is the enormous destruction power of modern weapons...' [51.] These weapons are nuclear-rocket weapons, while, speaking figuratively, these 'buttons' are radio-electronic devices."

#30. This read "... with nuclear warheads..."

#31. Omitted: "... and these operations will be carried out basically by weapons of the ground troops in contact with the enemy forces."

#32. Omitted: "Only rocket-carrying submarines and, to some extent, naval rocket-carrying aircraft will, of all the naval forces, be used in conjunction with nuclear weapons."

#33. Omitted: "... strategic bombers ..."

#34. Omitted: "... air-to-ground"

#35. This read "... PVO and..."

#36. This read "... and PVO air defense"

#37. Omitted: "... the creation of effective means of combatting enemy ballistic missiles in flight ..."

#38. Omitted: "... surprise, mass ..."

#39. Omitted: "... surprise ..."

#40. Omitted: "... surprise ..."

#41. Omitted: "... rockets and aviation ..."

#42. Omitted: "The coalition of the socialist countries includes more than 1 billion persons. Approximately 650 million people are included in the imperialist blocs. This indicates how great a mass of people would be involved in a third world war."

#43. This read "... will unavoidably ..."

EDITOR'S NOTES TO CHAPTER V

#1. Omitted: "... and of imperialist Japan ..."

#2. Omitted: "The defeated West German generals, forgetful of the lessons of the last war, have already been repeatedly openly demanding the arming of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons capable of hitting as far as the Urals.

"The French army has been responsible for more than 10 years of unjust colonial wars in Vietnam and Algeria since the end of World War II."

#3. Omitted: "American imperialism, relying on its enormous armed forces and the numerous military bases it has created on all the continents of the globe, is presently fulfilling the role of world policeman, supporting reactionary dictatorial regimes and decadent monarchies, opposing democratic revolutionary transformations, and launching aggression against the peoples who are fighting for their independence."

#4. This read "... workers and peasants ..."

#5. Omitted: "An example of this type of recruiting is found in the airborne units of France, which were used for conducting the 'dirty war' in Algeria. The selection of officers is carried out with special care."

#6. Omitted: "... France, Japan ..."

[Ed. Note: The Soviet authors are referring to such organizations as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts.]

#7. This read "... The Soviet Motherland ..."

#8. Revised: "The next factor which determines the foundations and directions in building the armed forces is the economic condition of the countries. However, the influence of this factor differs somewhat compared to the social structure of the countries. While the difference between the social systems of capitalist and socialist countries determines sharply opposed courses in the system for recruiting their armed forces and in the system for training their personnel, the influence of the economy on the building of the armed forces in both the capitalist and socialist countries is, in principle, the same. It exerts itself here in two directions: it determines the quantitative composition of the armed forces and how they are equipped militarily. This can be expressed briefly as follows: the stronger the economy of a country, the larger the population and the higher its consciousness and the better developed its industry, agriculture, science, and technology, the better able it is to maintain armed forces and provide them with the newest weapons and other military equipment. The economy influences, through weapons and personnel, the methods for conducting military operations. However, while an increase in the power of any strong imperialist power is invariably accompanied by an intensification in its aggressive aims, and therefore leads to an increase in the threat of war, the growth in the strength of the socialist countries, conversely, has created and creates a solid guaranty for the preservation of

peace and increases the chances of prevention of war.

"Capitalism imposes its rule by fire and sword; the weapons of socialism, however, are its supremacy over the capitalist system in social organization, in government, in the economy, and in raising the standard of living and the spiritual culture of the people. Therefore, the economic system of capitalism is the foundation of the aggressive substance of its armed forces, while the economic system of socialism is the foundation of its peace-loving aims, which are supported by the great military power of its army and navy."

#9. "... the B-52 costs \$8,500,000 and ..."

#10. This read "... Atlas ..."

#11. "... sixteen ..."

#12. This read "In the United States, during fiscal 1961-1962, about 43% of the military budget was spent on maintaining the armed forces, while in fiscal 1962-1963 the money allocated for maintaining personnel is planned to be about 28% of the military budget, despite the fact that, as compared with past years, the armed forces have considerably increased in numbers. In 1959, the United States spent 56 times more, and Britain 38 times more, than in 1938 for arms and scientific research in weaponry."

#13. This read "In the United States, military expenditures for fiscal 1962-1963 are 50 times greater than 1936. During the last five years, the direct military expenditures of the United States have exceeded \$220 billion; all the NATO countries have spent over \$500 billion in the arms race during the last ten years."

#14. This read "According to official data, the clear profits of U. S. monopolies have increased from \$3.3 billion in 1938 to \$43.4 billion in 1957; that is, they have increased by a factor of more than 13. In France, 32 capitalist companies received profits of over 32 billion francs in 1957, 40 billion francs in 1958, and about 46 billion francs in 1959. The clear profit to British monopolies grew from 1242 million pounds sterling in 1951 to 2210 million pounds in 1959."

"The capitalist monopolies manufacturing nuclear weapons have made the greatest profits. General Dynamics Corporation increased its profits in ten years from \$1.8 to 91.8 million, and General Electric, from \$177 million in 1947 to \$500 million in 1959."

#15. Omitted: "Thus, the military allocations of the Soviet Union in 1962 amounted to 16.7 percent of the state budget and in 1963 they are planned to be 16.1 percent, whereas in the U. S., the budget allocations for military goals have in recent years amounted to more than 50 percent."

#16. This read "... far exceed ..."

#17. Omitted: "... France ..."

#18. Omitted: "Pakistan, for example, spends two-thirds of its budget

on military purposes, as a result of which national industry in the country is not developing, and foreign capital rules there as if in its own private domain."

#19. Omitted: "N. S. Khrushchev in the report of the Central Committee of the CPSU given at the XXII Party Congress, stated: '...world reaction is ever-increasingly oriented toward striking a blow against the socialist countries from without, so that by war capitalism can again attain world supremacy, or at least retard the development of socialism... Therefore,... as long as imperialistic aggressors exist, we must be on our guard, keep our powder dry, improve the defenses of the socialist countries, their armed forces and state securities.' "

#20. Omitted: "But, whereas the quality of armed forces depends primarily on the level of industrial and scientific development, their size is limited largely by the number of able-bodied persons available for distribution between the armed forces and the national economy which provides for the needs of war and the vital functions of the state.

"In the capitalist countries, the monopolies which produce various types of weapons and which are interested in getting government contracts for them are by no means without influence in determining the quality of the armed forces. For example, in the United States, the constant battle between the three services of the armed forces for increased allocations, when the military budget is being discussed in Congress, is in fact a battle between the capitalist monopolies who stand behind each service of the armed forces and try to grab the lion's share of profits from arms production for themselves.

"Apropos of the fact that a country's policy and economy determine the quantitative and qualitative composition of the armed forces, it must always be borne in mind that strategy's concern is precisely with the concrete solution of these problems."

#21. This read "At the present time ..."

#22. This read "... The targets for destruction will now include not only armed forces deployed in theaters of military operations, but also the economies of the belligerents, their systems of governmental control, communications and also strategic weapons deployed outside of military theaters."

#23. Omitted: "The basic means of realizing these possibilities is the nuclear rocket weapon, especially strategic rockets."

#24. This read "It is this very weapon which presently determines the main line being taken in the organization and development of the armed forces and in the methods of waging a future war. It is being introduced more and more intensively into all branches of the armed forces and is radically changing them from the qualitative point of view: it is increasing their fire power and combat potential..."

#25. Revised: "It must be taken into account that in creating superiority in nuclear weapons, it is not the quantitative aspect which assumes the greatest significance at the present time, but the qualitative indices of the

weapons themselves and of the methods of using them."

#26. Omitted: "... especially in the West ..."

#27. Omitted: "... but densely populated ..."

#28. Omitted: "... all of ..."

#29. Omitted: "... including those regions where his safely covered strategic means of waging war are located."

#30. This read "Apparently, the best ..."

#31. Omitted: "... of the sides in the initial period of a nuclear rocket war."

#32. Omitted and revised: "Strategic Rocket Troops ..."

#33. This read "... most highly developed countries ..."

#34. Omitted and revised: "...; thus, to a considerable degree and, in a number of instances, they will entirely replace artillery and front bomber aircraft.

"The ground forces' missile troops provide them with their basic fire power. They will be the main means used to clear the way for tank and motorized troops to carry out broad maneuvers and rapid penetration in depth. When necessary, these forces will create obstacles in the path of advancing enemy troops, consisting of vast zones of destruction and radioactive contamination, which can become an insurmountable barrier on the ground."

#35. Omitted: "... of troop PVO ..."

#36. Omitted: "Hence, the principal mission of our navy in a modern war will be combat with enemy naval forces at sea and at their bases."

#37. Omitted: "The high combat readiness and combat capability of troops must be maintained both in peacetime and in the course of war. War is the most demanding and severest test of armed forces. The correctness of their development can be evaluated only by the results of war.

"The Soviet Armed Forces have twice stood up under such a severe test: in the Civil War and in the Great Patriotic War. The results of these wars, the victories achieved in them, and the entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces are vivid proof of the correctness of the principles used in building them and of the correctness in determining the fundamental courses of their development over all periods of history.

"This was achieved due to the tireless support given to the Armed Forces by the Communist party. The party is the organizing and guiding force in the entire life and activity of the Soviet Army and Navy. The party stood by the

cradle of our Armed Forces and, by the will of the party, have been transformed into an enormous force which will prevent the imperialist aggressors from unleashing a new world war."

EDITOR'S NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

#1. Omitted: "In his report to the XXII Congress of the CPSU Premier Khrushchev stated: 'We have developed particularly precise instrument construction; specialized metallurgy; an atomic, electronic, and missile industry; jet aircraft; modern shipbuilding; and the production of automatic devices.' On this basis our Armed Forces have been completely reequipped with nuclear-rocket equipment. Our Armed Forces have global missiles and ICBMs and IRBMs 'surface-to-air' missiles, rocket-carrying nuclear submarines, operational-tactical Ground Troops' rockets and 'air-to-ground' and 'air-to-air' rockets in the Air Force, and also other modern military equipment. All types of missiles have nuclear warheads of varying power, including 50 and 100 megaton warheads. The Soviet Union has achieved superiority over the probable enemy in the decisive means of armed conflict -- in missile weapons and yields of nuclear charges. Thereby, the necessary material prerequisites for successfully conducting a war have been created if it is launched by aggressors against the countries of the socialist camp."

#2. Omitted: "The Bolshevik Party, headed by V. I. Lenin, carefully prepared for the armed uprising. Lenin worked out in detail the plan for the revolution, and determined the political and economic platforms after the successful culmination of the uprising."

#3. Omitted: "Lenin developed the most important concepts of Soviet military strategy and the combat methods of the Civil War. Under his leadership strategic plans for conducting warfare were developed which would assure victory over a strong enemy. Lenin personally led the armed conflict throughout the Civil War."

#4. Omitted: "The Japanese predators encountered unforeseen stubborn resistance on the part of the local population in the occupied countries of Southeast Asia. They encountered particularly great difficulties in China, with constantly increasing resistance of the Chinese people led by the Chinese Communist Party."

#5. Omitted: "The American and British presses cried that through the use of aviation Germany could be 'bombed out' of the war."

#6. Omitted: "The American militarists did this in order that the atomic attack would kill the maximum number of people. The four Japanese cities selected for atomic attack were not bothered by aircraft from April, 1945, on."

Only individual aircraft flew over these cities from time to time, and because of this the Japanese did not sound the air raid sirens. Thus, the inhabitants of these cities became careless. As a result of atomic attacks, 200,000 persons died at Hiroshima and 120,000 at Nagasaki. This indicates that American imperialism is capable of the most monstrous crimes to attain its ends."

#7. This section has been omitted: "In the postwar period the aggressive militaristic world powers, mainly the imperialists of the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany, entered into a criminal pact for the preparation of a new third world war, openly directed against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist camp. The driving force behind this aggression and war is U. S. imperialism, the backbone of the imperialist camp, and is the inspiration and the backbone of the aggressive blocs, which are closely related, and represent a unified bloc of imperialists directed against the socialist camp. The imperialists have developed an unprecedented arms race and a 'cold war' which is an intermediate unstable state between peace and war, a state of political hostility, one step away from armed conflict. They continually inflame the international situation and have already repeatedly placed the world at the brink of war.

"In conducting their aggressive policy, the policy of preparing for a new war, the ruling circles of the imperialist governments, mainly the United States, do everything in their power to oppose a peaceful solution to the problem of disarmament and to the lessening of international tension, they fight for the strengthening and expansion of aggressive military blocs and they whip up war hysteria. The intensification of reaction within the imperialist states, the outrageous persecution of communist parties and other progressive forces, cruel terror, and the use of fascist methods by domestic regimes are considered serious threats to the cause of peace. International reaction is counting on neo-fascism -- on its last political reserve. The economic preparations for a new war are expressed by increased appropriations for military production, by a continuous increase in the production of modern weapons,... particularly nuclear weapons and the means for using them, by keeping a number of branches of industry on a mobilization basis, by preparing all industry and transportation for rapid conversion to a war footing, and by preparing theaters of military operations. The imperialists have embarked on the path of creating closed economic grouping between states; these groupings have an aggressive character.

"Preparations in the military field have been particularly active; coordinated plans have been developed and accomplished for this purpose. The participants of the aggressive blocs, particularly NATO, have in constant combat readiness vast armed forces, many of which are located near the borders of the socialist countries, and they surround the socialist countries with numerous military bases. There is continuous intensified preparation of the armed forces by means of systematic maneuvers and exercises using troops and command agencies, general alerts, systematic overflights of the USSR, and approaches of aircraft carriers and rocket-carrying submarines near the coasts of the socialist countries. Reconnaissance is carried on continually.

"Judging from the experience of numerous military exercises, we can

assume that the military leaders of the imperialist blocs have developed a unified strategy and, in all probability, a unified strategic plan for an all-out nuclear war against the countries of the socialist camp.

"There are sufficient grounds to assume that the basic form of this plan is the unleashing and launching of a world nuclear war against the socialist countries, a plan for surprise nuclear attack. But, apparently, there is another variation of the plan -- a plan for unleashing world war through local wars, i.e., a plan for the relatively slow involvement of countries in a new war. Along with the American imperialists, the West German imperialists are displaying special activity as the main aggressive force. The idea of the strategy of the Bonn militarists is to prepare for revenge, although this goes under the name of 'defense.' The General Staff of the Bundeswehr has developed a program for this revenge: the creation of the strongest army in Western Europe; equipping it with nuclear weapons and the latest military equipment; the conversion of Western Europe and, in part, Africa into its rear area; and the gradual take-over of the leadership of NATO. The ruling circles of the United States, Britain, and France have done everything in their power to realize this program.

"The press has published certain information on 'Deko-II,' and 'Sidestep' military plans of the Bundeswehr; these plans provide for a 'blitzkrieg' invasion of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. It is planned that one group of armies will attack from the south in order to cut off the GDR from Czechoslovakia and Poland and to capture the GDR in a matter of days; this was developed during NATO maneuvers 'Sidestep' in 1959. Another army group is to attack between Czechoslovakia and Austria with the aim of encircling Czechoslovakia, cutting it off from Poland, and invading Hungary; the West German fleet is to attack from the north. Such are the dangerous plans of the West German militarists and revanchists.

"For a long time, the most aggressive NATO circles have been nurturing plans for enlarging the circle of countries possessing nuclear weapons and giving access to these weapons to the West German revenge seekers. The decision adopted at the session of the NATO Council in May, 1963, is evidence that the imperialists have begun the practical implementation of these plans, which are most dangerous to the cause of peace.

"The military ideologists of imperialism, in preparing a new world war, are creating all possible strategic concepts, which are used as a basis for the plans being developed.

"The ringleaders of the imperialist blocs are preparing a general nuclear war against the socialist camp by the unrestricted surprise use of nuclear weapons, masking these plans with such terms as 'defense,' 'retaliatory blow,' and 'massive retaliation.' All these plans were based on U. S. superiority in nuclear weapons.

"However, by the end of the 1950s, when the Americans themselves admitted that their nuclear superiority had ended, this strategy reached a deadlock.

"Certain military theoreticians believe that this situation could be overcome by using outer space for military purposes where it would be possible

to attain a balance of power favorable to the imperialists. Other military theoreticians have advanced the idea of 'strategy by doses,' or limited (local) war.

"The true essence of this 'strategy by doses' is to assure for the United States the possibility of using nuclear weapons, while the other side will not be able to use them. The proponents of this strategy consider that they can thus compensate for the inability of U. S. strategic aviation to strike the strategic centers of the Soviet Union and cover up their plans for delivering nuclear weapons to the West German revanchists so that somebody else will take the war initiative, since it would be most unpopular for the United States to take the initiative. Whereas previously it was a question of conducting local wars in Africa, and in the Near, Middle, and Far East, now local wars in Europe are being openly discussed.

"Feverish preparations for all-out nuclear war against the socialist countries are being made under the cover of discussions of local war. We have reasonably convincing facts which show that the imperialists have not renounced their strategy of a surprise nuclear attack. True, the United States and its satellites have recently increased their defense budget for conventional weapons, but at the same time they are speeding up the development of strategic missiles and they are constructing missile bases at an ever increasing rate. On June 6, 1961, U. S. Under Secretary of Defense Gilpatric stated: '... we have no intention of decreasing our nuclear forces, but we do intend to increase our conventional forces.' This is attested to by the multitude of various military exercises and maneuvers, frequent military alerts, continuous flights by strategic bombers carrying nuclear bombs and missiles, etc.

"Consequently, the U. S. imperialists and the aggressive blocs led by them have in no way renounced their plans for unleashing an all-out (total) nuclear war; on the contrary, by speeding up the nuclear and missile arms race they have accelerated their preparation for the unleashing of such a war.

"Modern aggressive imperialist forces take into account the experience gained by unleashing war in the past -- that of fascist Germany, militaristic Japan, and other aggressive countries. The Hitler methods of perfidious surprise attack have become the official doctrine of the United States and its dependent imperialist countries. Important military officials have mentioned this openly. U. S. Secretary of the Air Force Douglas in 1959 stated: 'The basic United States strategy is a surprise attack with all available forces and weapons. The United States must be the first to make such an attack.'

"The recent statement by Kennedy that 'under certain conditions' the United States may take the initiative in a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union is a direct indication that the United States is preparing the surprise and unlimited use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and is preparing for preventive nuclear war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

"The imperialists are not so sure that they will be able to achieve serious results in open conflict. Therefore they are counting on perfidy,

adventurism, and surprise attack making full use of all the capabilities of modern means of armed combat. They consider that a nuclear strike by planes and missiles can produce incomparably better results than at the start of the last war, including solution of the basic problem of the war, i.e., the forcing of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries into unconditional surrender.

"However, as N. S. Khrushchev noted in his report at the 4th Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 'To attack first does not require much brainpower; but rather it requires recklessness, and we naturally realize that certain of our probable enemies have such tendencies... But can an attacking country, even if we assume for the moment that it can catch us unaware, immediately put out of action all the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and all the missile bases in the country subjected to the attack? Naturally not. A country subjected to a surprise attack, assuming we are talking of a reasonably large country, will always be able to retaliate... The territory of our country is enormous, and we have the capability of decentralizing our missile equipment and camouflaging it well. We have created a system whereby if one weapon intended to deliver a retaliatory blow is put out of action we can always substitute a duplicate weapon and destroy the targets from emergency positions.'

"In the aggressive plans of the imperialist bloc great attention is devoted to questions of the strategic deployment of the armed forces and their readiness to unleash war. The imperialists are attempting to repeat the methods used by aggressive governments in past wars, particularly that of fascist Germany in World War II. The ringleaders of the imperialist military blocs are making frenzied efforts in order to have, ahead of time (even in peacetime), the necessary armed forces in complete readiness, deployed in their respective units so that at any moment convenient for them they can suddenly unleash war.

"Military ideologists of imperialism intensely advocate the theory that in a modern war the mobilization of the armed forces is impossible, and therefore by the start of the war there must be, in full combat readiness, such armed forces as can accomplish the main aims of the war in the shortest time.

"British Field Marshal Montgomery, for example, has written that 'the previous type of mobilization... is archaic under the conditions of a nuclear war... We need a system which will produce the necessary results within several hours after radar warning; in addition, the system should not depend on vulnerable communication media...'

"Henry Kissinger has something more definite to say apropos of this: '... a general war conducted with modern weapons will be decided by the operations of the armed forces which the enemy has at the beginning of the war. We can no longer count on a more or less long period of time in which to mobilize.'

"This theory is very convenient for the imperialists. Therefore, the basic tenets of this theory have been implemented by the aggressive NATO bloc.

Even at present there are, to a considerable extent, groups of strategic aircraft and missiles, naval forces, air-defense forces and weapons, and some ground troops in a state of high combat readiness. These units are intended for a surprise attack; by no stretch of the imagination are they for 'defense' or for 'retaliatory strikes.'

"What are the features of the development and the creation of these groups of armed forces of the aggressive imperialist military bloc under modern conditions?

"Unlike past wars, the aggressive imperialist countries are primarily preparing, for a future war, strategic means for armed combat, including nuclear weapons, strategic aviation, ICBMs, IRBMs, nuclear submarines with 'Polaris' missiles and assault aircraft carriers and missile-launching ships. All these are considered to be the main striking force of a future nuclear world war. The Anglo-American bloc has already created these groupings necessary for unleashing a new war.

"As has already been mentioned in previous chapters, the United States and Britain have created large stockpiles of nuclear ammunition, warehouses and bases for this equipment have been established in suitable regions, and a certain amount of nuclear ammunition is continually on hand for immediate use.

"The United States has prepared a great many air bases for its strategic aircraft, including those in the territorial United States, England, Spain, North Africa, Greenland, and the Pacific.

"SAC is planning to deliver strikes from bases in the territorial United States. However, the available tanker planes do not make it possible to use all the bombers from these bases. Therefore, under various pretexts (training, maneuvers), a great many medium bombers have been moved to bases in England, Spain, North Africa, and the Pacific.

"SAC and the British strategic aircraft are in a state of high combat readiness. A certain number of crews are on constant alert. Some of the heavy bombers are always in the air, carrying bombs or missiles with nuclear warheads. Each crew has a specific objective in the USSR or some other socialist country for a nuclear attack. Control centers had been set up and a ready-alert system has been developed.

"Although strategic bombers have lost, to a considerable extent, their former military advantages due to the development of air-defense weapons, they are nonetheless a formidable weapon. It must be considered that SAC is aimed at our cities, industrial centers, and regions where our armed forces are based and deployed, and it has the task of weakening the military might of the socialist camp, undermining the military-economic potential, inflicting heavy losses on the population, and breaking its will to resist.

|| "The government of the United States is making feverish efforts for the elimination of its backwardness in missile weapons. The American press has published an extensive program for the deployment of rocket units armed with ||

intercontinental and medium-range missiles, placing into operation nuclear submarines with 'Polaris' missiles.

"The prepared missile sites are in a state of high combat readiness: the missiles are on site; fuel has been brought in; nuclear warheads in secret storehouses are nearby; maintenance personnel are on the alert; there is a signal system for rapidly making the missiles ready for launching; and a specific target has been assigned to each site. The strategic missiles are aimed at the same targets as the strategic bombers. The missile units are subordinate to SAC and have been deployed in the respective units for accomplishing the missions according to the plans for a future war.

"The naval forces are also prepared for rapid deployment to these regions for conducting military operations. They can be deployed under the guise of courtesy calls, exercises, and maneuvers. Of particular danger are the large-scale maneuvers and exercises during which the ships of the United States, Britain, and the other NATO countries are, in essence, deployed in battle formation and approach the borders of the socialist countries.

"The United States has planned and intensively activated a program of shipbuilding, particularly rocket-carrying nuclear submarines and assault aircraft carriers. Modernization of warships, particularly aircraft carriers, is also under way in England. All NATO members are arming their fleets with nuclear weapons.

"Consequently, the fleet of the Anglo-American military bloc, like its strategic aviation, requires no special mobilization. It is at high combat readiness, and can be deployed into battle positions in a short period of time.

"The imperialists are preparing vast armed forces in the European theater of military operations; these will have the main role in a future world war. The main forces and weapons for operation in this theater are under the command of NATO, i.e., under the military command of the United States.

"The NATO ringleaders plan timely, gradual, and secret preparation and deployment, in the European theater, of the first strategic echelon which is strong enough to be able to perform vast strategic missions during the initial phase of the war; they then plan opportune mobilization of the remaining echelons.

"The main striking force in the theater of military operations is tactical aviation, operational-tactical missiles, and atomic artillery. These can all use nuclear devices. Storehouses and bases of nuclear ammunition have been set up in the European countries near the borders of the socialist countries.

"The forces training for aggression in the European theater also include vast ground troops, the basis of which are the motorized and tank divisions of West Germany and the U. S. 7th Army, permanently stationed in West Germany.

"The NATO leaders realize full well that these forces are insufficient

for conducting a large-scale war in Europe against the socialist members of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, they are laying the groundwork for rapid mobilization of vast forces in the theater.

"The U. S. imperialists realize that under present-day conditions they cannot mobilize under the cover of their allies, as was done in the last two world wars. General Clark, former commander of U. S. ground troops, has been quite specific on this matter: 'We must have armed forces in the most important regions of the globe to conduct military operations in those regions and in other regions to which they can be rapidly sent.'

" 'We must have a base for the mobilization of the armed forces in the case of a general war. This requires reserves in a continuous state of combat readiness, and these must be equipped with modern weapons and equipment. We must create a flexible system of material and technical support for the troops and stores of arms in overseas theaters of military operations... Finally, we must have strategic striking forces which are sufficient and capable of rapid operations at any time and in any region.'

"The NATO troops in Europe are continually on the alert. In Western Europe there are two army groups: each theater has its command and armed-forces headquarters for the theater, army group, and armies. All troops have deployment regions, theoretically for defense but actually for offense, depending on the specific problems. In Western Europe the troops are deployed 50-120 kilometers from the western borders of East Germany; in the Balkans they are directly on the borders of the socialist countries.

"The mobilization plans of the aggressive imperialistic powers are kept in strictest secrecy. The imperialists do not plan for general mobilization at the start of a war because of the lessons learned from the operations of the aggressive nations during World War II. It is to be expected that the present aggressors are taking all measures to gradually and secretly mobilize before the war, as the situation becomes aggravated. The NATO military leaders are intensifying their development of means for secret rapid mobilization of additional forces and the transport of them to theaters of military operations before the start of an attack.

"Immediately before the war there will be rapid troop mobilization in military theaters under various pretexts, mainly in the form of training groups of Reservists, troop rotations, and the conducting of exercises and maneuvers. These measures include: the strengthening of troops in the border regions, the creation of groups, the bringing of troops and staffs to combat readiness, the preparation of nuclear weapons for a surprise attack, the activation of intelligence, the sending of equipment to the troops, the evacuation of the population and things of material value, etc. The American General M. Johnson has indicated that the final measures may include 'the transferral of headquarters to underground locations, the moving of the families of military personnel to the rear, the bringing of the troops up to combat readiness, the taking of positions by the troops according to operational plans, the setting up of mine fields in specified regions...'

|| In essence, here is how the preparation for the invasion of Cuba was ||

conducted in 1962. All armed forces of the United States were brought to full combat readiness and placed on a war footing. Reservists were called up. The Second Infantry Division, 102nd and 82nd Airborne Divisions, and the First Armored Division were concentrated on the eastern coast of the United States; the lift was accomplished in military and civilian airplanes, and heavy equipment was shipped by rail. Large forces of marines were prepared for assaulting the island of Freedom. Tactical aviation was transferred to the Florida peninsula, to the Caribbean Sea, and to the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. All airplanes were held at the air fields with missiles and bombs loaded. One hundred and eighty-three warships moved to the Cuban coasts, including attack aircraft carriers, antisubmarine aircraft carriers, assault helicopter carriers, and assault ships.

"The base at Guantanamo was reinforced. Staffs occupied command posts. Even the government intended to transfer to a prepared underground control post.

"The forces and weapons operating in the European war theater have the task of launching surprise nuclear attacks against units of troops of the socialist countries, particularly against missile-launching sites and airfields, control points, communications, and important objectives up to 1000 kilometers from the border; the ground troops will then launch a decisive offensive directly after the so-called nuclear offensive, rout the troops of the socialist countries which have been sent to the theaters of military operations, and invade the USSR in order to use as completely as possible the results of nuclear attacks by strategic weapons and to force unconditional surrender. Defensive operations are also provided for, if the nuclear offensive does not produce the desired results.

"In addition to preparing strategic aviation, missiles, the fleet, forces, and weapons on the land theaters of military operations, all the participants in the imperialist bloc are taking great measures to prepare against aircraft and missile strikes. For this purpose there has been created, and is being intensively improved, air defense of the territories of the imperialist countries, particularly the United States, Britain, and West Germany. The air-defense weapons and forces of all the NATO countries have already been deployed and are completely combat-ready.

"In the fall of 1962, one third of all fighter interceptors of the American Air Defense Command were maintained on a round-the-clock alert on 15-minute readiness for take-off. The plan for going on a round-the-clock alert with such a number of fighter-interceptors was developed back in 1961. The Air Defense Command plans to use the civilian airports for the best maintenance of the alert and better dispersion of aircraft.

"At the present time the United States is making increased efforts to create an antimissile defense system. This includes the construction of long-range detection and warning systems, target-identification systems, and missile-coordinate-determination centers. New methods are being developed for the detection of missiles, particularly through the use of infrared technology, and passive methods are being developed for tracking a missile from the moment of launch. Active methods for combating missiles are being developed at a rapid pace.

"All these facts convincingly demonstrate that the bloc of aggressive imperialist countries, headed by the United States, is exerting every effort to prepare, in peacetime, vast armed forces, to deploy them in appropriate strategic and operational formations, arm them with nuclear weapons and materiel, and to prepare them for the unleashing of a world or local war against the socialist countries at any moment convenient to them. At the same time, they are preparing mobilization deployment of the armed forces in order to intensify their efforts during the war.

"A striking feature of the deployment of the armed forces of the imperialist aggressors at the present time, compared with past wars, is that the troop and weapons units are spread out not only along the borders but throughout the countries of the imperialist bloc and over vast ocean expanses. The main weapons of a future war -- nuclear weapons, strategic aviation, and missiles -- are deployed far from the line of armed combat between the ground troops, and even on other continents.

"The nature of the military preparations of the imperialist bloc and the deployment of their armed forces are convincing evidence of the fact that modern aggressive world forces are preparing a surprise attack against the socialist countries using all available forces and combat weapons. The imperialists are preparing an offensive war, a war of massive annihilation of the population, mainly a peaceful population, a war of all-out destruction, a war which will completely destroy whole countries and peoples. The numerous military bases surrounding the socialist countries are clearly intended for surprise attack. The vast tactical air forces and operational-tactical rocket troops armed with nuclear devices, and also the ground troops near the borders of the socialist countries, attest to the fact that these forces and weapons are preparing for an offensive war, for deep penetration into the socialist countries. This is the true nature of the military preparations of the aggressive imperialist countries. Taking this into consideration, under present conditions we cannot count on any period of time (even at the start of the war) during which to mobilize and deploy the armed forces in strategic and operational positions. The development of means of armed combat, the distribution of political and military forces in the world, and the military preparations of the aggressive imperialist blocs, clearly directed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, require that the socialist countries also have armed forces in a state of military preparedness to be able to deliver an instantaneous retaliatory attack of crushing force and immediately develop active operations not only to restrain the imperialist aggressor but to completely defeat him.

"Thus, the conditions and methods of the strategic deployment of the armed forces under present-day conditions differ considerably from those in past wars, including World War II.

"The means by which the imperialists will unleash a new world war depend on many factors. The imperialist aggressors are counting on the fact that the war will be unexpected by the socialist countries, against whom the aggression will be mainly directed. The mission of our military strategy is to foresee the possible methods by which the imperialists will unleash the war, and to give timely warning to the public and the Armed Forces of the impending

threat and to avoid taking any chances. For this we must carefully study and analyze the policy of the aggressive imperialist countries, their means of war preparation, their military-theoretical views, the nature and the methods for training and preparing the Armed Forces, in particular the methods by which exercises and maneuvers are conducted.

"Study of the unleashing of local wars is particularly important, since in the past, aggressive countries have often used various types of local conflicts to check the accuracy of their own plans and the preparedness of the armed forces.

"We now have enough facts to draw the following conclusion: the aggressive imperialist governments will attempt to unleash a future war or a local war without warning, by means of a surprise attack. This was the method of operations of the imperialists of Britain, France, and Israel in Egypt in 1956.

"During the various maneuvers and exercises conducted by the NATO Command, a situation of gradually increasing international tension is usually created, a precarious situation develops, and only then are military activities brought into the open.

"However, just the reverse may occur. There may be a lessening of tensions by the imperialists to cover up their preparations for an unexpected military attack.

"Many authors in the capitalist West write openly on a surprise nuclear attack. They do not try to hide the fact that the attacks should be directed against heavily populated and industrial centers of the enemy.

"The Western press, especially the American press, frankly discusses the number of nuclear warheads, missiles, and aircraft required to launch a nuclear strike against the primary objectives in the USSR, the consequences which may result from such a strike, how many people will be destroyed, how many cities and industrial objectives will be destroyed, etc. All this is evidence that the imperialists have extremely dangerous plans for nuclear attack.

"Numerous exercises and maneuvers are used to develop different versions for the unleashing of a nuclear war. During the first three days of a war it is proposed that there be continual nuclear attacks against the entire enemy territory, by which we assume them to mean the socialist countries. The first attack will be made at night. The participants in this attack will be all combat-ready strategic and tactical aviation, all strategic missiles, carrier-based attack planes, and rocket-carrying nuclear submarines. Thousands of bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance planes can be sent into the air, and several hundred missiles with nuclear warheads can be launched. The attack will be directed against all large cities, industrial centers, known rocket-launching sites, air bases, naval bases, control points, troop units, communications, etc.

"In recent NATO exercises there has been a reduction in the time of the first massed nuclear attacks. Immediately after the nuclear attacks,

waves of ground troops will move in. The imperialists consider that such massive nuclear attacks will make it possible to completely overwhelm the enemy at the very beginning of the war, and the ground troops need only perform occupation duties. A number of authors in the U. S. military press have expressed the opinion that the probability of continuing military operations after such attacks depends to a great extent on the effectiveness of the attacks.

"The Western press has also discussed the question of what should be the main objective of the first nuclear attacks: nuclear devices (rocket-launching sites, air bases, nuclear-weapons stockpiles, etc.), or political centers and economic objectives. Certain authors consider it necessary to deliver the most powerful blow first to large cities, industrial regions, and other military-economic objectives where the peaceful population is concentrated. They are of the opinion that such objectives do not require special reconnaissance; their locations are known, and an unexpected nuclear attack on them could result in a tremendous loss of morale among the population.

"At the same time, certain Western military theoreticians justifiably consider that such a method of unleashing war is practically impossible under present conditions. Liddell Hart, for example, has stated that at present it is much more difficult to deliver a surprise and absolutely crushing blow than in 1941, since there is every likelihood of just as powerful a retaliatory strike. In particular, he has stated: 'The dream of complete neutralization of the enemy at the very beginning of the war has become even more incongruous since the creation of ballistic missiles which can be launched from any place on land, on sea, or in the air.'

"The ruling circles of the imperialist countries, particularly the United States, realize that if the Soviet Union has superiority in strategic missiles, a surprise nuclear attack would be even more dangerous, since it would not exclude a crushing retaliatory nuclear strike from the Soviet Union. Therefore, the imperialists are continually seeking other methods for unleashing a new world war. They are depending more and more on the revanchists of West Germany, intending that they instigate the first blow, incite a new war, and involve the socialist countries; then at a convenient moment they will enter the war with fresh forces, in order to force their will not only on the enemy but also on their allies.

"The main role in the unleashing of a new war is played by West Germany, in which revanchism is a main part of state policy. For this reason United States, British, and French imperialists have permitted West Germany to have the strongest army in NATO and are planning to give her nuclear weapons, encouraging in every way possible the revanchist aspirations of West German militarism.

"History has shown that the West German revanchists, encouraged by the world imperialist powers, are ready for any adventure.

"The present-day successors of Hitler in West Germany are attempting to interpret history in their own way; they are again preparing a military attack against East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR.

"It is possible that West Germany, independently or together with other NATO members, might unleash a local war in Europe by means of a surprise attack against East Germany. At the start of such a war nuclear weapons might not even be used. Military operations in this case might begin, for example, with massed attacks by tactical aviation and rocket troops using conventional ammunition against the entire territory of East Germany or some other close socialist country, and by invasion with large tank groups.

"The imperialists might also attempt to unleash a new world war by means of local conflict in other parts of the world. Finally, a new world war might be brought about by their policy of retaining colonial rule and suppressing the national-liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

"Any local military conflict under modern conditions, if it is not nipped in the bud, might become a world war with the unlimited use of nuclear weapons.

"This is actually what the United States imperialists are counting on. They fear taking the initiative in unleashing a nuclear war since this would be very unsatisfactory from the political standpoint, and extremely dangerous from the military standpoint. The essence of their plans in this respect is to use nuclear weapons in the expansion of local conflicts, particularly at the critical moments, in order to greatly change the situation in their favor. This calculation is based on: territorial limitation of the use of nuclear weapons; causing their satellites to be exposed to nuclear attack; and protecting their territory, at least at the start of the war, from a crushing nuclear blow. This is the essence of the aggressive plans for unleashing a new world war using local wars and conflicts.

"This is not to say that the ruling circles of imperialist governments dependent on the United States do not understand the essence of these plans of American imperialism. However, blinded by their hatred of communism and socialism, they might begin a new war at a command from the militarists of the United States, without even considering that a future war would threaten the existence of their countries. In 1958 a book was published in West Germany by a certain J. Branik, entitled German Trumps, which was heartily endorsed by former Defense Minister Strauss. This book contains the following passage: if a thermonuclear war is begun, 'Germany, no matter what happens around her and no matter what the consequences, should do her duty. She should again fight... But would this war then make any sense? Would not the death of mankind in radioactive fog negate all victories and everything in general? This we cannot know beforehand. Not only in an atomic war but in any war the stakes are life or death.'

"This example of the 'resoluteness' of the West German revanchists has been spreading to other participants of the aggressive blocs. The governments of Iran and Pakistan have even agreed to let the Americans and British establish devastation zones in these countries, including such cities as Tabriz, Hamadan, Pahlevi, Qazvin, Shahrud, and Quchan in Iran, and a number of cities in Pakistan.

"The U. S. imperialists plan to involve the world in a new world war gradually, also by means of local wars. In this case they would prefer to let one of their satellites take the initiative, one of the more bellicose and aggressive, mainly the West German revanchists.

"Does this mean that the U. S. imperialists have given up their plans for unleashing a new world war by a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR and the other socialist countries with unlimited use of all available forces and means? No, it does not. We must consider that they have prepared too long for such an attack, that they have spent too much money and used too many materials, and also the fact that adventurism and recklessness have always been inherent to imperialism. Blinded by their hatred of communism, the imperialists would commit any crimes imaginable.

"It should also be taken into account that the development of the means of armed conflict is opening greater opportunities for dealing a surprise blow.

"Therefore, there must be no underestimation of the tremendous threat to the cause of peace posed by the presence of the latest weapons of destruction in the hands of the imperialists.

"Under conditions of international tension, the ceaseless arms race increases the threat of war, even from accidental or technical reasons. Such a chance is latent in the weapon itself -- false radar signals, spontaneous nuclear explosion. Errors are not excluded in orders, in the evaluation of reconnaissance data, in the possible deviation in the behavior of people from normal, etc. On the basis of a false radar signal, the Strategic Air Force Commander, Power, in November, 1961, ordered the dispatch of bombers located on all American bases toward the USSR. He didn't even consider it necessary to inform the President of this although according to the regulations in existence in the United States, only the President can give such an order. The threat of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war is intensified by the fact that the United States is not stopping the flight of its bombers with nuclear bombs aboard, or the cruises of aircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines with supplies of nuclear weapons.

"Only the fear of a powerful retaliatory blow will stop the imperialists. Therefore the Soviet Union and all socialist countries must have ready the necessary forces and weapons for instantaneous retaliation to aggression."

#8. Omitted: "All countries have their adherents to old proven methods of armed combat used in past wars. Moreover, it has already become a bitter tradition that the general staffs of many countries are prepared to conduct a war using the methods of a past war. The French military leaders are particularly guilty of this. Conservatism of ideas is generally inherent in many military leaders, both theoreticians and practitioners, as Engels has pointed out. Although in our socialistic country there are no grounds for conservatism among military leaders, it is to be expected that we also have certain people who, burdened with past experiences and enamored of these

experiences, cannot cope with anything new.

"The Central Committee of our Party has determined the direction of the development not only of the means for armed combat but also the methods for conducting war, and the direction in the development of military science. The social essence of modern war and the nature and the means for conducting such a war have been expounded by the XX, XXI, and XXII Congresses of the CPSU and in the speeches of N. S. Khrushchev. These are of particular significance for the solution of all problems associated with the protection of our socialist nation.

"In determining the methods for conducting a modern war, we must first discuss the question of what should be the main objective of the operations of the armed forces in the war, to which the main efforts of the means of combat should be directed.

"As we have already noted, in past wars the main objectives of the operations have been the groups of ground troops and aviation deployed in the land theater along the front lines or the border, and also the groups of naval forces.

"In a modern war, the enemy will also concentrate groups of its ground forces, aviation, and new units -- rocket troops -- in land theaters along the border or the front line, while in the naval theaters he will concentrate the striking forces of the carrier fleet and submarines, although not so densely as during World War II. Therefore, before attaining completely the political and military-strategic aims of the war, these groups must be defeated. || But will these forces be the main objective of operations in war and the || main objective for the use of nuclear weapons?" ||

|| #9. Omitted: "It would be a fatal mistake to underestimate this circumstance." ||

#10. Omitted: "The decisive weapons in modern warfare are strategic nuclear weapons, and the long-range carriers for these weapons are located far from the front line or the border, beyond the theaters of military operations. Without annihilating or neutralizing these weapons it is impossible to prevent the destruction of the populated centers of a country and it is impossible to count on successfully achieving the aims of the war even if the troop units deployed in the theaters of military operations are destroyed. Since the Soviet Armed Forces have powerful long-range combat weapons -- strategic nuclear-rocket weapons -- it is possible to strike directly at the strategic nuclear weapons of the enemy, his economic foundation, and his system of government and military control. Any country, particularly one with a small and densely populated area, can be removed from the war and even annihilated within a very short time without ground troops entering its territory.

"Consequently, the main objectives of military operations will be those deep within enemy territory behind the front lines. The center of gravity of the armed combat will move deep within the territory of the

belligerents, although in the military theaters near the front lines or the border there will also be fierce battles on a large scale.

"The military-political aims of a world war can be attained by annihilation of the strategic means of armed combat, destruction of the economic foundation of the enemy, defeat of his armed forces in the theaters of military operations (land and sea), and capture of his territory.

"A local war might be another matter. Here, as before, the main events might develop in theaters of military operations near the front, although the methods of armed combat in this case as well have been changed considerably compared with the past war, since the war will be conducted with different weapons and the threat of nuclear war will hang constantly over the belligerents.

"To resolve the question of the ways of conducting a modern war, it is not enough to ascertain the main objective of an armed conflict. It is also necessary to determine what forms of military operations or what forms of strategic operations of the armed forces should be used to attain the aims of the war, and what specific form these operations should take."

#11. Omitted: "The operations of all other services of the armed forces, including the Strategic Rocket Troops, the Navy, and even the National PVO Troops are subordinate to the interests of the Ground Troops. From this we can obtain a number of practical recommendations: the nuclear attacks of the Strategic Rocket Troops on objects in the enemy interior should be made depending on the proposed operations of the Ground Troops in a given direction, there should be so-called joint rocket operations, and the way to the front should be paved, as it were, with powerful nuclear weapons."

#12. Omitted: "It will not be necessary for the Strategic Rocket Troops to attack in conjunction with the Ground Troops. The Rocket Troops are not a means of support for the Ground Troops. The Ground Troops have their own nuclear means (operational-tactical rocket troops and frontal aviation), which assure their advance at a rapid pace."

#13. Omitted: "Each of these types of strategic operations will be manifested in a world-wide nuclear war. In local wars, certain of these types of strategic operations may not be used at all, or will be used on a limited scale. This would be particularly true of military operations deep within enemy territory. Military operations in land and naval theaters may acquire decisive significance in such wars.

"During a world war the role of certain strategic operations must be subject to change. Depending on the circumstances, each type of operation may acquire decisive or secondary significance.

// "A future world nuclear rocket war, if unleashed by the imperialists, //

will become a very complex phenomenon and the most difficult test for all mankind. At the very start of the war, or in the course of a local conflict, the imperialist aggressor may launch a surprise nuclear blow with his inter-continental and medium-range missiles, including 'Polaris' missiles from submarines. The socialist countries will be forced immediately to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike, an inescapable retaliatory strike. At the same time, the means of antiaircraft and antimissile defense will go into action to destroy the enemy's intruding airplanes and missiles in the air. Immediately after the retaliatory strike, airborne assaults may be dropped at a great depth and, depending on the radiation situation, a swift attack will be launched by preserved ground force formations supported by aviation to complete the destruction of the enemy's surviving units. At this time, active military operations will be implemented on seas and oceans to defeat naval formations.

"Events may unfold differently in a local war. In such a war, military operations will first be conducted on ground as well as naval theaters. Objectives of the operations will be the armed forces, although attempted strikes against rear-area objectives with the use of aviation cannot be excluded. The offense and defense operations of ground forces and aviation will be conducted in ground theaters. Combat operations will be in the nature of a maneuver, more mobile than in the last war, because both the ground forces and the air forces have changed fundamentally in comparison with the last war.

"It may also happen that, in the course of a local war, the sides will employ tactical-operational nuclear weapons without employing strategic nuclear weapons. This will change sharply the methods of combat operations and will give them great dynamism and decisiveness. However, war will hardly be waged for a long time with the employment of operational-tactical nuclear weapons alone. Once matters reach the use of nuclear weapons, the sides will be forced to put into operation their entire nuclear strength. Local war will turn into world nuclear war.

"While local war is being fought, the main types of military operations will be the offense and defense in ground theaters as well as naval operations in naval theaters. There may also be attempts to launch nuclear strikes against rear-area objectives with the use of aviation; however, such strikes will hardly be on a large scale since air defense means have gained the ascendancy over aviation."

#14. Omitted: "England was one of the first imperialist countries to adopt the use of bombers against the civilian population. This represented the doctrine of Trenchard and the Royal Air Force. Such operations were tried by Britain in 1920 in the fight against the Somalis, and in 1922 and 1924 against the Iraqis.

"Shortly after World War I, the Italian General Douhet proposed, as already pointed out, the theory of air war which was built on the bombing of cities and on air raids against the civilian population. This theory became the basis of the official military doctrine of the imperialist states -- the United States, Britain, and fascist Germany. During World War II, the imperialist powers checked this theory in action. The United States even went so

far as to use nuclear weapons against Japanese cities.

"After World War II, the United States and Britain concentrated their main attention on the development of long-range strategic weapons and increasing the supply of nuclear weapons. They adapted the theories of Douhet to new conditions. Professor Brodie writes frankly of this: 'The bases of the strategic theory created by Douhet are especially acceptable for a general nuclear war.' "

#15. This read "... and, in part, France ..."

#16. Omitted: "In the American press the opinion has been expressed that rigid holding of regions and defense perimeters is not expedient. Instead they favor mobile defense and delaying operations.

"In Soviet military art the opinion is that defense, under present-day conditions, should be built on the principle of the rigid holding of regions and perimeters with troops maneuvering operations. During a defensive battle it is necessary not to allow enemy troops to invade the territory of the socialist countries, it is necessary to defeat them and prepare conditions for transferring military operations to the interior zone of the enemy."

#17. This read "... except for the frontal zone ..."

#18. Omitted: "An antimissile defense system for the country should obviously consist in the following: long-range detection of missiles using powerful radar (ground and airborne) or other automatic technical equipment (on artificial earth satellites) to assure the detection of missiles during the boost phase (at the moment of lift-off or while the engines are operating), working out of the coordinates of the flight trajectory of the missiles, timely warning, and application of active measures; antimissile batteries; jamming devices to assure deflection of the missile from its intended target and, possibly, to blow it up along its trajectory."

#19. Omitted: "Possibilities are being studied for the use, against rockets, of a stream of high-speed neutrons as small detonators for the nuclear charge of the rocket, and the use of electromagnetic energy to destroy the rocket charge in the descent phase of the trajectory or to deflect it from its target. Various radiation, antigravity, and antimatter systems, plasma (ball lightning), etc., are also being studied as a means of destroying rockets. Special attention is devoted to lasers ('death rays'); it is considered that in the future, any missile and satellite can be destroyed with powerful lasers. All this work which is being conducted in other countries deserves great attention.

"The creation of a reliable system of antispace defense became an important task in modern conditions. Various earth satellites of the United States and other countries, including reconnaissance, communications, navi-

gation, and other satellites, continuously ply the heavens and carefully look over our territory. It should be expected that nuclear weapon carrying satellites will be placed into orbit ready to fire nuclear weapons on objectives on the socialist countries. It is necessary to have corresponding means assuring the timely detection of enemy space equipment and its rapid destruction or neutralization."

#20. Omitted: "The most common methods for conducting air-defense operations may be: detection of the attacking enemy plane or missile by radar devices; causing active and passive interference to the aerial targets; interception of planes and winged missiles by long-range fighters on approaches to the border; annihilation of planes before rockets can be launched; annihilation of enemy planes or missiles by long-range antiaircraft rockets in conjunction with fighter aviation along the routes to the most important regions and objects; concentration of efforts of the fighter-interceptors to intercept and annihilate the main groups of planes and missiles along their routes to target areas; decisive annihilation of planes and missiles which penetrate our defenses by means of antiaircraft rockets, fighters, and antimissile missiles at all altitudes along their approaches to covered objects; and tracking and total annihilation of enemy planes by fighter aviation on their return flights."

#21. The following section was entirely omitted. Parts are found in Chapter II.

The problems of Using Outer Space for Military Purposes

"Above we have examined the means for conducting warfare with modern combat equipment on the ground, in the air, and at sea, which the aggressive imperialist forces are feverishly preparing. However, the imperialists do not stop here. They plan to use for aggressive military purposes the greatest achievements of modern science and technology in the mastery of space and have allocated great monetary resources for this. In particular, as long ago as 1958 a special agency, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), was created under the U. S. Defense Department; this agency directs operations on the mastery of space for military purposes. Somewhat later the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created; this agency also deals with the use of space for military purposes. A network of ground stations is being constructed for observation of all earth satellites.

"These questions have been widely and quite openly discussed in the American press where it has been said that 'outer space is the strategic theater of the future.' The specific methods for using outer space and space vehicles for military purposes have been discussed, and much attention has been devoted to the plans of the American government and the U. S. military command in this field. Certain U. S. military theoreticians do not even conceal the plans of their own leaders, hoping, by mastering outer space, to regain their lost military supremacy over the USSR.

"The militaristic circles of the United States see their way toward world supremacy through the mastery of outer space. Apropos of this President Kennedy has reported: 'Space supremacy is the aim of the next decade. The country that controls space can control the earth.'*

"At present the U. S. is conducting large-scale scientific research for mastering outer space, and is launching many earth satellites and other space vehicles supposedly for scientific purposes. However, all these 'scientific investigations' and launchings of space vehicles are actually only a cover for the far-reaching military plans which, by the way, the American press makes no bones about.

"The United States uses its space vehicles mainly for reconnaissance and espionage. Reconnaissance using earth satellites has already been put into practice by the United States. In 1960 the American journal Missiles and Rockets published a program for the creation of several types of artificial satellites for military purposes: 'Discoverer,' 'Mercury,' 'Midas,' 'Samos,' and 'Tiros.'

"The midas project provides for the creation of a reconnaissance satellite to detect the launching of ballistic missiles by means of infrared apparatus. The U. S. Air Force intends to launch into a polar orbit several such satellites in order to continuously detect rocket launchings in Soviet territory. Project 'Samos' provides for the launching of reconnaissance satellites with powerful television and aerial photographic equipment for photographing and transmitting pictures of various objects to the ground. This spy-satellite has been called the U-3 by analogy with the U-2 reconnaissance plane. Project 'Tiros' provides for the launching of satellites for meteorological reconnaissance.

"Reconnaissance satellites are to be used for detecting and determining the coordinates of military-industrial objectives, the launching sites of ICBMs, military bases, airfields, and other objectives in the socialist countries, compiling maps of the earth's surface, and weather reconnaissance.

"Due to the fact that reconnaissance satellites moving in known orbits could be destroyed, creation of maneuverable manned space ships with various reconnaissance apparatus is planned. For reconnoitering important regions, such a ship should drop to an altitude of about 130 kilometers.

"Great attention has been devoted to navigational satellites. In 1960 'Transit'-IB was launched to an altitude of 800 kilometers in an almost circular orbit. In the same year the 'Thor-Able Star' rocket was launched with two 'Transit'-IIA navigational satellites which will be used to facilitate

*President Kennedy's statement was: 'Control of space will be decided in the next decade, and the nation which controls space can control the earth,' Missiles and Rockets, October 24, 1960, p. 13 . Translator's note.

aerial and fleet navigational support, particularly for submarines, the compilation of navigational charts, study of the shape of the earth, etc.

"Great significance is attached to communications satellites. In 1958 the United States launched the 'Score' satellite which can receive signals from earth, record them on tape, and transmit them to the earth, and also relay television transmissions. The 'Echo' satellite with its pneumatic parabolic antenna provided communication between the U. S. and France. Work is also being conducted on the 'Courier' communications satellite. The launching of ECM electronic-countermeasure satellites is also planned.

"Reconnaissance, navigational, communications, and ECM satellites are only a minor part of the U.S. program of mastery of space for military purposes. The main part of the program is the creation of aircraft-satellites or other aerospace vehicles carrying nuclear warheads. The American press has published information on the preparation of the following space systems: satellite-bombers equipped with 'space-to-ground' missiles; manned space bombers (Dyna-Soar) and manned bombers (SR-79821) for operation at high altitudes; orbital bombers (Boss) for the destruction of ground targets. Presumably, these apparatuses will be launched into orbit in time of threat, to deliver nuclear attacks on objectives in socialist countries on command from the ground. Although the American press has given much detailed information on reconnaissance, navigational, communications, and ECM satellites, the work on space vehicles designed for delivering nuclear attacks is conducted in strictest secrecy.

"The German rocket specialist, Dornberger, who is working in the United States frankly writes that in America they are planning 'to shift the center of gravity of all our efforts to conquer outer space for solving military problems.' He even now recommends using missiles on hand to put into an orbit, which passes over the Soviet Union, hundreds of atomic bombs and to keep them in orbit in readiness to launch nuclear strikes against objectives in the socialist countries. He writes that 'with the use of such a space bomber system we can transfer the arena of combat operations from the earth to outer space.'

"In the American program for mastering outer space for military purposes, more and more importance is given to the moon. Investigations are being conducted to determine its military potential, and possibilities are being studied to use the moon for communications, reconnaissance, and as a base for space attack weapons. Worthy of attention is the statement of General Lemnitzer that the United States has already worked out the basic concepts for the use of outer space for military purposes, where the role of the moon has been determined, and functions have been distributed among the different armed services. In the United States, many scientific-research and test-design organizations are doing practical work on the problem of the military use of the moon, and they are preparing detailed topographic maps of the moon's surface.

"Finally, a considerable part of the U. S. program of the mastery of space for military purposes is the creation of antispace weapons for the destruction of aerospace vehicles. The American press has reported that at

present the U. S. is developing carrier-satellites (anti-satellites) with antimissile missiles and interference apparatus which will be launched into polar orbit at an altitude of 500-700 kilometers with a period of rotation of 94-98 minutes. These satellites will presumably be used to destroy, on command from the ground, satellites and other space vehicles as well as ICBMs. Intensified work is being carried out on the creation of antimissile missiles and other types of antispace weapons. Possibilities are being studied for the use of 'lasers,' plasma, and antigravitation as such weapons. In 1962, the United States conducted a series of nuclear tests in space.

"All this attests to the fact that the American imperialists will use space to accomplish their aggressive projects.

"The USSR has achieved important successes in the mastery of space. The Soviet Union was the first to launch a satellite into orbit around the earth, a Soviet spaceship circumnavigated the moon and photographed its far side, and Soviet space vehicles have penetrated into the infinite depths of the Universe. Yuri Gagarin on the Vostok I was the first to orbit the earth. Then German Titov on the Vostok II completed more than 17 orbits around the earth. Andrian Nikolayev and Pavel Popovich, in the Spaceships Vostik-3 and Vostok-4, accomplished a long group flight in space. The Soviet rocket Mars-1 is making a flight to the planet Mars, and the group flight of Valeriy Bykovskiy and the first woman cosmonaut, Valentina Tereshkova, in Spaceships Vostok-5 and Vostok-6 showed the growing successes of the Soviet Union in the peaceful conquest of space. All this convincingly testifies to the tremendous achievements of the Soviet Union in the fields of science and technology.

"Our achievements in space exploration serve the cause of peace and scientific progress for the good of all people on our planet. The Soviet space flights signify the inflexible tendency of the entire Soviet nation toward enduring world peace.

"However, the Soviet Union cannot disregard the fact the U. S. imperialists have subordinated space exploration to military aims and that they intend to use space to accomplish their aggressive projects -- a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

"In this regard Soviet military strategy takes into account the need for studying questions on the use of outer space and aerospace vehicles to strengthen the defense of the socialist countries. This must be done to insure the safety of our country, in the interest of all socialist cooperation, for the preservation of peace in the world. It would be a mistake to allow the imperialist camp to achieve superiority in this field. We must oppose the imperialists with more effective means and methods for the use of space for defense purposes. Only in this way can we force them to renounce the use of space for a destructive and devastating war.

* * *

"A modern world war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, will be a nuclear war, the most destructive and devastating war in the history

of mankind. The methods of conducting such a war will differ greatly from those used in past wars, including World War II.

"Retaliatory operations aimed at annihilating the strategic means for nuclear attack, destroying the economic foundation of the war, disrupting the system of governmental and military control, and defeating the troops of the aggressive bloc of imperialist governments will have the greatest significance for the victorious conduct of such a war... These aims can be achieved by massive nuclear strikes of the Strategic Rocket Troops, long range aviation, and missile-carrying submarines against the most important countries of the enemy coalition; against the regions and targets which form the basis for the enemy's military and economic power; against his strategic nuclear weapons; and against his troop formation.

"Despite the use of strategic nuclear weapons, military operations in ground theaters will, as before, play an important part in the victorious conduct of war. In local wars these military operations may play the decisive role in the defeat of the enemy.

"The main purpose of military operations in ground theaters will be the defeat of enemy troops deployed throughout the theater, the annihilation of operational-tactical nuclear weapons, the capture of vitally important enemy territory, and the prevention of invasion by enemy troops into the socialist countries. These tasks will be fulfilled mainly by the Ground Troops acting in conjunction with frontline aviation using nuclear rocket weapons. The Ground Troops should use to the fullest extent the results of massed nuclear rocket attacks by strategic devices to finally defeat groups of enemy troops in the most important theaters.

"Military operations for the protection of the interior of the country and groups of the Armed Forces from aggressor nuclear attacks will have vast scope in a modern war. The aim of these operations will be to ensure the vital activities of the socialist countries, their economy, the combat capability of the Armed Forces, and protection of the population. These ends can be achieved by decisive operations of the country's antiair, antimissile and antispace defenses aimed at repelling enemy aircraft and rocket attacks, the complete annihilation of attacking aircraft and rockets beyond the defended regions and objectives.

"Military operations in naval theaters will also be very significant for successful conduct of the war. The basic aim of these operations will be the defeat of enemy naval forces, primarily the defeat of carrier-based shock units and the annihilation of rocket-carrying nuclear submarines to destroy coastal objectives, and also the disruption of enemy naval communications.. These tasks will be fulfilled by the Navy, in which the main role will be assigned to the submarine forces and naval aviation equipped with nuclear weapons. Unlike past wars, our fleet will undertake active military operations against a strong naval enemy over broad naval theaters.

"The successful conduct of a modern war is possible with coordination

of all military operations, strictly centralized control of all the Armed Forces of the socialist countries. All operations should be conducted according to a unified plan of the Supreme High Command. The aggressor can be soundly defeated by active military operations at the front and deep in the interior.

"The search for the most effective means for conducting a future war and the mastery of these means, and also the constant preparedness of the Armed Forces of the socialist countries, will guarantee their victory over the aggressor in a modern war, if for some reason it cannot be successfully averted.

EDITOR'S NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

#1. Omitted: "...taking into account the development of the means of armed fighting and changes in the international situation.

"The nature of the preparation of a nation for war under present-day conditions may be affected by the following:

1) by the presence of megaton-range nuclear-rocket weapons, which reduce the expenditures for war preparations in peacetime, since it is possible to considerably decrease the production of all other types of armament without reducing the firepower of the armed forces;

2) as a result of nuclear strikes, the material and technical basis for waging a long war may be undermined at the very outset of the war, especially with respect to the production of nuclear weapons;

3) psychological shock on the population in the interior of the country, which immediately and within a very short period of time will suffer huge losses, as never happened in previous wars.

"Therefore each country under present-day conditions strives to prepare for war in such a way so as to attain victory within the shortest possible time. In practice, this means that in preparing a nation for war particular attention is given to the use of the latest strategic means of waging armed fighting.

"This, in turn, creates the prerequisites for successful waging of a protracted war, since a nation prepared to strike powerful nuclear strikes with the latest strategic means and having at its disposal sufficient industrial resources and its own raw materials can always produce simpler conventional types of weapons during the course of a protracted war.

"After these general remarks, let us consider individual aspects of the preparation of a nation for war."

#2. Omitted: "Under present-day conditions the beginning of total mobilization before the opening of military operations is highly unlikely, since it cannot go unnoticed by the enemy."

#3. Omitted: "... however, the quality of the training and consequently the combat readiness of those discharged is correspondingly reduced."

#4. Omitted: "Thus, the Strategic Rocket Troops and, to a considerable extent, the National Air-Defense Troops change their composition and organization very slightly during mobilization."

#5. This read "To use electronic computers linked in a comprehensive closed system to the General Staff."

#6. Omitted: "In addition, as a result of the enormous firepower of nuclear-rocket combat weapons, there has been a noticeable decrease in the amount of conventional ammunition required by the Armed Forces. While during the Great Patriotic War the amount of ammunition amounted to approximately 2/3 of the amount of fuels and lubricants, now, according to rough calculations, it will hardly exceed 1/2."

#7. This read "... and would increase the danger of war."

EDITOR'S NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

#1. This read "... of the USA and Britain ..."

#2. This read "... by Britain, France, Belgium and Holland, ..."

#3. This read "... the ruling circles of Britain, France, and especially West Germany ..."

#4. Revised: "It consists of the main staff of the armed forces (actually, the general staff), the main staffs of the ground troops, the air and naval forces and the territorial troops, the administration of the medical troops and a number of departments. The main agency of operational leadership of the armed forces is the high command of the armed forces (Bundeswehr). It works out the general plans for the creation and utilization of the armed forces, coordinates the work of the high commands, is occupied with problems arising from the participation of West Germany in imperialist blocs, and directs various militarized organizations in the country."

#5. Omitted: "... and will be headed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the head of the government, to whom the functions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces may also be entrusted."

#6. This read "... High Command ..."

#7. Omitted: "Leadership requires an exceptionally high efficiency in work, flexibility in the control of troops, creative and skillful solution of problems resulting from rapidly and sharply changing situations, and also foresight of the developments of military actions."

"Training in bold action, in conformity with the requirements of a nuclear rocket war, is the main task of the commanding personnel in preparing the personnel of the Armed Forces."

#8. This read "... and its Leninist Central Committee ..."

#9. Omitted: "The party is doing everything in its power to give the Soviet Armed Forces the most modern weapons: atomic and thermonuclear weapons, of all ranges, and all types of military equipment and weapons, to make them a distinct and well-knit organism with a high degree of organization and discipline. The party is assisting the armed forces to fulfill in an exemplary manner the tasks given them by the party, government, and people, and to be ready at any moment to give a shattering rebuff to the imperialist aggressors, to smash any enemy who dares to encroach upon the Soviet Motherland. The most important principle in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces is one-man command.

"While showing constant concern for strengthening one-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces, the party devotes particular attention to the training of command, political, and technical cadres of the army and navy, who are enlisted from among the best representatives of the Soviet people, and who are devoted to the cause of communism. Emphasizing the important role of commanders in the strengthening of the Armed Forces, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in their address to the Soviet troops on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution said: '... our greatest wealth is the excellent military cadres boundlessly devoted to the Motherland, the Communist Party and the Soviet government, bold and manly, familiar with modern equipment and able to skillfully use it in the most complex circumstances of present-day combat.' "

#10. Omitted: "The Communist Party is daily concerned with the strengthening of one-man command. The modern conditions and the nature of a future missile and nuclear war require firm and continuous control of the troops: boldness, initiative, and independence of commanders of all ranks; readiness to assume complete responsibility for fulfilling assigned tasks; and unquestioning fulfillment of orders by subordinates. This is possible only under conditions of one-man command.

"In strengthening one-man command and considering it as the most important principle in the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, the party devoted and is devoting unremitting attention to increasing its organizing and guiding influence on the entire activity and life of the armed forces, not only through the commanders and military councils, but also through the political agencies and party organizations."

|| #11. Omitted: "The high devotion to ideology of Soviet troops, their conviction as to the correctness and victory of our cause -- this is a mighty ||

|| weapon which adds great and irresistible force to our army. Well-organized
|| ideological educational work with people is the decisive prerequisite for
|| an even further increase in the might of our Armed Forces," ||

#12. Omitted: "Emphasizing the importance of these tasks, N. S. Khrushchev at a reception of graduates of military academies in November, 1957, said: 'A further increase in the fighting efficiency of the army and navy is the common task of all Communists, commanders, and political workers. The fulfillment of this great state task is possible only if the commanders and political workers work harmoniously together to improve the education and training of the troops, to increase the military preparedness of the troops, only if there is a further strengthening of one-man rule and improvement of the party and political work in the army and navy.' "

EDITOR'S NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

#1. This has been omitted from the 1968 edition:

"... probable types of military actions in space.

"Because in recent years the imperialist aggressors have devoted great attention to a study of the possibilities of carrying out military actions in space and through space, Soviet military strategy cannot ignore this fact and must also study the possibilities opening up in this sphere of military action."

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